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ABSTRACT 
This PhD study examines the consequences of modernity and modernisation for Kurdish-Iranian society 
in the twentieth century. It identifies a dual process of socio-economic transformation and 
homogenisation of culture and identity, the dialectics of which (re)formed the economic, social, political 
and cultural structures of modern Kurdish society in Iran. As a result, socio-economically, Kurdish 
society became integrated in modern Iran, whereas it vigorously resisted homogenisation of identity 
and culture; at the same time, it maintained porous cultural borders with other societies in Iran, and 
continued to be shaped by mechanisms of modern cultural encounters. The socio-economic 
transformation of Iran strengthened and created new bonds between societies in Iran, while at the same 
time resistance and struggle for political and cultural rights became permanent characteristics of 
Kurdish-Iranian society. During the modernisation of Iran, the era of the ‘White Revolution’ is 
distinguished for the profound transformation of Iran it entailed. Therefore, an interpretation of the era 
constitutes the main concern of this thesis because, building on previous attempts to modernise Iran, 
the era of the White Revolution was crucial in engendering profound changes in Kurdish society. 
The theoretical framework of this study is informed by theories of social change and 
transformation against modernisation theories, and by theories of nation and nationalism which 
theoretically enable this research to distance itself from national narratives. Significantly, this 
framework includes a range of cultural critiques, benefits from studies of homogenisation and state 
formation, and relies on rich scholarly works on the formation of modern Iran, which, when combined, 
accentuate the cultural, political and social dimensions of modern nation-building in Iran. The result is 
a multi-dimensional approach to social change in Kurdish society. It is the dynamics of the dual process 
which continue to (re)form the foundations of Kurdish society in Iran; and it is this approach which I 
regard as a crucial contribution to both Kurdish and Iranian studies. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Modernity unleashed modernisation and nation-building in Asian societies in an age 
when, as scholars have noted, Europe’s cultural superiority had followed its military and 
technological supremacy over such societies since the beginning of the nineteenth 
century.1 In twentieth-century multicultural Iran, where the Kurds had historically 
constituted a crucial component of the ethnic structure, this consisted of a dual process of 
socio-economic transformation and homogenisation of culture and identity, with their 
own consequences. In this process, Kurdish society became socio-economically more 
integrated into modern Iran, while it simultaneously resisted the state’s political 
modernisation, as a result of which modern Kurdayeti (Kurdishness), as both a national 
understanding of self and a movement for political and cultural rights, took form, based 
of course (to borrow from Marx) on conditions inherited from the past. This study 
discovers that modern Kurdish society in Iran is in fact a synthesis of this dual process, 
which has continued to be reconfigured according to the different historical and social 
contexts throughout the twentieth century.  
There are several important historical conjunctures within the dual process. 
However, the era of the ‘White Revolution’ (1963-1979) distinguishes itself as an epoch 
during which modernisation intensified, resulting in a profound transformation of Iranian 
societies’ economic, social, political and cultural structures by the end of the 1970s. 
Although this era was the culmination of the preceding modernising efforts, its impact on 
Kurdish society was revolutionary. Therefore, one can argue that in many ways Kurdish 
                                                          
1 See Nikki R. Keddie, "The French Revolution and the Middle East," in Nikki R. Keddie (ed.), Iran and 
the Muslim World: Resistance and Revolution (London: Macmillan Press, 1995). 
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society of the end of the 1970s was the result of the era of the White Revolution. From 
this perspective, which fundamentally contrasts the prevalent homogenous approach in 
the scholarship to the concepts of ‘Kurds’ and ‘Kurdistan’, this study follows its analysis 
of the consequences of modernity for Iran’s Kurdish society in two parts, which cover 
significant aspects of the dual process of socio-economic and political modernisation.  
In Part 1, Chapter 1 presents a background to the social and political integration of 
Kurdish society, by drawing a link with pre-modern times. The transformation of power 
relations, modernisation and centralisation in the Ottoman and Qajar Empires, modernity, 
and, finally, the emergence of modern nation-states, took place in a process which 
transformed the identity of the Kurds from a historical-cultural people, into an ‘ethnic 
minority’.  In Iran, this process was inextricably linked with the process of the formation 
of a national Iranian identity, a process in which the modern state, to borrow from a study 
on states’ moral inclusion and exclusion, ‘sought the monopoly over the right to define 
political identity’ in addition to its other functions.2 Finally, this chapter argues that the 
state-led modernisation demonstrated a tendency to strengthen the social, economic and 
cultural bonds between various societies in Iran. This is a point, overlooked by Iranian 
and Kurdish national narratives, is in fact crucial because, for example, the subsequent 
political and ethnic demands of the Kurds in Iran, in which autonomy within the 
framework of Iran stands above all, can mainly be explained in the light of that fact. 
Chapter 2 deals with the paradox of modernity which is exposed in the preceding 
chapter. How can the political and ethnic resistance of the Kurds be explained, if 
modernisation created or strengthened the tendency to integrate? This chapter argues that 
the answers to this question lie within the dual process. Homogenisation (re)produced 
                                                          
2 Andrew Linklater, "The Problem of Community in International Relations," Alternatives: Global, Local, 
Political 15, No. 2 (Spring 1990), 149. 
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modern Kurdayeti because decentralisation became inimical to the modern state. 
However, the policies of the state in the process of nation-building did not merely derive 
from the nationalisation of identity around a core ethno-cultural community, i.e. the 
Persian community, or from blind animosity towards non-Persians; this study highlights 
the exigencies of the modern state too. A case in point is language reform, alongside 
attempts to create new vocabularies needed for the running of a modern state. 
Furthermore, this approach enables us to engage with other crucial themes, such as 
linguistic simplification and purification.  
Chapters in Part 2 follow the dual process and focus on the era of the White 
Revolution. Chapter 3 presents a background to the ideas incorporated in the principles 
of the White Revolution, ideas which had been formed and pursued by various forces in 
Iran since the early decades of the twentieth century. It also presents a brief overview of 
development plans, to demonstrate that while they grew in sophistication and benefited 
from enormous financial resources, they became increasingly centralised, and were 
devoid of economic plans for the provincial regions. Chapter 4 discusses the social 
consequences of the modernisation in Kurdistan. Unplanned economic expansion and 
urbanisation, and exodus to cities because of the White Revolution’s land reform and 
economic transformation, had different consequences for different layers of society. 
Modernisation raised standards of living for many, whereas new impoverished city 
neighbourhoods began to expand around Kurdish urban centres; it introduced and 
expanded education and healthcare provision, while in many ways it strengthened the 
disparity between urban and rural areas, city and village. Many became better-off, 
enjoying increased income and forms of cultural capital. At the same time with no labour 
law in place, modernisation created a modern Kurdish working class consisting of armies 
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of urban unskilled labourers and seasonal workers, and forced poor rural families to 
migrate and work in terrible working conditions surrounded by unfamiliar circumstances, 
expanding child labour. Therefore, this chapter sheds light on a crucial dimension of 
Iran’s rapid socio-economic change, completely overlooked in the existing scholarship. 
Chapter 5 analyses the political and cultural consequences of modernisation by 
examining the way that the political and cultural structures of Kurdish society responded 
to homogenisation. Political suppression of the Kurds and their resistance constituted two 
prominent characteristics of Kurdistan which continued during the White Revolution. 
Modern education, urbanisation and intellectual transformations were among factors 
which yielded networks of cultural and political activists, and formed the nuclei of 
modern political parties. Interestingly, although the idea of armed struggle remained 
attractive because of its worldwide popularity in the time, and as a response to 
militarisation and dictatorship, the political and cultural activism of the 1970s 
distinguished itself by distancing from theories of armed struggle, instead committing to 
theories of popular social revolution. Culturally, the argument of this chapter develops 
around two significant consequences of the modernisation for Iran, being, its cultural 
‘westernisation’ and, in Gramscian terms, the establishment of Persian cultural 
hegemony.3 ‘Westernisation’ here refers to the state’s imposition and inculcation of the 
preferred aspects of what was deemed as the ‘Western’ way of life because of its origin. 
In these circumstances, a democratic and progressive perception of modernity inspired a 
generation to engage actively in social change, adopt cultural innovations, and enhance 
                                                          
3 Hegemony, in Gramscian terms, is maintaining authority through consent rather than coercion. An 
intellectual hegemony is achieved when a set of ideas becomes a point of departure, making a conception 
‘instinct’, ‘spontaneously’ conceived, as ‘common sense’. See  Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith 
(eds), Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci  (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), 
198-99. 
5 
 
their societies’ cultural achievements. Simultaneously, based on the theory of 
Gharbzadegi or ‘Westoxication’, nativism became a formidable force in Iranian politics. 
In Kurdistan, however, the new educated generation mainly inclined towards socialist 
critiques of modernisation and distanced itself from calls to return to cultural purity, an 
idea increasingly cultivated by cultural critiques based on Islamic traditions and a 
Heideggerian critique of Western modernity.4 Cultural, especially religious, distinctions, 
functioned as effective barriers to imparting political Islam to Kurdistan, although 
evidence points to a nascent religious Kurdayeti, constituting the origins of a Kurdish 
nativism. As regards Persian cultural hegemony, the era was marked by the establishment 
of the hegemony of the Persian language and culture in Iran. The emergence and 
proliferation of the new visual means of communication, e.g. television and cinema, in 
addition to the existing audio means of communication, were crucial cultural 
developments for both the westernisation of culture and the establishment of Persian 
cultural hegemony. In brief, Kurdish society was culturally a synthesis of such 
developments, including the resistance to homogenisation. Lastly, this chapter’s 
arguments engage the scholarship for the first time on the theme of modernisation’s 
cultural consequences and, as crucially, also draw scholarly attention to the impact of the 
new means of communication in modern culture regarding, in this case, Iranian Kurdish 
society. 
Finally, Chapter 6 investigates the modernisation of gender relations in Kurdistan 
as another consequence of the modernisation of Iran. Guided by gender theories5 and 
                                                          
4 For more on Heidegger and his influence on important thinkers such as Ahmad Fardid, Ali Shari‘ati and 
Jalal Al-e Ahmad, see Ali Mirsepassi, Political Islam, Iran, and the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 85-128. 
5 See Joan Wallach Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," in Sue Morgan (ed.), The 
Feminist History Reader (New York: Routledge, 2006); Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks, "Gender," in Garthine 
Walker (ed.), Writing Early Modern History (London: Hodder Arnold, 2005); Dorothy Ko, "Gender," in 
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theories of change and transformation (see below), this chapter adds yet another important 
dimension to studies of the formation of modern Kurdish society in Iran in the twentieth 
century. It deliberately stresses modernisation of gender order against the notion of 
emancipation of women to maintain a critical approach towards development theories 
which perceive women as a category for ‘secularisation’, regarded as a prerequisite to 
become ‘modern’. Similarly, this chapter’s examination of the transformation of the 
social status of women, aims to emancipate women from the Kurdish national narrative, 
which promotes the notion of woman as a national asset, whose appearance and social 
place or action need to correspond to the need of the perceived nation. This chapter briefly 
highlights how the idea of a ‘new woman’ was part of modernity’s ideological package, 
and therefore intimately accompanied the idea of ‘nation’. This is followed by identifying 
major factors, including women’s agency, which affected the social status of women in 
Kurdish society. Furthermore, this chapter links social change in Kurdish society to social 
change across Iran, which partly forms a critical reading of, and a different approach to, 
national narratives which nationalise and categorise women as ‘Kurdish’ or ‘Persian’. At 
the same time, this chapter transcends the limited boundaries of a popular Marxist 
approach which regards ‘the woman question’ as part of the class struggle and, therefore, 
secondary to the struggle of the working class. Lastly, it needs to be emphasised that, 
insofar as gender order is concerned, the era of the White Revolution is a crucial period 
for investment in modern education of women and healthcare, and for legal reforms. 
  
                                                          
Ulnika Rublack (ed.), A Concise Companion to History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Stefan 
Dudink et al. (eds), Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History  (Manchester 
Manchester University Press, 2004). 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on the Kurds contains many authoritative works, which have contributed to 
the foundation and consolidation of an intellectual tradition in Kurdish studies. However, 
the scholarship tends to focus on later works. For example, a recent annotated 
bibliography states that William Eagleton, Archie Roosevelt and Abdulrahman 
Ghassemlou are ‘perhaps the best authorities on the Kurds in Iran’.6 The first two have 
written on the Kurdish Republic of 1946. Ghassemlou completed his doctorate thesis, 
Kurdistan and the Kurds, in the 1960s which (though not identified by the bibliography) 
is an historical and geographical description of the Kurds in the context of the Cold War 
which warns, in relation to the notion of the independence of Kurdistan, that ‘as long as 
Imperialism remains master of the Middle East, the Communists in Kurdistan have to lay 
main stress on the link between the nations of these countries and propagandize against 
separation’.7 ‘Supplements to these works’, the annotated bibliography asserts, ‘can be 
found in [David] McDowall […] and Rouhollah K. Ramazani’.8 The latter’s work 
concerns the autonomous Republics of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan during the Second 
World War, whereas the former has become more than a supplementary work and is 
generally regarded as an authoritative modern history of the Kurds.  Despite the book’s 
important contribution to Kurdish histories, David McDowall’s A Modern History of the 
Kurds presents a useful but limited section on the Kurds in the revolutionary Iran.9 In 
addition to this, Van Bruinessen’s Agha, Sheikh and State (1978) is another extremely 
popular historical and anthropological study of the Kurds.10 However, since its 
                                                          
6 Lokman I. Meho and Kelly L. Maglaughlin, Kurdish Culture and Society: An Annotated Bibliograph 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001), 16. 
7 Abdulrahman Ghassemlou, Kurdistan and the Kurds (Czechoslovakia: Academy of Sciences, 1965), 255. 
8 Meho and Maglaughlin, Kurdish Culture and Society, 16-17. 
9 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London: I.B.Tauris, 1996), 261-83. 
10 Martin Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political History of Kurdistan (London: 
Zed Books, 1992). 
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publication, the field of cultural studies along with, for instance, post-colonial theories, 
have greatly expanded, making a critical reading of such valuable studies a continuous 
task.  
The pioneering group includes the works of European and Russian scholars and 
diplomats. Recognised as ‘the “fathers” of modern Kurdology’,11 Vladimir Minorsky, 
Basili Nikitin and Pierre Rondot contributed to the foundation and consolidation of an 
intellectual tradition on the Kurds. Apart from ‘frequent obeisance’ to such figures, there 
are other authoritative works such as Thomas Bois’s The Kurds (1965) in French, which 
has been available in Arabic since 1973, and his contribution to the Encyclopaedia of 
Islam (IE).12 Bois enumerates many travel accounts and anthropological works since the 
early nineteenth century. Indeed, without such contributions by Europeans, the entries on 
Kurds in IE cannot be imagined. Inspired by political contexts, both categories were 
largely political accounts, the methodological and theoretical foundations of which have 
not been sufficiently challenged widely enough. The exception is recent academic works 
in modern Kurdish and Iranian studies. However, while Kurdish studies have mainly been 
preoccupied with the origins of Kurdish nationalism,13 Iranian studies’ incomparable and 
rich studies of Iran are yet to extend to Kurdish society. 
Until very recently, studies on the modernisation of Iran had not been extended into 
analysing social change in Kurdistan.  In the last two decades, however, a number of 
valuable studies on Iranian Kurdistan have appeared. These studies are attributed to a 
group of Iranian scholars in Iran, mainly but not exclusively Kurdish, who have begun to 
                                                          
11 Meho and Maglaughlin, Kurdish Culture and Society, 52. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Cf. Abbas Vali (ed.), Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism  (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 
2003). 
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challenge the exclusive domination of political and elite Kurdish historiographies.14 
Works produced by this group pay attention to academic advances especially in the social 
sciences to avoid the dichotomy of tradition and modernity, which nevertheless continues 
to shape the popular perception of modernisation in Iran. However, this tendency is rather 
implicitly illustrated in relevant articles which assess the impact of the modernisation of 
Iran on many regions and cities in Kurdistan.15 For example, analysing the transformation 
of family amongst the Gaverk and Mangor peoples around Mahabad, one study identifies 
a ‘gradual transition’ from traditional ways of life to modern family structures.16 
However, based on interviews, the study manages to reflect how there were people who 
lamented the loss of some aspects of the ‘traditional’ way of life, while others praised the 
emergence of the new family structure. Another study on the Hawraman region, generally 
regarded as geographically impregnable, records improvements in the provision of health 
and education, more effective means of communication and transportation as positive 
ramifications of the interaction of the elements of nowsazi or modernisation.17 
 These scholars’ tendency to transcend the duality of traditional and modern, 
conduct serious and responsible research, and base their research on various theories in 
the social sciences and anthropology, are among many promising aspects of this new 
                                                          
14 Cf. Ahmad Mohammadpur and Taqi Iman, "Taqhirate Ejtemai Dar Sardasht," [Social Chang in Sardasht], 
Nameye Ensanshenasi 1, No. 5 (1383 [2004]); Mehdi Rezayi et al., "Sonnat, Nosazi Wa Khanewade," 
[Tradition, Modernisation and Family], Pazhoheshe Zanan, No. 4 (2010); Omid Qaderzade et al., "Tejarate 
Marzi Wa Tafsire Mardom Az Taghirate Jahane Ziste Khanevade," [Border Trade and People's Perception 
of Family], Rahbord Farhang 1, No. 22 (Summer 1392 [2013]). 
15 The administrative division of Iran allocates Kurdish cities to the Kurdistan, Western Azerbaijan and 
Kermanshah provinces. 
16 A. Mohammadpur et al., "The Meaning Reconstruction of Family Changes Using Grounded Theory: (a 
Case Study of Mangor and Gaverk Tribes)," [Persian], Journal of Family Research 5, No. 3 (2009); Ahmad 
Mohammadpur, "Disembedding the Traditional Family: Grounded Theory and the Study of Family Change 
among Mangor and Gaverk Tribes of Iranian Kurdistan," Comparative Family Studies 44, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 
2013). 
17 Mehdi Rezayi and Ahmad Mohammadpur, "Darke Manaiye Payamadhaye Woroode Nowsazi Be 
Mantaqeye Oramanate Kordestane Iran," [The Consequences of Modernisation for the Oraman Region], 
Majaleye Jame‘eshenasie Iran 9, No. 1-2 (Tabestan 1387 [2008]), 3-33. 
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trend in studies of social change in Iranian Kurdistan. However, a tendency to transcend 
the rigid dichotomy of traditional and modern, must lead to a critical analysis of the 
components of this dichotomy. The concepts of traditional and modern, employed in these 
studies remain undefined, with the effect that they seem to be used as self-evident 
concepts. They follow a Weberian notion of ‘primordial Eastern societies’ versus modern 
Western societies, which became very influential especially after the Second World 
War.18 These studies do not provide any critical examination of modernisation theories in 
general, nor the dichotomy in particular. Lastly, the above theoretical deficiency 
continues to restrict the scope of current social change studies.   
 
‘State-of-the-Art’ of Kurdish Studies  
The following points on the state of current Kurdish literature reveal the decisive 
contribution of this study. First, the conspicuous absence of social change studies exposes 
the limits of the existing scholarship. As an umbrella founded on theories of social change 
and transformation, such studies have infinite potential to cover a wide range of subjects 
dealing with, for example, social history, and cultural, gender and labour studies which 
are not at least adequately represented in the scholarship. The topic of social change 
studies has been discussed in other parts of this study when reviewing a number of recent 
works in that direction by the scholars of Kurdish studies in academic centres in Iran. 
This takes us to the second point on historiography. As an intellectual authority, 
Kurdish historiography has not relieved itself from a predominant national 
historiography, the foundations of which were laid in the early decades of the twentieth 
century. Modern Kurdish national historiography emerged to safeguard the historical and 
                                                          
18 Zachary Lockman, The Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism, 
2nd ed. (USA: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 86-89. 
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cultural existence of the Kurds in the face of the modern states’ homogenisation of 
identity.19 Nevertheless, the historiography fed off modern European racial and national 
theories which had gained cultural hegemony as ‘scientific’ knowledge, following 
Europe’s technological and military ascendancy. Enshrining the existing myths, it turned 
them into facts to authenticate its nation’s historical existence; this was a common 
enterprise of all modern ‘nations’. 
The final point pertains to an intellectual tradition with strong connections to power 
which continues to enjoy an intellectual authority in Kurdish studies. This tradition goes 
back to the West in the nineteenth century, during which the secondary literature on 
‘Kurds’ began to grow as the result of a considerable rise in interests in both overseas and 
adjacent cultures and societies. The nineteenth century, in Cecil John Edmonds’ words, 
was ‘the Golden Age of exploration in the Middle East, and most of the giants of those 
days were Englishmen’.20 Indeed, for Europeans the age of exploration was an age of 
competition to be the first to reach the remotest and most ‘unknown’ places.21 Edmonds 
enumerates thirteen travel accounts regarding Kurds and Kurdistan by such Europeans 
from 1819 until 1913, a ‘never-ending source of delight’ which thrilled the likes of 
Edmonds to follow in their tracks and add to such accounts on the Kurds.22 In addition to 
this, Thomas Bois cites many more travel accounts or memoirs as well as anthropological 
sources, which were published by the end of the century.23 The contributions of the 
                                                          
19 Cf. Hussain Huzni, "Ghonchai Baharistan: Tarikhi Kurdan," [Blossoms of Spring: The History of the 
Kurds] in Badran Ahmad habib (ed.), Sarjam Barhami H. Huzni [Collected Work] (Aras: Hawler, 2011), 
53-104; Muhammad Mardukh, Mezhui Kurd Wa Kurdistan [The History of Kurd and Kurdistan] (Hawler: 
Rozhhalat Press, 2011). 
20 C. J. Edmonds, Kurds, Turks and Arabs: Politics, Travel and Research in North-Eastern Iraq, 1919-1925 
(London: Oxfor University Press, 1957), 21. 
21 Ibid., 21. 
22 Ibid., 21-28. 
23 Thomas Bois, "The Geography of Kurdistan," in C. E. Bosworth, et al. (eds), The Encyclopaedia of Islam 
(Leiden, The Netherland: E. J. Brill, 1986), 447. 
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English travellers and the British Empire notwithstanding, Russian and French 
orientalists and anthropologists too played a significant role in expanding studies on the 
Kurds. Combined, nineteenth century exploration laid the foundation of an intellectual 
tradition which significantly contributed to fashioning a modern, homogenous Kurdish 
identity through studying Kurds and their lands from a new perspective.24 Crucially, the 
exploration was ideologically stimulated by modern orientalism and ‘scientific’ 
ethnography (later anthropology), which, as social and political disciplines, were rooted 
in the intellectual advancements of the Enlightenment and Romanticism.25 However, the 
publication of their findings primarily satisfied specific ‘scientific’ curiosity and political 
enquiry, rather than serving the Kurds themselves. 
The second half of the nineteenth century was characterised by the emergence of 
the language of science, generated by the works of Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel 
Wallace, which replaced the previous explanation of history by divine guidance and 
intervention. This intellectual process, from which many authoritative figures emerged, 
constituted the basis on which further studies on the Kurds in the next century advanced. 
Furthermore, inspired by political developments throughout the twentieth century, this 
intellectual tradition vigorously persisted. Names such as Minorsky, Bois, Driver and 
Nikitin became popular as their published works on the Kurds embellished 
encyclopaedias or became authoritative accounts, satiating ethnographic curiosities.26 
Nikitin’s Kurd and Kurdistan (1955), translated into Persian and praised by the renowned 
                                                          
24 Cf. bibliographies used by Thomas Bois and Vladimir Minorsky in ibid., 438-64. 
25 For a history of anthropology, cf. Johannes Fabian, Time and Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Dale F. Eickelman, The Middle East and Central Asia: An 
Anthropological Approach, 4th ed. (US: Pearson Education, 1966); and for a history of modern orientalism, 
cf. Lockman, Contending Vision. 
26 Cf. Vladimir Minorsky, "Origins and Pre-Islamic History," in C. E. Bosworth, et al. (eds), Encyclopaedia 
of Islam (Leiden, The Netherland: E. J. Brill, 1986). 
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Kurdish translator, Muhammad Qazi, has remained a reference book for the Kurds in 
Iran.27 Coming into the twenty-first century, this intellectual tradition in Kurdish studies 
continues its affinity with a homogenous, culturally descriptive and orientalist approach 
to Kurds and Kurdistan. Finally, the deterioration in academic standards of rigorous 
research, systematic investigation and innovation in Kurdish studies over the last two 
decades, indicates the persistence and authority of that intellectual tradition.  
This academic shortcoming becomes more evident when we note that the 
intellectual tradition of the twentieth century and its current persistence are bridged by a 
number of serious academic works which were published towards the end of the last 
century and which, despite their deficiencies, continued to represent rigorous research 
and scholarship.28 In fact, this was the time when a more heterogeneous, critical trend 
began to challenge the dominant intellectual tradition that had represented the Kurds as a 
monolithic entity, thus forming a new intellectual trend in Kurdish studies characterised 
by increased relevance and accuracy. One prominent example is Amir Hassanpour’s 
Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan (1992), which has rightly become a classic. 
Hassanpour’s book belongs to a trend which has countervailed the intellectual tradition, 
and is distinguished by both its heterogeneous, critical approach, and its academic 
standards. Furthermore, there have also been valuable works on Kurdish nationalism and 
literature with theoretical and methodological contributions.29 
                                                          
27 Vasili Nikitin, Kord Wa Kordestan [Kurd and Kurdistan], trans. M. Qazi (Iran: Nilufar, 1363 [1984-5]). 
28 Cf. Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State; McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds. This excludes 
McDowall’s Chapter 13, entitled “Subjects of Shia in Iran”, which is a limited account of the events in 
Iranian Kurdistan during the 1979 Revolution. 
29 Cf. Vali, Origins of Kurdish Nationalism; Farangis Qaderi, "The Emergance of Modern Kurdish Poetry,"  
PhD Thesis, University of Exeter, 2015.; Hakan Ozoglu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving 
Identities, Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries (USA: State University of New York Press, 2004); 
Abbas Vali, Kurds and the State in Iran (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011); Jaffer Sheyholislami, "Language 
Varieties of the Kurds," in Wolfgang Taucher (ed.), The Kurds: History - Religion - Language - Politics 
(Austria: Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interio, 2015); and academic journals Kurdish Studies and 
Derwaze. 
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 Nevertheless, the homogenous approach of the intellectual tradition has persisted, 
with undesirable outcomes. The main reason for this is that whereas the increase in the 
international awareness on the Kurds and their political and social predicaments have 
stimulated studies on the Kurds, the academic credentials of the old intellectual tradition 
not only are left unchallenged but, probably unwittingly in most cases, reinforced. 
Handbooks, which are presented as academic studies but give the impression of expert 
analyses, completely ignore the impact of social change and transformation in the nation-
states, especially in Iran, since the middle of the twentieth century.  
  
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The theoretical framework of this study consists of theories of change and transformation, 
which go against modernisation theories, to serve a multi-dimensional approach to social 
change in Kurdish society; and of theories of nation and nationalism, to maintain a critical 
approach to Kurdish and Iranian national narratives. These are explained in the following 
sections which also provide the definitions of many concepts used in this research. 
Furthermore, this framework is informed by a number of cultural critiques which enable 
us to understand both the cultural dimension of state formation and cultural consequences 
of modernisation. Discussed mainly in Chapter 5, Antonio Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony is vital to understand the process of modern cultural encounters in 
multicultural Iran. Likewise, Raymond Williams’ notion of ‘residual’ and ‘emergent’ 
cultures, a notion based on Gramsci, is employed to explain the ongoing tension between 
a hegemonic, powerful culture and marginalised cultures, and elucidate the process in 
which the hegemonic culture concedes ground to others or other cultures achieve better 
cultural positions. This is complemented by Pierre Bourdieu’s definition of culture as a 
symbolic system and his concept of cultural capital. As a symbolic system, culture relies 
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on social conditions and relations of power to produce and perpetuate meanings which 
safeguard the interest of the dominant social group or class. For socio-economic and 
political as well as cultural reasons, the era of the White Revolution profoundly affected 
social conditions and relations of power (see Chapter 5). The establishment of the 
hegemony of Persian language and culture is one crucial consequence of the way such 
conditions changed. Insofar as the concept of cultural capital is concerned, it is one form 
of capital, and refers to culture as an economic practice. According to Bourdieu, economic 
theory has reduced ‘the universe of exchanges to mercantile exchange, which is 
objectively and subjectively oriented toward the maximization of profit, i.e., 
(economically) self-interested’, and ‘has implicitly defined the other forms of exchange 
as non-economic, and therefore, disinterested’.30 Cultural capital includes products and 
practices which are not ‘directly or immediately convertible into money’,31 but 
accumulate in different forms in relation to the way society is formed; therefore, 
restricting or expanding the access of different social groups to cultural capital becomes 
a means to achieve higher social positions. From this perspective, this study benefits from 
the concept of cultural capital for two reasons. First, it sheds light on regional and social 
disparities which either were not at least adequately addressed by economic plans in the 
1960s and the 1970s or increased because of the plans’ orientations. Secondly, its 
inclusion in this study aims to raise awareness of this concept in Kurdish social change 
studies. 
At the same time, this study is indebted to John Thompson’s analysis of the role 
of the new visual means of communication in modern society, because it makes possible 
                                                          
30 Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," in John G. Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory and 
Research for the Sociology of Education (London: Greenwood Press, 1986), 242. 
31 Ibid. 
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an adequate interpretation of the way the cultural hegemony of Persian in multicultural 
Iran was established. Lastly, Edward Said’s critique of orientalism as a discourse, which 
in Foucauldian terms denotes notions and systematic statements to explain the world and 
is a manifestation of the link between knowledge and power, contributes to this study’s 
historical perspective.32 As regards the Kurds, orientalism as a discourse has on the one 
hand continued to reproduce a monolithic perception of the Kurds, for example, as tribal, 
rural, and masculine with their own connotations which contrast with the idea of the 
‘modern’. On the other, highlighting elitist, national or political historiographies, 
orientalism has undermined social histories of various Kurdish societies. Such 
misrepresentations of the Kurds have served discourses of power to undermine the 
political and cultural rights of the Kurds in Iran, and continue to shape ideological 
battlegrounds between opposing national narratives (see below). 
The intimate relation between modernisation and nation-building exposes itself 
when we note that modernisation theories were formulated based on a Western model for 
non-Western countries where nation-building was in full swing. This said, studies of 
Kurdish identity in the process of change and transformation can yield a theoretical 
contribution to theories of nation and nationalism. Comparative studies of the Copts and 
the modernisation of Egypt, and of Catalan nationalism, only accentuate the peculiarity 
of Kurdish identity. Unlike the Copts, Kurds cannot be treated as a religious community; 
and Kurdish nationalism is different from Catalan nationalism which emerged with 
industrial foundations during the formation of modern Spain since the nineteenth 
century.33  
                                                          
32 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: 
Routledge, 1972), 24-25 and Ch. 2; Edward Said, Orientalism (1978), 3. 
33 On the Copts, see Vivian Ibrahim, The Copts of Egypt: Challenges of Modernisation and Identity 
(London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2011); and for information on Catalan nationalism, see Stanley Payne, 
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MOERNITY AND MODERNISATION 
This section’s review of modernisation theories and the debates on their origins aims to 
create a firm theoretical foundation for (Kurdish) social change studies in Iran. The 
following discussions derive on a number of selected works on the subject, both old and 
recent. This includes Zachary Lockman’s recent study, which brings Max Weber to our 
attention for the role of Weber’s ideas in popularising the duality of tradition and 
modernity. Obviously, Weber’s sociology is not confined to this and constitutes a very 
rich authoritative, intellectual source for the scholarship;34 nevertheless, as I have noted 
based on recent scholarly works on social change in Iranian Kurdish society, it is this 
authority which has shaped popular and scholarly perceptions of ‘tradition’ and 
‘modernity’ in Iran. At the same time, this section intends to contribute to these 
discussions by adding another dimension to the debate on modernisation in regard to Iran, 
where modernisation and development theories played a crucial role in shaping the state’s 
centralising, urban-oriented economic plans. 
In this study, ‘modernisation’ does not denote a single process of transition from a 
‘traditional’ society to a ‘modern’ one. ‘Traditional’ and ‘modern’ are not self-evident 
concepts, nor are they, as Reinhard Bendix explains, mutually exclusive. As John 
Stevenson argues in his study of social change in interwar Britain, ‘all ages are ages of 
transition’ and some of the most significant features of social change have their origins 
in the earlier period.35  Therefore, Stevenson concludes, any understanding of an era 
involves recognising that ‘it was an end as much as a beginning, in which the concerns of 
the past have as important a part to play as those which foreshadow an emerging 
                                                          
"Catalan and Basque Nationalism," Journal of Contemporary History 6, No. 1, Nationalism and Separatism 
(1971). 
34 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (California: University of 
California Press, 1978). 
35 John Stevenson, British Society 1914-1945 (Great Britain: Penguin, 1984), 17. 
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society’.36 Furthermore, this study follows this discussion by maintaining a critical view 
of modernisation theories, which were advanced and formulated in the post-World War 
Two era as the result of a series of international and political developments;37 the theories 
followed development discourse formed in this era.38 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the term modernisation connoted social 
change. It consisted of ‘the economic or political advance of some pioneering society and 
subsequent changes in follower societies’.39 Social change resulted in modern sociology 
pioneered by Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, which, as Bendix explains, 
‘developed almost wholly around the themes and antitheses cast up’ by social change. 
However, an oversimplified view of tradition versus modernity developed too. This 
‘oversimplification resulted from ideological interpretation of the contrast between 
tradition and modernity, and from undue generalizations of the European experience’.40 
This generalisation entailed a paradigmatic view of modernity as the new civilisation of 
Europe and North America that has developed ever since. Modernity as a new civilisation 
implies its uniqueness in human history, and is based on a positive self-image that 
‘modern Western culture has most often given to itself’.41 Modernity is generally 
perceived as ‘a coherent system, a package deal, with a well-defined set of attributes’.42 
However, modernisation in the post-World War Two era began increasingly to connote 
                                                          
36 Ibid. 
37 For critiques of modernisation, tradition and modernity, and modernisation theories cf. Reinhard Bendix, 
"Tradition and Modern Reconsidered," in Reinhard Bendix (ed.), Embattled Reason (New Jersey: 
Transaction, Inc., 1988); Ilan Pappe, The Modern Middle East (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1-13; 
Lockman, The Contending Visions of the Middle Eas, 134-48. 
38 Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995). 
39 Bendix Reinhard, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered," Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 9, No. 3 (April 1967), 331. 
40 Ibid., 293. 
41 Lawrence Cahoone (ed.), From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology  (Australia: Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd, 2003), 9. 
42 Lockman, The Contending Visions of the Middle Eas, 137-8. 
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state-led programmes to modernise non-Western countries based on modernising 
paradigms propagated by modernisation theories. From this perspective, a profound 
socio-economic change that came to characterise Iran and its Kurdish society by 1979, 
cannot be merely explained in terms of such programmes, nor by a number of ‘positive’ 
and ‘negative’ ramifications.  
 
Modernisation Theories  
Modernisation theories promulgated ‘a new and intellectually powerful way of thinking 
about social, political and cultural change’, by which American social scientists tried to 
understand  and predict social and political changes in the Middle East as well as in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America.43 This paradigm, was ‘rooted in a common set of assumptions 
about the character and trajectory of historical change’.44 Intellectually, these theories 
were rooted in an intellectual tradition which imposed a sharp distinction between the 
West and the rest of the world. The older dichotomy between civilisation and barbarism 
was replaced, in the works of Hamilton Gibbs and Bernard Lewis, by that between 
tradition and modernity, which stemmed from Max Weber’s sociology.45 According to 
Weber, the traditional societies of ‘the East’ must follow the linear path of civilisation, 
which Western societies had successfully passed through, in order to be able to earn 
modern characteristics and end backwardness.46 
Academically, modernisation theories were the consequence of the political 
developments since the Second World War which were characterised by independence 
                                                          
43 Ibid., 134. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 88. 
46 Ibid., 134-41. 
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movements, the emergence of new, post-colonial countries, and crucially, the emergence 
of the United States as a new world power. Modernisation became a fashionable term 
following the War, when comparative social studies in the United States increased and 
produced a number of modernisation theories.47 These theories were founded on the 
theories of social evolutions, which as Bendix explains guided domestic studies in the 
United States, unlike in Europe where the theories of social evolution had been ‘employed 
to interpret the encounter between the advanced industrial societies of the West and the 
peoples and cultures of colonial and dependent areas in Africa and the Orient’.48 In the 
context of the Cold War, theories of political development were presented as alternative 
to a dominant Marxism, which explained social and political predicaments by economic 
inequality, and advocated land reform, state-led economic development, etc., which were 
later picked up by pro-Western governments and implemented for political reasons.49 
Preparing a prescription for the modernisation of traditional monarchies, Samuel 
Huntington has nonetheless rightly noted that while the aim of the modernising monarchs 
of the nineteenth century was ‘to thwart Imperialism’, the aim of those in the twentieth 
century was to ‘thwart revolution’.50 In the case of Iran, as scholars have noted, the White 
Revolution was initially a reaction to regional revolutions and coups, in order to preserve 
the Pahlavi regime and to prevent revolution from below.51 This study derives from 
academic works, for example, on the ideological construction of the White Revolution 
                                                          
47 Ibid., 280. 
48 Ibid. 
49 On political developments, cf. W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Samuel Huntington, Political Order in 
Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968). 
50 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 155. 
51 TNA, FO371 157605 EP 1015/123 24 May 1961, quoted in Ali M. Ansari, "The Myth of the White 
Revolution," in Ali M. Ansari (ed.), Politics of Modern Iran (London: Routledge, 2001), 262. 
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and the interpretation of modernisation that followed as an uneven development.52  
However, this study contributes to this interpretation of the White Revolution as a 
revolution from above, by underlining the way the idea of ‘White Revolution’ was 
exploited by the state, which adopted and then systematically implemented the existing 
reformist ideas in such regional and internal contexts, and analysing its consequences for 
Kurdish society in Iran.  
With the intensification of state-led modernisations over the following decades in 
countries such as Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Egypt and other Arab countries, modernisation 
increasingly came to be perceived as a transition to a Euro-centric modernity, creating, as 
Bendix notes, certain prerequisites, since it was thought that ‘regardless of time and place 
all countries must somehow create all the conditions characteristic of modernity before 
they can hope to be successful in their drive for modernization’.53 However, Bendix 
maintains, to distinguish ‘before and after’, is ‘an analytical tool, not a tool to predict 
“developing” countries’.54 Concerning concepts of modernity, tradition and 
modernisation, as far as modernisation theories are concerned, Kurdish social change 
studies need to employ a critical view and distance itself from a transitional understanding 
of social change. This includes ‘transitional modernisation’ which, according to Daniel 
Lerner’s The Passing of Traditional Society (1958), one of the most influential books in 
theories of modernisation, is a ‘passage’ from an undesirable, backward situation to a 
more advanced, modern one. The passage is characterised by invidious dualities such as 
‘village versus town, land versus cash, illiteracy versus enlightenment, resignation versus 
                                                          
52 Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), Ch. 
9. 
53 Reinhard, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered", 315-16. 
54 Ibid., 316. 
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ambition, [and] piety versus excitement’.55 Transformation from one to the other, 
therefore, constitutes the passage from a traditional society.  
In brief, this study does not regard ‘modernisation’ as the transition to becoming 
‘modern’. Rapid social change has been popularly conceived as an inevitable result of a 
‘transitional phase’. Reflected in social change studies, this view is reinforced by ongoing 
intellectual debates which reinforce a transitional perception of modernisation, leading to 
an oversimplifying single-dimensional approach to social change. By contrast, this study 
argues for a multi-dimensional approach which invites us to adopt a critical reading of 
concepts and subjects involved. Moreover, this study’s critique of the modernisation of 
Iran does not intend to unduly demonise the state or the reigning Shah, nor intends to 
equal the state with the Shah. The state was crucial for the institutional transformation of 
Iran. However, the White Revolution’s modernisation was violently terminated because 
of the monarch’s mismanagement of the process, and dictatorship. 
 
The White Revolution 
As mentioned above, this study is concerned with social change in the era of the White 
Revolution, which began with Muhammad Reza Shah’s official proclamation of the 
principles of his ‘White Revolution’ in 1963, and ends with the Iranian Revolution of 
1979. Therefore, this study makes a distinction between the motives and intentions of the 
monarch and the way Iran was transformed as a result of the interactions of various 
factors, including the state. There is a considerable number of scholarly works on many 
aspects of the White Revolution which also provide background information, while 
Muhammad Reza Shah’s Great Civilization reveals his intentions and desires sufficiently. 
                                                          
55 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of the Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (USA: Free Press, 
1958), 44. 
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Nevertheless, a study of social change in Kurdish society aims to add new dimensions to 
the studies of such a significant era in Iran. 
 
NATION AND NATIONALISM 
Homogenisation and modern nation-building 
In an Iranian context, homogenisation refers to a number of strategies employed by state-
builders, including intellectuals who provided the moral justification, to construct a 
unified Iranian political community based on the pillars of ‘national unity’ and ‘territorial 
integrity’. As a violent process, homogenisation has included the coercive practices of 
banning Kurdish, the forced settlement of tribes, and the overt suppression of revolts or 
any practices of self-rule, e.g. the Mahabad Republic and the uprisings and political 
movements throughout the Pahlavi era; in short, it has been tantamount to stami milli or 
national oppression, as popularly referred to by Iranian Kurds. However, as the 
modernisation of Iran intensified during post-WWII era, the cultural hegemony of the 
perceived core ethnocultural group, i.e. the consensual acceptance of the cultural 
superiority of Persian culture and language, was established through the expansion of 
modern (Persian) education and, significantly, the mediasation of culture (see Chapter 5). 
Benefiting from studies of state formation56 and of the politicisation of ethnicity in 
the age of modern nation-states,57 we can assert that the Kurds in Iran have faced different 
strategies of homogenisation, while at the same time they present an interesting case 
which may affect perspectives on nation and nationalism. For this reason, this study 
highlights a dual process which interestingly includes socio-economic and, to some 
                                                          
56 See Heather Rae, State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 1-54. 
57 See Andreas Wimmer, Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), Chapters 3 and 6. 
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extent, cultural ‘integration’, and resistance to various forms of homogenisation. 
Generally speaking, the process of state formation in Iran is not merely characterised by 
systematic inclusion through, for instance, education or administrative divisions or forced 
inclusion, but also by attempts to create a normative state whose legitimacy is guaranteed 
by reproducing the cultural hegemony of Persian (see Chapter 5). Therefore, as Heather 
Rae rightly argues, ‘state formation has a crucial cultural dimension’58 which needs to be 
analysed in studies of homogenisation and modern nation-building too; and this study 
provides a new perspective in this regard. 
 Similarly, the Kurdish experience presents a challenge for theories of nation and 
nationalism, demanding the scholarship to pay attention to the notion of Kurdayeti 
(Kurdishness) and the peculiarities of the Kurdish experience. As both ideology and 
movement, nationalism is founded on difference. Its historical consciousness rests on a 
‘national’ perception of history, throughout which the ‘nation’ maintains its cohesiveness 
despite historical changes and transformations;59 historically, it obscures a good 
understanding of the past. In fact, nationalism usurps history in order to justify its 
distinctiveness from and its cultural superiority over others. 
However, unlike a vague and static ‘Kurdish nationalism’, this study employs the 
concept of Kurdayeti, defined as struggle for Kurdish cultural and political rights, in order 
to simultaneously recognise such rights and be critical of the ideology of nationalism as 
such. Furthermore, ‘Kurdayeti’ represents a dynamic process, serves a better 
understanding of Kurdish histories in Iran, and reflects more effectively resistance against 
                                                          
58 Rae, State Identities, 2 
59 See Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz (eds), The Contested Nation: Ethnicity, Class, Religion and 
Gender in National Histories  (UK: Palgrave McMillan, 2008). 
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the homogenising and oppressive policies of the modern Iranian state.60 Like nationalism, 
Kurdayeti is also a worldview based on a modern, national understanding of self and 
history, which was a result of the transformation of historical consciousness by the early 
twentieth century. Indeed, as Andreas Wimmer rightly points out, nationalism is not ‘just 
a by-product of modern state formation […]; rather, modernity itself rests on a basis of 
ethnic and nationalist principles’.61 However, while in an Iranian context a distinctive 
Kurdish nationalism emerged alongside Persian nationalism, it preserved aspects of 
Iraniyant (Iranianness) both to define itself and construct an authentic past. Therefore, it 
is important to heed the cultural and historical affinities with the idea of Iran. For example, 
modern, national Kurdish historiography has substantially relied on race, ‘scientific’ and 
mythical, e.g. Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh and the Aryan myth, constructions of a national 
Iranian past. It defined the Kurds as, in Huzni’s words, ‘an Iranian qaum’,62 which prior 
to modernity’s ‘ethnic minority’ only denoted kinship or a people who had distinct traits 
but (as a branch of a bigger family) also shared characteristics and origins with others. 
On the other hand, for the Kurds, throughout the twentieth century, ‘Kurdayeti’ developed 
as a popular and legitimate concept guiding various movements to achieve Kurdish ethnic 
rights in the framework of modern Iran, whereas ‘nationalism’, with the ascendancy of 
Marxism’s class theories especially from the 1970s onward, came to be perceived merely 
as a source of belligerent stances aiming to divide human society based on ‘nations’. 
Therefore, as it becomes more evident throughout this study, Kurdayeti, or any concept 
                                                          
60 Denis Natali has attempted to explain Kurdayeti or ‘Kurdish national identity’ and ‘its similarities and 
variations in its manifestation […] based on the nature of political space’ in the nation-states of Turkey, 
Iraq and Iran. While a useful approach, it is limited because it is only concerned with political aspects of 
the formation of national or ethnic identities. In contrast, the current study stresses a dynamic, 
multifaceted dual process of modernisation and homogenisation which also contains social and cultural 
aspects. See Denise Natali, The Kurds and the Stat: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran 
(New York: Syracuse University Press, 2005), Introduction. 
61 Wimmer, Shadows of Modernity, 1. 
62 Cf. Huzni, "Blossom of Spring", 67; and Mardukh, Mezhui Kurd, 25. 
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which can reflect the dynamism of Iranian Kurdish history more effectively, is 
academically also more productive. 
 
Iranian Kurdistan or Kurdish Society? 
‘Iranian Kurdistan’ and ‘Kurdistan’ have political connotations. However, these concepts 
are used in a geographical sense to refer to the region occupied by the Kurds in the west 
of Iran. Moreover, referring to the province, ‘Iranian Kurdistan’, for the Iranian state has 
represented a discourse to sustain the relations of domination in favour of power. On the 
other hand, Rozh-halat-i Kurdistan, or Eastern Kurdistan, has become very popular 
among the Kurds as an alternative to the discourse of ‘Iranian Kurdistan’. However, while 
it is a challenge to a dominant discourse which denies the cultural and political rights of 
the Kurds in Iran, ‘Eastern Kurdistan’ is an act of spatialisation which inevitably creates 
imagined lines between the Kurds and other Iranian societies, overlooking their shared 
historical, social and cultural bonds. In contrast, this study adopts the concepts of Kurdish 
society (in Iran) and Iranian Kurdish society (see below) in order to acknowledge an 
independent existence of the Kurds in Iran on the one hand, and emphasise the values 
shared by various peoples on the other. 
‘Kurdish society’ or komalgai kurdawari, a term often used by the Kurds, denotes 
an ethnic community residing in a specific geography, not in isolation but with intimate 
ties with other peoples or societies around them. Moreover, due to administrative 
divisions in Iran as a component of political modernisation, many Kurdish cities are 
excluded from the Kurdistan Province. Kurdish-speaking people in Iran call the area 
Kurdistan, which includes all Kurdish cities (in addition to many mixed Kurdish-Turkish, 
Kurdish-Lur, and Kurdish-Persian cities), thus ignoring the administrative divisions. 
Furthermore, ‘Kurdish society’ in this paper is employed without delineating ethnic and 
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political boundaries; it refers to an area where Kurds with a distinct language and culture 
have lived for centuries and their socio-economic, cultural and political ways of life have 
been shaped, especially in modern times, in connection with the other societies 
encompassing them. The concept is at the same time an alternative to political and 
national histories, and aims to encourage social change studies on Iranian Kurdish society. 
 
Kurds: Qaum or Millat? 
There is a persistent tension over the concepts of qaum (an ethnic group) and millat 
(nation), which has become one of the primary battlegrounds in the clash of Iranian 
(Persian) and Kurdish national narratives. Qaum justifies the former’s denial of political 
and cultural rights of a community, which is, in turn, represented by the latter’s definition 
of Kurds as millat, in need of recognition as such. As such, the national narratives derive 
their definitions from a misconception of these concepts, reinforced by constituent 
notions in the national narratives. On the one hand, the notions of national unity and 
territorial integrity, which constitute the pillars of Iranian national identity, continue to 
provide powerful grounds for the Iranian national narrative. On the other hand, the 
Kurdish national narrative continues to have historical and intellectual relevance in a 
situation in which the cultural and political rights of the Kurds in Iran are persistently and 
violently denied. 
This confrontation over the concepts of qaum and millat in post-revolutionary Iran 
has emanated from the Islamic Republic’s Constitution, which allows limited cultural 
rights for other ethnic communities (that is, non-Persian speakers), defined as aqvam 
(sing. qaum), not as millat. The Constitution in this respect was based on a definition of 
the Kurdish community as an inextricable part of a unified Iranian nation. Nevertheless, 
it also reflected the pressure on behalf of various elements of the community to improve 
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their cultural positions. Therefore, in the continuous clash of national narratives, qaum, 
which denotes a group of people with distinct characteristics and similarities with other 
peoples, is redefined as an undeveloped nation, presumably not yet prepared to form an 
independent state. This is a meaning which has served power and continues to sustain the 
current relations of domination.63 By contrast, the Kurdish national narrative endeavours 
to prove the Kurds are a ‘ripe’ nation, and justifies its claim to nationhood by referring to 
a common descent, a specific land with a distinct history, language, and popular culture. 
Any study of the Kurds in Iran, therefore, needs to treat such concepts not as self-evident 
but as power-serving ideas. In this regard, critical theories of nation and nationalism, 
which are followed by new perspectives on these concepts, provide firm foundations for 
an intellectual confrontation against national narratives, including their invented 
definitions and reconstructed histories, which are closely linked to both political power 
and political mobilisation. 
In the last few decades, a modernist approach to the nationalist discourse of the 
nineteenth century has contributed considerably to our understanding of nation and the 
nation-state. These theories can be subdivided into various subgroups which explain these 
modern phenomena from different perspectives.64 In short, this modernist approach 
regards these concepts as both relatively modern (hence modernist) and historically 
                                                          
63 Ideology as meaning in the service of power is discussed in John B. Thompson, Ideology and Modern 
Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication (UK: Polity Press, 1990), 6-7. 
64 Nation as an imagined community and a product of print capitalism is represented in Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities (London and New York: Verso, 2006), 37-47; nation as a product of 
industrialisation is discussed in Ernest Gellner, Nationalism (New York: New York University Press, 
1997); whilst for Anthony Smith nationalism is not only an ideology but is also a cultural phenomenon 
which is closely related to national identity: Anthony Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 
1991), 19-42; nation and nationalism as inventions of the nineteenth century Europe are represented in Eric 
Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), 1-15 and in Eli Kedouri, Nationalism in Asia and Africa (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 
1971), 1-188; and for nation as narration, see Homi K. Bhabha (ed.), Nation and Narration  (New York: 
Routledge, 1990). 
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contingent phenomena, and defines itself against the idea of nation as an entity dating 
back to time immemorial. One of the main reasons for the emergence of this modernist 
approach was the failure of theories of modernisation.65 
Perspectives on nation and nationalism continue to transform. For example, Roger 
Brubaker’s study on nationhood and national identities in Eastern Europe emphasises the 
existence of an outside homeland.66 His study reveals how cases of national identities can 
be different. For the Kurds, an outside homeland has not been relevant (See Chapter 2), 
and this demands that one go beyond Brubaker’s study, however valuable and insightful, 
to explain Kurdish identity. As mentioned earlier, another important study in this regard 
is Andreas Wimmer’s Shadow of Modernity, which explains nationalism and ethnic 
politics as pillars on which modernity rests. Therefore, the above theories are employed 
in this research also to initiate a new approach in studies of national identities, in this case 
Kurdish identity, which have the potential to contribute to the existing perspectives on 
nations and nationalism. Furthermore, studies of the history of Iran from such 
perspectives have theoretically and considerably enriched our understanding of the 
histories and politics of modern Iran.67 
 
Kurdish-Iranian? 
The concept of ‘Kurdish-Iranian’ does not repudiate Kurdish histories, nor does it deny 
ethnic, political and human rights, or a people’s claims to political autonomy or the right 
to self-determination. It serves three purposes in this study. First, it represents an 
                                                          
65 Anthony Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (New York: Routledge, 1998), 3 and 1-24. 
66 Roger Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
67 Cf. Touraj Atabaki (ed.), Iran in the 20th Century: Historiography and Political Culture  (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 2009); Ali M. Ansari, Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012); Afshin Marashi, Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power and the State (US: University of 
Washington Press, 2008). 
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alternative to national historiography, practiced by national narratives. Secondly, it refers 
to the heterogeneity of the Kurds as members of various, diverse Kurdish societies in 
different nation-states, on the one hand, and underlines historical, socio-economic, 
political as well as cultural bonds between Kurdish society and other linguistically 
different societies in Iran, on the other. Furthermore, it defies a homogenous approach 
which overlooks the diversity of Kurdish societies. It is legitimate to inquire of the author 
of a recent annotated bibliography of Kurdish culture and society, which Kurdish society 
are they referring to when they claim that ‘Kurdish society is still basically tribal’?68 
Finally, ‘Kurdish-Iranian’ demonstrates an awareness of the fact that any analysis of 
modern Kurdish society in Iran ought to be done in the context of, and not separated from, 
the formation of modern Iran, and in the light of its socio-economic, political and cultural 
transformations.  
SOURCE MATERIALS 
A vast range of primary and secondary sources constitute this thesis’s source materials. 
To sketch an image of Kurdish society in the early twentieth century, I have relied on 
travelogues, the memoirs of prominent literary figures, and their literary works. I explored 
the valuable reference tools of the Encyclopaedia Iranica and the Encyclopaedia of Islam, 
both printed and the online second edition, and critically engaged with the interesting 
works of the earlier authors of studies on the Kurds. At the same time, I benefited from 
more recent statistical and informative works on the modernisation of Iran. For primary 
sources on the era of the White Revolution, I have used official statistics, newspapers and 
scholarly journals of the time. These sources include books which contain statistics and 
information on, for example, development programmes and various state organisations. 
                                                          
68 Meho and Maglaughlin, Kurdish Culture and Society, 4. 
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The National Archives (TNA) in London was particularly useful for its wide range of 
sources in the forms of correspondence and reports, which occupied me for weeks.69 On 
the cultural and educational aspects of modernisation, Iran’s leading universities’ 
academic journals and the Ministry of Education’s educational reports and articles proved 
priceless, covering the entire Pahlavi era.  
Furthermore, in addition to secondary literature, a critical reading of books 
published in the decades following the Second World War enabled me to gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of the era of the White Revolution. The literature in Iranian 
studies concerned with the era provided me with valuable information and analyses of 
significant themes. In addition to historiographical works on the period, a case in point is 
Gholam Reza Afkhami’s The Life and the Times of the Shah, which stands as a collective 
effort and contains valuable primary source information. 
Finally, a number of interviews were conducted with members of the generation of 
the 1960s and 1970s who, in various capacities of teacher, judge, doctor and cultural or 
political activists, had witnessed the impact of the era of the White Revolution on Kurdish 
society. Memoirs form a significant part of Kurdish collective memory, while interviews 
help the researcher to understand the past. For this study, the published memoirs and 
interviews are, as Lynn Abrams argues, ‘means of accessing not just information but also 
signification, interpretation and meaning’.70 This study maintains this approach to oral 
history throughout the manuscript.71 
  
                                                          
69 Records and catalogues held by the National Archives are cited in this order: ‘Title, (other references), 
date, TNA, Reference. 
70 Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory (London: Routledge, 2010), 1.  
71 For more on oral history, cf. Donal A. Ritchie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Oral History  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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Part I: The Formation of Modern Kurdish-Iranian Society 
 
 
 
 
The knowledge/science [‘ilm] of history will enhance wisdom, it is a 
means to erudition, the truthfulness of views, and to prudence. 
[Rephrasing Mirkhand (d.1498),] Sharaf Khan Bitlisi, The Sharafnameh (1598), 9. 
 
A just estimation of or undistorted communication with the past is simultaneously 
to believe that the present can be significantly altered for the better. The result 
might not be progress, with all the questionable assumptions of continuity that 
entails, but it would make a difference.  
Paul Hamilton, Historicism, 6. 
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Chapter 1: The integration of Kurdish Society into Modern Iran 
 
 
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY KURDISH SOCIETY 
Insufficient research and the lack of evidence hinder any attempt to depict social 
conditions prior to modern times and allow generalisation and speculation too. A limited 
scope and slow pace of change until the modern times did not connote the absence of 
change. Ever since the fifteenth century the Kurdish region had been caught up in the 
rivalries between formidable confederacies of Akquyunlu and Qaraquyunlu in the early 
modern times and then until the twentieth century between the Ottoman and Iranian 
Empires, the policies of which shaped the Kurdish societies’ social and political 
structures. Meanwhile, various Kurdish Emirates or principalities ruled over the Kurds, 
oversaw an economy, exemplified by markets or handcraft industry, and promoted 
cultural activities. Originated in philosophical, theological as well as literary movements 
of past centuries, religious education centres and literary innovations spread to more 
regions, embodied by an increasing number of literary figures.1 Nevertheless, modernity 
distinguished itself by its unprecedented speed of social transformation. 
 In the nineteenth century, the region experienced major regional and imperial wars 
which paved the way for the unprecedented political and economic presence of Britain 
and Russia in the Ottoman and Qajar Empires. The Kurdish Emirates eventually faded 
away as the result of the empires’ centralisation policies which aimed to strengthen and 
modernise the state in the face of the military and political onslaught of European powers. 
                                                          
1 Cf. Evliya Chelebi, An Ottoman Traveller: Selections from the Book of Travels of Evliya Çelebi, trans. 
Robert Dankoff and Sooyong Kim (London: Eland, 2010). 
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The integration of the economies of the region into the world market by the end of the 
century resulted in an unequal trading balance with the effect that it made these economies 
exporters of raw materials and importers of manufactured goods.2 Consequently, as 
Masoud Karshenas argues in the case of Iran, free trade led to the peripheralisation of 
these economies in a world economy,3 which by the end of the century, as Eric Hobsbawm 
explains, had been effectively and permanently divided into ‘advanced’ and 
‘underdeveloped’ as the result of political and industrial revolutions.4 Consequently, 
structural reforms in the regional states to modernise and strengthen economy and society 
followed. As regards the Kurds, this subsequently transformed the pre-modern power-
relations based on Empire-Emirate with the effect that the rule of the ‘autonomous’ 
Emirates ended and the direct authority of the central state over the Kurdish regions 
through its representatives followed.  
The integration of the Ottoman and Qajar Empires in the world market had 
undoubtedly engaged the Kurds in a wider regional trade. Mrs Bishop, a missionary, 
observed in her journey in Kurdistan around 1890 that, 
Long before reaching Sujbulak [modern Mahabad] there were indications of the vicinity of a place 
of some importance, caravans going both ways, asses loaded with perishable produce, horsemen and 
foot passengers, including many fine-looking Kurdish women unveiled, and walking with a firm 
masculine stride, even when carrying children on their backs.5 Sujbulak, the capital of Northern 
Persian Kurdistan, and the residence of a governor, is quite an important entrepôt for furs, in which 
                                                          
2 Masoud Karshenas, Oil, State Ad Industrialisation in Iran (Cambridge: CUP, 1990), Ch. 2. For example, 
‘while in 1844 more than 70 percent of Iranian exports were composed of handicraft manufactures, by 1910 
the share of manufactures, with the exception of carpet, was reduced to virtually nil’. Ibid., 48. 
3 Ibid., 47-48. 
4 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789-1848 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1962), 
181. 
5 Isabella Bishop, Journeys in Persia and Kurdistan, Vol. 2 (London: John Murray, 1891), 207. According 
to Bishop, the city had ‘twenty small mosques, three hammams [public bath], some very inferior 
caravansaries and a few coffee houses’ and its bazaar well supplied. Ibid., 206. 
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it carries on a large trade with Russia, and a French firm, it is said, buys up fur rugs to the value of 
several hundred thousand francs annually.6  
 
In addition to the regional trade, the economy was characterised by an inter-trade 
system involving towns, tribal and village communities, which lived in conditions devoid 
of a sanitation system;7 wheel-carts and quadrupeds were used as means of transportation. 
A nomadic and rural life had made people economically self-sufficient, while they 
continued to benefit from cross-border trades before its interruption by the modern state, 
which identified it as an act of ‘smuggling’ in order to make it illegal. Kurdish society 
was a feudal society under the yoke of darabags or aghas (landowners) who ruled over 
ra‘yats (servants).  The agha and the tribal chief owned both the land and the jutiar (Ku. 
peasant) class who cultivated the land. Although historically Kurdish societies (including 
urban, settled, nomadic, and tribal) possessed distinct language and culture, socio-
economically they were not radically different in comparison with other communities 
such as Baluchis, Lurs, Persians, Azeris, and Turkomans who demographically 
contributed to the ethnic structure of Iran. Based on nineteenth century travelogues and 
anthropological accounts, it seems that until the expansion of trade in modern times, 
various nomadic, tribal, and settled Kurdish social organisations were geographically 
scattered and socio-economically not compactly connected.8 Nomads depended on cattle 
so were the tribes and settled communities whose economic resources also included 
cultivated lands, vineyard, orchards, fruit, wheat and barley. There were limited resources 
                                                          
6 Ibid., 207. 
7 Ibid., 208. 
8 Cf. C. Rich, A Narrative of Residence in Koordistan (London1836); James B. Fraser, Narratives of a 
Journey into Khurasan in the Yeas 1821 and 1822 (London1825); Bishop, Journeys in Persia and 
Kurdistan, V. 2; and, first published in 1915, Sir Mark Sykes, The Chalifs’ Last Heritage (UK: Garnet 
Publishing, 2002). 
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as regards cash crops and few markets. However, this began to change effectively with 
the expansion of trade, the emergence of a modern economy, urbanisation and the 
availability of better roads with the effect that dairy products, meat and grain found new 
markets in growing urban centres. The expansion of trade and increasing movements of 
people upgraded economic trade, symbolised by regional markets where various 
linguistically and culturally distinct people continued to trade.9 As regards the tribes, 
constant tribal conflicts originated in their desire to appropriate other tribes’ territories as 
well as their economic and military resources. Unsurprisingly, authoritarian centralising 
modernisation elicited strong opposition on behalf of powerful Kurdish tribes who had 
enjoyed a long-standing political authority legitimised in many cases by religion.10 
Moreover, wealth and military arsenals were in the possession of the agha or the Sheikh, 
the chief religious authority. In contrast, the wider population suffered from harsh living 
conditions, economic exploitation of the ruling class and social injustice while notions of 
hygiene and healthcare were absent. 
 James B. Fraser who travelled to a number of regions in central and northwest Iran in 
the early 1820s warns against exotic narratives wherein false impressions of that land ‘are 
calculated to shut out all disagreeable impressions of poverty and misery, and to substitute 
for them those of population and riches’.11 According to him, 
 
                                                          
9 See Sykes’s observation of Kurdish and Armenian markets in Sykes, Last Heritage, 403 and Ch. V. 
10 A case in point is the famous Barzani tribal community. For a brief account see William Eagleton, The 
Kurdish Republic of 1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 47-54. Referring to the Young Turks 
government, Sir Mark Sykes argued that the aim of the policy of the settlement of tribes was ‘the 
pacification of so-called turbulent [Kurdish] tribes, who, as history has shown, never gave the least trouble 
to a just or even moderately strong government, and, who, if treated with ordinary kindness, are a bulwark 
of strength in time of war’. For this see Sykes, Last Heritage, 404. 
11 Fraser, Narratives of a Journey, 160. 
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We hear little or nothing of the state of the people, or the face of the country; these may 
have been poor, wretched, and desert as now; while the king and his court were dazzling 
strangers by their magnificence and ostentation, these were probably supported as at 
present, by grinding his unfortunate subjects to the bones; the population may have been 
as scanty, the cultivation as rare as at this day […] An estimate of the condition of any 
country formed from descriptions of scenes in which kings, nobles, and rich men are 
almost the only actors, would be as fallacious, as a judgment of the real state of England 
or France, founded on accounts of the transactions at Carleton House, or the Louvre.12 
   
Applying to the whole land of Iran, Fraser’s depiction of a situation, where ‘the class of 
farmers and cultivators’ lived ‘continually under a system of extortion and injustice’, 
illustrates distressing social conditions of the time.13 The structure of the Kurdish society 
was characterised by powerful tribes, the agricultural activity in the rural areas by non-
tribal groups, small towns and a vast number of villages. The fact that Kurdistan up till 
the 1960s witnessed a sluggish urbanisation confirms this picture of early twentieth-
century Kurdish society, although Reza Shah’s forced settlement of the tribes and, in later 
decades, their more voluntary settlements, benefited population growth in both village 
and city. Rural life was characterised by an unequal relationship between the landowner 
and the peasant who had to provide the former with various forms of rents in order to 
ensure survival, residency in the village and cultivate the land.  
Kinship, clan and other ties characterised social bonds, while equally strong were also 
religious loyalties to genealogically authoritative sheikhs and spiritual adherence to 
various Sufi movements which originated religious orders and institutions such as tariqa 
                                                          
12 Ibid., 160-61. 
13 Ibid., 173. 
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and khanaqa, respectively.14 Shari‘a (Islamic law) and ‘urf (tradition) regulated the social 
and religious life, and, in spite of being mostly identified as the followers of the Shafi‘i 
legal school in Sunni Islam, the Kurdish region religiously came to be known as very 
diverse, incorporating communities affiliated to other religions or schools of law. 
Although Kurdish culture was inseparable from religious values and institutions, din 
(religion) and ‘ilm (knowledge/science), as it was understood in pre-modern times, had 
historically coexisted and not opposed each other. Texts by Kurdish authors who were at 
the same time devoted religious individuals reflected this coexistence. In his history of 
Kurdistan (1597), Sharaf Khan defines history as ‘ilm which enhances ‘wisdom to find 
truth’ while, upon encounter with modernity, Hajji Qadir Koyi’s poetry in the end of the 
nineteenth century was distinguished by his appeal to science and reason in order to 
elevate the Kurds to the rank of a ‘nation’.15 Scientific subjects formed important parts of 
the curriculum in religious schools where, for example, astronomy and astrology, 
language, and Aristotle’s logic were taught.16 However, this relatively harmonious 
coexistence was also partly due to the fact that religion and the social position of its 
representative class had not yet faced the onslaught of modern natural sciences. 
Furthermore, illiteracy was widespread while education was ‘in the hands of a few 
learned families’.17 Attached to the mosque, Hojra and khanaqa (religious centres of 
education) trained faqeh (Ku. religious student) and mala (Ku. the teacher of shari‘a) 
whom upon graduation led religious duties in villages.18 They studied religious texts but 
                                                          
14 For more discussions on such terms see M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 220-23 and 81. 
15 See, respectively, Sharaf Khan Bitlisi, The Sharafnameh: The Complete History of Kurdistan (in Persian) 
(Iran: Asatir, 1377 [1998]), 9; and  Haji Qadir Koyi, Diwan (Kurdish) (Stockholm: Nefel, 2004), 106-07. 
16 ʿAbd-Allāh Mardūḵ, "The Madrasa in Sunni Kurdistan," in Encyclopaedia Iranica, 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/education-vi-the-madrasa-in-sunni-kurdistan, accessed 15 March 
2017. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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also Kurdish, Persian and Arabic literature.19 Both religious and literary figures built 
spiritual and intellectual bridges between regions until the emerging nation-states 
effectively hindered the regional connection between peoples and created fixed, physical 
borders instead. Until the mid-twentieth century, the fabric of Kurdish literates was 
composed of mainly hojra-educated, who conveyed ideas and influenced thought. The 
modern states’ modernisations had already begun to affect this composition by both 
introducing and popularising a nationally inspired modern education, which gradually but 
effectively revolutionised the existing systems of learning. 
The modern state also introduced notions of healthcare and hygienisation. Orientalist 
accounts on the nineteenth and early twentieth century claim that the Kurds were almost 
unaware of healthcare and did not pay attention to hygiene while infectious diseases 
among them were widespread and the nomads suffered from rheumatism.20 The 
foundations of public education and healthcare in Iranian Kurdistan–this applies to other 
peripheral regions as well–were laid down in the reign of Reza Shah (1925-1941), 
however, these institutions spread in the second half of the twentieth century, specifically 
in the era of the White Revolution (1963-1979). 
A weak infrastructure in a mountainous land hindered communication and had a 
negative effect, as noted by Ervand Abrahamian, also on the expansion of trade.21 These 
contributed to the isolation of villages which thus had to rely on a self-sufficient economy. 
In the course of the nineteenth century, the movement of multilingual Kurdish literates, 
poets and religious educated had compensated for the absence of the means of 
                                                          
19 Cf. Maref Khaznadar, The History of Kurdish Literature: The 19th Century and the Early 20th Century 
(Kurdish), ed. Dr Kurdustan Mukriani, 4 vols. (Kurdistan, Hawler: The Education Ministry Publication, 
2004). 
20 Nikitin, Kord Wa Kordestan, 230-31. 
21 Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 13. 
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communication, and their literary endeavours intertwined with social and political 
developments in Kurdish societies under the Emirates.22 Their journeys and the ideas they 
conveyed were significant for spreading knowledge as well as connecting various 
regions.23 However, this does not conceal a closed structure of Kurdish societies which 
seemed to be uninformed about important political upheavals of the time. For example, 
Kurdish literature (represented mainly by poetry) did not reflect the impact of movements 
such as Sheikhism or Babism in the first half of the nineteenth century that preceded later 
movements of the century and ultimately that of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. 
The lack of data can also be attributed to the ignorance of researchers who have been 
conventionally more interested in origins and genealogies of peoples and ruling families. 
Nevertheless, ineffective communications system, or complete lack of it, made these 
regions politically isolated. 
Women were active participants in agriculture, animal husbandry, the village and 
nomadic life and in the upbringing of the children. While approaching a Kurdish town 
around 1890, Mrs Bishop observed ‘Kurdish women unveiled, and walking with a firm 
masculine stride, even when carrying children on their backs’.24 Orientalist accounts 
depict Kurdish women capable of ‘hosting strangers in the absence of the men of the 
household’, brave and active.25 Carpet weaving based on women’s labour satisfied the 
agha household’s luxurious needs and the existing carpet trade as well. This craft 
                                                          
22 See Khaznadar, The History of Kurdish Literature. 
23 Maref Khaznadar, The History of Kurdish Literature: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Kurdish), 
Vol. 4 (Kurdistan, Hawler: The Education Ministry, 2004), 21. Another example is Sayyid Abdulrahim 
known as Mavlavi (1806-1883) who frequently travelled to Iran. 
24 Bishop, Journeys in Persia and Kurdistan, V. 2, 207. Unveiled Kurdish women attracted all Europeans 
like Sykes who contrasted them to (Turkish) women in ‘Turkified’ Anatolia. Sykes, Last Heritage, 405. 
25 Cf. Nikitin, Kord Wa Kordestan, 223-28. 
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continued to remain a permanent aspect of Kurdish rural life.26 Women also rose to 
preeminent literary positions but only among the literate, the upper class and ruling elites 
of Kurdistan. Mastura Ardalan (1804-1848), known as Mastura Kurdistani, in the ruling 
Ardalan family was a historian and poet. Other ruling families such as Soran and Jaf also 
yielded ruling women. In the course of the sixteenth century when the Ottoman governor 
imprisoned Suleiman bag, the mir (Ku. ruler) of the powerful Soran Emirate, Suleiman’s 
sister, Khanzad, ruled the Emirate for a few years.27 ‘Adila Khanim, the governor of 
Halabja in the early twentieth century came from the famous Jaf tribe. Both are 
remembered by posterity as just and capable rulers. 
As Abrahamian has noted ‘the nineteenth century remains the dark age for Iranian 
statistics’.28 This, as regards the Kurds, extends to 1956 when the government carried out 
the first official census. Moreover, porous geographical and cultural boundaries between 
various communities in that century render it difficult to collect data on a society which 
had not yet been defined as ‘Iranian Kurdistan’. It is nonetheless estimated that of a 
population of nearly seven million living in Qajar Iran in the 1850s, 800,000 were 
Kurds.29 This high number also includes the population resided in regions which later did 
not form parts of Iranian Kurdistan. According to Vaqaye‘ Negar-e Kordestani (Kurdistan 
Gazette), the Kurdish region under the Qajar rule had a population of 600,000 in 1874. It 
was administratively divided into 17 blocs, each comprised of a qasaba or small town 
administering a number of villages, and a city, i.e. Sanandaj with a population of 24,744.30 
                                                          
26 The French ambassador, Eugene Aubin, recalls in his travelogue (1907-1908) ‘beautiful carpets which 
had been weaved for the agha by women in their free time in winter’. Eugene Aubin, Iran Emrouz 1907-
1908 [Iran Today] (Iran: Zawarm, 1362 [1984-5]), 110. 
27 Maref Khaznadar, The History of Kurdish Literature: From the Beginning until the Fourteenth Century 
(Kurdish), Vol. 1 (Kurdistan, Hawler: Education Ministry, 2001), 17-18. 
28 Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 12. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Mehdi Rezayi, "A Study of Low-Birth Rate in Iranian Kurdistan,"  PhD Thesis, University of Tehran, 
2011. 
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Bishop, who published her memoir in 1891 after traveling to Kurdistan, claims that Sauj 
Blagh (modern Mahabad), an economically important town in northern part, had a 
population of 5,000.31 Lastly, to these figures on the number of the Kurdish population 
we should add other Kurdish communities who lived in other parts of Iran, for example, 
in Khurasan in northeast and Mazandaran in north. 
Therefore, such dominant socio-economic features, a landowner-peasant relation, 
geographical obstacles, weak infrastructure and ineffective means of communications, a 
self-sufficient, predominantly rural and illiterate society continued to characterise Iranian 
Kurdistan until the first half of the twentieth century.  
 
MODERNITY 
The Constitutional Revolutions of the early twentieth century in both Qajar Iran and the 
Ottoman Empire marked the effective encounter of the Kurds with modernity, a 
framework in which European ideas assumed cultural superiority. Modernity introduced 
the notions of law, justice system, progress, education and representation. It also 
inaugurated ideas of nation, nation-state and fixed border, reflected in later political 
developments. Consequently, the political landscape of the Kurdish region was 
profoundly altered in the decades following the Constitutional Revolution. Documents 
pertaining to the constitutional years until the outbreak of the First World War 
demonstrate the impact of the revolution and its ideas throughout the Kurdish region. 
Correspondence exchanged between the Majlis and anjoman-e Eyalati or the provincial 
representative body of Kurdistan along with complaints made by guilds and prominent 
                                                          
31 Bishop, Journeys in Persia and Kurdistan, V. 2, 207. 
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figures to the Majlis are framed around such concepts to justify their works, support their 
critiques and present their demands more effectively.32  
In general, two aspects of Kurdish society, tribal and non-tribal, began to be 
reshaped in different ways. Historiography and anthropology have been lopsided on 
Kurdish tribal history. This is understandable because a large portion of the population 
lived under the rule of the tribes, which were known for their military prowess, economic 
resources and territorial possessions (see Figure 2). The political changes in Iran elicited 
resistance on behalf of the tribes such as the Kalhors and the Shikaks. The Kalhor tribes 
presumably preferred the status quo and in 1911 ‘supported the abortive military move of 
Salar ad Dola against the Constitutionalist government in Tehran’.33 Located in the 
northwest of Iran and estimated to have numbered around 2000 families in 1921, the 
Shikak confederacy under the leadership of the famous Simko continued to challenge the 
Iranian government’s authority with demands to secure a ‘Kurdish’ rule.34 Although, the 
ideas of ‘nation’ and ‘nation-state’ inspired the rebellion of Simko in Kurdistan, in 
retrospect it did not demonstrate political cohesiveness in that direction. The confederacy 
spread over a vast region between the Ottoman and Qajar Empires. It was consisted of 
two main branches of ‘Abduiy and Kardar, each of which was divided into eight and 
thirteen tribes, respectively. The Shikaks were nomads and were engaged in animal 
husbandry as their source of economic power. According to Sanar Mamedi, one of the 
later leaders of the powerful Mamedi tribe (in the Kardar branch), ‘until 1941 the Shikaks 
                                                          
32 Cf. document 31 and 32, correspondence of spring 1911, in Reza Azari Sharzayi (ed.), Asnade 
Baharestan (1): Gozideye Asnadi Az Waqaye' Mashroote Dar Kordestan Wa Kermanshahan [Bahrestan 
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disdained agriculture. They looked down at the Kirmanjs [settled, farming Kurds] and 
considered them as their own servants, while coercing them into forced labour’.35 The 
confederacy lost unity and its political power with the emergence of modern, centralised 
states. The quelling of the rebellion of Simko by the early 1930s was followed by forced, 
and later more voluntary, settlements of the Shikaks as well as their forced migration to 
other parts of Iran. Moreover, modern territorial borders resulted in the division of the 
confederacy and reorientation of its subtribes’ loyalties to different states. 
Moreover, based on contemporary appeals addressed to the Majlis for help, 
Kurdish tribes interrupted the processes of the formation of provincial administration and 
political participation of the population in the Kurdish region because these went against 
their political and economic powers.36 However, decisively defeated by Reza Shah, 
Kurdish tribes in Iran re-emerged with his abdication following the outbreak of the 
Second World War. They played a crucial role in the formation of the Kurdistan Republic 
of 1946, which, ironically, both as an idea and a political platform was not the culmination 
of tribal politics. They formed the Republic’s military backbone and their chiefs were 
engaged in negotiations with the Soviet, the Azerbaijani and Iranian governments.37 
Tribal interests, however, prevented unity in action and even caused defection and further 
intertribal conflicts.38 The end of the Republic in January 1947, and the intensification of 
the modernisation of Iran effectively diminished their political power.39 
                                                          
35 Sanar Mamedi, Khaterat Wa Dardha [Memorandom and Pains], Vol. 1 (Sweden: Alfabet Maxima, 
2000), 14 and 14-16. 
36 Cf. document 54, which contains a correspondence as of 1911, in Sharzayi, Asnade Baharestan, 98-
101. 
37 As Eagleton noted, ‘the Republic overcame the most disrupting factors in large-scale tribal movements, 
i.e. the foraging which often led to looting’. Eagleton, Kurdish Republic, 94. 
38 ‘The Kurds of Persia’, dated 28 March 1946, TNA, FO371/52702 E2782/104/34 confirms a previous 
statement that ‘The Kurds of Persia are hopelessly divided among themselves’. 
39 For more on Kurdish tribes see Eagleton, Kurdish Republic, 16-23. 
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2. Main tribal areas in Iranian and Iraqi Kurdistan [first half of the twentieth century]. 
 
Source: Eagleton, Kurdish Republic, 19. 
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Insofar as non-tribal Kurdistan was concerned, Iran’s Constitutional Revolution 
inspired the formation of anjomans or societies by Kurdish literates, for example in major 
cities like Sanandaj, Kermanshah and Sauj Blagh, followed by the publication of irregular 
journals.40 It engaged the Kurds with the ideas of law, Majlis and representation.41 It 
inspired many to attempt to spread modern schools, a process which was interrupted not 
only because of political instability but also because of lack of support.42  
 Furthermore, nationalist movements and ideas began to spread manifest in 
various Kurdish political movements which exerted regional impacts too. The modern 
Iranian nation-state’s educational, political and socio-economic requirements shaped a 
Kurdish urbanised (non-tribal) environment from which a new educated generation 
emerged. Organisational and ideological approaches attest to this fact and are symbolised 
by the first political organisation, Komala-i Zhiyanawai-i Kurd (Ku. the Organisation of 
Kurdish Revival, 1942-1945) or Zhe Kaf. This nationalist, progressive organisation was 
founded by a group of urbanised educated or, in Eagleton’s words, ‘middle class citizens’ 
who also paved the way for the formation of the Kurdistan Republic.43 Furthermore, the 
modern administrative structure of the Republic differentiated its functions in various 
ministries such as Health, Education, Economics, Labour, Justice, Road and Agriculture. 
This simultaneously reflected preoccupation with reforms and economic plans as well as 
with ideas which tribal politics could not have and did not intend to, induce.44 
Furthermore, political demands increasingly began to reflect socio-economic and political 
                                                          
40 Muhammad Mardukh claims to have founded Anjoman-e Sedaqat in Sanandaj in the time of the 
Constitutional Revolution. Mardukh, Mezhui Kurd, 483. 
41 For the representatives from the Kurdish region see Kaveh, Year 1, No. 29 and 30, 8-9. 
42 A correspondence as of May 1911 addressed to the Majlis complains about ‘bad intentions’ on behalf 
of some [powerful people] and demands the reopening of Ma‘refat school which had been functioning for 
the previous three years. For this see document 49 in Sharzayi, Asnade Baharestan, 91-93. 
43 Eagleton, Kurdish Republic, 33. For their names see ibid., 133. 
44 For a list of the Republic’s ministries see ibid., 134. 
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transformations. For example, the ideas of self-determination and autonomy in the 
framework of Iran had gained grounds in political vocabularies by the early 1920s. As 
regards these ideas and resulting from prolonged political instability, a contributing factor 
was intensifying tension between a growing will for centralisation of power and 
decentralisation represented by provincial councils.45 Simultaneously, although 
nationalism inspired separatist demands, these demands gradually lost touch with reality, 
that is, socio-economic and political situations. In contrast, autonomy in the framework 
of Iran increasingly reflected the dual process of modernisation and homogenisation of 
identity which reproduced the tension between centralisation and decentralisation. This 
process paradoxically accelerated socio-economic integrations of ethnically distinctive 
societies in modern Iran, on the one hand, and created conditions for the survival of their 
ethnic identities through ethnic struggle, on the other (see Chapter 2).  
Finally, new borders and their fixation shaped modern Kurdish societies 
territorially. Borders were redefined as the result of two processes: first, the idea of a 
powerful centralised state which, in turn, would end cross-border tribal conflicts; and 
secondly, attempts to serve socio-economic interests of Britain and Russia and secure the 
production of oil—this was done with absolute neglect of the tribal populations’ socio-
economic interests.46 Indeed, the famous Sykes–Picot Agreement had been preceded by 
a common commission, authorised by Russia and England and led by Vladimir Minorsky 
and Sir Arnold Wilson, between December 1913 and October 1914.47 Oil had become a 
                                                          
45 See Touraj Atabaki, Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and Struggle for Power in Iran (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 
54-59. For example, since the start of the Constitutional Revolution, Iranian Azerbaijan had become a 
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46 Sir Arnold Wilson, Sw. Persia: A Political Officer’s Diary 1907-1914 (London: Oxford University Press, 
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48 
 
primary factor and ‘it mattered less where the line should lie that it should be laid down 
definitely somewhere, for, until that had been done no development [in oil wells] was 
possible’.48 In this respect, ‘a strong central government’ was advocated to put an end to 
‘inter-tribal feuds and raids’ that had desolated the land and ruined villages.49 
Territorially, therefore, fixed geographical and cultural borders replaced hitherto 
permeable ones, effectively separating Iranian Kurdistan from other Kurdish societies, 
which were each ultimately redefined as a nation-state’s Kurdistan—modern Turkey and 
Syria did not recognise Kurdistan, whereas Iran’s and Iraq’s administrative divisions, 
albeit for different reasons (see below), consisted of a Kurdistan Province.  
 
THE IMPACT OF THE GREAT WAR 
Meanwhile, the Great War effectively interrupted the constitutionalist movement in Iran 
and paralysed attempts to implement modernising reforms. The legacy of the war proved 
to be enduring. Regions occupied by the Kurds suffered immensely and the presence of 
Russia, Britain and the Ottoman Empire in Iran and their rivalry in the north and 
northwest, where the Kurds lived, made this region one of the battlefields of the Great 
War. Kaveh, a contemporary journal published by a number of Iranian intellectuals in 
Berlin, included regular war reports and maps which illustrated the Kurdish region in the 
heart of the belligerent sides’ rivalries.50 In the aftermath of the war, journals in the mid-
1920s still reported ‘widespread poverty and unemployment’, urging the government to 
establish factories and pay more heed to agriculture.51 During the War, the Kurds suffered 
hunger and death in a great scale while mass migration in search of food took place several 
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50 Kaveh, 127-129. 
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times: ‘waves after waves of [Kurdish speaking] people from Iran arrived in Sulaimaniya 
[in Ottoman Kurdistan] where the death toll had already reached ten per day. They begged 
and in some cases women sold their bodies in order to survive’.52 Nevertheless, in many 
respects the war had only exacerbated political and economic situations. Contemporary 
correspondence of the pre-war years from Kurdistan province complained about a sense 
of being abandoned ‘in the hands of estebdad [despotism] of the local rulers’ and in the 
face of the devastating impact of the presence of the Ottoman forces since the mid-1900s 
in some areas, frequent pillages and insecurity. Moreover, they uncover many cases of 
corruption and refer to the interruption of the expansion of mo‘aref  or (modern) education 
by closing down schools in many areas.53  
Famine and hunger, cold winters and bad harvests in the 1920s and 1930s soon were 
to be followed by the outbreak of the Second World War, the drastic consequences of 
which exacerbated living conditions. The government introduced a system of rationing 
of staple food such as sugar, tea, bread, and cotton in Tehran in 1941 and later Ministry 
of Food is claimed to have issued ration cards to the senior officials in the provinces.54 
However, the absence of census data and widespread bribery and fraud rendered the 
system and also the distribution of food and ration cards insufficient and ineffective.55 
Geographical barriers and war presumably created additional hindrance for such efforts. 
Moreover, bread riots and political instability destroyed the system in many towns.56 The 
exception was the Kurdish region administered by the Kurdish Republic in 1946, where 
                                                          
52 Rafiq Hilmi, Yaddasht [Notes] (Iraq: Roshinbiri Lawan Press, 1988), 32-3. 
53 Cf. documents 32 Sharzayi, Asnade Baharestan, 69-73. 
54 E. M. H. Lloyd, Food and Inflation in the Middle East, 1940-45 (California: Stanford University Press, 
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55 Ibid., 241. 
56 Ibid., 242. 
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the shortages of staple food were to some extent overcome due to the good harvest of 
1944, the sale of the entire Kurdish tobacco supply to Russia, and the collection of taxes.57 
However, lingering inflation and shortages of food, exacerbated by a weak 
infrastructure and a fragile economy, continued into the Second World War and outlasted 
the reign of Reza Shah. For example, a widespread famine in Kurdistan which had 
followed the cold winter of 1947, brought about inhumane economic practices. As soon 
as the news reached Hemin that a young girl was being bartered for a sack of flour, he 
recalled in his famous Tark u Run (Dark and Light), he embarked to investigate and began 
to ask ‘a group of village women what was happening [...] they started to spit in the other 
man’s face who had intended to buy the girl, and [then] run to bring as much flour as they 
could find [to prevent the trade].58 Referring to all humanity and highlighting the 
consequences of the war in his own region, Hemin Mukriyani (Muhammad Amin 
Sheikhuleslami, 1921-1986) maintained metaphorically that ‘while mankind in the 
twentieth century had created and used atom, radars, and even invaded the moon, I 
witnessed how human beings grazed in the grazing fields’.59 
 
In brief, a Kurdish man and woman in the nineteenth and early twentieth century was 
under the yoke of agha and tribal chiefs, and the literature mainly represented their class 
and ruling families. A self-sufficient economy and a weak infrastructure characterised the 
Kurdish region which was mainly rural with a number of small towns. Facilities to 
ameliorate social conditions were absent, so was the state itself except for its military 
ventures. The political developments since the early twentieth century originated political 
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processes which, influenced by the dissemination of new ideas, war and political 
instability, began to reshape Kurdish tribal and non-tribal societies in Iran. Moreover, 
modern state and border effectively separated the Kurds in Iran from other Kurdish 
communities in adjacent regions while modernity in the shape of modern institutional, 
social and political ideas yielded an urbanised, educated generation who added a new 
aspect to Iran’s Kurdish society hitherto dominated by tribes and the agha class. By the 
mid-twentieth century, the tribes’ military and political power declined as the result of a 
centralising and modernising state’s oppressive policies as well as socio-economic 
transformation. However, their ownership of the village and the peasant in an oppressive 
economic structure, ensured by their monopoly of the legitimate use of violence against 
the poor, survived. In general, redefined as an ‘ethnic minority’, socio-economic and 
political transformations facilitated the Kurds’ socio-economic transformation into 
modern Iran. The next section deals with this unequal integration. 
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3. Kurdistan as a battlefield in the First World War. 
 
 
The thick line in this modified map (texts in white are added) shows the battlefield from the Black Sea (1) through the Kurdish 
region, Lake Van (2) and Lake Urumia (3), to Hamadan (4) in South. The footnote reads ‘the battlefield in Caucasus, Iran and the 
Arab Iraq’. Source: Kaveh, 127. 
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THE INTEGRATING TENDENCIES OF MODERNISATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
The state-led modernisation and socio-economic change since the 1920s maintained their 
tendency to strengthen social, economic and cultural bonds between various societies in 
Iran. The prevalent modernising discourse of the time, reflected in contemporary journals 
such as Ayandeh, advocated the integration of Iranian Kurds by expanding socio-
economic developments. Two other manifestations of this tendency included the Kurds’ 
political and cultural demands, that began to revolve around autonomy in the framework 
of Iran and not independence in different historical conjuncture, and the intensified social 
change during the era of the White Revolution, which profoundly changed Iran in the 
same direction. In fact, this tendency determined the course of both state-led 
modernisation and transformation in Iran throughout the twentieth century with the effect 
that by the time of the 1979 Revolution Kurdish-Iranian society had become both socio-
economically and culturally inseparable from modern Iran. However, the growth of such 
inseparable qualities never negated cultural or political demands embodied in Kurdayeti. 
Discussed in the next chapter, this refers to a paradox rather than a contradiction and to 
the way the relationship between modernisation and identity was determined by both 
these integrating tendencies and the resistance of Kurdayeti.  
Following the constitutional era, the reign of Reza Shah (1925-41) is another 
significant era for its politics of modernisation, laying the foundations of modern 
institutions, despite sluggish socio-economic change, and modernising the political 
structure of Kurdish society along national lines. Politically, as the reign of Reza Shah 
regressed from the parliamentary rule and liberalism to an authoritarian and nationalist 
monarchy, it marked the end of the ideals of the Constitutional Revolution and the 
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formation of a centralised state;60 a state which came to be firmly based on the pillars of 
modern Iranian identity, namely national unity (one nation one language) and territorial 
integrity. 
 
KURDISTAN AND THE POLITICS OF MODERNISATION, 1920-1960 
The modern social and political structures of Kurdish society was shaped by the process 
of the formation of a centralising and rationalising nation-state in Iran, the requirements 
of which determined its policies in Kurdistan. The early decades of the modern Iranian 
state were significant for an effective start towards the social integration of all 
linguistically and culturally distinctive societies in modern Iran. Politically integrating 
elements comprised both rationalising and coercive institutions, namely an efficient 
bureaucracy and a national army, while socially integrating elements included, but were 
not restricted to, educational, socio-economic and judicial reforms. Such reforms 
originated in the ideas and reforming efforts at least since the second constitutional Majlis 
in 1909 after Muhammad Ali Shah’s anti-Constitutional coup failed and he was 
subsequently abdicated.61 In addition to war, as many intellectuals argue, the absence of 
‘national unity’ and, crucially, the absence of ‘public education’ and resistance to 
European culture and ideas were explained as obstacles to reform and progress.62 
Nevertheless, while in the spiritual sphere religious and secular thought yielded varied 
opinions on the roots of the ‘backwardness’ of Iran–in the material sphere there was a 
consensus to employ European advanced technology–a personified, central power never 
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featured in such arguments.63 An influential journal such as Kaveh (1916-1922) 
continuously emphasised Iranian national unity, Europeanisation of culture, public 
education and Persian language.64 Noted by historians of Iran, in the intellectual sphere 
the argument was usually for a central authority, and this was also voiced by Kurdish 
intellectuals such as Muhammad Mardukh, who, celebrating Nowruz in 1919, wondered 
‘why has not this strong and erudite [Iranian] state been able to end the chaos [in 
Kurdistan] in recent [post Constitutional] years?65 
However, the emergence of Reza Khan (later Reza Shah) induced inclinations towards 
a powerful centralised state in order to end political instability, implement reforms, and 
ensure national unity and territorial integrity of Iran. Intellectuals and able statesmen such 
as Mahmud Afshar, Ali Akbar Davar and Muhammad Foroughi regarded Reza Shah vital 
for the creation of the modern, Iranian nation-state,66 and although constitutionalists, 
including Hassan Taqizadeh, a veteran of the Constitutional Revolution, opposed the 
change of the dynasty for constitutional reasons, they regarded Reza Khan in the same 
way.67 As an illustration of this popular attitude towards Reza Khan, in the struggle to 
establish a modern judicial system to introduce and enforce new laws many prominent 
figures had strived against cultural and religious obstacles until, as Foroughi recalls, 
‘there was a total change of fortune [in their favour] with the rise of Reza Shah Pahlavi’.68 
Support for the establishment of the dynasty also came from other layers of society. As 
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Homa Katouzian concludes, in 1926 the emerging Pahlavi state claimed ‘a broad support 
among the country’s various influential elites’ such as landlords, provincial magnates and 
leading merchants.69 
The state in much of the first Pahlavi era endeavoured to fulfil the requisites for a 
modern, centralised nation-state as the institutional condition for the realisation of the 
long-standing will to reform, constantly interrupted by the presence and rivalry of the 
great powers in Iran and political instability.70 Indeed, its efforts, however oppressive, 
were also dictated by historical facts–a prolonged instability and indirect colonialism–as 
well as by the need of a modern state to function effectively. Ultimately, however, both 
Pahlavi eras witnessed the concentration of political authority in the monarch, whereas 
many Iranian intellectuals had stipulated a progressive (erteqayi), constitutional system 
to tackle ‘the unsteadiness of the central government, the chaos of the central 
administration, political instability and insecurity’ against a ‘regressive’ (qahqaraiy) 
administration under previous Qajar kings.71 Instead, except for the period between the 
outbreak of the Second World War, which entailed sever financial and political crisis with 
paralysing effects, and the coup of 1953 against Muhammad Musaddeq, the state turned 
into a powerful, centralised authority surrounded by a cult of personality.72 Therefore, 
Reza Shah purged those who had been pivotal for the formation of the Iranian nation-
state, and Muhammad Reza Shah (1941-1979) side-lined planners, appropriated their 
ideas, and found around himself uncritical statesmen, legitimising his political 
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involvement on the grounds of ‘the deficiency in the political system’.73 Ultimately, both 
the Shahs overlooked collective efforts in favour of the glory of a nationalist dynasty. 
Although between 1941 and 1953 the Majlis and the press managed to manoeuvre more 
freely, the state remained politically oppressive in Kurdistan. For example, the cultural 
and political revival of the early 1940s ended when the army finally suppressed the 
experience of Mahabad in 1946, subsequently forcing a considerable number of political 
and cultural activists into prolonged exile, while, with the help of the landowners, the 
state brutally quelled the peasant uprising in the region around Bukan (1952-1953).74 In 
fact, the poet Hazhar’s (Abdulrahman Sharafkandi, 1921-1991) memoirs entitled Cheshti 
Mijawir is an account of him and many others, who spent three decades in exile following 
the end of the Kurdish Republic of 1946. 
Against this background, policies and reforms in the process of the formation of the 
Iranian nation-state under the Pahlavis began to alter the social and political structures of 
Kurdish-Iranian society. To avoid simplifying the politics of modernisation into mere 
adversarial attitudes towards the Kurds, one can identify at least two issues surrounding 
the state’s linguistic policies to demonstrate how the linguistic policies of the state derived 
from its linguistic requirements: first, the continuation of the drive for linguistic 
simplification since the early nineteenth century and the lack of a radical purification of 
Persian until well into the second Pahlavi era;75 and secondly, the need of a modern state 
for new legal, economic, scientific and educational vocabularies. For example, the 1935 
                                                          
73 Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mission for My Country (London: Hutchinson, 1991), 220-21. 
74 Another example is Ghani Blurian (1924-2011) who was a young activist in the time of the Republic and 
later spent almost three decades in prison. For this see Ghani Blurian, Alakok (in Persian) (Tehran: Farhange 
Rasa, 1384 [2005]); for the peasant uprising see Amir Hassanpour, "Raparini Verzerani Mukriyan, 1331-
1332," [The Peasant uprising of Mukriyan, 1952-1953], Derwaze, No. 1 (Apr.-May 2017). 
75 Muhammad Ali Jamalzadeh’s Yeki Bud Yeki Nabud (1921), a collection of short stories, was primarily a 
fierce criticism of using French and Arabic words not necessarily for their ‘nationality’ but for being 
incomprehensible. 
58 
 
Constitution of the First Academy (1935-1941) calls for replacing unsuitable foreign 
words with equivalents used among ‘the artisans [...] in poetry or in local songs’.76 
Moreover, suggested vocabularies for various professions, specifically the army but also 
for the sciences corresponded to institutional reforms. However, one familiar with such 
vocabularies will notice that a considerable number of the suggested words were never 
popularised nor did they ever replace the old one.77 Undoubtedly, anti-Arabic and Turkish 
sentiments, as well as a pride in Persian inspired such efforts, though they divided 
opinions too.78 The state banned using Kurdish as the language of education and 
administration but instruction and communication in Kurdish between teachers and 
students and also in government offices continued in spite of early encouragements to 
speak only Persian. However, a persistent Kurdayeti and, in spite of intermittent coercive 
measures, the absence of both a radical linguistic oppression and total ethnic denial in 
Iran, as it was the case, for example, in contemporary Turkey, helped Kurdish to flourish, 
embodied in continuous literary activities. Although Hassanpour’s authoritative 
Language and Nationalism in Kurdistan 1918-1985 discusses linguistic policies of new 
modern nation-states, including Iran, a more in-depth reading of the role of language in 
the formation of the Iranian national identity since the end of the nineteenth century 
highlights a dual process of linguistic simplification and a modest, rather than a radical, 
linguistic purification until the 1970s. 
In addition to oppressive linguistic policies, the politics of modernisation comprised 
other significant measures such as administrative division and the constant presence of 
                                                          
76 Mohsen Rustayi, Tarikhe Nokhostin Farhangestane Iran [The History of the First Iranian Academy] 
(Iran: Nei Publications, 1385 [2006-7]). 
77 Ibid., 345-478. 
78 Hosain Makki, Tarikh-E Bist Sale Ye Iran [Twenty Years History of Iran], Vol. 6 (Tehran: Entesharat 
Elmi, 1374 [1995]), 235  cited in Ansari, Politics of Nationalism, 99. 
59 
 
the gendarmerie to ensure the consolidation of the central authority and the political 
integration of the Kurds into modern Iran— by now gendarmerie had been deprived of 
its constitutional functions and radically reshaped in the wake of Khyabani’s and Lahuti’s 
rebellions.79 With no regards to ethnic rights and guided by political considerations, the 
constant practice of administrative division of Iran established a precedent for arbitrarily 
(re)division of the Kurdish region in Iran among the neighbouring provinces. Prior to the 
modern border, the contours of the existing and old ruling Kurdish Emirates or 
principalities delineated a map of Kurdistan divided among its ruling Emirates. The 
Kurdish region, which later became ‘Iranian Kurdistan’, comprised the regions under 
tribal confederacies such as the Shikak and the ruling Emirates of Mukrian, Ardalan and 
Baban. As additional centres of power, there were other ruling families in and around 
Kermanshah. This division of power naturally left a legacy for later administrative and 
electoral laws of succeeding Iranian governments since the Constitutional Revolution 
until Reza Khan’s coup of 1921. In addition to this, geographical proximity (in the 
absence of effective means of communication and a weak infrastructure) and existing 
economic relationships, rather than the idea of modern border and identity, were behind 
such decisions and laws.  
Administrative policies under various ruling dynasties since the early modern period 
had attempted to pacify the local powers and ensure the effective collection of revenue 
(e.g. custom and land tax) needed to maintain the court, bureaucracy and the army.80 
However, as an important break with the way administration was organised in the past, 
the impact of Europe on nineteenth-century Iran resulted in the expansion of bureaucracy 
                                                          
79 See chapters on the role of gendarmerie and these rebellions in Cronin, Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns 
in Iran. 
80 S. Bakhash, "Administration in Iran Vi. Safavid, Zand, and Qajar Periods," in Encyclopaedia Iranica, 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/administration-vi-safavid, accessed 13 February 2017. 
60 
 
under the Qajars and later the introduction of new electoral laws after the Constitutional 
Revolution.81 The first law concerning with administrative division was passed in this 
period and divided Iran into a number of ayalats, with their own ‘central government’, 
and velayats (sub-ayalat regions with an important city). Factors of modern border and 
national identity did not shape provincial policies, although, presumably, the Ottoman 
Empire and the ruling Iranian dynasties had constantly perceived Kurdish ethnic identity 
as a threat to their central authorities because of the role Kurdish ruling families could 
have played in imperial rivalries. Indeed, such modern factors gained ascendency when, 
in the process of forming the Iranian nation-state in the 1920s and 1930s, Kurdish ethnic 
identity became inimical to the ‘national unity’ of Iran. For example, it seems that the 
electoral law of 1909 allocated Sauj Blagh as a constituency in the Azerbaijan province 
mainly because of history, electoral convenience and geographical proximity rather than 
political motivation.82 Sauj Belagh and the surrounding region had been historically in 
close connection with the Turkish-speaking region in its northwest stretched to Tabriz, 
itself an important economic, cultural, and in modern times since the early nineteenth 
century, also an ideological hub.  
The ascendency of political considerations that served an Iranian national unity began 
effectively with the rationalisation of administrative division in the process of the 
formation of the Iranian nation-state. Moreover, the expansion of modern bureaucracy 
and population increase resulted the country to be re-divided into new provinces based 
on new system of nomenclature more compatible with modern times. Iran’s National 
Council divided Iran into four ayalats (provinces) and twelve velayats (sub-provinces). 
                                                          
81 Ibid. 
82 Rahim Rezazade Malek (ed.), Enqelabe Mashrooteye Iran Be Rawayate Asnade Wazarate Khareje 
Englis [Parliamentary Papers, Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia] (Iran: Mazyar, 1377 [1998-
9]), 270 
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The new law of December 1937 replaced the ayalats with ten ostans. This was followed 
by gradual changes in which Iran was finally divided into 14 provinces in 1339 [1960-1] 
which were recognised by names instead of numbers as it was the case under the law of 
1937. Meanwhile Kurdistan Province was created in 1336 [1957-8]. Prior to this, 
Kurdistan, that is Sanandaj and a few other cities, and Mahabad were major cities which 
were allocated to the Fifth and Fourth Provinces, respectively; other minor Kurdish cities 
were administrated by these cities as bakhsh (sub-city). However, Mahabad is allocated 
to Western Azerbaijan to this day and Kurdistan Province does not represent the region 
dominantly populated by the Kurds in the west of Iran either. Modern administrative 
divisions defied notions of Kurdish ethnic and geographical unity and served ‘national 
unity’ of Iran. The rationalisation of Iran’s administrative divisions began no later than 
the Radical Party’s manifesto of 1923 under Ali Akbar Davar.83 This was the first step to 
reform the administration according to the exigencies of a modern state. However, 
although there are only little studies on this subject, they show that administrative 
divisions throughout the twentieth century have been mainly arbitrary, economically and 
politically unproductive, and failed to serve decentralisation, while ignoring, for example, 
the connection between local identity and geography (see Figure 4).84 In later decades, 
and with the emergence of a more organised Kurdayeti, administrative divisions explicitly 
became a political act to safeguard the central authority against potential Kurdish political 
movements. Moreover, from the outset, some intellectuals believed that administrative 
division should serve the same purpose as uniformity in ‘language, moral, [and] dress’ 
                                                          
83 ‘Intelligent report amended provincial administrative division’, FO 371 21895 E672/167/34, dated 15 
January 1938, quoted in Ali M. Ansari, Modern Iran: The Pahlavi and After, 2nd ed. (England: Pearson 
Education Limited, 2007), 56. Ali Akbar Davar (1885-1937), minister of justice in 1927, was the founder 
of modern Persian judicial system. 
84 See Bahador 'Alami, Naqd Wa Arziyabie Qanoon Taqsimate Keshwarie Iran [A Study of Iran's 
Administrative Divisons Law] (Tehran: Iran Parliament's Research Centre, 2013). 
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did to achieve ‘national unity’, and asked to avoid the existing ethnic names of the 
provinces too (see below).85 
Consequently, ‘Kurdistan province’ began to comprise smaller number of Kurdish 
cities and population under successive governments (see Figure 4). Guided ‘mainly by 
security considerations’, the modern state aimed to interrupt linguistic and ethnic 
commonalities between the Kurds inside Iran and the Kurdish residents of adjacent 
countries, and in this way diminish the impact of ‘external’ political movements.86 
Although this politically motivated policy never resulted in ethnic assimilation of 
annexed cities and regions into other provinces nor was it successful in diminishing 
Kurdish identity, it created a condition to deny individuals the right to prosper because of 
their ethnicity and ingrained prejudices. As crucially, it continued to conceal the 
sufferings of social and religious groups, such as the Faili Kurds, who geographically 
found themselves in the margins of Kurdistan.87 Therefore, the history of the 
administrative division of Iran is also a history of denying millions of Kurds opportunities 
to prosper socially and economically. As significant, it also created conditions prone to 
ethnic animosity in the time of political crisis among, for example, the historically mixed 
communities of the Kurds and Azaris in the north and Faili Kurds and others in Ilam in 
the south. The administrative division of Iran corresponded to the need of a modern state 
in modern time and the White Revolution was the heir to such policies and their outcomes. 
                                                          
85 Mahmud Afshar, Ayandeh, 1925, No. 1. 
86 Hamed Nohekhan, "Administrative Divisions under the Pahlavi,"  Univerisity of Shahid Beheshti at 
http://www.ensani.ir/storage/Files/20140616144106-9945-24.pdf, accessed 23 July 2016. 
87 The Faili Shi‘a Kurds have suffered in both Iran and Iraq. They faced constant banishment and forced 
settlements by the Ba‘th regime in Iraq in the 1970s. The administrative division of Iran complicated life 
for the Failis by ignoring their religious and ethnic identities. Studies on the Failis are rare. However, for a 
background reading of the Faili Kurds in modern Iraq see State and Society in Iran; and on the Faili Kurds 
in Iran see Jamil Rahmani, "Motale'eye Kaifie Mazhab Wa Qomgaraiy Dar Mian Kordhaye Shi'e," [A 
Qualitative Study of Religion and Ethnicity Among Shia Kurds], [in Persian], Jame‘eshenasi [Sociology]  
(2015). 
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4. Administrative Division of Iran 1908-1979 
  
5. The Province of Azerbaijan Gharbi 
 
6. The Province of Kurdistan 
 
7. The Province of Kermanshah 
 
 
 
The province of Azerbaijan Gharbi (West Azerbaijan) includes 
Kurdish cities south, west and north of Lake Urumia (English 
words added). 
Source: The official website of West Azerbaijan, at http://ostan-
ag.gov.ir/FaramandariMaps, accessed 03 March 2017. 
 
 
The province of Kurdistan (English words added).  
Source: The official website of Kurdistan province, at 
http://www.tamin.ir/news/9593.html, accessed 03 March 2017. 
 
 
 
The province of Kermanshah includes a number of Kurdish 
cities, including Paveh, Kermanshah and Ilam (English 
words added). 
 
 
Source: Tourism Iran, at https://tourismiran.blog.ir., accessed 
03 March 2017. 
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 8. The region populated by the Kurds in the west of Iran 
 
Areas in green show the region populated by 
the Kurds in the west of Iran. Inner borders 
indicate that the region is administered under 
different provincial centres ( ). Cultural and 
linguistic borders become thicker as they meet 
the regions populated by Turkish speaking 
people in north and northeast, and by Persian 
speaking people in south and southeast. 
 
This map is a modified part of the map below. 
 
 
Source: Institute Kurd De Paris, at http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama/map_of_kurdistan.php (accessed 03 March 
2017). 
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9. The linguistic map of the Kurdish region in Iran and in other neighbouring countries 
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REFORMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
The modern Iranian government undertook unprecedented social, institutional and 
economic reforms between 1925 and 1941. This marked the start of deliberate, centrally 
directed development in Iran. As Jahangir Amuzegar has noted, these reforms were ‘the 
outcome of a philosophy and a policy, rather than of a concrete program or strategy’.88 
Although these reforms did not entail profound alteration of the social structure of 
Kurdish society, they were significant because they (1) laid the foundation of new 
institutions into that society, reshaping its social and political structure and (2) maintained 
the tendency to socio-economic integration. The pace and scope of many aspects of such 
reforms as, for example, the spread of modern schools, healthcare, infrastructural 
development and the provision of modern facilities to ameliorate living conditions 
remained limited. Moreover, the chasm between village and city persisted as the latter 
began to benefit from reforms and feel the impact of social and technological 
transformation too; the prevalent agha-jutiar (landowner-peasant) relationship survived 
and continued to characterise an agricultural, rural Kurdish society. Moreover, the Second 
World War and the political developments that followed Reza Shah’s rule, at best 
interrupted both a sluggish state-led modernisation and the amelioration of living 
conditions in Kurdistan. In fact, economic conditions in Kurdistan under Reza Shah 
deteriorated and his rule did not entail any profound alteration in the social order of 
society with respect to social stratification, gender relations, living conditions, healthcare, 
communications and transportation.89 
                                                          
88 Jahangir Amuzegar, "Capital Formation and Development Finance," in Ehasan Yarshater (ed.), Iran 
Faces the Seventies (England: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 67. 
89 On famine and poverty in Kurdistan in this period see Karim Hesami, Le Bireweriekanim [From My 
Memoirs], 4 vols. (Uppsala: Jina Nu Forlaget, 1986); and Hazhar, Cheshti Mijawir [A Mosque Servant's 
Stew] (Iraq: Kitebi Mehregan, 2007).  
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Insofar as the state was concerned, two main factors were responsible for these 
unimpressive results. First, the state was present as a political and coercive power rather 
than a socially modernising and inclusive authority. Secondly, as scholars have noted, the 
economic objectives of Reza Shah comprised rapid industrialisation and infrastructural 
development, which mostly benefited the centre, tended to fulfil the state’s military 
requirements, and served to produce a modern, progressive and independent image of 
Iran.90 For example, economic development plans ignored agriculture and contained an 
ambitious, extravagant but uneconomical railway system from the Persian Gulf in the 
South to the Caspian Sea in the North. The cost fell on people while oil reserves could 
have been used to provide foreign loans.91 Moreover, the economic plans did not 
effectively deal with geographical hurdles (vast arable lands, lack of rivers and roads), 
though one can infer that such a hostile environment in addition to Iran’s fragile 
infrastructure were serious hurdles to overcome by any government in favour of 
agriculture. Therefore, the orientation of the economic plans and the neglect of agriculture 
disadvantaged a periphery region like Kurdistan, which relied on agriculture and had a 
fragile infrastructure. Moreover, Kurdistan continued to suffer under the centralising 
tendency of the modernisation whose second development plan (1956-1962) effectively 
marked the triumph of centralisation in its tension with decentralisation or more province-
oriented plans.  
Reports and books on the general socio-economic condition across Iran make amends 
for the lack of statistics on Kurdistan under Reza Shah. Although this period witnessed 
                                                          
90 For more on economic objectives of Reza Shah see Kamran Mofid, Development Planning in Iran: From 
Monarchy to Islamic Republic (England: MENS Press, 1987), 7-33; and for a brief account of economic 
development under Reza Shah see M. E. Yapp, The near East since the First World War: A History to 1995 
(London: Longman, 1996), 177-8. 
91 Yapp, Yapp, The near East, 177. For more on economic policies of Reza Shah and the neglect of 
agriculture see Kamran Mofid, Development Planning in Iran, 19. 
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an increase in the state’s influence and size in economy, comprehensive economic plans 
were only introduced after the Second World War. Indeed, the role of the state in economy 
prior to 1921 was confined to granting concessions to foreigners in order to stimulate the 
use of natural resources. Nevertheless, based on unequal terms, these agreements to a 
great extend formed the basin for later economic development and finance for example 
in oil industry, telegraph, bank, and railways.92 Until the end of the 1960s, the lack of 
revenue was one of the main reasons which continued to paralyse economic plans and 
delay their effective executions. As a positive aspect, however, this period witnessed the 
coming of age of a generation of Iranian political leaders and activists who initiated 
important principles of later reforms including the White Revolution.  Furthermore, in 
addition to the existing literates, an emerging urbanised educated generation in Kurdish 
society compensated for the deficiencies of the state in a number of significant ways by 
actively engaging in social and political activities, which included the spread of literacy 
and the promulgation of social, political, gender, and ethnic awareness. This was 
especially the case between 1939 and 1946 (see below). Meanwhile, socio-economic 
plans began to assume two common characteristics: they were confined to the centre and 
ignorant of agriculture, which in the 1930s employed up to 85 percent of the labour force. 
Moreover, in spite of expansion in transport and communication, contemporary 
observers’ accounts confirm ineffective role of the state in rural areas and provinces.93  
Therefore, as a mainly rural and agricultural society, the Kurdish region suffered from 
the orientation and deficiencies of economic policies in this period. General observations 
of the Iranian economy in this period as well as the writings of contemporary Kurdish 
                                                          
92 Julian Bharier, Economic Development in Iran 1900-1970 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 84. 
For more on the role of the Iranian state in economy see ibid., 87. 
93 Mallispaugh in ibid. 
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literary figures attest to the fact that by neglecting agriculture and prioritising political 
objectives, socio-economic conditions in Kurdistan did not improve; in fact, for most 
people it even deteriorated: 
 
In the time of Reza Shah, the economy was in a very bad state. In addition to the oppression of the 
gendarmerie, unemployment and poverty in villages increased economic burden. Peasants used oxen 
to plough the land. The most profitable crop was tobacco. A family of eight had to worked long 
hours. However, in the end either the crop was damaged by humidity or swallowed by the Tobacco 
Collection Centre. The remaining was in the mercy of the landowner.94 
 
The abovementioned political and geographical restrictions and the impact of the Great 
War generated little hope for immediate economic prosperity. Moreover, Kurdish society 
carried the scares of the War for many years, paralysed further by famine, cold and 
hunger, and the quest of powerful tribes such as the Shikak for political power over other 
tribes also increased the casualties of wars and conflicts. At the same time, Kurdistan’s 
economic structure and its class relations perpetuated economic hardship and social 
miseries for many. The society was mainly characterised by an unequal and oppressive 
regime of the Kurdish agha (landowner class), which ensured the agha’s ownership of 
the land and the exploitation of the peasant. When the ownership of a village was 
transferred from one landowner to another, it included peasants’ families as well. This 
social relationship differed from a slave-based economy in that the peasant shared a small 
portion of the harvest. Agha could expel a peasant not only from his village but also from 
the region under his jurisdiction. In addition to poverty, this forced many peasants and 
                                                          
94 Hesami, Le Bireweriekanim, 83. 
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their families to be constantly on the move.95 On the other hand, agriculture and 
agricultural techniques in this period in Kurdistan did not improve, while the production 
of grain across Iran decreased towards the end of Reza Shah’s reign in 1941 with the 
effect that the government was forced to import wheat.96 The situation was exacerbated 
by the increase in the population of Iran from 10 million in 1925 to almost 15 million in 
1941. The 1934 budget allocated 42.2% to war while the share of agriculture and public 
health was 0.4% and 2.3% respectively.97 
Furthermore, observers in the 1940s reported that, 
 
Agricultural labour force and their living conditions were very poor and for the most part illiterate. 
Public-health services were almost completely lacking, and clothing and fuel were scanty and hard 
to come by. The peasants were often in ill health, suffering from malnutrition, malaria, dysentery, 
typhoid, typhus and cholera’.98  
 
G. Black also observed in 1948 that ‘the ground [was] ploughed by oxen dragging a 
crooked stick, […] The grain [was] cut with stickle and threshed upon clay threshing 
floors by beaters pulled in a circle by oxen. The grain is separated by winnowing’.99 
Confirmed by many contemporaries such as Hemin and Hussami, such living conditions 
and agricultural techniques aptly applied to Kurdish rural and village communities. 
Therefore, as the result of neglecting agriculture and prioritising political objectives, 
Kurdistan did not considerably benefit from economic policies under Reza Shah while 
political oppression and the constant presence of gendarmerie remained striking aspects 
                                                          
95 Ibid. 
96 Mofid, Development Planning in Iran, 8. 
97 Bharier, Economic Development in Iran, 65-66. 
98 Mofid, Development Planning in Iran, 8. 
99 Quoted in ibid. 
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of his rule. However, this period is distinguished for its significant contribution to social 
change through the foundation of modern institutions such as schools and healthcare, the 
introduction of new means of transportation, and the rationalisation of administration. 
Such institutional and technological changes provided the base for a more profound 
transformation of the society during the era of the White Revolution.  
 
SOCIAL CHANGE, 1920-1960 
Until the 1960s, the socio-economic change in Kurdistan was a sluggish and prolonged 
one. However, the emergence of a number of modern institutions and trends marked the 
beginning of a new era. The state, whose policies corresponded to the need of a modern 
state, was the main contributor in this process except where non-state agents of change 
were crucial, for example, for simultaneously spreading literacy and promulgating 
social awareness. These revealed the interaction of various factors in reshaping a 
society.  
In addition to the gradual spread of modern education and healthcare, the new era was 
going to be characterised by the emergence of wage labour, including seasonal workers, 
and the formation of an urbanised middle class which accompanied urbanisation with its 
impact on Kurdish urban centres, the transformation of cultural values and norms, and 
technological changes. As regards social stratification, an urbanised middle-class only 
emerged towards the 1960s. In rural areas, an abject lack of a health system and public 
education continued to characterise life in both rural and urban centres. In the 1930s and 
1940s, modern education had not become widespread and a weak infrastructure prevented 
it from reaching rural areas. However, adding the itinerant literates to this category, this 
period marked the emergence of an educated, urbanised generation who reflected 
modernisation and modern education. Their impact alongside the hojra educated on 
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political developments, for example, by founding societies and publishing Nishtiman (Ku. 
Homeland) and Kurdistan which either preceded or coincided with the Kurdish Republic 
of 1946. 
Modern urbanisation did not radically begin in Kurdish cities until after land reform 
in the 1960s which entailed an exodus to cities. A Kurdish city was mainly characterised 
by a military base, a Bazaar (market) in a mercantile economy based on agriculture, and 
mahallas (neighbourhoods) which evolved around the main congregational mosque and 
the Bazaar, the main components of an unindustrialised self-sufficient economy.100 
Towns had two important components: caravansaries that constituted the focal point of 
overland trade and commerce; and mahalla, the physical borders and gates of which, in 
spite of psychological bounds of its residents, were eroding away. However, a Kurdish 
city or town was not merely typified by a ‘traditional’, implying immobile, way of life. 
Prior to the vast migration of the 1960s and 1970s, people moved between villages or 
resided in cities as the result of a number of push factors such as the oppression of aghas 
and poverty, as well as pull factors, including the existence of free, i.e. not owned by 
aghas, and culturally attractive cities. Industry was mainly limited to craftsmen but also 
craftswomen. Women worked in agriculture, animal husbandry and carpet weaving, in 
addition to demanding household tasks. Although the conspicuous absence of adequate 
research related to gender studies characterises Kurdish studies, circumstantial evidence 
and public knowledge refer to a history of the hardship women endured as unrecognised 
labourers in the carpet weaving, in agriculture and in the production of dairy for cities.  
                                                          
100 For pre-modernisation cities and modern urbanisation in Iran see Eckart Ehlers, "Modern Urbanization 
and Modernization in Persia," in Encyclopaedia Iranica, available online at 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/cities-iv, accessed 16 July 2016. 
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Finally, whereas one of the main characteristics of the Kurdish region was the village-
city discrepancy, it was shockingly maintained, including in the era of the White 
Revolution, despite institutional, economic and infrastructural changes. As noted above, 
a profound change of this aspect of life or more precisely a radical alteration of social life 
in the rural area, depended upon the main contributor’s, i.e. the state’s, socio-economic, 
cultural and political policies. It did not imply that life in cities was more prosperous but 
that villages could not benefit from reforms also due to an inadequate transportation and 
communications system. The Pahlavi modernisation maintained the tendency to ignore 
rural areas, whereas in this period the majority of Kurdish population lived in countryside 
without sufficient access to modern facilities, such as education, health, and 
communications. On the other hand, each Kurdish town was surrounded by a great 
number of villages in which agha ruled and the state was effectively absent for the 
provision of economic, social and educational needs. Instead, it insured its physical 
presence through growing gendarmerie bases.  
 
Healthcare 
As Byron Good argues, studies on the history of the healthcare in Iran tend to link the 
transformation of healthcare to economic, political and social transformations rather than 
the diffusion of Western medical knowledge.101 The centralisation of power under Reza 
Shah marked both the beginning of the centralisation of healthcare system, including the 
institutionalisation of the imperialist legacy of Quarantine services and the control of 
hospitals. This included the transformation of the Constitutional Sanitary Council into a 
                                                          
101 Byron J. Good, "The Transformation of Health Care in Modern Iranian History," in Michael E. Bonine 
and Nikki R. Keddie (eds), Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change (USA: State University 
of New York Pres, 1981). 
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Department of Public Health and the introduction of new services such as vaccination, 
provincial medical offices and licensing regulations.102 The impact of this on the Kurdish 
society of the time is reflected in including a Ministry of Health in the ministries of the 
autonomous Kurdistan Republic, attesting to the growing awareness of the population to 
public health.103 This awareness, however, did not necessarily confirm the existence of 
any effective health system. For example, in 1925 the Iranian government’s director of 
Public Health, Dr. Amir Alam, stated that, 
For the last two years the general sanitary situation of the country has left much to be desired. 
Provincial Medical Officers of Health, having failed to receive for several months their salaries, 
have for the most part abandoned their posts. An indifference, a laissez aller, truly regrettable reigns 
with regard to all questions of public health. Our plans, our schemes, our cries, have had no chance 
of finding an echo in governmental or parliamentary circles.104 
 
The modes of practice included hakims (an unqualified ‘doctor’, apothecary), bazaar 
shops, which provided herbal medicine, curator prayers, pray writers, fracture healers, 
and visiting sacred shrines. Also crucial were holy places and celebrated Sheikhs whose 
religious prestige and genealogy provided unmatched authority. Historical medical 
knowledge and books guided practitioners while religious beliefs allowed many such 
forms to continue to exist. It seems that the role of missionary doctors was restricted by 
the influence of religion with which hakims or healers were closely connected.105 The 
connection of religious figures and medicine (advanced chemical or herbal), to benefit 
from Gramsci’s insight on the role of the intellectuals in society, reveals how Sheikhs 
                                                          
102 Ibid., 69. 
103 Kakshar Oremar, Interview with Mina Qazi (in Kurdish) (Sulaimaniya: Karo, 2013), 35. 
104 Quoted in Good, "The Transformation of Health Care", 70. 
105 Cf. Bishop, Journeys in Persia and Kurdistan, V. 2. 
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were seen as healers and hakims as possessing divine power.106 In the same way as it is 
noted in studies on the history of healthcare in Iran, the structure of healthcare can be 
characterised as decentralised, relatively self-sustaining and autonomous from central 
powers.107 This structure corresponded to the political and economic structure of a society 
that was politically ruled by powerful tribal chiefs, and economically was characterised 
as dominantly self-sufficient and geographically restricted. The absence of both 
transportation networks and an effective communications system isolated village and 
town communities from not only each other but also from major urban centres. 
Modernisation and socio-economic transformation were going to cause structural change 
in this respect, too, with the effect that modern medical institutions gradually replaced 
known modes of medical practices. 
 However, the introduction of modern healthcare in Kurdistan was slow and 
ineffective, while illiteracy, the lack of facilities and cadres hindered its expansion. 
Although the 1930s witnessed licensing regulations, the requirement of diploma for 
physicians, the establishment of a Ministry of Health with provincial offices, there is no 
indication to any health programme in Kurdistan in this period. Moreover, as noted in the 
study of other regions, the provision of healthcare prioritised the requirements of the 
military and ‘reflected the basic interests of Reza Shah and the elite’.108 Sir Harry 
Sinderson confirmed in 1935 that ‘in this [medical programme] the civil population was 
regarded as secondary in importance to the army’.109 The first hospital in the provincial 
city of Sanandaj was ‘a military hospital, the construction of which between 1927 and 
                                                          
106 Hoare and Smith, Prison Notebooks, 137-38. 
107 Good, "The Transformation of Health Care", 63. 
108 Ibid., 70. 
109 Quoted in ibid. 
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1931 was concurrent with the establishment of a padegan (army base)’.110 Events 
surrounding the establishment of this hospital demonstrated the slow progress of 
healthcare. After its destruction as the result of a fire in 1321 [1942-43], it was only 
reopened in 1340 [1961].111 Rega, published by the remnants of the fallen Republic in 
exile, provided further evidence of the prioritisation of the military and the unavailability 
of modern healthcare for the population. In its first and the only issue published in autumn 
1949, Rega reported 
 
Red Lion and Sun Society has been taken over by the Tip (army brigade) in Mahabad and it 
accepts only people close to itself. [The Society] has opened a branch for the population 
merely to pretend that it serves people. Across Kurdistan, in Bukan, Saqqez, Baneh, Sardasht 
and Naghadeh, as well as in villages, there are no doctors nor are there any medicine 
available.112  
 
Instead of more adequate institutions of healthcare, Kurdish cities in the 1950s and 1960s 
embraced Tazriqat va Panseman (Injection and Bandage) which were set up by, for 
example, previous army medics with preliminary medical knowledge; pharmacies run by 
graduated doctors are phenomena of the 1970s. (According to official statistics for 1352 
[1973] by administrative divisions, there were 26 dependant and independent pharmacies 
in Kurdistan province).113 Therefore, Kurdistan in this period continued to be 
characterised by the absence of an effective health system and its requirements, including 
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trained personnel. Geography, however, was not the only hurdle to the expansion of 
modern healthcare. The tendency of the state-led modernisation to rapid urbanisation and 
industrialisation left out vast, disconnected rural areas and further delayed the promotion 
of social consciousness and the provision of healthcare and sanitation.  
Crucially, a significant aspect of social change was attempts to raise awareness on such 
issues, which were carried out by non-state agents of change who were influenced by 
humanitarian and social ideas of the time. Receptivity to progressive ideas of the time 
influenced social activists across Iran. For example, in the early years of the Iranian 
nation-state Alam-e Naswan (the World of Women), one of the earliest periodicals 
published by and for women, ‘concentrated on such matters as health and hygiene, care 
of children, domestic science, cookery, dress, and fashion’.114 This paper, which ‘was 
enthusiastic and hopeful about reforms for women carried out by the state’ faced the fate 
of many other journals and was ironically shut down by Reza Shah in 1934 as he 
‘consolidated more power and authority’.115  
In Kurdistan too, war and political upheavals quickly caused profound change in 
attitudes and actions. They inspired cultural revivals in the forms of literary activities and 
publications, which drew attentions to social conditions too. Nishtiman and Kurdistan 
promoted awareness of social issues in the early 1940s. However, the forceful end of the 
political experiences which allowed their publications interrupted activities that aimed to 
ameliorate living conditions. Finally, complementary to these efforts was the state’s 
contribution to the promulgation of social awareness of health issues since the 1920s by 
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introducing plans to form provincial medical centres and ministries. These efforts 
remained limited in scope and did not entail profound change. However, the ideas 
remained and laid the foundation for later attempts to establish a more effective health 
system. Consequently, the Kurdish society gradually began to receive new ideas and 
practices in healthcare.  
Literacy and modern education in Kurdistan  
In the second decade of the twentieth century, the famous journal Kaveh regarded 
illiteracy in Iran as om ol-ma‘ayeb or the mother of all faults.116 Literacy was restricted to 
main urban centres; historically it was a luxury of wealthy families, a prerogative 
accorded to people, including a percentage of women with a wealthy background, in the 
upper echelons of society. Before the advent of state schools, mosques and other 
worshipping places were centres of learning. Religious establishment under the Safavids 
and Qajars maintained the role of providing literacy and religious education until modern 
madrasas in Iran overtook traditional educational centres, which saw their demise as a 
consequence of socioeconomic transformation of Iran in the end of the 1960s and 1970s. 
In Kurdistan maktab and hojra were attached to the mosque, and khanaqa was a 
centre for the upkeep of tariqa (a non-orthodox religious sect) and a place where 
Tasawuuf or Sufism was studied. Khanaqa belonged to a sheikh who taught his followers 
by employing mullahs in the khanaqa’s own hojra. For example, the sheikhs of Borhan 
and Zanbil in the vicinity of Bukan ran khanaqas to where many notable families sent 
their sons for religious education. Faqeh was a religious student who learned under a 
                                                          
116 Hassan Taqizadeh, "Nokat Wa Molahezat," [Points and Observations], Kaveh 5, No. 11 (1299 [1920]), 
1. 
79 
 
mullah in the mosque’s or khanaqa’s hojra. According to Hemin, who himself spent four 
years in a khanaqa, the diversity was remarkable:  
 
In those years khanaqa was densely populated. People could freely visit khanaqa. The disparity 
between its inhabitants was negligible [...] it was like Noah’s Ark. There were people from 
different ethnicities. Wanderers, socially isolated, worshippers, Muslim, mullah, Sayyed, learned, 
educated, robber, thief, illiterate, crazy, idle, disabled, blind, limping and even atheist all lived 
together under the same roof. Afghanis, Persians, Turks, Azeris and even Indians could be seen 
there. [There were] Kurds with their own dialects from different parts of Kurdistan. Men who 
later became well-known such as Fauzi, Saifi Qazi, Peshawa Qazi Muhammad [the head of the 
Kurdistan Republic of 1946], haji mullah Muhammad Sharafkandi, ‘Ali khan Amiri, and 
especially the literate aghas of Faizulabegi visited khanaqa and stayed for several months.117 
 
However, the mosque’s hojra embraced more men from the lower strata of society 
with the effect that those from poor families constituted the majority of faqehs. 
According to Hazhar:  
 
The majority of faqehs are [either] the sons of widows [or] poor peasants. Once in hojra, they 
have to beg for bread and provide clothing from ratura [bursary]. In springs and autumns, they 
have to travel to villages to beg for cooking oil, cheese, tobacco, tea and sugar. People paid 
faqehs zakat [alms] by setting aside proportions from the harvest.118 
  
Away from home, they used the mosques’ resources for the duration of their religious 
learning; and the landowners’ financial support was crucial for the maintenance of 
                                                          
117Mukriyani, Tarik W Run. For more on religious education in Kurdistan see Mardūḵ, "The Madrasa in 
Sunni Kurdistan". 
118 Hazhar, Cheshti Mijawir, 28. 
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hojras. Free meal and accommodation were provided albeit at the expense of village 
inhabitants. An attendant of hojra around Bukan in the second Pahlavi era downgrades 
the role of khanaqas, which was mainly ‘a place for rich and notables’, in spreading 
literacy and science and in improving living conditions as long as a wider population 
is concerned. However, in spite of economic hardships endured by faqehs and the 
existing curriculum, religious schools were crucial for literacy as available centres of 
education. As regards both subjects and teaching methods, their deficiencies were 
illuminated by the spread of modern education. Hazhar complains, 
 
How is their [faqehs’] education? [It consists of] a number of age-old books which have changed 
a little. I mean the curriculum has not changed for centuries. Teaching is only the responsibility 
of those who have learnt from such books […] The educational discipline and quarterly or annual 
exams are unheard of.119 
 
As a starting point for acquiring literacy and also a variety of scientific and religious 
knowledge, a mosque’s hojra played similar role in other regions of Kurdistan such as 
Marivan where it was supported by landowners and vaqfs (religious endowment). 
Therefore, benefiting from the residency of a landowner family, many villages came to 
possess hojra as a centre of literacy. In many villages the mosque provided both religious 
and some form of scientific education for around twenty students in the first decades of 
the twentieth century. After a few years these students were qualified as mala and 
received a certificate to be able to carry out religious duties in a village. 
Furthermore, in a village a landowner’s resources were crucial for providing funds and 
shelter for recruited mullahs. The literates became bound to a system of patronage at the 
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same time and this explains, for example, a close relationship of many poets with the 
landowner class in spite of their criticism of the agha-jutiar economic system which also 
guaranteed the economic and political power of the landowner over the village.120 In a 
mass immigration of mullahs of Baneh to Mariwan amid the harsh conditions of the 
Second World War, the aghas of this region embraced and provided them with both 
accommodation and religious status in various villages. The agha class apparently sought 
to continue its legitimacy in the eyes of the population by maintaining its link to religion. 
The Qajar Empire (1798-1925) is recognised as an era when mosques and 
subsequently khanaqas spread across Kurdistan with the effect that it increased interest 
in literacy. In this respect, we should recognise the importance of religious centres of 
education and also the accidental nature of acquiring literacy by individuals. Religious 
education centres produced literate individuals who later, in various capacities, spread 
literacy across the region. As stated above, the lives of many such literate individuals and 
poets illustrate how the interest in acquiring literacy and knowledge was promoted 
especially where the state was effectively absent. Qane‘ is probably the quintessential 
example by illustrating how the life and activity of a literate person can simultaneously 
popularise the importance of education and promulgate social and political awareness. 
Despite economic hardship, he became an active person whose travel and literary 
activities, made literacy a popular goal among the lower strata of the society.121 Crucially, 
the Great War and the October Revolution of 1917 were the cataclysm which caused 
reorientation in social outlooks. With later political upheavals, such events ended the 
                                                          
120 See the life and poems of Qane‘, known as ‘the poet of the exploited’ in Borhan Qane‘ (ed.), Divani 
Qane‘ [An Anthology of Qane's Poetry] (Iran: Dalaho Publications, 1393 [2014-15]) 
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isolation of Kurdish society and opened it to change and new ideas. In one of his poems, 
Qane’ warns the landowner class: 
Listen! Socialism has become widespread  
Is ever closer your end. 
Your servants have realised 
 you are their enemies  
Your fort is not formidable or unconquerable  
Because its walls are made of colonialism. 
And in another message to the masses, he demands: 
Arm yourself with guns, shuffles and pens 
You, from the enlightened to shepherds. 
Let’s demolish this rotten order 
Let’s build the equality palace. 
Then the son of the Kurdish proletariat 
Will lead their homeland, Kurdistan. 122 
 
As regards the accidental nature of becoming literate, a number of factors, such as family 
ties, location and a relative’s attitude to life, were decisive in putting one on the path of 
acquiring literacy and obtaining available religious and scientific education. This applies 
to Qane‘, Hemin, Hazhar and many others who testify to this fact in their memoirs.123 As 
another example, Karim Hussami (1926-2001), writer and political activist, became 
literate because of his father and another mirza who were both in the service of the agahs 
of Qizilja in the Mahabad region. After becoming fluent in Persian, Hussami attracted the 
                                                          
122 Ibid. 
123 As ‘the son of a refugee who had rebelled against the landowner class’, Qane‘ was lucky to have a 
relative who became his guardian after his father died and enrolled him in a Hojra around Marivan. See 
ibid., 3.; Hazhar’s acquisition of education was also accidental. See Hazhar, Cheshti Mijawir, 13. 
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attention of a family acquaintance, a landowner of a remote village, with the effect that 
he became his mirza and also the teacher of his sons.124  
10. Qane'. 
 
‘The pedagogy of the oppressed’. Qane‘ at his best, ca. 1950. 
 Source:  http://www.kurdipedia.org/folderviewer.aspx?lng=7&id=20081215133936730, accessed 04/04/2017. 
 
As a result of acquiring education through religious schools and by accident, literacy 
spread in circumstances influenced little by the state. Such a generation, exemplified by 
the likes of the abovementioned poets, established themselves as the enlightened of 
twentieth-century modernising Iranian Kurdistan. In addition to nationalist ideas, they 
carried a mixture of socialist ideas (except in the case of Hazhar) with the effect that when 
the illiterate masses learned their poems it simultaneously increased the will for the 
acquisition of knowledge. Poetry was probably the most attractive literary form for many 
reasons. Widespread illiteracy was not a barrier for its learning but was more accessible 
because listening to or encouraging short poems was easier than reading books. 
Furthermore, poetry was creative and most importantly a reliable source in which ‘truth’ 
could be cited. Such factors around poetry probably explained why the majority of the 
learned men in this time became poets or acquired poetic skills, imitated their 
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predecessors and conveyed the ideas of the time. Modern education could not conceal the 
history of literacy which provided conditions and agency for new education. 
 
Modern education and non-state agents of change 
Modern education in Iran formally began with the establishment of primary and then 
secondary schools in towns as the result of pre- and post-Constitutional reforms, which 
had been inspired by the idea of modern education. Upon contact with modernity, a 
‘progressive’ and ‘scientific’ perception of education began to guide contemporary 
intellectuals.125 This view originated in the Enlightenment and also, as scholars have 
noted, in the Whig perception of history as progress, influential in the Victorian Britain.126 
Kurdish intellectuals were attracted to this conception for two primary reasons: first, 
illiteracy was perceived as a social ill; and, second, modern education was regarded as a 
means to elevate Kurds to the level of a (progressive) ‘nation’. The transformation of 
Kurdish poetry into a social discourse in the end of the nineteenth century, was 
intellectually guided by modern concepts of nation and education,127 while modern 
Kurdish journalism and historiography vividly began to reflect the progressive conception 
of modern education.  
There were attempts at establishing modern schools in Kurdish urban centres in the 
end of the Constitutional era; and like the religious education, state education mostly 
                                                          
125 For a history of education in Iran see Marashi, Nationalizing Iran, Ch. 3; Ahmad Ashraf, "General 
Survey of Modern Education," in Encyclopaedia Iranica, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/education-
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Making of Modern Iran (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992). On the Ottoman Empire see 
Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernisation of Turkish Political 
Ideas (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 283-84; and M. Sukru Hanioglu, The Young Turks in 
Opposition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
126 Michael Bentley, Modernizing England's Past: English Historiography in the Age of Modernism, 1870-
1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 5-6. 
127 Cf. Koyi’s poetry in Koyi, Diwan, 61; and Piramerd’s memoir in Omed Ashna, Piramerd, Vol. 1 
(Hawler: Aras, 2001). 
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benefited the male population. Educational efforts incited the reaction of some religious 
schools and figures when towns and cities such as Mahabad, Sanandaj and Saqqez began 
to acquire public primary schools in the 1920s.128 Memoirs and biographies indicate the 
emergence of secondary schools much later. For example, in 1938 a male student from 
Mahabad, where an education department seems to have existed in these years, had to go 
to Urumia to finish his secondary education.129  
The intrusion of modern ideas into the existing culture elicited the resistance of the 
religious institution, and the prevalent anti-modern education attitudes hindered the 
spread of modern schools. Moreover, in spite of the existence of ‘motajadded’ (Pe. 
modernised) religious persons, the pressure of religious beliefs was constant. The era of 
the coexistence of religion and science in the education system of hojra had gone. Modern 
natural sciences and modern schools began to threaten the position of the clergy and also 
the validity of the religious texts.  
 
In 1927, I finished my primary school in Mahabad. The situation was strange then. Non-
religious education [was regarded] as wrong and a person who tried to enrol in a secondary 
school was seen as an infidel. If a person believed in a spherical earth or said that it is the 
earth which goes round the sun, that person was considered as someone who was regressing 
towards the worship of fire.130 
 
                                                          
128 Cf. Mola Qadir Modarresi, ‘Komalay Zhekaf’, in Karimi, Zabihi, 67. 
129 Karimi, Zabihi, 82-3. 
130 Modarresi, ‘Komalay Zhekaf’, 67. A useful comparison is the opposition of the clergy to the 
establishment of a modern judicial system in Iran in the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution. See 
Foroughi, "Modernisation of Law". Foroughi recounts that wearing hats, neckties and glasses were 
‘considered as ostentatious and westernised tendency’.  
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Opposed by Maktab-e Quran (Pe. A Quranic school), the first modern school in Saqqez 
was established around 1918 ‘with the support of Sadr-olama Mofti’, the representative 
of Saqqez for the Majlis in three periods from the ascension of Ahmad Shah (1909) to the 
end of Reza Shah’s rule (1941).131 He was the founder of ‘Ahmadia national four-class in 
1921 […] which eventually became a six-class school called Shahpour in 1925’, followed 
by the foundation of a secondary school for girls in 1935.132 The inception of modern 
education was, thus, marked by the efforts of individuals who carried with them the 
educational ideas of the Constitutional Revolution. In addition to the linguistic needs and 
educational policies of the modern Iranian state, its authority, in spite of a negligible 
budget, led to an increase in the number of elementary and secondary schools. Although 
the introduction of modern education was a significant development, primary sources 
indicate a slow process for the period between 1920 and 1940,133 which was interrupted 
by the outbreak of the Second World War followed by the political crisis that Iran 
experienced until the coup of 1953. Nevertheless, in a society affected by abrupt regional 
and international upheavals since the Constitutional Revolution, the cultural revivals in 
Kurdistan between 1939 and 1945, symbolised by Zhe Kaf and its organ Nishtiman and 
then the short-lived Kurdish Republic, multiplied the impact of educational efforts. These 
inspired the population to participate in politics and engage more actively in educational, 
social and literary activities. Indeed, such upheavals proved to be crucial factors for 
creating widespread enthusiasm for social change in Kurdistan primarily because they 
                                                          
131 Rezayi, "A Study". Other representatives from the Kurdish region to the Third Majlis included Asadula 
Haji Mirza Khan, Sardar Mu‘azam (Farajola Khan), Qasem (Mirza Khan Tabrizi) from Sauj Belagh, and 
A‘zaz al-Saltaneh. For this see Kaveh, Year 1, No. 29 and 30, 8-9. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Cf. Ta‘lim va Tarbiyat (Amuzesh va Parvaresh since 1938) between 1925-1938. Published by the 
Ministry of Education, the earlier issues of this journal contained more educational statistics and articles on 
provinces. Later issues, however, gradually became embroidered with the pictures of Reza Shah and his 
son, accompanied by eulogising articles; Modarresi, ‘Komalay Zhekaf’. 
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created a momentum for the popularisation of modern ideas. At the same time, this period 
marked the emergence, or proliferation, of modern Kurdish intellectuals too who 
gradually parted with religious education. Therefore, as the result of ongoing social and 
political transformations, and modern education, these intellectuals were composed of 
either non-hojra educated or those, as in the case of Qane‘, Hemin and Hazhar, who had 
been transformed into modern intellectuals possessing a strong social consciousness.134 A 
case in point was Qane‘ (Muhammad Kabuli, 1898-1965), a hojra educated. Influenced by 
modern progressive ideas and shaped by the impact of the October Revolution of 1917, 
his poetry was transformed from love poetry into a socially and ethnically critical one. As 
evident in their books, both Hemin’s and Hazhar’s poetic careers were propelled by the 
experience of the Kurdistan Republic, which also signified profound intellectual 
transformations in a worldwide context. 
The Constitution of 1907 ‘provided for public education […] through the Ministry of 
Education’.135 In the 1920s and 1930s new educational laws were ratified and culminated 
in the establishment of Tehran University in 1935. ‘Nevertheless, the modern education 
system [under Reza Shah] remained small, urban, formalistic, and elitist; it was barely 
able to meet the qualitative and quantitative needs of a modernizing economy’.136 The 
education system in this period became centralised and continued to expand in the 
decades after the Second World War. By 1978 there were nineteen universities in Iran.137 
In Kurdistan, the introduction of modern education by establishing public primary 
schools in the time of Reza Shah remained limited to towns and cities. Ta‘lim wa 
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Tarbyiat, published by the Ministry of Education since 1925, reported in its educational 
map for 1925 the existence of only one such school in Sanandaj, Sauj Blagh, Kermanshah 
and Urumia; there is no indication of any intermediary schools (Figure 11). However, 
memoirs refer to the existence of primary school in other cities such as Saqqez in the 
1920s. The first public school in Sardasht, another Kurdish city, was established in 1310 
[1931/2] with 25 to 30 students.138 Statistics of later periods also indicate, for example, a 
low level of primary and secondary enrolments until the 1960s.139 Moreover, in Reza 
Shah’s years political considerations overshadowed educational and social concerns to a 
great extent. Persian became compulsory and therefore incited resentment towards the 
government and increased interest in Kurdish. While residing with a rich family as mirza, 
Hussami became acquainted with Kurdish literature through people from Iraqi Kurdistan 
where Kurdish was not forbidden at schools.140 In the time of Reza Shah, except in a few 
villages for their military and strategic positions, rural areas were entirely deprived of 
modern educational centres. Instead the presence of gendarmerie characterised this era. 
In Hawraman region in south-western Kurdistan with a legacy of Zoroastrian culture, 
literacy was seen as a social duty also for women who to some extent managed to become 
literate in mosques. Furthermore, to the traditional role of the landowners in the upkeep 
of hojra, mentioned above, was added, gradually in the 1960s, responsibility and 
authority for the opening of modern schools. Their wealth had provided funds for hojra 
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and this time their permission was a prerequisite for the establishment of a school. This 
is another factor that explains the existence, or the lack of, both religious and modern 
schools in rural areas. With the demise of the landowner’s influence and wealth following 
the socioeconomic developments in the late 1960s and 1970s, hojra lost its patronage and 
subsequently faded away. However, as discussed in the next chapter, they were not 
immediately replaced by schools in the rural areas and the absence of modern schools 
continued to characterise rural life in those decades. In addition to this, modern primarily 
and secondary schools in cities reduced enthusiasm for the traditional education; they 
became increasingly attractive by providing new means and paths to employment in the 
public sector.  
To sum up, although the state’s authority was crucial for educational changes, it was 
not a sole actor and in some occasions, for instance the cultural revival of the early 1940s, 
also a barrier. As an interesting development, the dialectic of (a limited) modern education 
and agency produced an urbanised new educated generation, who promoted social and 
political awareness in Kurdistan and became another social force alongside notables and 
tribal chiefs. Social change and transformation had assigned a historical role to the non-
state agents of change to stamp their mark on social change.   
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11. Kurdistan in Naqsheye Ma‘arefie Iran (the educational map of Iran), 1304/1925. 
 
Source Ta‘lim wa Tarbiyat. This educational map is modified by adding a white circle that roughly covers the Kurdish region in Iran. 
Numbers 1-4 show big cities of Mahabad, Saqqez, Sanandaj, and Kermanshah respectively. 
 Public primary schools 
∆ Three-year elementary schools 
 Six-year elementary schools 
 Iranian schools abroad 
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To sum up, one can argue that the dialectics of religious and modern education in 
Kurdistan advanced literacy and gradually produced an educated generation whose 
composition was not limited to the privileged anymore. Hojra remains crucial in the 
history of education. It produced Kurdish literary figures who, since the end of the 
nineteenth century, became the advocates of the popularisation of modern education. 
Insofar as the state is concerned, the continuation of the Constitutional educational 
reforms in the first half of the twentieth century, in the shape of modern primary and 
secondary schools, however limited, changed the educational landscape of Kurdish 
society. A complementary factor, which seems to be in many respects more responsible 
for the spread of literacy than the state itself, was undoubtedly the literate, the non-state 
agents of change.  
 
THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF KURDISTAN  
The process of the consolidation of the central state thorough the militarisation of public 
spaces by a new, conscripted army and the expansion of bureaucracy in the forms of 
various institutions shaped the political structure of Kurdistan. Modern political structure 
of Kurdistan began to be influenced by military considerations because of, as Afshar 
warned, the region’s potential to be dominated by political developments in other 
coterminous and ethnically similar societies.141 On the rumours of ‘the independence of 
the Ottoman Kurdistan, Afshar wrote in 1925 that, 
 
Our domestic policy should be so that the Iranian Kurds, who are from the Iranian race and 
their language is one of the Iranian languages, gradually but quickly integrate with [amikhte] 
other Iranians in order to eradicate any differences. Solutions include the establishment of 
                                                          
141 Mahmood Afshar, "Shooreshe Kordhaye Osmani Wa Masaleye Kordestan," [The Revolt of the Ottoman 
Kurds and the Kurdish Question], Ayandeh, No. 1 (Tir 1304 [1925]). 
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[modern] schools in that region, the propagation of Persian, the teaching of the history of Iran, 
promoting a feeling of Iraniyat among the population and, finally, extending the railways 
from the central parts of the country to that region in order to create further social and 
economic relationships between the Kurdish and Persians speaking [peoples]. Whenever this 
task, i.e. “the Persianisation of the Kurds” was carried out, then the independence of the 
Ottoman Kurdistan and the existence of a racially Kurdish government [in that country] 
[located] between a Turkish state and us will not harm us.142 
 
 Moreover, The Reza Shah’s rule became increasingly oppressive and the suppression of 
the elements of Kurdish identity, which were perceived as inimical to a unified Iranian 
identity, was carried out by the gendarmerie in both urban and rural areas. ‘In the time of 
Reza Khan Pahlavi’, Hazhar recalls, ‘no one could even think about writing in Kurdish’ 
and people buried Kurdish books such as the divans [anthologies] of prominent Kurdish 
poets in order to protect them.143 It had become routine for the gendarmes to interrupt life 
in the rural areas: 
 
When [I was living] in Taragha [in the vicinity of Bukan], the gendarmes visited that 
village on a daily basis. They regarded [wearing] Kurdish dress, [using] tobacco and 
[cigarette] paper, and any seemingly unfriendly gesture of people towards [both] 
themselves and their horses as a big sin.144 
 
The consolidation of the state crucially included eradicating or debilitating local powers. 
At least the urban population welcomed the weakening of the powerful tribes’ grips on 
their lives. The historian, Ayatulla Muhammad Mardukh, praised the ‘end of chaos’ in 
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Kurdistan ‘by this strong and erudite state’ in his Nowruz celebration speech.145 Hazhar 
also retells, ironically, the story of the Shikaks’ pillage of Sauj Belagh in autumn 1921: 
 
The army of “Smail agha Simko” raided Sauj Belagh to fight the ‘ajams [the Turks]. [It is 
claimed] that they went house to house and looted the Kurds. It seemed that in the same way 
that Smail agha had wanted to liberate us from the ‘ajams, he also wanted to [‘] liberate [’] us 
from that we had [achieved] thanks to the ‘ajams. They pillaged everything […] they even 
robbed the babies […] they robbed women of their pyjamas and then, apologising, turned 
their faces away [in order not to see their naked bodies]. The Shikaks robbed the Kurds but 
did not kill them; they [however] killed any Turkish-speaking person [they came across].146 
  
Nevertheless, both the disarmament and displacement of tribes, which were followed by 
building padegans or military bases in growing towns and strategic villages, constituted 
various elements of a militaristic policy. A dozens of tribes with tens of taifas or sub-
tribes were forced to settle, while many others were robbed of their properties and sent to 
exile.147 The policy of compulsory settlement, called takht-e qapu (wooden door) instead 
of the ‘black tent’, forced many other tribes such as the Peshdaris to cross the border and 
reside in what is now Iraqi Kurdistan. This policy, which included the incarceration of 
tribal leaders even after being disarmed, was to some degree reversed in the early 1930s 
because of its negative economic impact on, for example, meat production.148 
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The social and economic plans in the time of Reza Shah were usually preceded by 
military expansions and considerations. This continued to restrict the capacity of the state 
to implement effective social programmes in order to improve social conditions in 
Kurdistan. The degree of the militarisation of the public space fluctuated according to the 
existence or the absence of political crises in Kurdistan. However, the military gaze of 
the state became constant; and this is the precedent set by military policies and means in 
the reign of Reza Shah. 
Furthermore, political participation through the election of Majlis deputies since the 
Constitutional Revolution was restricted, or did not develop further, with the effect that 
the election of representatives eventually became a symbolic act by the 1970s. Moreover, 
the ascendency of Persian as the official language of both education and administration 
created formidable obstacles for Kurdish language to thrive in cultural and literary 
spheres. The number of journals or newspapers remained near zero until the 1979 
Revolution. All these elements effected political participation negatively. However, in 
addition to the free space, which the Kurdistan Republic and the Musaddeq era created, 
the resolution of political and social activists to promote political and social awareness 
by publishing and distributing ‘illegal’ journals, books and pamphlets, which addressed 
issues concerned with politics, culture and literature, counterpoised dictatorship and the 
authoritarian modernisation.  
Therefore, a modernising Kurdistan began to assume a political structure shaped by 
military considerations, reflecting the tension between Kurdayeti and the process of 
creating a homogenous nation-state. Indeed, by claiming to protect borders, the state has 
ever since attempted to legitimise military considerations and policies. Although the 
administrative division of provinces clearly revealed military and political motivations 
95 
 
behind such policies, the emergence of discourses of power in the formation of modern 
political structure of Kurdish-Iranian society merits a brief review. 
Politically, the state’s cultural and linguistic efforts to ensure a unified Iranian identity 
led to a period of political suppression, which included banning Kurdish in schools, 
introducing a dress code and persecuting the literate individuals and literary works.149 The 
idea of vahdat-e melli-e Iran (Pe. the national unity of Iran) provided intellectual 
legitimacy for the state’s linguistic policies. Affected by the political instability and wars, 
the Persian journals in the 1920s reflected a political culture in which a strong state and 
‘national unity’ were advocated as core principles creating a politically stable and socio-
economically advancing Iran. For example, Afshar defined national unity as ‘the political, 
moral, and social unity of people living within the territory of Iran’ in order to ‘preserve 
the political independence of Iran and its territorial integrity’.150 The national unity 
stipulated uniformity in custom and the eradication of diversity in dress, language and 
names. 
We believe that until national unity in language, morals, dress, etc., has been achieved, 
imminent danger to our political independence and territorial integrity will always exist […] 
Some Persian-speaking ilats [tribes] can be transported to reside in foreign-speaking [i.e. 
non-Persian-speaking] regions [navahi-e bigane zaban], while foreign-speaking tribes can 
be moved to Persian-speaking regions. Foreign geographical names […] must be replaced 
with Persian names. The country must assume new suitable [administrative] divisions and 
avoid using the [current] names of Khurasan, Baluchistan, Fars, Azerbaijan, and Kurdistan 
[for its provinces].151 
 
Afshar, however, did not want to sound ‘Chauvinistic’ or ‘imperialistic’. Indeed, such 
ideas emanated from an existing feeling of threat from outside of Iran, and also from 
                                                          
149 See Hazhar, Cheshti Mijawir, 52-53. 
150 Cf. Mahmood Afshar, Ayandeh, 1925, No. 1. 
151 Ibid. 
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a common wish of intellectuals and statesmen such as Muhammad Foroughi and Ali 
Akbar Davar to build an effective modern state. Afshar also defended 
‘deconcentration’ as against both ‘centralisation’ and ‘decentralisation’ and did not 
necessarily agree with any administrative divisions.152 Nevertheless, he remained 
adamant about the unity and conformity of diverse Iranian communities under the 
banner of Iranian national unity in every sphere of life.153  
The implementation of such ideas on behalf of an authoritarian state inevitably 
presupposed coercive means as it was going to face resistance against ethnic unity 
and conformity. As regards the Kurds, the tension between these hegemonic and 
resisting identities incited violence also on behalf of the Kurds and became the origin 
of modern armed struggle perceived as a legitimate form of resistance against ethnic 
oppression. Abbas Vali rightly observes that the suppression of Kurdish identity 
became the root of a continuing conflict with the central government, and of the 
violence in Iranian Kurdistan.154 However, the modern Kurdish armed struggle in 
correlation with militarisation is still largely understudied. 
A powerful Iranian national narrative, which conceptually marginalises the Kurds and 
their history, assumed an oppressive attitude towards cultural and political rights regarded 
inimical to a centralised, territorially defined modern Iran. Indeed, Kurdish identity 
became the victim of two historical factors. First, a painful memory of Iran’s territorial 
loss in the hands of the great powers which inflicted severe damage to its territorial 
integrity and independence; the written evidences are the treaties of Golestan (1813) and 
Turkmanchay (1828). Logically, therefore, the modern Iranian identity was based on the 
                                                          
152 Mahmud Afshar, Ayandeh, Vol. 4. No. 1-2. (Mehr-Aban 1338 [Oct.-Nov. 1959]. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Vali, Kurds and the State in Iran, 19. 
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pillars of national unity and territorial integrity with the effects that the Kurds began to 
be judged by the abovementioned principles, leading to ingrained prejudices against 
them. Second, this unified Iranian identity established the Persian community as the core 
ethno-cultural nation and this resulted in the marginalisation of other ethnic communities, 
including Kurdish.155 Although in this unification ‘differences’ were not codified, for 
example, by issuing different Shenasnameh or ID based on ethnicity, as Brubaker has 
shown was the case in the multinational Soviet Union, it institutionalised difference.156 
All residents of Iran were defined as Iranian but ethnic groups such as the Kurds became 
a modern qaum (ethnic community) as a constituent of the modern nation of Iran 
connoting an ‘undeveloped nation’ at the same time, as opposed to mellat (Pe. nation); 
and their cultural and political rights were defined in connection with ‘Iran’ as a unified 
nation. Moreover, the institutionalisation of difference in favour of the Persian 
community is exemplified by the clash of definitions between the Iranian and Kurdish 
national narratives over the concepts of qaum and mellat which is originated in the 
processes of the formation of modern Iranian and Kurdish identities. Qaum justifies the 
Iranian national narrative’s denial of political and cultural rights of a community, which 
is, in turn, represented by the Kurdish national narrative’s definition of itself as mellat, in 
need of recognition. 
Therefore, the politics of modernisation entailed an enduring clash between Iranian 
and Kurdish identities and their legitimising national narratives. Except occasionally in 
the time of political crises, wars and revolutions, a powerful and stable central 
government has continued the oppression of Kurdish identity and guaranteed the 
                                                          
155 For the link between the idea of ‘core nation’ and a nationalising and modernising state see Brubaker, 
Nationalism Reframed, 83. 
156 Ibid., 26 and Ch. 2. 
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ascendancy of the discourse of a unified Iran; a discourse which is in fact very divisive. 
Such claims and policies began to interrupt modus vivendi and encourage violent modes 
of resistance. Indeed, the political structure of Kurdistan began to be shaped by political 
and militarily motivated policies, on the one hand, and the resistance of Kurdayeti, on the 
other. The continuous resistance to power and its discourses as regards the Kurds thus 
originated in the process of the nationalisation of Iranian identity. However, discussed in 
the next chapter, Kurdish society proved to be more receptive of socio-economic change 
with the effect that Kurdayeti found itself in a paradox of ethnically resisting but socially 
adaptive. 
 
CONCLUSION  
Against a historical background, this chapter aims to illustrate the integrating tendency of 
modernisation and social change in Kurdish society since the early twentieth century. The 
crucial elements in this process are identified as attempts at socio-economic reforms, 
institutional changes, and the state’s politics of modernisation. Although Kurdistan 
experienced a sluggish socio-economic change until 1960 and its social order did not 
radically alter, it witnessed the emergence of new socio-economic trends, affecting its 
social structure. The state was the main authority in this process and its policies were 
shaped by various historical and ideological factors as well as political exigencies. This 
socio-economic process laid the foundation of modernising institutions such as education 
and healthcare. They did not become widespread under Reza Shah. Nevertheless, they 
were significant as foundations for reforms in later decades. Undeniably, based on a 
literary background, modern education yielded a new educated, urban generation which 
became a social and political force in political upheavals alongside tribal chiefs of tribal 
communities. Furthermore, the efforts of members of such a generation to simultaneously 
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spread literacy and promote social, ethnic and political awareness of people, highlight the 
crucial role of non-state agents of change. This becomes more evident in the way the 
political structure of Kurdish society continued to change according to the modern nation-
state’s nationalistic and militaristic attitudes, on the one hand, and the resistance of 
Kurdayeti, now intellectually transformed by second half of the century, to the state’s 
‘national unity’, on the other. In this way, therefore, modernisation surfaced a paradox, 
to be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2: The Paradox of Kurdayeti and Modernisation 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
THE SUCCESS OF MODERNISATION, THE FAILURE OF HOMOGENISATION? 
 
In the process of the integration of Kurdish society in modern Iran a paradox around 
identity surfaced: the modernisation of Iran did not render Kurdayeti irrelevant but 
reshaped and reinvigorated it along modern national lines. Modernisation ensured 
Kurdayeti’s continuous presence in the political field of modern Iran rather than inducing 
the assimilation of the Kurds and the disappearance of Kurdish identity.1 Put simply while 
modernisation succeeded in creating a shared, strong socio-economic and political field, 
attempts to create a homogenous entity failed in eradicating Kurdayeti in both perception 
and practice. In an expanding, shared socio-economic base the Kurds in Iran began, and 
continued, to define themselves as Iranians. Nevertheless, the suppression of Kurdish 
identity and its resistance to a hegemonic Persian culture continued to generate a 
prolonged tension between a homogenising sate and the Kurds in Iran. This paradox of 
socially integrating but ethnically resisting has formed a Kurdish identity that socio-
economically and culturally maintains a sense of belonging to Iran on the one hand, and 
to Kurdayeti on the other. 
 Two important reasons necessitate a detailed analysis of this paradox. The first 
reason is an academic one: studies on the Kurds in Iran are largely influenced by a 
                                                          
1 Sami Zubaida defines political field as ‘a whole complex of political models, vocabularies, organisations 
and techniques which have established and animated […] a political field of organisation, mobilisation, 
agitation and struggle’, Sami Zubaida, Islam, the People, and the State: Essays on Political Ideas and 
Movements in the Middle East (London: Tauris, 1993), 145-46. 
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homogenous approach to the Kurds who are treated as a single people regardless of being 
parts of different political fields since the formation of the nation-states following the 
First World War. To this, one must also add an age-old coexistence of the Kurds with 
other culturally and linguistically distinct communities. Although there are exceptions, 
for example David McDowell has briefly discussed socio-economic change, and 
highlighted a number of important economic and political consequences,2 such studies 
are usually ignorant of decades of socio-economic and cultural transformations of such 
countries, especially in Iran. On the other hand, many other scholars such as Martin Van 
Bruinessen, Amir Hassanpour and Abbas Vali have produced valuable works usually 
concerned with ethnic nationalism, Kurdish language and Kurdish identity. However, the 
absence of social change studies—to a great extent Hassanpour is an exception—in 
addition to a dominant homogenous approach, has led to an academic decline of studies 
on Kurds in Iran with the effect that a scholar of Kurdish studies expresses bewilderment 
at the ‘temporarily quiescent’ of Kurds in Iran.3 In this respect, a crucial question which 
is often overlooked is why a culturally distinct people continue to define themselves in 
the framework, and not outside of modern Iran. One can argue that, unlike the case of 
‘national identities’ in Eastern Europe, the Kurds do not have an outside homeland. For 
example, as Brubaker has noted, millions of ethnic Russians, Hungarians, Albanians and 
Serbs, who live in other states in Eastern Europe, have ‘abruptly transformed from state-
bearing nationality in a vast and powerful state into vulnerably situated minorities of 
uncertain identity and loyalty in weak and struggling successor states’.4 Therefore, their 
ethnic affinity does not align with their state of citizenship. However, this does not apply 
                                                          
2 McDowall, The Kurds, 254-59. 
3 Cf. Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds: A Modern History (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publisher, 2016), Ch. 
5. 
4 Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, 56. 
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to the case of the Kurds including those living in Iran. Although the Kurds recognise 
ethno-cultural affinity with other communities outside of Iran, an outside homeland, i.e. 
a Kurdish state that could give them a state-bearing identity, has been absent. In fact, ‘the 
framework of Iran’ accentuates the absence of any outside homeland. (The formation of 
a Kurdish government in Iraq effectively since 2003 has never led to an ‘outside 
homeland’). Secondly, social transformation is a crucial factor shaping Kurdish political 
behaviour and society in Iran. Indeed, except for a turn to social change studies by 
Kurdish-Iranian academics inside Iran since the early 2000s, this point has been largely 
overlooked in Kurdish studies. Attempts to make the factor of social change and 
transformation central to studies focused on the Kurds in Iran both enhance our 
understanding of a transforming society and assist us to link social transformation with 
social, cultural and political behaviours.  
 
KURDAYETI AND THE NATIONALISATION OF IRANIAN IDENTITY 
Kurdayeti in both theory and practice continued to enjoy a formidable base for its 
existence and also for the formation and transformation of the values to which the Kurds 
adhered. Modern Kurdayeti is a national perception of self, formed as the result of 
nineteenth century literary transformation in the wake of the cultural superiority of 
Europe. However, practically, it has been shaped and reshaped in reaction to the advance 
of other nationalisms and the formation of modern states, crucially in the context of 
decades of socio-economic and political developments in such states.  
This study perceives Kurdayeti not as a fixed term but rather as both a politico-
cultural stance, a term borrowed from Brubaker, and a practice.5 Kurdayeti represents a 
                                                          
5 Ibid., 60. 
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self, re-fashioned by modernity, and incorporates means to achieve a desirable socio-
economic condition and a promoted cultural position for that Kurdish self. Distinctive 
ethnic and cultural characteristics necessitated this transformation, while subjugated 
political status and the impoverished social conditions of Kurdish societies, expressed 
explicitly by poets such as Hajj Qadir Koyi in the end of the nineteenth century, made 
progressive, educational and evolutionary ideas the necessary concomitant of a national 
conception of self and history. Moreover, the demise of the Kurdish Emirates as a result 
of modernising centralisations contributed to a process in which the Kurds were 
conceptually redefined as ‘ethnic minority’ in the nation-state. A number of regional wars 
between the remnants of the Emirates and the surrounding states since the middle of the 
nineteenth century, including the famous rebellion of Sheikh ‘Ubeidula in the early 1880s, 
regarded by many as the origins of Kurdish nationalism,6 exemplified tensions in that 
process. Meanwhile, the transformation of Kurdish poetry into a social discourse to 
promote national consciousness marked the start of refashioning self in the process of the 
formation of a Kurdish national identity, making attractive the claim of a recent study that 
this was actually the origins of Kurdish nationalism.7 
 In fact, both the processes of the transformation of the Kurds into an ‘ethnic 
minority’ in a modern nation-state and refashioning self took place simultaneously. The 
early periods of the former process with its political consequences were to some extent 
discussed above. The latter process is equally significant for forming national, historical 
and political consciousness of the Kurds. Indeed, Kurdayeti is not merely resistance to 
the onslaught of other dominant identities, including Iranian or Persian; it is a worldview 
too. Furthermore, the emergence of a modern perception of self in Kurdish poetry was 
                                                          
6 Cf. Vali, Kurdish Nationalism. 
7 See Qaderi, "Modern Kurdish Poetry". 
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followed by other literary outputs namely historiography and journalism which 
transformed historical perception and simultaneously promulgated modern Kurdayeti 
based on a national perception of self and history. For example, modern Kurdish 
historiography provided both means to fulfil, as Koyi lamented, a long overdue recording 
of Kurdish history and the historical authenticity needed; it enriched books and journals 
which began to flourish in the 1920s and 1930s.8 
In practice, the legacy of various regional Kurdish movements inspired later 
political activists who began to emerge in inter-war years Iranian Kurdistan. For example, 
the impact of the Khoyibun (For Self) movement in Syria is reflected in the activities of 
the emerging educated, urban generation, epitomised by Abdulrahman Zabihi (1920-
1980), while movements led by tribal chiefs and sheikhs such as Simko, Sheikh Mahmud 
Barzenji and Sheikh Sa‘id Piran in Iran, Iraq and Turkey, respectively, enriched a Kurdish 
social memory.9 As regards Iran, Simko’s rebellion and quest for political power was a 
precursor to later political developments. As one of such activists asserts, 
 
If we have a glance at the leading members of Komala-i Zhe Kaf, we will realise that they were a 
group of runakbir-i sharistani (Ku. urban enlightened) […] they formed the foundation of Zhe Kaf 
and Zabihi was more informed than others. I believe the Kurdayeti that inspired him [Zabihi] to 
form such an organisation originated in both a [contemporary] intellectual movement, existed in 
Iraqi Kurdistan, and a reciprocal relationship between Iranian and Iraqi Kurdistan[s]. Materials, 
books, [and] memoirs published in Iraqi Kurdistan found their ways into Iran. This in addition to 
rebellions in other parts of Kurdistan and the defeat of Sheikh Mahmud’s uprising. All these had 
impact on Kurdish enlightened in Mahabad.10 
                                                          
8 Cf. works by prominent historians such as Husein Huzni, Muhammad Mardukh, Amin Zaki Beg. 
9 For Zabihi’s biography see the Kurdish Academy of Language website, 
http://www.kurdishacademy.org/?q=node/124 (accessed 27/01/2017). 
10 Hamadamin Siraji, “Interview with Hamadamin Siraji” in Karimi, Zabihi, 192-193. 
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A survived Zabihi’s letter includes the name of many more activists living in other cities 
such as Saqqez, Sanandaj and Kermanshah.11  
 Therefore, these years marked the emergence of Kurdish political societies 
exemplified by the Kurdish revival which effectively paved the way for the formation of 
the Kurdistan Republic of 1946 through its active political and intellectual engagements 
in the early 1940s. The Kurdistan Republic of 1946 which followed was a result of a 
period of foreign occupation of Iran (1941-1946) in which Kurdistan had been 
experiencing political freedom as well as cultural revivals since the outbreak of the 
Second World War in 1939. Furthermore, the proliferation of political and cultural 
activities as the consequence of the fall of Reza Shah originated in at least three decades 
of major political developments since the Constitutional Revolution. This background 
compels us to pay more attention to this unique experience than it has usually been the 
case with authoritative histories of Iran which have contributed to a chronology in which 
the Kurdistan Republic of Mahabad is treated too briefly as a ‘secessionist’ attempt, thus 
avoiding other important factors along with favourable circumstances, caused by the 
presence of the Soviet Union in Iran, in its formation. The Republic was a democratic 
experience which grew to reflect the dual process of modernisation and homogenisation, 
undertaken by a modern state which, enjoying ‘the monopoly over the right to define 
identity’, explained the Kurds as inextricable part of modern Iran in order to guarantee 
territorial and moral boundaries of Iranian political community. As asserted above, the 
Republic was the outcome of several decades of political developments and socio-
economic, cultural as well as intellectual transformations since the Constitutional 
                                                          
11 Ibid., 194. 
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Revolution, in general, and the outbreak of WWII, which weakened the central state, in 
particular. The presence of a friendly Russian army, in the same way as a debilitating 
central government, undeniably favoured the formation of the Republic and led to close 
relations which involved taking advice and conducting trade. furthermore, Nishtiman and 
Kurdistan reflected not only intellectual transformations or the advance of Kurdish 
national desires, they mirrored a dynamic and transforming society which was embracing 
modern progressive ideas. This said, the current study is mainly concerned with the place 
of the Republic in the dual process and attempts to explain its formation, programme and 
legacy in light of broader socio-economic, political and intellectual transformations 
which manifest the formation of Iran’s modern Kurdish society.  
The Republic was announced a few months after the foundation of the Democratic 
Party of Iranian Kurdistan in September 1945, the manifesto of which included ‘an 
autonomous Kurdistan within the frontiers of the Persian State’.12 It has been argued that 
by doing so both the party and the Republic betrayed the slogan of ‘independence’ which 
had been advocated by Zhe Kaf which was then ‘mysteriously’ absorbed in the 
Democratic Party. The idea that Zhe Kaf was transformed into the Democratic Party is 
disputed and the latter is perceived by many as the end of Zhe Kaf and its desire for an 
independent Kurdistan. 13 On the other hand, Eagleton sheds light on the matter by stating 
that the change of the name was the result of Baghirove’s (the Prime Minister of the 
Soviet Azerbaijan) advice to Qazi Muhammad, the president of the Republic, as he 
believed the new name and structure under a Central committee were more in tune with 
                                                          
12 ‘The Kurds of Persia’, dated 28 March 1946, TNA, FO371 52702 E2782/104/34; see also the first 
proclamation of the Republic in Muhammad Ezzat, Hukkamati Komari Kurdistan: Namekan W Balgekan 
[Kurdish Republic: Correspondece and Documents] (n.: n., 1995), Document 1, 18. 
13 Karimi, Zabihi, 100-120. 
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the new age of ‘democracy’.14 It is true that Zhe Kaf referred to ‘independence’ and a 
‘Great Kurdistan’ in its publications. A distinct Kurdish nationalism is exemplified, for 
example, by revealing the atrocities against the Kurds in the region and the outcome of 
recent unfavourable treaties of Lausanne (1923) and Sa‘dabad (1935), but also by 
providing an enduring Kurdish calendar.15 Indeed, ‘Long Live Kurd[s] and the Great 
Kurdistan’ embroidered Nishtiman’s cover page.16 However, the meaning and 
circumstances behind such concepts can be contested for the following reasons: 
firstly, Zhe Kaf had at its disposal Kurdish texts, mainly poetry, written by 
prominent Kurdish intellectuals, e.g. Hajji Qadir Koyi (d. 1898) and Mulla Muhammad 
Koyi, from other Kurdish regions. These figures and their works generally aimed at 
promoting national consciousness and spiritually elevating Kurds to the rank of other 
nations. They emphasised the role of education, revealed social and political conditions 
of Kurdish societies and maintained a critical view towards the agha class.17 Therefore, 
such texts did not necessarily reflect the political and social situation in Iranian Kurdistan. 
On the contrary, a deprived social situation characteristic of a Kurdish society motivated 
such activists as Zabihi to provide social and political alternatives. Indeed, because of the 
absence of both the central government and a Kurdish political entity, achieving freedom 
and independence for the Kurds was a general guideline to overcome political and social 
subjugation. In reality, according to a Foreign Office correspondence, 
 
During 1944 Mahabad became the centre of Kurdish nationalism in Persia, where Qazi 
Muhamed […] emerged as the leader of the movement. His original aims appear to have 
                                                          
14 Eagleton, Kurdish Republic, 57. 
15 Cf. Nishtiman, No. 7,8,9: 1323 [1944], 2; For this calendar see ‘The Special Calendar of Komala-i Zhe 
Kaf for 1943-4 and 1944-5’ [in Kurdish], in ibid., 561-74.  
16 Nishtiman, No. 7-8-9, Spring 1944, in Karimi, Zabihi, 575. 
17 Cf. ‘Zhe Kaf’s Gift for the Kurdish Youth,” (in Kurdish) Numbers 1-2-3: 1953, in ibid., 536-60. 
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been to obtain local autonomy on lines similar to those demanded by the ‘Iraqi Kurdish 
spokesmen […] In November he [Qazi Muhamed] visited Tehran with several tribal leaders 
and attempted, with incomplete success, to convince the Persian authorities of his loyalty, 
although independent reports credited him with the admission that many Kurds did not want 
independence, but would be content with a fair administration, schools in which Kurdish 
was allowed, health services and improved communications.18  
 
Moreover, the growing popularity of Russia owed itself primarily to the friendly 
treatment of people by the Red Army, unlike the brutal actions of the Tsarist Army during 
the First World War, its economic records as well as its victories over the Nazi Germany. 
The Manchester Guardian wrote in 1946 that 
 
Nothing have been done [in Iran] to improve the living conditions of the Kurds and other 
subject races. The problem of combatting the nomad form of life and banditism was being 
regarded as a problem of a military character and not as an economic problem which 
constituted the Russian approach to the problem. It was not therefore surprising that the 
Kurds were beginning to look to [Russia] in the North.19 
 
While the Kurds were encouraged by the presence of the Soviet Union in Iran, in 1944 
there was ‘no evidence of direct Russian support for any larger schemes for Kurdish 
independence’ nor the formation of the Kurdish societies owed anything ‘to Russian 
inspiration’.20 
Secondly, the foundation of the Kurdistan Republic, which defined itself in the 
framework of Iran, apparently marked a sudden turn in slogans and political programmes 
                                                          
18 ‘The Kurds of Persian’, (E2782/104/34), dated 28 March 1946, TNA, FO371/52702. 
19 Philips Price, “On Situation in Iran,” Manchester Guardian, January 1946, Quoted in ‘Manchester 
Guardian: ‘On Situation in Iran’’, ( E2268/104/34), dated 28 February 1946, TNA, FO371/52702. 
20 ‘The Kurds of Persia’, (E2782/104/34), dated 28 February 1946, TNA, FO371/52702. 
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hitherto advocated by Zhe Kaf; Zabihi along with other members supported the Republic. 
However, this turn ought to be interpreted according to circumstances developed in the 
context of the political and socio-economic transformation of Iran. Zhe Kaf advocated a 
will, however justified, while the Republic reflected a Kurdayeti (re)configured in that 
continuous transformation. 
Indeed, from the proclamation of the Republic onwards the Kurdish movement is 
unmistakably Iranian as it defines itself in the framework of Iran. Later literary and 
political activities present more evidence for this claim. For example, the only issue of 
Rega (Way), a bilingual Kurdish and Persian journal, which was published by Zabihi and 
some other remnants of Zhe Kaf only a few years after the end of the Republic, clearly 
asserts:  
 
Kurds have only one wish and it is freedom based on a real democracy. […] Based on these 
[abovementioned] reasons and historical evidence as well as the statement of Mr Mozaffar Firuz, 
the incumbent deputy Prime Minister who has explicitly recognised our rights and existence in 
the treaties of Tehran and Azerbaijan, we Iranian Kurds demand our natural rights. [These rights] 
consist of an autonomous, democratic government which conforms to a central, democratic 
government of Iran and [its] Constitution.21 (Emphasis added). 
 
Furthermore, although during later decades until the 1979 Iranian Revolution khabat-i 
natawayati (Ku. national struggle) for the eradication of stam-i natawayati (oppression 
because of nationality) is a constant theme, the influence of the Thirdworldist ideas of the 
1960s and 1970s on Kurdayeti is evident. As regards Iran, Kurdayeti continued to 
formulate its political and cultural demands in the framework of Iran (see the following 
                                                          
21 Rega: the Central Organ of Komala-i Zhe Kaf, No.1, 1327 [1949], in Karimi, Zabihi, 631. 
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chapters) and Kurdish movements of the 1960s and 1970s reflected this trend. 
Abdulrahman Qasimlu’s, a leading Kurdish-Iranian politician, doctorate thesis (1962) 
argues for the unity of all people of the Middle East in their struggle against imperialism.22 
It would be naive to consider such defining of self in the framework of Iran as tactical to 
appease the Iranian intellectuals or the government because such interpretations of 
political behaviour would ignore the process of change and transformation, modernisation 
and homogenisation. This is in spite of the fact that the Iranian national narrative’s 
accusation of the Kurds of attempting to secede from Iran is constantly denied by the 
Kurds, while a Kurdish national narrative continues to reinforce the myth of the Great 
Kurdistan. A more recent example of an increasingly ‘Iranian’ nature of the Kurdish 
movement in Iran is the 1979 Revolution, in which Zabihi, now overshadowed by new 
political forces but in agreement with them, wrote in the summer about ‘a free and 
independent Iran and the brotherhood of nations’, and approved ‘autonomy in the 
framework of the Islamic Republic’.23 There were attempts by some veterans in vain to 
form an inter-regional Kurdish party. 
Therefore, the definition of self in the framework of the myth of the Great 
Kurdistan, which inspired Zhe Kaf, and in the framework of Iran, as did the Republic, 
must be explained according to circumstances surrounding such an organisation and 
entity and not as opposing elements in Kurdayeti. Intellectually, Zhe Kaf was radicalised 
in the context of the Second World War, the increasing popularity of the Soviet Union 
and socialist ideas as the result of this country’s impressive role in the War, while modern 
ideas and literary transformations shaped its tenets. Politically the Republic, to whose 
                                                          
22 Ghassemlou, Kurdistan and the Kurds, 255. 
23 Birzoo [Rahman Zabihi], ‘The Blessed Revolution of the Iranian peoples’ [Kurdish], in Chrika-y 
Kurdistan, No. 1, Tamuz-Ab [July-August] 1979, in Karimi, Zabihi, 519-528.  
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disposal Zhe Kaf surrendered its resources, was the culmination of a series of cultural and 
political movements as well as the revival of local tribal powers, while structurally it 
characterised socio-economic, political and cultural bonds between Kurdish society and 
Iran as the amalgamation of various ethnic communities. This is not to say that the 
termination of Zhe Kaf, followed by the Republic and the Democrtic Party, was an 
inevitable outcome of some socio-economic process. Indeed, to the conformity of these 
societies to a central government, many other factors such as state coercion, decision-
making, historical conjuncture and cultural factors have played a great role. However, 
this study insists that the act of defining self in the framework of Iran becomes more 
evident as Iran continues its modernisation and social transformation which incorporate 
all such factors. 
 
RELIGION AND LANGUAGE 
Culturally, Kurdayeti owes its existence to a number of formidable elements, above all 
perhaps religion, as both a way of life and a mechanism of ethnic persistence, and 
language. 
The Sunni religion of the Kurds is a way of life different from that of the state-
sponsored Shi‘a religion in Iran and has been one of the most salient components of 
Kurdish identity. It has also provided resistance against homogenisation.24 In this sense, 
religion has had at least two major effects. First, historically it continues to serve a 
Kurdish ethnic identity distinctive of an Iranian one which favours Shi‘a Islam. Here 
religion, rather indirectly, creates a bulwark for Kurdish ethnic identity. Quite 
interestingly, religion has followed and confirmed Kurdish identity because it provides a 
                                                          
24 See Smith’s discussion on the role of organised religion in ethnic persistence among ‘vertical’ 
communities. Smith, National Identity, 62 
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distinguishable Kurdish way of life. In addition to this, in the modern history of the Kurds 
in Iran political and literary lives of the prominent politico-religious figures as well as the 
hojra-educated activist-intellectual, e.g. poets, historians and journalists, attest to the fact 
that Kurdish ethnic identity is prioritised over the religious identity.25 For example, 
membership in Zhe Kaf was free for the adherents of different faiths but it was conditioned 
on swearing allegiance to Qur’an for Muslims or ‘to anything sacred’ if members were 
believers of other faiths such as Yazidis.26 In this case, religion as a means to ensure the 
faithfulness of the members served to legitimise Kurdayeti. Indeed, the prioritisation of 
the ethnic sentiments continued throughout the process of modernisation in later decades 
with the effect that with increasing secularisation of thought and also the growing 
influence of Thirdworldist ideologies on Kurdish political groups in the 1960s and 1970s, 
religion lost such a contributory role. However, a nascent religious Kurdayeti or nativism 
towards the end of the 1970s in Iran could be detected (see Chapter 5). 
Second, distinctive religious beliefs left the Kurds generally unaffected by 
theological transformations in the Shi‘a thought at least since the eighteenth century 
which provided formidable ideological foundations for later Iranian nativist ideologues 
who equated modernisation with Westernisation.27 As Sunni, the Kurds have followed a 
different religious hierarchy than that of the Shi‘a Muslims and this includes immunity 
against concepts such as ijtihad (interpretation) practiced by a mujtahed (interpreter of 
the Shari‘a) and, most importantly, marja‘e taqlid (source of emulation). The latter has 
the potential to become Imam who is infallible in his leading of the umma. This is not to 
                                                          
25 For a good discussion of the priority of national identity over religious identity see ibid., 6-8. 
26 Modarresi, ‘Komalay Zhekaf’, 68. 
27 For a history of theological transformations in the Shi‘a thought see Said Amir Arjomand, The Shadow 
of God and the Hidden Imam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). On the ideologue of the Islamic 
Revolution see Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2006). 
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suggest that Shi‘a identity has historically overshadowed an Iranian national identity. 
Quite the contrary, pre-Islamic mythology plays a fundamental role in shaping a modern 
Iranian identity with the affect that in historical conjunctions its mythical figures and 
stories are Islamicised; here it is the religion that needs legitimacy.28 Comparatively, 
while Kurdish mythology has heavily borrowed from Iranian mythology and its pre-
Islamic legends, it has largely served an ethnic, and not religious, Kurdish identity.  
Therefore, not being influenced by either theological transformations or existing 
religious rituals in Shi‘a tradition, Kurds as a religious minority under a religiously biased 
state in Iran have inclined towards ‘secularism’ and non-religious political movements. 
Therefore, insofar as religion is concerned, any analysis of the nationalisation and 
modernisation of Iran ought to consider those two aspects that pertain to the relationship 
between an ethnic and a religious identity. In what ways this relationship is maintained 
or transformed when both the state-led modernisation and social change intensify, is a 
question for later chapters. For the moment, we can assert that the indirect impact of a 
distinctive religious tradition, religious prejudices, and direct impact of secular 
movements, shaped and reinforced a rather secular Kurdayeti in its struggle for ethnic 
rights. However, with the intensification of modernisation in later decades of the 
twentieth century, it seems that a religious Kurdayeti gradually becomes another 
distinctive contributor in struggle for those rights. 
Kurdish language is another salient feature of Kurdish identity. The literature is 
pioneered by Hassanpour’s  Language and Nationalism in Kurdistan, in which the author 
presents a history of linguistic oppression by modern nation states including that of Iran. 
A distinct Kurdish language and endeavours to preserve it were factors that ensured the 
                                                          
28 Saeed Talajooy, "Rostam and Esfandiyar: From a Heroic Age to Page, Stage and Screen", unpublished 
article, 2011. 
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persistence of Kurdish language in the face of Persianisation of language and culture in 
Iran. However, there are other factors which distinguished linguistic policies within that 
country with that of, for example, Turkey where outright linguistic purification and 
annihilation occurred.29 These include historical and cultural bonds as well as the 
simplification movements which affected linguistic policies and preceded modern 
linguistic oppression, respectively. Indeed, the exigencies of a modern state in Iran to 
create military, and later, medical and educational vocabularies also guided linguistic 
policies. These factors, also ignored in a pioneering study such as that mentioned above, 
allow us to broaden our understanding of the processes of both linguistic simplification 
and purification in Iran, and gauge the radicalism of linguistic policies in the time of Reza 
Shah compared to a much more radicalised one under his son, Muhammad Reza Shah. 
Therefore, while Kurdish language in modern Iran began to suffer in the sphere of 
literature, education and administration, such factors reduced barriers for those who 
enhanced Kurdayeti’s linguistic capacities. Thus, benefiting from history and individual 
endeavours, Kurdish language in Iran continued to function as a distinctive feature of 
Kurdish identity and served Kurdayeti in its struggle for ethnic or national rights. 
 
CONCLUSION 
While political and economic modernisation seemed to succeed in determining the 
integrating tendency of Kurdish society, the nationalisation of Iranian identity not only 
failed to erase Kurdish identity, it unwittingly provided motivation for its perseverance. 
In this regard, many important elements of Kurdish ethnic identity such as religion and 
language continued to function in favour of Kurdayeti by reinforcing distinct ethnic 
                                                          
29 See R. John Perry, "Language Reform in Turkey and Iran," International Journal of Middle East Studies 
17, No. 3 (Aug., 1985); Kia, "Persian Nationalism"; and Rustayi, Tarikhe Nokhostin Farhangestane Iran. 
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characteristics. Kurdayeti, therefore, exists as a synthesis of nationalisation and 
modernisation of Iran. The nationalisation of Iranian identity continued to provide 
legitimacy for Kurdayeti as a sense of both belonging to and struggle for the Kurds and 
Kurdistan; a sense which, based on a historical ethnie, i.e., according to Smith, an ethnic 
community with its historical and cultural elements,30 continued to be reinforced 
theoretically and practically by intellectual endeavours and political movements. 
Modernisation, on the other hand, sustained its tendency to integrate Iranian societies into 
a distinct, Iranian socio-economic and political field which formed the source of defining 
self in the framework of Iran since the Second World War. This said, Kurdayeti was not 
a rigid phenomenon, but continued to reshape according to historical conjunctures and 
intellectual transformations in the second half of the century. However, it became more 
embedded in the framework of Iran as Kurdish society became socio-economically more 
integrated into that country because of the intensification of modernisation and social 
change, especially in the era of the White Revolution.    
                                                          
30 For more on ethnie see Smith, National Identity, Ch. 1. 
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12. The Kurdish Revival’s Kurdish Calendar for 1322/1943-44 
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13. Single dimensional approach to social change in Kurdistan. 
  
 118 
 
  
S
o
u
rc
es
: 
In
k
el
es
 a
n
d
 S
m
it
h
, 
B
ec
o
m
in
g
 M
o
d
er
n
; 
L
er
n
er
, 
T
h
e 
P
a
ss
in
g
 o
f 
th
e 
T
ra
d
it
io
n
a
l 
S
o
ci
et
y
; 
H
u
n
ti
n
g
to
n
, 
‘P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
M
o
d
er
n
iz
at
io
n
; 
K
er
r,
 a
n
d
 e
t 
a
l.
, 
In
d
u
st
ri
a
li
sm
 a
n
d
 I
n
d
u
st
ri
a
l 
M
a
n
; 
P
ap
p
e,
 T
h
e 
M
o
d
er
n
 M
id
d
le
 E
a
st
; 
N
ik
k
i 
R
. 
K
ed
d
ie
, 
‘S
ec
u
la
ri
sm
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
S
ta
te
’;
 W
at
er
s,
 M
o
d
er
n
 S
o
ci
o
lo
g
y.
 
M
an
y
 m
o
d
er
n
is
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
th
eo
ri
es
 a
ck
n
o
w
le
d
g
e,
 f
o
r 
ex
am
p
le
, 
th
at
 i
n
d
u
st
ri
al
is
at
io
n
 i
s 
n
o
t 
a 
si
n
g
le
 m
o
d
el
, 
th
e 
re
su
lt
 w
il
l 
b
e 
a 
p
lu
ra
l 
in
d
u
st
ri
al
is
at
io
n
, 
an
d
 c
u
lt
u
ra
l 
an
d
 e
co
n
o
m
ic
 p
re
co
n
d
it
io
n
s 
ca
n
 b
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
ac
co
rd
in
g
 t
o
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
w
it
h
 t
h
e 
ef
fe
ct
 t
h
at
 s
o
m
e 
cu
lt
u
re
s 
ca
n
 b
e 
m
o
re
 r
es
is
ta
n
t 
th
an
 o
th
er
s.
 
H
o
w
ev
er
, 
in
 t
h
es
e 
th
eo
ri
es
 i
t 
se
em
s 
th
at
 ‘
in
d
u
st
ri
al
is
at
io
n
’ 
is
 a
 s
u
b
st
it
u
te
 f
o
r 
‘m
o
d
er
n
is
at
io
n
/W
es
te
rn
is
at
io
n
’ 
an
d
 ‘
in
d
u
st
ri
al
 s
o
ci
et
y
’ 
is
 a
 s
u
b
st
it
u
te
 f
o
r 
‘m
o
d
er
n
 
so
ci
et
y
’ 
in
 c
o
n
tr
as
t 
to
 ‘
tr
ad
it
io
n
al
 s
o
ci
et
y
’.
 C
f.
 K
er
r 
an
d
 e
t 
a
l.
, 
In
d
u
st
ri
a
li
sm
, 
3
1
-8
6
. 
H
is
to
ri
ca
ll
y
, 
th
e 
co
n
te
x
t 
o
f 
th
e 
C
o
ld
 W
ar
 i
s 
v
er
y
 i
n
fl
u
en
ti
al
 i
n
 s
h
ap
in
g
 
d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
th
eo
ri
es
. 
 
 119 
 
 
14. Multi-dimensional approach to social change in Kurdistan. 
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Part II: Kurdistan and the Era of the White Revolution 
 
 
 
The White Revolution is a social transformation unprecedented in Iran’s three-thousand-year history. 
Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, 19621 
 
 
While the Westerner has become disillusioned and the Western culture is declining, we are marching 
behind the West […] and keep boasting about the advances of the West and claiming that we will soon be 
one of the greatest advanced countries of the world.  
         Reza Barahani, 19692 
 
Part I discussed a limited, but significant, social change in Kurdish-Iranian society in the 
decades prior to the era of the ‘White Revolution’ (1963-1979). Part II is an assessment 
of this society’s social transformation in the two decades following the inception of the 
reforms in the early 1960s. The Shah’s Revolution, based on the existing ideas in Iran to 
reform the Iranian state and society, developed into a dream of making Iran a Great 
Civilisation, while the spiralling oil revenues effectively contributed to the intensification 
of the state-led modernisation. Political consequences notwithstanding, reforms 
profoundly changed Kurdish-Iranian society too. Therefore, it is the task of the following 
chapters to interpret and analyse the way this took place.  
                                                          
1 Quoted in Afkhami, The Shah, 768. 
2 Reza Barahani, Tarikhe Mozakkar [Masculine History] (Tehran: Nashre Awwal, 1984), 79. 
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Chapter 3: The White Revolution: Origins, Aims and Economic Plans 
 
INTRODUCTION  
By the time the 1979 popular revolution began, the White Revolution had profoundly 
transformed Iran. The scale of this transformation extended to Kurdish society too, and 
therefore, an analysis of social change in Kurdistan in the two decades of the 1960s and 
1970s is inevitably linked to change across Iran. The popular revolution did terminate the 
Pahlavi’s modernisation. However, the state and the society that emerged bore indelible 
marks of this earlier period because it had laid strong foundations for the continuation of 
future state-led modernisation, regardless of the nature of the succeeding state. This 
chapter briefly contextualises the White Revolution and identifies the origins of the ideas 
that led to its inception. This is necessary for three reasons. First, the historical context 
and reformist ideas, which were already in circulation, invite a critical reading of the 
White Revolution for us to identify its negative and positive ramifications as the result of 
a mixture of factors peculiar to contemporary Iran. Secondly, as regards Kurdish society, 
this critical reading assists us to place this period in the dual process we have been 
following, and not regard it as an inevitable transitory point in the age of modernity, let 
alone an unprecedented event in ‘Iran’s three-thousand-year history’, ahistorical and 
inflated claim by the reigning monarch. Finally, this approach enables us to identify other 
contributing factors alongside the state in the process of change and transformation and 
engage in a critical assessment of the consequences of reforms too. In addition to an 
overview of the reaction to the White Revolution in Kurdistan, the conceptualisation of 
the White Revolution is followed by presenting a general discussion of some other 
significant topics in the process of the socio-economic transformation of the Kurdish 
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region: the Kurdish region in economic planning; land reform and its general 
consequences for the rural class structure; and infrastructure.  
 
AN IDEA EXPLOITED 
As an idea, ‘White Revolution’ had been cultivated by Iranian intellectuals at least since 
the early 1940s.3 It represented a non-violent transformation of Iran under a ‘leader’ who 
would also pacify the presumed perils of different hues of red, yellow, and green (later 
black) menace, i.e. Communism, the Far East, and Islam, respectively. The initial 
meaning of the term served a ‘parliamentarian regime’ and aimed to create a ‘balance 
between the executive and legislative powers’.4 In contrast, the Shah’s White Revolution 
primarily aimed to pacify the multifaceted threat to the monarchy in order to preserve and 
strengthen its foundations. Simultaneously, the ideas of land reform, the centrepiece of 
the Shah’s White Revolution, had been advocated since the early 1940s, for example, by 
left-wing groups to curb the power of the landowner class and transform agriculture. The 
division of land in Iran had been previously attempted, for instance, under the autonomous 
government of Azerbaijan in the early 1940s; 5 and since it was a long-standing demand 
of the left, the monarch’s Revolution hoped to neutralise ‘the threat of Communism’ by 
accomplishing social reforms in general and the land reform, in particular. The White 
Revolution not only reflected a history of genuine desires of Iranians for reform pursued 
since the Constitutional Revolution (1906-11), it also aimed to prevent social revolution 
form below. The fear of revolution from below originated in the crisis around the 
nationalisation of oil industry as early as 1949. As Roger Louis reveals, for the British 
                                                          
3  Mahmud Afshar, "Enqelabe Sefid," [The White Revolution], Ayandeh 3, No. 14-16 (1946), 767-8. 
4Ibid., 768. 
5 Cf. Manucher Farmanfarmaian and Roxane Farmanfarmaian, Blood and Oil: A Prince's Memoir of Iran, 
from the Shah to the Ayatollah (USA: Random House, 1997); and Jami, Gozashte Cheraghe Rahe Ayande 
Ast [Past is the Torch of Future's Path] (Tehran: Qaqnus, 1998). 
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officials such as Michael Wright, assistant Under-Secretary supervising Middle Eastern 
affairs, ‘for a long time it had been clear that the situation of ‘political stagnation’ in Iran 
could not continue indefinitely. Either the Iranian government would have to come to 
grips with far-reaching economic and social reform or there would be a Communist 
revolution’.6 The White Revolution was a revolution from above. 
The Shah’s White Revolution denotes a set of principles in the process of the 
modernisation of Iran. These principles were originally comprised of six points: land 
reform, nationalisation of forests, sale of state-owned enterprises to the public, workers’ 
profit sharing in 20 percent of net corporate earnings, voting and political rights for 
women, and formation of the Literacy Corps. These were extended to 19 points by 1977. 
These principles, which were formally presented by the Shah, first to the cabinet and then 
to the Congress of the Farmers of Iran in January 1963, included reforms that had already 
been introduced by successive Iranian governments, mostly during the previous cabinet 
under Ali Amini in the absence of the Majlis, recasting much of the ingredients of the 
Third Economic Plan (1962).7 Land reform was a long-standing preoccupation of Iranian 
statesmen too and the incorporation of a Literacy Corps in the principles for mandatory 
universal education had become a law in October 1962.8 The government had already 
started land reform in northwest Iran in March 1962.9 This was also the case with the 
principle of voting and political rights for women. As an increasingly considerable social 
                                                          
6 William Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984), 632. 
7Afkhami, The Shah, 231. 
8 As Afkhami has noted, the idea of the Literacy Corps came from the Education Minister, Parviz Khanlari. 
See also Khanlari’s speech at Tehran College Training on ‘the situation and the future of education’, entitled 
by the journal of Education as ‘To Accomplish the Shah’s Command [to form the Literacy Corps]. For this 
see Parivz Khanlari, "The Situation and the Future of Education," Amuzesh wa Parvaresh 33 (New Era) 
No. 1 (Esfand 1341 [Feb-March 1963]), 9-22. 
9 Dariush Homayun, "Eslahate Arzi Dar Iran," [Land Reform in Iran], Tahqiqate Eqtesadi [Economic 
Research], No. 5 & 6 (Khordad 1342 [June 1963]), 38. 
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force in modernising Iran, women activists had continued to pursue such rights since the 
1920s and pressure the state and statesmen to conceive more rights, including the right to 
vote.10 The Shah remained conservative especially when he faced a major challenge from 
the clergy.11 Therefore, it was mainly the women activists who eventually forced an 
informal participation of women in the election of 1962, without their votes being 
counted, which made the Shah two days later to promise ‘the right of women to vote in 
the future’.12 Ali Amini, the incumbent Prime Minister, who had advocated land reform 
since the mid-1940s, had used the title ‘White Revolution’ when the land reform was 
passed, and for whom this reform, along with women’s rights, constituted the pillars of 
that revolution.13 The Shah added new ideas such as profit sharing schemes for workers 
in industry, an idea he had conceived while observing life in the United States. Noted 
above, as an alternative to social theories of the left and as a modernising programme to 
prevent social revolution, the White Revolution was quickly renamed ‘The Revolution of 
the Shah and the People’; more points were added to the principles of the White 
Revolution in the following years.  
This said, the novelty of the Shah’s White Revolution was in its political 
dimensions, though it inaugurated a profound socio-economic transformation of Iran. 
While it was affected by the previous attempts at reform and the preceding economic 
plans, the political situation in Iran granted urgency to such reforms. Domestically the 
dynasty had been facing a protracted political crisis since the Second World War, 
embodied in short tenures of successive cabinets and ultimately the oil crisis which was 
                                                          
10 ‘Alam-e Naswan (the World of Women) was one of the earliest journals advocating women’s rights and 
advising women on social issues. For more see Elwell-Sutton, “Alam-E Nesvan,”. 
11 Afkhami, The Shah, 227-29. 
12 Mahnaz Afkhami, Zanan, Dowlat Va Jame'e Dar Iran: 1941-1978 [Women, State, and Society in Iran] 
(Maryland: Foundation for Iranian Studies, 2003), 124-35. 
13 Afkhami, The Shah, 227. 
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culminated in the coup of 1953.14 In the early 1960s and prior to the declaration of the 
principles of the White Revolution, a new wave of social unrest threatened the monarchy 
when religious and secular oppositions alike resurfaced. In effect, the Shah’s revolution 
attempted at thwarting both the ‘black and red menace’. Furthermore, economically, the 
Third Economic Plan seemed to have forged a rival power centre consisting of the so-
called Harvard economic advisors, Amini and the Plan Organisation under Gholamhosain 
Ebtehaj, whose performances were judged under the shadow of the Kennedy 
administration (see below). This ‘raised political concern for the Shah who wanted a 
strong army’.15 Regionally, the toppling of the monarchy in Iraq (1958) and the military 
coup in Turkey (1960) further increased political pressure to intensify economic 
development for which the oil revenue and a strong military constituted its pillars. The 
White Revolution, therefore, aimed at preserving the establishment by providing 
alternatives to other social and political forces represented by an increasingly politicised 
religious opposition and various reformist movements, the existence or reconfiguration 
of which was due to social transformation of Iran in general and the state-led 
modernisations in particular. In Mission for My Country, the Shah stipulated ‘positive 
nationalism’ and ‘political democracy’ for economic development to simultaneously 
make the opposition irrelevant and promote Iran to an unprecedented status among the 
world’s powerful nations.16 As it turned out to be the case, he had to cross the path towards 
that imaginary status alone with dire political consequences for Iran.  
 
REACTION TO THE WHITE REVOLUTION 
                                                          
14 For the political crisis of this period cf. Azimi, The Crisis of Democracy. 
15 Afkhami, The Shah, 219. 
16 Quoted in ibid., 220-21. 
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There seems to have been two kinds of reaction to the announcement of the principles of 
the White Revolution and the referendum in Kurdistan: an initial general reaction and a 
more specific one put forward by organised Kurdish activists. The White Revolution 
created an unprecedented opportunity to effectively challenge the Kurdish aghas’ 
authority over society and benefit from a more favourable context to affect poor socio-
economic conditions. An initial positive reaction to the land reform explained the need to 
weaken the social and political power of the landowner class. However, the continuation 
of a more organised opposition to the Pahlavi state and of a Kurdayeti, intellectually more 
connected to the outside world, created mixed feelings towards the reforms.  
The reaction of Kurdish political activists to the Shah’s announcement of the 
White Revolution illuminated the political dimensions of the reforms in question. The 
increase in the number of Kurdish university students in Tehran had led to the formation 
of Yakiyati Khwendkaran-i Kurd (Ku. The Union of Kurdish Students), which was 
concerned with domestic and international political developments and began to expand 
in 1961-2.17 An influential event of the time was the expansion of the Kurdish movement 
in Iraq which also attracted the support of the opportunistic Iranian government, which 
perceived Arab nationalism as a threat to its regional position. The state exploited this 
situation by organising new but controlled Kurdish publications and radio programmes. 
However, the state unintentionally created opportunities for Kurdish activists and literary 
figures to practice Kurdish language and literature. Yakiati ‘identified itself with the 
Kurdish movement in Iraq with the effect that the movement’s rise [in the early 1960s] 
and fall [in 1975] determined its fate too’.18 Moreover, the National Front and Dariush 
                                                          
17 Yadola Biglari, "Kurdistan and the White Revolution," interview with author, July 6, 2017 
18 Ibid. 
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Foruhar’s Iran Party turned to the Union to benefit from their active engagement in 
political and cultural activities and tried to absorb it.19 
 In these circumstances, Kurdish educated-activists treated the White Revolution 
as a political project and ‘did not pay heed to its social promises’.20 According to one 
such activist who founded a small bookshop called Danesh (Knowledge) in 1966, when 
he was only eighteen and later became a teacher, international, regional and domestic 
contexts, including the rise of the USA as a world power, revolutions in China and Cuba, 
the military coup in Turkey, the collapse of the monarchy in Iraq and the advance of the 
Kurdish movement in Iraq, ‘shaped their initial opposition’ to the Shah’s White 
Revolution ‘without having a deep understanding of its contents’.21 However, attitudes to 
social issues addressed in the principles of the White Revolution changed in the 1970s, 
when the opposition to the Pahlavi regime increased.22 Moreover, while many members 
of Yakiyati voted to participate in the referendum, some others, among them engineers, 
voted against it mainly because of ‘Kurdayeti and the social status of some members’ 
who came from wealthy landowning families.23 Nevertheless, while political dispositions 
were shaped according to the ideas and context of the time, ‘the oppressive and inhumane 
socio-economic regime of the Kurdish agha was another factor to welcome the land 
reform.24 Moreover, participating in the Referendum for the White Revolution was 
considered a shrewd move ‘to cover political activities and safeguard the organisation 
against SAVAK’. This said, the common characteristic of these mixed attitudes can be 
                                                          
19 Yadola Biglari who worked as a judge between 1354 and 57 [1975-79] in Kermanshah, recalls a meeting 
of the Union with the National Front, represented by Siyawash Mokri (Kermanshahi) and Kayumars 
Baghbani, a follower of Foruhar, in which the Union rejected any cooperation for fear of losing its 
organisational independence, ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Mahmud Kaiwan, "Kurdistan and the White Revolution," interview with author, July 4, 2017. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Biglari, Interview. 
24 Ibid. 
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identified as a superficial understanding of the events which were taking place. For 
example, according to one such activists, using ‘dehqan (peasant) instead of newly 
adopted keshavarz [Pe. farmer] amounted only to an oppositional gesture to the Shah and 
thus demonstrated ‘a lack of deep knowledge of the principles concerned with social 
issues’.25 
In contrast, the popular reaction to the White Revolution was more enthusiastic. 
 
It had a good impact on the population living in villages under the yoke of the agha. It 
upset the landowners. The idea of land reform and attempts to divide the land were not 
new and dated back to the time of Musaddeq [Prime Minister 1951-3], who also demanded 
the landowners to move to cities. During his tenure, many villages in the Gawirk region 
founded Shura [Ku. Council] to run the village. Ultimately, Shuras were brutally 
suppressed as another outcome of the 1953 coup.26  
 
The popular enthusiasm was understandable. Villagers lived under the brutal regime of 
the Kurdish aghas devoid of any basic rights. The rashaiy, the Kurdish serf, and jutbanda 
[Ku. sharecropper], who formed the lowest layers of the village social structure, ‘lived 
like slaves’.27 Therefore, people, including students, teachers and staff in public offices, 
participated in the demonstration organised to support the referendum. Even the clergy, 
‘unlike their Shi‘a counterparts, did not oppose the White Revolution at least publicly’.28 
However, as time proceeded, negative and positive ramifications of the reforms became 
more evident. The Division of land proved to be unequal because the landowners were 
                                                          
25 Ibid. 
26 Rahim Amini, "Kurdistan and the White Revolution," interview with author, July 10, 2017. A teacher in 
the mid-1970s and an activist since the early 1960s, Amini grew up in a village near Saqqez and witnessed 
the inception of land reform in the area.  
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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able to keep good quality lands while the rashaiy remained landless and was forced to 
migrate to cities. As a result, popular discontent increased, reflecting in Kurdish 
activists’ growing political and social awareness, too.29 However, this is undeniable that 
the White Revolution triggered unprecedented interaction and movements of people, and 
connected the totally confined village life to the outside world, modern education, 
healthcare and new ways of life.30 In attracting further rural and urban public support, 
the expanding, extremely attractive ‘radio played a crucial role by promoting awareness 
on social issues such as healthcare, in various local dialects’.31 Both the big and small 
landowners viewed the White Revolution negatively, while the state continued to remind 
them of the peaceful nature of the Shah’s Revolution, ensuring compensation for the lost 
lands. According to oral history, in the end Khorde-malik (the small landowner), 
‘including my sceptical father, lost more in possession and status than the big 
landowners’.32 However, the latter’s social and political power had been dealt a severe 
blow, too. 
 Therefore, the reaction to the inception of the White Revolution can be assessed 
as follows. Modern, urban activists, who had become more organised, and politically 
and ethnically aware, opposed or agreed to the declaration of the reforms and the 
referendum for different political reasons which, as we discussed above, also explained 
the White Revolution’s raison d'etre. At the same time, the initial enthusiastic reaction 
of the wider population, including the educated and activists, however sceptical, 
originated from the oppressive regime of the Kurdish aghas which the land reform had 
now begun to imperil. The state’s authority was crucial to implement the long-craved 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Reshad Mustafasultani, "Kurdistan and the White Revolution," interview with author, July 3, 2017. 
32 Ibid. 
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reforms, which began to materialise through more sophisticated economic plans. 
However, while the plans’ directions and contents made sense in a political context, 
perspectives on how to transform Iranian societies had a long pedigree.  
 
THE POTENTIAL AND DIRECTIONS OF ECONOMIC PLANS 
The era of the White Revolution is distinguished by two completed Third (1962-1968) 
and Fourth (1968-1973) Development Plans, followed by an aborted Fifth Development 
plan (1973- ). As scholars have noted, the previous modernising attempts of inter-war 
years were ‘outcomes of philosophy and policy, rather than of a concrete program or 
strategy’.33 The First (1949-1955) and Second (1955-1962) economic plans were at best 
paralysed by political instability and the shortage of revenue, whereas the spiralling oil 
revenue since the 1960s, and especially in the early 1970s, made possible the execution 
of more ambitious and sophisticated economic plans. The Second Plan spent, out of a 
budget of 82.3 billion Rials, 75.2 million mostly on transportation and communications.34 
Owing to increasing oil revenue, which reached $958 million in the mid-1960s and rose 
to a staggering $20 billion by 1973,35 these plans coincided with the most significant 
socio-economic developments that Iran had ever witnessed. Although they continued 
previous infrastructural and agricultural works, improved transportation and built dams 
for electrical output, they concentrated on industry, mining and human resources.36 
Consequently, Iran began to experience unprecedented economic growth. As another 
illustration of this, $6.9 billion was spent during the Third and Forth plans and GDP grew 
                                                          
33 Amuzegar, "Capital Formation", 67. 
34 Ibid., 68.; Plan Organization, Report on the Operation of the Second Seven-Year Plan (Tehran: 1964), 
appendix 5. 
35 Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 427. 
36 See ibid., 426-35. Ibid. 
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from at an annual rate of 8% in 1962-1970 to 14% in 1972-1973 and then to 30% in 1973-
1974.37 
Furthermore, this period distinguishes itself for embracing more effective 
organisations and centres to spur economic development and conduct research.38 This 
was, as Afkhami has noted, embodied in ‘the development tripod’ of Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Finance, the Plan Organisation, and the Central Bank which 
‘became a synergic force for development’ and their chiefs enjoyed a good degree of 
harmony.39 In addition to this, economists along with reports by Plan Organisation and 
the Central Bank point to an increase in national income during the Second Plan despite 
political instabilities in the early 1960s. During this period a combination of foreign 
public and private loans as well as grants and credits, with a significant contribution of 
oil industry helped a capital formation of about $3,500 million.40 Moreover, the 
government’s oil revenue increased, of which $810 million helped finance the Second 
Plan.41 In effect, both the First and Second Plans ‘were essentially financial allocations 
set aside for public sector projects’.42 
During the Second Plan, the Plan Organisation became a more established entity 
in economic development in Iran. Claimed as an incorruptible individual who eventually 
resigned as the head of the Plan Organisation in 1958, Abolhasan Ebtehaj contributed 
immensely to the reorganisation and transformation of the Plan Organisation. As a 
prelude to economic actions, he generated what was sometimes regarded as controversial 
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or prolonged studies on economic needs of Iran and its various regions; in addition to 
‘qualified’ Western educated Iranian economists, he employed Western economists 
through The World Bank, for which institutions such as Harvard toped its list.43 The 
significance of the Second Plan, according to Ebtehaj, was the foundational and 
organisational basis it laid for later expansive economic plans. Nevertheless, during the 
Plan asphalted and rail roads were also expanded across Iran while new factories and 
dams went under construction.  
As regards provincial development, according to Javad Mansur, the Public 
Relation Officer of the Plan Organisation, ‘the [Second] Plan had more than enough 
projects […] [but] no further funds to devote to provincial surveys of the EBASCO 
[Electric Bond and Share Company which provided engineering and construction 
services] type, as these crucially involved heavy additional financial commitment’.44 As 
a result, this forced ‘Ebtehaj to go slow on further provincial progress for the time 
being’;45 and subsequently assign the development of provinces to various foreign firms. 
Though unsuccessful, this included dividing Iran into five regions allocated to four 
foreign companies to assess their economic and infrastructural needs and engage in their 
developments.46 This project enticed a scramble for Iranian provinces by American, 
French, Japanese, Italian and British firms which looked for ‘the most suitable areas’.47 
In addition to increasing political pressures on Ebtehaj, the project failed because foreign 
companies sought propitious areas whereas undesirability of a region such as Khurasan 
in the east deterred, for example, British and German companies, which had not been 
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initially included, to commit themselves and invest in that region. Instead, they pressed 
for a share in other regions with the French or for other projects in more central regions 
such as Fars and Isfahan.48 Even in this case, UK companies were not ‘required to invest 
in the social development of the area, e.g. [building] schools [and] hospitals’.49 This 
meant investment in certain and not properly planned social projects. Moreover, political 
considerations and economic interests on both sides shaped their approaches to provincial 
projects. For instance, while the Shah and Ebtehaj insisted that the interested British firms 
should invest in Khurasan because of the region’s rich potential but neglected situation,50 
the British considered their economic interests, regional and international political 
positions to avoid lagging behind others. 
The end of Ebtehaj’s reign, which followed a government proposal to bring the 
Plan Organisation under the control of the Prime Minister, revealed to some extent the 
prevalent contemporary trends in the economic development of Iran, on the one hand, and 
the start of a more centralised planning which was going to coincide with the 
centralisation of political power in one individual, on the other. The origin of centralising 
development planning went back to the Second Plan and to the dispute between the 
incumbent Prime Minister, Razmara, and Ebtehaj. The former was in favour of an 
economic plan which provided the provinces with financial help in order to enable them 
to undertake their own development projects, whereas the latter’s stringent attitudes 
restrained such decentralising attempts,51 and mainly intended to attract foreign capital 
through his ideas for provincial development. Ebtehaj’s rejection of both the plan and 
demand of the representatives of Khuzistan, dominantly an Arabic speaking region in the 
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south, for a share in the oil revenue exemplified his centralising approach, favoured by 
the Shah.52 Instead of adopting a welcoming attitude, Ebtehaj rebuked them for not 
speaking [i.e. presenting their case in] Persian.53 
However, as it can be inferred from a foreign office document, the fate of Ebtehaj 
was sealed when disagreements between various functions of the government, e.g. the 
cabinet, the ministries and the Plan Organisation, revealed impatience with his meticulous 
methods and disregard for military budget.54 In any case, Ebtehaj embodied the 
government’s will for centralisation of economic development and it can be surmised that 
he set a precedent in this regard too.55 Although economic development in Iran before 
Ebtehaj had been inclined towards centralisation, he effectively blocked initiatives from 
the provinces. Moreover, his plan for ‘omran-e shahri (Pe. city development) stipulated 
provinces to provide 50 percent of the budget, whereas the other half he projected to come 
from oil revenues.56 However, Ebtehaj became increasingly unpopular with politicians 
for other reasons, which included his long-term planning, being both ‘indifferent’ to the 
present distress of the population and, according to some views, extravagant, so that he 
came to be known as someone who preferred foreign experts and loans, and an 
‘uncooperative, obstinate and arrogant’ person, who spent four years surveying and 
planning.57 That is why the incumbent Prime Minister claimed in the early months of 
1959 that ‘Iran had the Plan Organisation as well as a Ministry of Road, but still no 
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road’.58 By April, ‘the various schemes for regional development initiated by the Plan 
Organisation [were] in suspense […] EBASCO was told to go home’.59 
 
DEVELOPMENT PLANS AFTER EBTEHAJ 
Enabled by spiralling oil revenues, post-Ebtehaj more comprehensive and cogent 
economic plans continued economic growth and ushered in profound socio-economic 
transformation of Iran. Moreover, encouraged by income and growth, economic planning 
resulted in formulating other long-term plan of Twenty-Year Perspective. The 
Perspective was based on a Plan Strategy, whose ideas had French origins. These latter 
plans also signalled the fear of the depletion of oil as the blood of Iran’s economy. The 
axis was the Plan Organisation under Khodadad Farmanfarmaian (the end of 1960s-1972) 
and Abdolmajid Majidi (1972-1977). An overview of the next economic plans 
demonstrates the growing economic capacity of the state, on the one hand, and how the 
plans maintained a centralising approach devoid of specific provincial plans. 
In the view of some economists, the Third Economic Plan (1962-1968), whose framework 
was formulated by the new Economic Bureau, outclassed the previous ones by being 
‘truly the first comprehensive attempt at scientific planning in Iran’.60 Its objectives 
included an average annual increase in gross national product of 6 percent; maximum 
employment based on annual population growth rate of 2.5 percent; improvement in 
national income distribution through socioeconomic reform; and maintenance of 
reasonable price stability.61 In contrast to the previous plan which was ‘simply a list of 
investment programs and projects’ and faced ‘the lack of both statistical data and 
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familiarity with methodological planning and techniques’,62 the next development plans 
were going to be prepared in more favourable economic circumstances. Politically, 
although Iran was going to experience a period of stability, modernisation also intensified 
the opposition of an increasingly politicised religious force which had turned against the 
monarchy and was eventually attracted to the ideas of vilayet-e faqih (Guardianship of 
the Islamic jurists) and Islamic government (see Chapter 5).63  
 
15. The Third Economic Plan (1962-1968). 
 
 
The Fourth and Fifth Development Plans distinguished themselves for being even more 
comprehensive in both quantitative and qualitative terms and containing clearly defined 
objectives. They accelerated the pace of industrialisation and privatisation by huge 
investments.64 As scholars have noted, any economic ambivalence on behalf of the Shah 
was finally resolved when Iran’s annual income from oil reached from $200 million in 
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1957 to $20 billion by 1973.65 Up to $10 billion, which was channelled into the plans, 
aimed to accelerate the pace of modernisation in all sectors ‘but particularly through 
heavy industrialization’.66 Other qualitative aims included ‘a more equitable distribution 
of income through the extension of welfare services, particularly education, health, rural 
rehabilitation and urban development’; ‘export diversification in order to reduce heavy 
dependence on oil income’; and the modernisation of techniques and administrative 
reforms.67 
Moreover, the continuing increase of the shares of the oil sector and industry in 
GNP had made possible the inexorable pace of modernisation albeit at the expense of 
agriculture and export diversification. The Fifth Plan superseded the previous one in 
being ‘the most comprehensive’ with more emphases on industrialisation and 
privatisation, regarded as positive economic developments in Iran because, for example, 
privatisation had become an accepted concept well ahead of other countries such as 
Egypt, India or Indonesia.68 In contrast to the early 1960s, the development plans of the 
first half of the 1970s coincided with a period of political and economic stability which 
made possible a more effective execution of their programmes. In this context, as 
becomes more evident in the following chapters, what it assumes to be a culture of change 
across Iran surfaced, reflecting both a popular and intellectual enthusiasm for socio-
economic change. 
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This said, development plans continued to retain their concentration on the 
expansion of modernisation from the centre and lack any specific provincial development 
planning. The plans’ emphases on industrialisation or privatisation left out regions which 
lacked resources or their potential were ignored while the dramatic growth of GNP 
between 1963 and 1977 benefited ‘the central regions, particularly Tehran, more than the 
outer provinces’. 69 In Kurdistan, therefore, the state’s modernisation was tangible 
through the expansion of welfare services by government ministries and these ministries’ 
provincial offices such as Rah (Road) or ‘Omran (Development). By the same token, the 
impressive growths of GNP and per capita income were palpable as employment in the 
public sector increased alongside the population’s spending power. In addition to Bazaar 
as an integral constituent of the economy, the capital and work force in this region became 
heavily concentrated in the construction industry. Indeed, in the absence of 
‘industrialisation’, the predominant mode of production continued to evolve around 
conventional artisanship and handicraft, and this pushed the work force towards the 
construction industry, which owed its expansion to a relentless pace of urbanisation. 
Moreover, demographic change and population movement had made the economy more 
dynamic with the effect that bazaar or the existing mode of production expanded. Iran’s 
economic growth was indeed very impressive. However, in the absence of provincial 
planning, modernisation was felt through its reverberations originated in the capital. 
Instead, overshadowing economic and political contradictions, the ambitious plans such 
as the Twenty-Year Perspective (1972-1992) marked the determination of the Shah to 
take Iran towards a ‘Great Civilisation’, a dream based on oil reserves. Ironically, as 
scholars have noted, the Perspective was designed based on a pessimistic view of the 
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world and urged the Iranians to act fast and take the opportunity to develop before Iran’s 
‘oil was depleted’.70 According to Manucher Farmanfarmaian, ‘oil was Iran’s economy’ 
and defined its future because ‘oil was not just a commodity for Iran; it was the blood of 
its earth and means to catapult its people into the twentieth century’ and after.71 
Perspective was based on an ambitious Spatial Strategy Plan, an idea of French origin, to 
deploy the population in relation to natural resources and deal with every region. ‘Rapid 
growth’, the plans shrewdly acknowledged, ‘leads to imbalance between groups, regions, 
and economic sectors’.72 The economic crisis of 1977 forced the Shah to embrace such a 
strategy knowing that it would not restrain his power; Perspective and Strategy also 
inspired the Six Economic Plan, which was  terminated with the outbreak of the popular 
revolution of 1978-9.73     
 
KURDISTAN IN DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
The general improvement of socio-economic conditions in Kurdistan depended on the 
effectiveness of development plans to address infrastructure, transportations, 
communications, healthcare and education across Iran. In this respect, the development 
plans of the 1960s and 1970s were more effective than their predecessors. However, these 
plans were centralising, exclusive and lacked province-specific planning. While 
economic planning changed the face of Iran in general, their aims and directions did not 
directly benefit a peripheral region like Kurdistan for three main reasons. First, 
development plans and projects had been initially paralysed by the shortage of revenue 
and, when oil revenue meteorically increased in the early 1970s, its increase emboldened 
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grandeur desires of the Shah. As a result, the plans became increasingly dependent on 
how the Shah decided to spend oil revenues. Secondly, as we noted above, economic 
planning in Iran historically developed amid political instability; they were politically 
motivated. Finally, insofar as peripheral regions were concerned, these plans served 
centralised planning to the detriment of provincial planning. These three aspects 
influenced the nature, and effected the outcome, of economic planning in both the centre 
and peripheries. Therefore, Kurdistan as a periphery benefited from the state-led 
modernisation as much as the state’s infrastructural and industrial efforts expanded from 
the centre towards its peripheries. We have discussed dependency on oil in other parts of 
this study to some extent, the following is an elaboration of the last two aspects. 
 Political instability not only exerted negative impact on economic planning, it 
inspired politically motivated reforms. The White Revolution, as we discussed above, 
was itself the outcome of the fear of ominous perils of internal forces and thus intended 
to preserve the monarchy. Although the ideas which embellished the principles of the 
White Revolution were already in circulation, so was widespread the will to change Iran 
through an overarching reform process, both the state and the Shah provided platforms 
for the implementation of reforms. Moreover, domestic and international political 
developments in the 1970s, just like the pressure from the Kennedy administration did, 
continued to shape the plans and affect their outcomes. In effect, the uncertainty over 
Iran’s oil reserves and the Shah’s hubris further made reforms in the service of politics. 
As studies have noted, all projects became ‘means to an end, the fulfilment of the Shah’s 
dream of the Great Civilisation’.74 Moreover, as the White Revolution advanced, the Shah 
sidelined those with more critical mind. All these clearly functioned against plans or 
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projects based on studies or the needs of the population of Iran, the peripheral regions of 
which, and subsequently these regions’ rural areas, were certainly the most deprived. 
Probably no other topic can better highlight planning deficiencies and deprivation than 
the sustained city-village disparity in such regions, in general, and in Kurdistan, in 
particular. The disparity between urban and rural areas in Kurdistan was sustained 
throughout the White Revolution and no economic plan, which aimed at urbanisation, 
industrialisation, modern healthcare and education, addressed that issue effectively. 
Discussed in the following chapters, this aspect of life in Kurdistan kept out most of the 
Kurdish population from the benefits of modernisation. This is confirmed by Afkhami’s 
collective study—and in this respect it distinguishes itself from many other studies on this 
period—that rapid industrial growth increased ‘already widening urban-rural 
disparities.75 However, no industrialisation was pursued in Kurdish urban areas and 
consequently a bazaar-artisan economy continued to characterise the region’s economic 
life. Moreover, an industrially feeble Kurdish city relied on trade with a village, lucky for 
its proximity with urban centres, to survive, without promoting the rural economy. 
Crucially, amid increasing urbanisation, the lack of rural and urban development plans in 
the aftermath of land reform made expanding Kurdish cities encircled by deprived 
mahallas. Interestingly, as regards these districts, the nomenclature resembled a division 
of labour: Hammal Awa (Porters Quarter), jutiaran (Peasants), Sangborran 
(Stonecutters), Qarachi Awa (Gypsies Quarter), Spour Awa (Sweepers Quarter). To this, 
one can add many more such as Kiwer Awa (Blinds Quarter) and Diz Awa (Thieves 
Quarter). Modernisation continued to maintain the chasm between city and village, 
depriving the latter from the benefits of social change and economic programmes 
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effectively. In contrast, as regards the process of planning, in retrospect it seems that 
Ebtehaj’s Plan and Budget Organisation, a pre-White Revolution reforming body, 
pursued reforms which served social and economic needs of Iranian societies. 
Simultaneously, it could take credit for being the continuation of the previous attempts 
by Iranian statesmen and intellectuals at economic planning since the Second World War, 
and not inspired, at least entirely, by later political concerns or grandeur ideas, which 
were more obsessed with producing a progressive image of Iran in the West through 
superficial and showy achievements than with socio-economic problems of the whole 
country. As the end of the 1950s approached and the threat of both internal and external 
political upheavals loomed large, Ebtehaj’s meticulous methods and prolonged studies 
proved to be too much for the fragile nervous system of the Iranian politicians to take. 
However, as regards the Kurdish region, Ebtehaj’s centralising tendency and his demand 
that the provinces should contribute immensely to the budget, did not go in favour of such 
a region which had a weak infrastructure and lacked financial resources. Finally, political 
considerations overlooked many other crucial aspects such as Kurdish culture and identity 
with the effect that they remained areas prone to tensions and conflicts (see Chapter 5).  
Finally, the tendency to centralisation outlasted Ebtehaj’s era with the effect that 
economic plans, perspectives and strategies that followed, served a centralising state and 
an absolute monarch. Consequently, economic planning and social reforms in the 
peripheries reflected the overall trend across Iran and made these regions the terminus of 
economic expansion from more central regions. It is beyond the scope of this study to 
present a comparative study, the modernisation in the Kurdish region was not an 
exception vis-à-vis other regions of the country. However, in many respects each region 
reacted to change differently based on its history, culture and socio-economic structures. 
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Moreover, the idea of ‘provincial development’, however inadequate, did not survive into 
the White Revolution, whose increasing principles did not simply bother to address 
different regions in different ways. Therefore, politically concerned development plans, 
the misuse of revenue and the preoccupation with centralisation hindered socio-economic 
change in peripheral regions such as Kurdistan and Khuzistan, and determined the scope 
and pace of change—as discussed above, Ebtehaj’s Plan Organisation rejected a plan by 
the latter’s representatives. This was also the case, as we analyse it later, with the 
expansion of modern institutions such as healthcare and education. On the other hand, the 
state became even more political in those regions where distinct culture and identity 
continued to create reasons for concern. Consequently, whereas the Persianisation of 
culture and language through modern education, and, by the 1970s, audio and visual 
means of communication ensured the suppression of distinct identity, it was no 
coincidence that the White Revolution enhanced the role of SAVAK, the secret intelligent 
service (established in 1957), as a brutal force to quell political and cultural activism. 
 
EFFECTIVE MECHANISMS OF MODERNISATION 
Land reform, infrastructural developments and modernising institutions such as modern 
education and healthcare were effective mechanisms of modernisation, which entailed 
profound socio-economic change in Kurdistan by the end of the 1970s. Modern education 
and healthcare are discussed in Chapter 4. The following section presents an overview of 
the other two processes.  
 
Land Reform 
The literature on land reform in Iran is relatively vast and they provide a general 
understanding of its historical background, implementation and consequences; the 
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literature is also supported by some extensive studies on land and landowning in Iran.76 
Published in 1979, Baqer Mo‘meni’s Land Question and Class Struggle in Iran in Persian 
presents a detailed account of historical backgrounds to land reform, including previous 
attempts by different social and political forces which pursued their economic or political 
interests since the Constitutional Revolution; it demonstrates how land and landowning 
becomes a crucial subject in the context of rapid socio-economic and political changes 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century.77 Despite differences in approach, it 
seems that there is a consensus on both the purpose and the consequences of the reform 
during the era of the White Revolution: land reform ‘was purely a case of induced social 
change from above with minimal grass-roots input’,78 which failed, as it claimed, to 
establish social justice and end the landowner-peasant economic relations, leading to 
landlessness and mass migration of the peasant class to urban centres.79  
In contrast, the literature on land reform in the Kurdish region is extremely 
limited, although it has become a major topic for academic studies pertaining to 
Kurdistan, reflecting the growing number of Kurdish-Iranian academics in Iran’s 
academic centres.80 However, this study does not claim to fill the gap in this respect but 
attempts to contribute to studies on land reform in the Kurdish region by being concerned 
with methodology and highlighting other, understudied consequences of the reform. 
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Studies on land reform in Kurdistan rightly identify the White Revolution, in general, and 
land reform, in particular, as major factors in both debilitating the hold of the agha class 
on Kurdish society and accelerating social change. Methodologically, however, they tend 
to remain within the confines of the dichotomy of traditional and modern, concentrating 
on ‘positive’ impacts of the development plans. Nevertheless, one can acknowledge that 
recent historical research demonstrates more comprehensive discussions of social 
consequences of the reform.81  
The land reform, Tahqiqat-e Eqtesadi (Pe. Economic Research) informed its 
readers in 1963, was the result of ‘debates [which had lasted] for almost two generations’ 
across Iran.82 In Kurdistan since the early 1950s ‘a new concept of Keshavarz [farmer] to 
replace ra‘yat’ [serf] had been cultivated by social and political activists.83 In order to 
impact the life of the peasants, Hezb-e Sa‘adat-e Melli (Pe. The National Prosperity 
Party), founded by Habibolla Mohit, a lawyer and a follower of Musaddeq, organised 
meetings and issued exclusive cards for farmers to allow them to benefit from available 
social provisions.84 Against such backgrounds and in the absence of the Majlis, the Amini 
administration initiated the land reform in Maragheh in northwest of Iran in March 1962 
by ‘bequeathing the peasants land deeds which had been obtained from previous 
landowners’.85 The journal asserted that ‘the biggest shortcoming of land reform [was] 
the lack of popular support’ and thus warned that ‘denting the power of big landowners 
might not lead to a profound transformation of agriculture in Iran nor to the amelioration 
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of the peasantry’s living conditions’.86 Although the contributors to the journal believed 
that such reforms would serve both yeganegi-e melli (Pe. national oneness) and economic 
growth necessary to tackle economic problems in ‘backward societies’, their articles 
reflected a concern with a critical reading of the economic needs of Iran, which, as 
demonstrated in the articles, contrasted the political ambition of the monarchy, and 
reflected shared intellectual and popular expectations. On the other hand, as noted above, 
politically instigated reforms did not guarantee a radical transformation of the prevalent 
landowner-peasant relationship nor were they necessarily concerned with the provision 
of social needs or prepared for the consequences of land reform.  
The appalling socio-economic condition in the rural areas, reproduced under the 
regime of the landowner class, demonstrated the magnitude of the problem which the land 
reform intended to address. In the early 1960s, the peasantry in Kurdistan was a poor 
social class, landless and deprived of educational and medical services. Village was 
largely disconnected from city because of the lack of suitable roads or the absence of 
other means of communication. The rural class structure and economy, discussed in Part 
I, continued without significant changes, though peasantry and nomads were now more 
sedentarised. Rebellion against such conditions and against the agha class was also a 
permanent aspect of life so much so that, in addition to individual subversion, collective 
defiance of the regime of the Kurdish agha has characterised Kurdish histories. One case 
in point, which clearly demonstrated the depth of the social chasm, was the peasant 
uprising around Bukan in 1952-3, which was brutally quelled by the collective military 
forces of the government and the landowners in the aftermath of the Coup against 
Musaddeq.87 Although there were exceptions on individual level, the oppressive 
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landowner class continued its luxurious life-style by exploiting impoverished peasant 
families in most inhumane ways. Children grew up in sordid environments with no 
education and entered premature manhood as servants of the landowner household, 
shepherds or land labourers. Women, already buried under household tasks and childcare, 
contributed to the workforce needed on the land too; beri, the practice of milking the 
cattle in the evening, was the task of village girls who had to travel to the cattle’s resting 
point outside of the village. In villages, women were deprived of any medical help during 
menstruation or childbirth nor was there any medical advice on contraceptive methods. 
Even worse than women did in urban centres, contraceptive prevalence rate was low, 
families were populated, and immunisation was unheard of. Moreover, the cultivation of 
the land and harvesting of the crops were carried out in unfavourable topography and 
without effective agricultural machinery. The mechanisation of agriculture began in the 
1970s; however, its pace and scope was slow and limited. In 1973-74, a decade after the 
inception of the White Revolution, from a total of 22,940 agricultural machineries in Iran, 
according to Plan and Budget Organisation, the share of Kurdistan province was 1,605, 
including 933 tractors and 205 Combine harvesters; two-thirds of such machineries were 
individually owned.88 Even based on these statistics, the number of tractors at best 
covered one-tenth of the rural areas in Kurdistan, whereas combines, which began to 
increase towards the end of the 1970s, operated in less hilly areas close to main inter-city 
roads with the effect that vast areas could not benefit from them.89 The quantity becomes 
less impressive if we note that because of the absence of other job opportunities, most 
people were engaged in activities related to agriculture or livestock. 
                                                          
88Plan and Budget Organisation, Statistical Yearbook of Iran 1352 [March 1973 - March 1974], 199. 
89 Ibid. 
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  The land reform was supposed to transform the socio-economic condition of the 
village life through distributing the land and making farmers and their lives independent 
and prosperous. The Literacy and Medical Corps were other means to this end. The Land 
Reform Act (1962) triggered the first stage of the reform. It allowed the landowners to 
retain a village or one-eighth of a village in eight villages but sell the rest to the state. This 
enabled the state to sell or rent out the purchased lands to sharecroppers who worked on 
the same land while absentee landowners residing in the cities retained the ownership of 
both village and land. The second stage law (Esfand 1349/ March 1971) demanded 
landowners either to rent out their lands or form agricultural units with farmers. The 
government was set to intervene to ensure the implementation of the next stages. 
Ostensibly, the landowners’ defiance and, as scholars have argued, popular consternation 
pushed the government towards more radical solutions to abolish the peasant-landowner 
social relation.  90 The third stage from the end of the early 1970s onward, was supposed 
to include more strict actions on behalf of the government. The different stages, therefore, 
were the manifestation of an uneven and a prolonged process which continued to be 
affected by political crisis. For example, the replacement of Hasan Arsanjani, an ardent 
advocate of land reform in the early 1960s, ‘set the land reform towards an unknown 
future’;91 while the concentration of power in the hand of the Shah increased as the 
modernisation progressed. Land reform was not supposed to be an easy process since 
prior to its inception 65 percent of the Iranian population lived in some 67,000 villages. 
Moreover, 37 families owned 19,000 villages or 39 percent of all the villages; the rest 
was in the possessions of smaller landowners, who nonetheless owned a large number of 
                                                          
90 Zahed, "Land Reform". 
91 Ibid., 107. 
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villages. 92 The Kurdish region in the west of Iran, which is bigger than the circumscribed 
‘Kurdistan Province’, is estimated to contain at least one seventh of the total villages in 
Iran.93 
Parallel to the damage the land reform inflicted on the political and social status 
of the agha class and its liberating effect for the peasantry to move out of its oppressive 
regime, the peasantry faced modernisation’s new challenges. The scarcity of land or other 
sources of income forced thousands to migrate and seek work in expanding cities inside, 
but also increasingly outside, of Kurdistan such as Tabriz and Tehran or in more southern 
or harbour cities on the shore of the Persian Gulf. As a significant consequence of this 
process, a new class of unskilled urban labourers and seasonal workers was formed. 
The first challenge was urban life. New urban labourers usually resided with their 
families in poor city neighbourhoods, while seasonal workers left families most of the 
year and worked long hours in low-paid jobs such as building, catering and service 
industries. They found themselves in an unfamiliar environment, shared living space in 
squalid conditions with no access to social and medical services. Other negative 
ramifications of land reform included the migration of the entire family to work in brick-
oven factories, where child labour was also essential to the upkeep of the family, and 
the emergence of unskilled workers in Kurdish cities as low-paid labourers or porters. 
Luckier porters owned horse-carts, others relied on the strength of their shoulders. 
Moreover, housing became the most difficult issue for the migrants, who expanded the 
new class of wage workers because of little gains from the land reform—‘In 1351 [1972-
                                                          
92 Ibid., 98. Mo‘meni highlights the problem of official statistics during the land reform. According to him, 
both the number of villages, ‘claimed to be around 72,000’, and the number of landowners varied according 
to official sources. For this see Mo'meni, The Land Question, 259-69. 
93 This estimation is based on the number of Kurdish (big and small) cities and other more mixed cities in 
the region. On average, each Kurdish city administers between 300 and 400 villages. 
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3] [in Iran] 47 percent of farmers owned 3 hectares or did not own any land at all while 
33 percent owned 3 to 10 hectares’,94 demonstrating an unimpressive distribution of 
lands. On the other hand, unable to anticipate the outcomes, the land reform never 
included the provision of urban facilities to assist newcomers. Moreover, around 
Kermanshah more Kurdish (Shi‘a) Failis migrated to Iraq in search of income and ended 
up working in cleaning jobs or as shoeshine men.    95 Migration to search for work was 
not a new phenomenon. For example, seasonal workers had travelled to Sharazour, a 
Kurdish region in modern Iraq, to work for only three months a year, benefit from 
various bonuses and enjoy a familiar cultural environment. In comparison with the 
1970s, they could transmit infectious diseases such as malaria but not sexually 
transmitted diseases, which many seasonal workers contracted in big urban centres of 
Iran.96 The novelty of the era of the White Revolution was not only the scale and 
pervasiveness of migration but also the fact that it signified a social displacement of 
people on a more permanent basis. Resettlement in a new environment, now across Iran, 
carried with it estrangement from known cultural environments.  
Furthermore, the land reform began to transform the rural class structure. In 
addition to absentee landowners and the upper class (village headmen and landowner’s 
bailiffs), the poor peasantry, divided into landless rashaiy and jutbanda, expanded with 
the effect that rashaiy provided new labour force to the emerging wage labour class. 
Indeed, both inexorable urbanisation and population increase across Iran exposed the 
scarcity of cultivated land in rural areas and attracted landless peasants into urban 
workforce. As regards the social and political status of the Kurdish agha, the White 
                                                          
94 Bahram Davari, "Tarhi Baraye Ehiyaye Keshawarzi Wa Bazsaziye Roosta [A Plan for the Revival of 
Agriculture and Reconstruction of the Village]," Keyhan 1351 [1972-3], 6. 
95 Biglari, Interview. 
96 Mustafasultani, Interview. 
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Revolution effectively replaced the landowner with the state (represented by the 
gendarmerie force) as the sole authority in the village. However, the extent of the state’s 
authority varied according to accessibility or remoteness of an area and to social 
organisations. For example, in northern Kurdish region powerful tribes managed to retain 
their power bases to a considerable extent. Therefore, when new forms of social bonds 
began to challenge tribal and conventional familial bonds, this proved to be a prolonged 
process. Moreover, during the 1979 Revolution the opportunistic class of the Kurdish 
agha, whose power had not been completely and permanently wiped out, began to claim 
the restitution of its lost lands. Prior to the Revolution, the constant presence of the Shah’s 
gendarmery force in the countryside had checked the agha’s political power. However, 
in the wake of the 1979 February uprising that terminated the Pahlavi state, the landowner 
class re-emerged in many parts of Kurdistan and organised mercenaries to reclaim their 
seized lands by force. For example, Keyhan reported in May 1979 that the representatives 
of Na‘il Shekan village in the vicinity of the town of Diwandara had complained to 
Sanandaj City Council that ‘some landowners under the leadership of ‘Abbas Khan 
Mozafari had expelled [a number of ] villagers from that village on the pretext that the 
downfall of the previous [Pahlavi] regime  had invalidated its land reform’.97 Therefore, 
this attested to the fact that the land reform had not completely diminished the economic 
and political power of the landowner class. As another illustration of this, the February 
uprising seemed to have revived ‘feudalism’ in the region around Mariwan.98 
 
Infrastructural Development 
                                                          
97 Keyhan, 19 Ordibehesht 1358 [9 May 1979], 7. 
98 Fuad Mustafasultani, "Dar Bareye Chegunegiye Ijade Etehadyeye Dehqanan," [On the Foramtion of the 
Peasant Union] in Malaka Mustafasultani, et al. (eds), Kak Fuad Mustafasultani (Stettin: Print Group, 
2017), 317. 
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The constructions of new inter-city roads, tunnels and bridges in the Kurdish region were 
defining moments in the transformation of the economy in the Kurdish region. Beginning 
in the middle of the 1930s, these constructions gradually became the hallmarks of Kurdish 
cities and inter-city roads.99 For example, when ‘Czechoslovakian Skoda built Saqqez 
Bridge between 1314-17 [1935-38], it was both the dawn of motorised means of 
transportation for that city and a sign of more effective economic reforms.100 Two decades 
later, the city’s Tobacco Factory was built in 1957. The factory was intended to regulate 
the production of tobacco concentrated in the region around border. However, Saqqez 
had been selected for its relative distance from such a region. Silo, an agricultural storage 
or modern mill, followed in the 1970s. Mahabad and Sanandaj also acquired such 
production centres which remained the only ‘industrial’ hallmarks of the Kurdish cities 
throughout the modernising era of the White Revolution.  
 It can be surmised that infrastructural improvement was inspired by a mixture of 
economic and political motives on behalf of the state. In addition to the growing 
expectations and technological awareness of people amid political and social 
transformation of the country, the state was economically motivated to connect the region 
effectively to an evolving economy. Political and military considerations in constructing 
factories or roads cannot be ruled out as it was evident in the construction of Tobacco 
centres. As another example, according to contemporaries, during the construction of 
Sanadaj-Mariwan road, the constructors preferred to ignore recommendations by 
influential regional figures, who had suggested a shorter route, because ‘it seemed that 
                                                          
99 Cf. document number 44/1 of Edareye Rah [Road Office] dated 25/08/1331 [16/09/1952] in Presidential 
Office Document Centre, Documents on Truman's Point Four in Iran (1946-1947) (Tehran: Vizārat-i 
Farhang va Irshād-i Islamī, 1382 [2003]). 
100 Kaiwan, Interview. 
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the state preferred to have continuous access to higher lands for military purposes’.101 
Moreover, other signs of political and military considerations included the construction 
of gendarmerie bases on inter-city roads at intervals or in what was regarded to be 
strategic locations throughout the region and across the border. Usually as side effects, 
villages, located further away from inter-city roads, benefited from roads, schools and 
medical centres provided they had contained a gendarmerie base. As it was specifically 
the case with the Third Plan, Development programmes concentrated on the construction 
of main roads and not feeder roads.102 Nevertheless, a few feeder roads such as Bukan 
city to Torjan (a prestigious village) or Khorkhora Road passed through a number of 
villages, hence primarily benefited from new means of transportation rather than social 
services. Therefore, roads in most regions initially followed the movement of the army. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the military considerably contributed to connecting more villages 
to urban centres. Modernisation entered the Kurdish village by following the military and 
this led to unplanned, spontaneous provision of welfare and technology, e.g. electricity. 
The expansion of the state-led modernisation into rural areas in Kurdistan took place in 
parallel with military expansion and this is a crucial point which is ignored by social 
change studies of the modernisation of rural life in this period. The extent (and the state) 
of the roads, the level of communications and transportations, the provision of electricity, 
let alone durables, almost matched the extension of military roads and cables. Even in 
prestigious locations not all the residents benefited, for instance, from electricity, which 
was available to the gendarmery base and to the agha household. Moreover, the absence 
of feeder roads restrained transportation, which had started to appear more frequently 
with the construction or improvement of main inter-city roads especially since the end of 
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1950s. Iran witnessed more cars and trucks upon its occupation by the allied forces during 
the Second World war but the impact of the Americans on the transport system was 
electrifying. 103 Many such vehicles scattered across Iran in the aftermath of the war and 
the scarcity of cars in the following decades made their presence conspicuous. For 
example, obtained by their new owners, some American dodges or trucks continued to be 
used for transporting people across Iran, including in the Kurdish region well into the 
early 1980s. Nevertheless, by the mid-1970s both new roads, which connected village 
and city, and the expansion of money economy, which attracted countryside produce into 
city bazaars, increased the number of Jeeps or mini trucks in the countryside. Inter-city 
buses and private cars also increased towards the end of the decade. 
Prior to 1960 foreign construction companies undertook the construction of 
buildings owned by the government such as courts and various offices. The American 
firm MKO built army bases in cities while the Iranian-Italian COMSACS managed 
contracts, the construction of bridges and roads.104 In addition to the extension of welfare 
services, new electric generators marked a crucial point in socio-economic development. 
Electricity’s slow expansion since the early 1950s led to new generators by the 1970s; 
one of the pioneers of the introduction of electricity to Kurdistan during the Premiership 
of Muhammad Musaddeq was General Baharmast.105 Electricity was not unheard of as a 
letter to the constitutional Majlis in 1910 demonstrates, in which two Kurdish tujjars or 
businessmen seek to obtain concessions to produce and expand electricity in Kurdistan.106 
It only took many more decades to introduce and expand, and, like hospitals, it awaited 
the expansion of the army. Nevertheless, the impact of electricity was revolutionary. 
                                                          
103 Farmanfarmaian and Farmanfarmaian, Blood and Oil, 149. 
104 Biglari, Interview. 
105 Ibid. 
106 See Document 161 in Sharzayi, Asnade Baharestan, 35-36. 
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Despite military and political considerations, discussed above, economic motives 
remained prime reasons for infrastructural projects, which accelerated the pace of socio-
economic change with the effect that in the long run the state could not ignore the growing 
economic requirements of the region. With regard to rural areas, the movement of the 
military paved the way for modernisation to reach villages in a limited scale. 
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CONCLUSION: CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY 
The White Revolution which intensified the Pahlavi modernisation plans was born amid 
a political situation peculiar to Iran. The ideas already in circulation formed its tenets 
while political considerations, influenced by international and domestic economic and 
political developments, continued to shape its direction. In Kurdistan, land reform and 
infrastructural developments created a more dynamic economy, resulting in a fast pace of 
urbanisation. The improvement of roads and the provision of social services took place 
as the extension of the state-led modernisation, which was based on centralised 
development plans, thus lacking extensive and deliberate plans to reform Iranian 
peripheral provinces. Development planning in Iran matured into more comprehensive 
and elaborate planning by 1970, benefiting from massive oil revenue, statistical data, 
more sophisticated methodologies and technics as well as economic units, e.g. Economic 
Bureau. However, as contemporaries have noted ‘provincial development’ remained an 
unknown concept throughout the White Revolution.107 Analysed by contemporary 
economists cited in this chapter, the plans suffered from discrepancies between economic 
sectors too. Agriculture, on which the majority of the Kurdish population depended, did 
not experience growth, whereas the oil and service industries continued to have the 
highest growth rates. Crucially, the plans’ objectives and concerns, for example as regards 
transportation and roads, omitted a huge portion of the Kurdish region which required 
feeder roads to get connected to the main stream of socio-economic transformation. 
Undoubtedly the land reform was a defining moment in the transformation of 
socio-economic relations in the village: it damaged the oppressive regime of the Kurdish 
agha by diminishing their political and social powers. Along with the creation of more 
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opportunities in life for the population, these were positive ramifications of land reform. 
However, both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ ramifications of modernisation made sense in an 
ongoing institutional transformation of Kurdish society. From this perspective, 
modernisation also revealed serious social challenges manifest in the following trends: 
unprecedented migration to urban centres; the expansion of seasonal workers and 
unskilled labour force geographically and numerically; inadequate social provisions or 
absolute lack of them; sustained city-village disparity; and, finally, the unpreparedness of 
reforms or development plans for unforeseen consequences of their actions. Moreover, 
‘industrialisation’ in Kurdistan was extremely limited to few production centres, 
confining its economy to its conventional bazaar and artisan manufacturing, though these 
were expanded while the construction boom absorbed a substantial portion of the labour 
force; the modern Kurdish working class began to form as a result of migration in search 
of income, urbanisation and the expansion of economy in urban centres. On the other 
hand, the expansion of the economy resulted in more infrastructural changes in the 
Kurdish region. However, political considerations also went into the construction of roads 
especially in the region across border. The movement of the military in the countryside 
led to the construction of many important inter-village or city-countryside gravel roads 
with the effect that welfare services followed the military into the village. This meant that 
the introduction of social services was not according to any specific economic or social 
development plan. The spontaneous and irregular pattern of the expansion of such 
services further vindicate the point. According to oral history, villages located on the main 
roads, close to cities or with a gendarmery base could benefit from transportation, 
electricity or have access to medical centres, but this was extremely limited. However, 
the expanding population’s awareness of welfare services, including healthcare, and 
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technology such as new means of transportation and radio, were significant aspects of 
social change.108  
Finally, the White Revolution, in general, and the land reform, in particular, 
triggered two crucial processes. First, it replaced the agha class with the state as the sole 
political body to have access to the means of control and violence, effectively restricting 
the direct access of the Kurdish agha to such sources. Previously, the state as an entity 
was either absent or an accomplice both in crimes committed by the landowner class and 
in the maintenance of its brutal regime. However, the stages of the land reform 
demonstrated a conservative approach to uprooting the regime of the agha. Secondly, the 
socio-economic consequences of the reforms along with urbanisation and infrastructural 
improvements signified the emergence, or intensification, of a capitalist economy, 
symbolised by money economy and a new class structure. As scholars have noted, the 
gradual replacement of a self-sufficient economy in the village by money economy 
manifested the extension of a nascent capitalist economic system.109 On the other hand, 
the transformation of the class structure led to the emergence of a new Kurdish labour 
class, whose existence owed itself to an expanding class of investors and owners of 
capital. Therefore, the class relation was going to be incorporated in a new framework of 
capitalist production that was not sustained by violence, predominantly characteristic of 
the agha-jutiar economic relation, but by social contract. However, to assess the scope 
and pace of the institutional dimensions of change towards a framework incorporating 
capitalist production and industrialisation, this modernising process, as we noticed above, 
was both limited and prolonged.110 Therefore, parallel to recognising the crucial role of 
                                                          
108 Dr Ahmad 'Azizpur, "Kurdistan and the White Revolution," interview with author, July 8, 2017. 
109 See Zahed, "Land Reform".  
110 For a theoretical analysis of the institutional dimensions of modernity cf. Anthony Giddens, The 
Consequences of Modernity (UK: Polity, 1990), 55-78. 
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the intensifying state-led modernisation in the 1960s and 1970s, it is significant to identify 
social consequences of the modernising reforms in Kurdistan in both rural and urban 
areas. 
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Chapter 4: The Social Consequences of Modernisation 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter credited the White Revolution for intensifying, and in many ways 
triggering, the institutional transformation of Kurdish society. In this regard, the land 
reform and infrastructural developments were identified as parts of crucial mechanisms 
of the state-led modernisation in that direction. These were, however, parts of a prolonged 
and uneven modernisation with their own social consequences, some aspects of which 
this chapter highlights. In addition to evaluating the social consequences of land reform 
and modernisation, this chapter presents an interpretation of the following concurrent 
trends too: the transformation of the urban class structure, and the modernisation of 
education and healthcare.  
 
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF LAND REFORM AND MODERNISATION 
The land reform proved to be a prolonged and uneven process partly because of 
undesirable infrastructural conditions. In addition to the political factors involved in the 
introduction of the reform, its accomplishment was further paralysed by vast numbers of 
villages scattered in a geography which physically defied human movements. Therefore, 
the peasantry’s gain from the deal depended on the location of the village and its 
approximation to services. Gradually, the migration of landless peasants or those with 
insufficient income to cities and towns increased. This was especially true in the case of 
those with no previous cultivating rights. This resulted in high rates of urban population 
increase and unbridled urbanisation. Simultaneously, insufficient land in villages and low 
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incomes forced a considerable number of village men to seek income in cities across Iran. 
Therefore, migration and seasonal labour were direct results of an inconsistent land 
reform which was unenthusiastically pursued by the state through various stages. On the 
other hand, as modernisation accelerated across Iran with oil revenues soaring after 1973, 
work and life in urban centres became increasingly attractive. The urban and rural income 
gap was the primary motivating factor, while the availability of services and the prospect 
of a better life also prompted village proletariats, i.e. landless peasants who only relied 
on their ability to engage in manual labour, to migrate to urban centres. According to a 
more contemporary assessment of migration to cities across Iran, the ratio of urban to 
rural income per head was estimated at 4.6 to 1 in 1959 and 4.7 to 1 in 1969, while official 
reports reveal that ‘in 1972 the average income per day from agricultural work was only 
$1.40 for male and 74 cents for female laborers’.1 Moreover, with a population of 33.5 
million, Iran’s ‘urban growth rate in 1976 stood at 4.5 percent per year as against only 
two percent for rural areas’. 2 
Urbanisation and modernisation meant the transformation from a land-based to an 
urban-market economy and this involved processes of stratification (in general a system 
of inequality based on class and status) and differentiation (specialisation), setting up new 
institutions (for example alienable private property, contract, wage labour mediated by 
labour, capital, commodity, and land markets), leading to a more complex division of 
labour.3 From this perspective, stratification and differentiation do not connote an 
evolutionary progress of modernisation as certain, but influential, modernisation theorists 
                                                          
1 Farhad Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran: The Migrant Poor, Urban Marginality and Politics (New 
York: New York University Press, 1980), 42. 
2 Jahangir Amuzegar, Iran: An Economic Profile (Washington D. C.: Middle East Institue, 1977), 15. 
3 Theorists of sociology such as Spencer and Durkheim specify differentiation as the modernising, 
evolutionary pattern of social change in the direction of improved material well-being of all. See Malcolm 
Waters, Modern Sociological Theory (London: Sage Publications, 1994), 320. 
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argued. For example, Marion J. Levy and Neil J. Smelser are among such theorists of the 
1960s who, from a functionalist point of view, valued differentiation as positive and 
necessary for modernisation.4 From this perspective, ‘effective differentiation’ includes 
the displacement of ascriptive status ranking such as ethnicity, family, race, and gender. 
Levy stresses a rationalising modernisation of society in which ‘its members use 
inanimate sources of power and/or use tools to multiply the effects of their efforts’.5 Based 
on this, Levy articulates a modernised society’s characteristics which correspond to a 
highly specialised social unit.6 Smelser, however, ‘equates modernization with economic 
development’ which he defines in terms of technological-scientific and mechanical and 
demographic (urbanisation) shifts necessary for a transition from traditional to modern 
society.7 Both arguments are for a highly differentiated society and define differentiation 
and stratification as an evolutionary progress of modernisation. 
In contrast to such an evolutionary view of social change, this chapter argues that 
modernisation in Kurdistan meant different things for different people. This is elaborated 
through the following four topics: the unbridled growth of impoverished neighbourhoods; 
the expansion of seasonal workers; village population condemned to an undesirable rural 
life; and cities unplanned growth. These topics, therefore, reveal dire social consequences 
of the land reform and modernisation for both the village and the city. While each theme, 
discussed only within the scope of this study, could individually constitute a further area 
of research in Kurdish and Iranian social change studies, collectively they illuminate a 
                                                          
4 Ibid., 302-05. For more on these theorists and a discussion of stratification and differentiation see ibid., 
Ch. 9. 
5 Quoted in ibid., 302. 
6 Ibid., 302-03. 
7 Ibid., 303. 
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process which was far from a necessary or smooth ‘transition’ to a better, ‘modern’ way 
of life. 
 
The unbridled growth of impoverished neighbourhoods  
Development plans did not forestall social consequences of their plans and, in the absence 
of adequate social services or a social security system, poor city neighbourhoods in the 
outskirts of cities and towns expanded amid sordid and degrading living conditions. The 
existing city neighbourhoods, the growth of which was negligible prior to 1960, did not 
perform much better as low incomes forced common tenancy of a house by several, 
usually large, families, and restricted access to necessary services. The expansion of cities 
continued to outstrip services, including asphalt roads, electricity, sanitation, schools, and 
health centres, whose provisions were hindered by lack of will, resources, trained staff, 
and, especially as regards housing, by legal procedures. The lowest layer of the rural 
population, i.e. rashaiy or qara (Ku. landless peasants), spearheaded migration to such 
city neighbourhoods while at the same time the rural class structure began to be defined 
not merely by its relation to land and the agha but by its relation to an expanding capitalist 
economy. 
 The state responded to urbanisation by launching city projects which reflected 
growing pressures that stemmed from city expansion. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the Plan Organisation under Ebtehaj had envisaged city development plans by 
assigning provinces to different foreign firms. However, the provinces’ financial 
contributions stipulated such plans. The economic plans, which followed and formulated 
economic directions of the Pahlavi modernisation, totally disregarded specific plans for 
provinces and its actions were mostly reactions to an unplanned urbanisation.  
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Urbanisation and an expanding urban economy were characterised by growing 
bazaars that began to include both agricultural produce and factory pasteurised products 
as well as small artisan shops. In addition to this, a construction boom created its own 
market places and the economy absorbed unskilled wage labourers who consisted of 
recently migrated or low-income city dwellers. This unskilled urban workforce included 
fa‘las (Ku. construction workers), cleaners and hammals (porters). Daily wage labour and 
hammaliy (delivery) especially stood out. The luckiest of those in the latter job used 
horse-carts or gari (a four-wheeled, flat trolley) to deliver items but the majority had to 
deliver usually heavy items long distances, on foot, and with the loads tied to their back 
with a special coat in return for a trivial amount of money. ‘Minimum national wage’, if 
not an unknown concept for all, was not at least in practice endorsed by any effective 
labour law.8 This was partly because the dictatorial system restricted social activities 
effectively, and thus the working class expanded without representative bodies. 
According to contemporary observers, a form of social insurance was introduced in 1339 
[1960-61] in the provincial city of Sanandaj for work centres with more than three 
employees.9 Although this initiated plans to allow employees to benefit from a pension, 
it took a long time for social insurance to become widespread.10  
                                                          
8 Although the workers of the Abadan oil refinery had set a precedent in the 1940s, minimum wage probably 
remained a concept among industrial workers and was certainly not developed by any government. There 
were two pieces of minimum wage legislation. The 1959 Labour Law ruled minimum wage to be set every 
two years through a high labour council while in 1973 companies with more than 100 employees were 
required ‘with the concurrence of labor representatives or syndicates, to prepare detailed job classifications 
to be used for determining employee’s wages’. For this see Amuzegar, Iran: An Economic Profile, 233-34; 
and for the first imposition of a minimum wage in Iran see Farmanfarmaian and Farmanfarmaian, Blood 
and Oil, 186-7. 
9 Biglari, Interview. 
10 It can be estimated that forms of social insurance for employees to benefit from healthcare or a retirement 
salary in the Kurdish region were introduced by the end of the 1950s. Although with civil servant or 
teaching jobs came such schemes, these jobs only increased with the expansion of bureaucracy, 
governmental offices, and modern education since the 1950s. 
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Moreover, urbanisation and modernisation increased child labour (mostly young 
boys) in the forms of itinerant vendors of confectionary items, shagird (Ku. assistant), an 
‘apprentice’ who, for example, was employed by a tailor or an artisan for free in return 
for teaching him/her the skill, and shoeshine boys/girls. The growing city created a less 
restricted, but hostile, environment for young village migrants and provided young city 
dwellers with more opportunities to earn more, however in undesirable conditions. Urban 
poverty created an army of working children whose social and educational lives were 
negatively affected due to their families’ low-income and the lack of governmental 
services, including leisure and sports. In such families, women, helped by young girls, 
undertook domestic services for better-off families. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
new nomenclature epitomised these types of new impoverished neighbourhoods. Before 
the intensification of urbanisation when such neighbourhoods were mostly known by 
names rooted in clans or geography, the names Porters or Sweepers referred to ‘modern’ 
unskilled workers. Many such quarters, for example in Mariwan city, were named after 
the name of a village or a region from which migration had originated. In the 1970s there 
were also cases in which the city engulfed nearby villages, as was the case in Bukan. 
Furthermore, a crucial side effect of urbanisation was the emergence of 
categorisation of rural migrants as dehati (literary meaning coming from village) in 
contrast to shari (Ku. city dweller). While communities had been defined according to 
their economic activities or ethnic traits, modernisation led to categorisation based on 
modern concepts. For example, the rural population around Kermanshah were called 
Kurds while in the northern part of the Kurdish region, e.g. in Turkey and Iraq, settled 
Kurdish speaking communities were known as Kirmanj11—historically, other signifiers 
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have been used alongside ‘Kurd’ to distinguish between settled and nomadic ways of life 
until ‘Kurd’ became an ethnic marker and signifiers such as Kirmanj became a dialect. 
Modernisation’s categorisation of individuals developed a set of traits which became 
increasingly based on two concepts of diwakawtoo (Ku. backward) and peshkawtoo (Ku. 
advanced) with the effect that dress, accent, appearance, level of literacy, and even diet 
were stereotyped. Moreover, verbal, and sometimes physical, abuse of those defined as 
dehati increased with the pace of modernisation while tahqir (humiliation) in public 
spaces or in schools, mostly in forms of jokes or remarks that had strong racial 
connotations, became part of life for many.12 
 
The expansion of seasonal workers  
Alongside the urban working class, the expansion of seasonal workers was another 
significant consequence of the land reform and modernisation. As touched upon 
previously, landless peasants had always exercised seasonal work by seeking 
employment in other villages or regions where their labour was in demand. Work in 
demand included a nine-month sheep tending season, tobacco farm assistant, or servant 
of a landowner household.  However, the land reform and the acceleration of 
modernisation across Iran created a class of permanent seasonal workers who left the 
Kurdish region in search of work in expanding cities or in factories in other parts of Iran. 
Seasonal work became a permanent line of work that devoured an increasing number of 
free labourers. Confirmed by oral history, geographically, it expanded to cover all of Iran 
with its urbanising cities and growing economy, creating seasonal workers who worked 
in factories and construction.13 Therefore, new seasonal workers were distinguished from 
                                                          
12 Kaiwan, Interview.  
13 Amini, Interview. 
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previous ones in many ways. Their numbers increased considerably; they travelled in 
search of work to remote cities; and worked and lived in an unsafe and culturally unknown 
environment. Prior to the inexorable pace of modernisation over the second half of the 
century, a poor Kurdish seasonal worker would generally work in a culturally familiar 
environment and for benevolent employers. This drastically changed when seasonal 
workers had to work in harsh conditions and live in groups in unfavourable 
circumstances. Moreover, although many travelled to cities in the neighbouring 
countries—Faili Kurds travelled as far as Baghdad14—seasonal workers were 
increasingly limited to Iran as the modernising nation-state’s economy acquired its 
national shape.15 
 Seasonal work also had significant consequences for workers’ families that were 
left behind. Because of the dearth of effective means of communication, families received 
remittances irregularly or had to wait until workers returned. As a result they were 
dependent on relatives to survive. Moreover, the misery and hardship experienced by such 
families, including, and perhaps especially by, women whose spouses were away, are yet 
to be registered in history books or reflected in social studies. However, the collective 
memory is not devoid of such experiences.   
 
Family migration and family as a unit of workforce 
In the same way as seasonal workers, family migration was not unprecedented. As 
discussed in previous chapters, the landowner-peasant economy, governed by the 
oppressive regime of the Kurdish agha, more frequently than not compelled poor peasant 
                                                          
14 Biglari, Interview. 
15 Cross-border trade continued to defy the national economy and remained a crucial part of economic life 
for communities living in coterminous regions divided by national borders. 
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families to migrate in search of a better life while subversives were expelled from the 
village forcefully. Nevertheless, the destination was rarely beyond a nearby village or a 
village or city in a nearby region; family migration was also caused by economic factors, 
e.g. the loss of income, or political factors, e.g. the pressure of the landowner or intruding 
tribes.16 
 In addition to family migration to reside in urban centres, modernisation forced 
many other families to settle in production centres of which the brick-oven factory 
became well known for its harsh, inhuman conditions. Work in a brick-oven factory was 
based on a contract and therefore, female and male members of families and their children 
had to do heavy work to contribute to production in order to increase income. Because 
brick-oven factories were concentrated in the northern part of the Kurdish region, they 
embraced families more from that area, while people from the southern part were attracted 
to cities in south of Iran or to rice farms in the north. In a brick-oven factory, families’ 
living space was part of the working environment and therefore their lives were tightly 
shackled to the factory, deprived of education, healthcare and social services. According 
to oral history, prior to the White Revolution, brick-oven factories did not attract anybody 
from the village.17 When their number increased as the result of urbanisation, more 
families left village in favourable seasons to reside in such factories. In comparison to life 
in the village where a family could still live in relatively ‘better’ conditions, in the brick-
oven factory they lived in squalid circumstances; were paid inadequately and most of the 
time with delay; and lived in remote places far away from available social services. In the 
absence of healthcare, sanitation and education, families experienced an unhealthy and 
meagre diet while sources of healthy protein or vitamin became luxury products—at best 
                                                          
16 See Hesami, Le Bireweriekanim; Hazhar, Cheshti Mijawir; Mukriyani, Tarik W Run. 
17 Amini, Interview. 
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meat was consumed once a month.18            The brick-oven factory was a direct product 
of the White Revolution’s land reform and unbridled urbanisation.  
 
An undesirable rural life 
Modernisation allowed landless peasants to remain in the village either as free labourers 
working on the land or with the cattle. The sharecroppers, jutbanda, who stood just above 
this lower class, did slightly better as their land, though still insufficient, provided a little 
bit security.19 It was small landowners rather than large ones that lost land as their power 
diminished;20 good quality lands remained in the possession of wealthier landowners.  
If seasonal work and family migration in search of better income situated 
individuals in extremely unfavourable economic and cultural circumstances, this did not 
mean that life in the familiar environment of the village was more rewarding. The 
continuity of harsh socio-economic conditions after the introduction of land reform was 
still prevalent. City-village disparity, discussed in the previous chapter, epitomised this 
continuity in many ways. Even as late as 1978 optimistic assessments of Iran’s economic 
performance and its future planning attested to ‘the existing gap between rural and urban 
areas (in physical facilities, income level, educational and employment opportunities, 
cultural advancement and political participation)’, a problem supposed to be dealt with in 
the Sixth Plan (1978-83).21 The population movement, the coming of roads and provision 
for services to some extent, undoubtedly helped connect rural areas to urban centres 
which were experiencing new things. However, the best part of the Kurdish rural area 
was either disconnected or loosely linked to the process of change. This was because the 
                                                          
18 Ibid. 
19 Kaiwan, Interview. 
20 Mustafasultani, Interview. 
21 Amuzegar, Iran: An Economic Profile, 260. 
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White Revolution was an urban phenomenon which gave priority to population centres 
and to those projects that would create an advancing image of Iran. Regions close to main 
roads began to acquire rudimentary levels of some social services. However, to get access 
to higher levels of healthcare or educational services individuals had to travel to cities to 
see doctors or reside in cities to continue their education. Travelling to see doctors was 
both difficult and expensive and residing in cities to continue education meant that young 
boys had to rent their accommodation in groups and work to survive. Because of their 
regionality, it was especially this group that was the target of verbal and physical abuse. 
Undeniably, the land reform as the centrepiece of the White Revolution marked the 
effective beginning of the end of both the Kurdish agha class and tribalism. However, 
this was a prolonged process which outlasted the Pahlavi regime itself. Indeed, connecting 
the village to the city as the centre of the process of change became an irreversible process 
from the early 1960s onwards. Nevertheless, state-led modernisation was accountable for 
the continuity of the miserable village life, the rural-urban development gap, and for the 
absence of specific development plans for the Kurdish region, in general, and its rural 
areas, in particular. Therefore, up till the political upheaval of the end of the 1970s, the 
socio-economic condition of the village continued to experience only limited change. 
Indeed, the continuity of the undesirable village life was an accompanying feature of 
modernisations in all countries of the region; a universal phenomenon, reflected in literary 
works of Gholamhosayn Saedi, Ali Ashraf Darwishyan, Hanan Al-Shaykh, Yusuf Edris, 
Yashar Kemal and Mahmud Tahir Lashin, and formed the themes of many movies shown 
on television or in rapidly popularising cinema. In Iran, however, widespread awareness 
of shocking rural conditions came with the 1979 Revolution. 
CITIES 
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Modern Kurdish cities began to grow based on no specific plans. This illuminates a 
significant failure because, as discussed previously, there were sophisticated minds and 
state organisations which designed comprehensive development plans which benefited 
from huge oil revenues. Therefore, urbanisation could have been positively affected by 
such organisations. It was not necessarily the question of resources as much as the 
question of policy: the economic plans were centralising and general, and lacked specific 
provincial plans. Cities were abandoned to deal with modernisation and face its 
reverberations which originated from the centre. A realistic expectation of non-
centralised, provincial-oriented economic plans in the context of Iran in the 1950s, 1960s 
and 1970s is corroborated by increasingly upbeat attitudes of both the monarch and more 
sophisticated development plans. Therefore, the unplanned expansions of economy and 
society, specifically in the Kurdish region, signify a multi-layered social change affected 
by political consideration and the nature of the state. 
 Economy in conventional trade expanded but did not lead to the emergence of 
production centres, except for tobacco factories and Silos, nor to a coordinated economic 
system to utilise regional potential and benefit from the expansion of economy across 
Iran. The unrestrained expansion of city and economy amid infrastructural developments 
engaged the population of rural areas in city markets by bringing to city markets mostly 
homemade dairy produce while the emergence of pasteurised products created a 
competition for local economy. As a result, city markets swelled with increased 
contributions from the countryside. However, the existing economic patterns of bazaar 
and craft production continued to dominate city life. 
 The growth of cities outstripped social services; this was another significant 
aspect of urbanisation. Defined as an establishment responsible for conducting urban 
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affairs, an elected municipality was a modern notion and although its introduction 
originated in the expansion of modern bureaucracy in Iran since the Constitutional 
Revolution, it was in the 1960s and 1970s that it began to exert more influence as a new 
urban institution across Iran.22 In 1968-69 the new municipality law, (qanoun-e shahrdari) 
passed in 1956 and amended in 1966, was finally implemented and Tehran’s was ‘the 
first council to convene’.23 However, the implementation of the law had no implications 
for Kurdish cities, and this seems to be the case across Iran. A sharadar (Ku. City 
Councillor), imported from outside the region, was appointed by an ostandar (provincial 
governor) or by a farmandar (regional governor) who were also non-natives.24 New 
municipalities gradually replaced the conventional community councils which consisted 
of reliable and respected men of the community. Throughout the 1970s, parks and asphalt 
roads were created, and electricity and sanitation reached more homes. Nevertheless, a 
neighbourhood continued to rely on wells, public baths and mosques’ toilets. It was inner 
parts of a city rather than the poor, shapeless districts surrounding the city that benefited 
from the new city council. Therefore, modernisation created, in the same way as it 
sustained the city-village disparity, an urban disparity between a city’s neighbourhoods. 
The absence of a social welfare system, assumed by the new municipalities law to be the 
task of the new city council, allowed the continuation of formidable hurdles for the 
amelioration of living standards which, as mentioned above, correlated highly with the 
level of income eked out by individual efforts in unfavourable socio-economic conditions.  
Amid the expansion of the economy and public sector, both the level of income and 
the type of employment were crucial factors affecting the transformation of the urban 
                                                          
22 Ḥosayn Farhūdī, "City Councils," in Encyclopaedia Iranica, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/city-
councils-anjoman-e-sahr-in-persia, accessed 27 August 2017. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Kaiwan, Interview. 
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class structure. The expansion of trade enriched both non-bazaari and bazaari merchants 
and enabled them to invest and expand trade. In addition to the capital invested in the 
bazaar, construction contractors accumulated capital in the booming construction 
economy. On the other hand, the nature of construction as a labour-, rather than a capital- 
intensive economy led to employing an army of unskilled or semi-skilled free-moving 
labourers who became an important part of the new Kurdish working class. The 
construction economy’s impact was huge for it created a wide network of other trades 
around it. Another section of society therefore benefited from the construction boom and 
their levels of income increased. However, the expanding economy remained within the 
existing modes of trade and did not enter a phase of ‘industrialisation’ to promote the 
industrial potential of the region. Moreover, the level of income determined the level of 
access to technological or cultural products. 
Simultaneously, the expansion of the public sector created new employment, which 
was distinguished not only by the provision of regular salaries, but also for its access to 
cultural innovations. Public education and healthcare stand out as two prominent public 
areas. Working in education or healthcare increased family incomes and transformed the 
family culturally too. In this way increased income and access to the means of cultural 
consumption and production distinguished another section of society from those whose 
low level of income restricted their access especially to technological but also to cultural 
products. Therefore, a Kurdish ‘middle class’ emerged as a result of the expansion of 
economy and public sector. Whereas many could be identified as sarmayedar (Ku. one 
with capital) towards the end of the 1970s, a ‘capitalist class’ engaged in the organisation 
of an industrial economic system did not exist. By the same token, ‘bourgeoisie’ 
developed as a notion referring to a cultural way of life rather than a specific class. 
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However, the middle class in question was divided into lower and upper levels, 
distinguished by their possession of alienable or inalienable wealth and income, while its 
members’ ‘class consciousness’ was probably restricted to an awareness of their 
materialistic wellbeing and cultural differences. Women’s place in both private and public 
spheres functioned as another significant distinction for the ‘middle class’ wherein 
women had potentially more access to socio-economic or cultural innovations and 
worked to gain a degree of economic independence, becoming empowered in the process. 
This new image of Kurdish womanhood applied to the new generation of women that 
emerged from the 1960s. Nevertheless, the modernising institutions, especially education, 
affected (mostly urban) women in low-income families, by enabling them to enter 
employment. Finally, it is more productive to refrain from superficially creating 
‘antagonistic classes’ and instead to concentrate on what it meant for Kurdish society to 
have such a middle class emerged amid socio-economic transformations. As an 
expanding ‘class’, it contributed to social change in many ways, as will become evident 
throughout this study. 
 
EDUCATION 
Discussed in chapter two, the modernisation of Iran since the early decades of the 
twentieth century yielded an educated, urban generation in Kurdistan increasingly 
independent of its tribal society. By the end of the 1970s, we witness the emergence of a 
formidable urban, educated generation, which resulted from the intensification of 
modernisation since the end of the 1950s. Although this generation was the product of 
modern education, they played a crucial role in expanding modern education into urban, 
but especially, rural centres and can be credited for attempting to promote social, cultural 
and political awareness in urban and rural populations. For the intellectuals of the age of 
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‘modernity’, education was the new nation’s vehicle of progress and its aim was to 
eradicate illiteracy in Iran, as Taqizadeh claimed (see Part I), a ‘sacred goal’ which had 
been pursued by intellectuals since the Constitutional Revolution. Although eradicating 
illiteracy was a monumental task for the modern nation-state of Iran, the result was by no 
means negligible by the end of the 1970s.25 However, there are two points to be made. 
First, the expansion of modern education, like many other modernising institutions, took 
place in a changing socio-political context in which not only the state but an educated 
generation was needed for its expansion. Modern education was not essentially a 
‘humanitarian’ effort to help lift ‘traditional’ societies out of poverty but it was crucial to 
the future prosperity of the ‘nation’ in the way the state desired. Secondly, the new state 
was ethnically a homogenising polity and its educational policies were aimed at 
Persianisation of the culture. Therefore, resistance against the nationalisation of education 
was also reflected in the efforts of the Kurdish educated urban groups who were involved 
in expanding literacy and imparting social and historical awareness to the people. These 
two points help us to identify more contributors in the struggle to eradicate illiteracy since 
the Constitutional Revolution, on the one hand, and to promote a critical reading of the 
state’s modern education that distinguishes literacy as ability to rote skills such as reading, 
writing, and arithmetic, and literacy as the ability to acquire knowledge critically. By the 
1970s, Iran’s education system had become an instrument to form the ‘new Iranian’, as 
the state became more authoritarian and was inspired by more radical nationalist agendas.  
 
Education: 1920-1960 
                                                          
25 See Menashri, Education and the Making of Modern Iran; Ashraf, "General Survey of Modern 
Education"; Marashi, Nationalizing Iran 
Ch. 3. 
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A considerable number of Kurdistan Province’s Education Office documents, which had 
been abandoned in cellars or awaited shredding, were saved for posterity by tenacious 
efforts of Sayyed Abdolhamid Hayrat Sajjadi. Published in Persian under the title The 
History of Education in Kurdistan (1941-1979), the book provides important data, which 
along with information published by the Education Ministry’s journal of Amuzesh wa 
Parvaresh (Pe. education), form valuable source materials for further analysis of 
education in this period in Iran, in general, and in the Kurdish region, in particular. 
Distinguished also for its inclusion of female teachers and headteachers who formed a 
crucial part of the education system throughout the Kurdish region, the documents in The 
History identify 50 educational centres in the province between 1941 and 1946, many of 
which are in rural areas, attesting to continuous educational efforts since the early 
century.26 However, the number is higher if we add schools in the Kurdish cities excluded 
from the province because of Iran’s administrative divisions. The share of the provincial 
city of Sanandaj was 14 which increased to more than 60 in two decades.27 As Figure 17 
shows, bigger cities also acquired secondary schools.28 By the mid-1950s the growth was 
more impressive as the number of both primary and secondary schools, the number of 
students, and the proportion of girls in education had grown considerably since the late 
1930;29 this included an increase in the number of female teachers and headteachers (see 
Figure 16). Therefore, although efforts to expand modern education by 1940s had been 
impressive, the period in the aftermath of WWII stands out because of a profound change 
in the educational structure of Kurdish society. 
                                                          
26 Abdulhamid Heyrat Sajjadi, Pishineye Amuzesh Wa Parvaresh Dar Kurdistan (1320-1357) [The 
History of Education in Kurdistan (1941-1957)], Vol. 2 & 3 (Sanandaj: Kurdistan Publications, 2004), 
330. 
27 Ibid., 343-46. 
28 See Amuzesh wa Parvaresh, No. 5, Mordad 1321 [Jul-Aug 1939], 70. 
29 See Amuzesh wa Parvaresh, Vol. 28, No. 1, Farvardin 1335 [Mar-Apr 1956]. 
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However, the performance of growing Kurdish cities such as Sanandaj, Mahabad 
and Saqqez was average or below average compared to educational statistics for all 
provinces in this period.30 Constant administrative divisions, the exclusion of other 
smaller Kurdish cities now allocated to other provinces, and undermining the educational 
performance of a city, for example, such as that of Baneh, which was evaluated with that 
of Saqqez, hindered educational statistics from the Kurdish region. Moreover, avoiding 
small numbers, as Baneh seemed to have only between one and two primary schools, 
probably served to create an image of constant and satisfying growth of modern 
education.31 In this regard, documents in Sajjadi’s book cast light upon the state of 
education in this city which by 1960 had acquired 12 primary schools and one secondary 
school, albeit with very limited classes for their 945 students.32 Quantitative changes do 
not conceal educational deficiencies also in this case where in addition to lack of 
sufficient classes there was a shortage of trained teachers. With a population of around 
15,000 Baneh city’s secondary school for boys in 1968 did not have any teacher to teach 
experimental sciences. Students travelled to Sanandaj, the provincial centre, to demand 
more teachers.33 
 By the end of the 1950s, only Sanandaj, like other non-Kurdish provincial centres 
in Iran, acquired Daneshsara or training colleges for teachers and nurses, while other 
growing cities were left out because they were not provincial centres or because they were 
administered by another province, as was the case with Mahabad in the Fourth Province 
(later West Azerbaijan Province).34 
                                                          
30 Cf. Amuzesh wa Parvaresh, Vol. 28, No. 4, Dey 1335 [Dec. 1957-Jan. 1958]. 
31 Cf. Amuzesh wa Parvaresh, Vol. 28, No. 3, Khordad 1336 [May-Jun 1957]. 
32 Sajjadi, Pishineye Amuzesh Wa Parvaresh, V. 2 & 3, 209. 
33 'Azizpur, Interview. 
34 Amuzesh wa Parvaresh, Vol. 28, No. 3, Khordad 1336 [May-Jun 1957], 71. In this year there were 12 
provinces in Iran. 
 178 
 
Moreover, parallel to impressive quantitative changes, Iran’s education system 
continued to experience changes in the way education and its role was conceived. The 
Education Ministry’s journal published in this period reveals many aspects of this 
qualitative change. As part of the process of linguistic simplification and purification in 
Iran, the term ‘amuzesh va parvaresh’ replaced ‘ta‘lim va tarbiyat’, an Arabic-derived 
title, in 1317 [1938], in an intellectual and governmental attempt to create new 
vocabularies compatible with the new state and its requirements. In 1925 the Ministry of 
Education began to publish Ta‘lim wa Tarbiyat to promulgate modern education. 
Although political crises and the lack of enthusiasm interrupted its publication—it was 
postponed for five years from March 1929—its first issues contained enlightening, 
educational articles as well as educational statistics.35 By 1938, these aspects had already 
been diminished as eulogising articles on the Shah and his son, Muhammad Reza, along 
with their photographs, emerged more frequently. Moreover, although the school 
curriculum became more cohesive and began to contain a variety of scientific subjects, 
patriotism, kingship and a homogenising, national Iranian history were increasingly 
emphasised. The most effective instruments to inculcate such ideas were Persian language 
and Persian literature; all other languages and literatures of Iran were absolutely neglected 
in favour of Persian studies. As a result of the changing political contexts, the journal and 
its diverse contributors vacillated between an educational, critical journal and one under 
the shadow of the ruling Shah. In the aftermath of the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941, 
the Education Ministry issued a new law for universal and compulsory education. It 
lamented that in spite of ‘thirty-five years since the Constitution’s [introduction of] 
compulsory education, unfortunately [universal and compulsory education] has still 
                                                          
35 For a brief background of the journal see Amuzesh was Parvaresh, Vol. 23, No. 1, Mehr 1327 [Sep.-Oct. 
1948]. 
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remained a dream’.36 Even by the end of the 1950s, reporting to the UNESCO’s 
international congress, a contributor warned that ‘no country was supposed to use schools 
as means to promulgate radical nationalism’.37 Made possible by its various contributors, 
Amuzesh va Parvaresh published articles which presented critical assessments of Iran’s 
education system. As an illustration of this, the ineffectiveness of both one-way teacher-
student teaching (naqli) and the method of learning by heart (hefzi) were addressed.38 
Equally interesting, poverty was linked to learning at schools;39 and a history of education 
in Iran drew attention to the continuance of corporal punishment and detrimental 
educational environments in the previous fifty years.40 Furthermore, research conducted 
to assess education in rural areas featured in many issues of the journal,41 while the 
publication of educational books, including comparative studies, increased.42 
The existence of such critical assessments of the educational system demonstrated 
the presence of a diverse, educated generation determined to affect social change. 
Amuzesh va Parvaresh remained a battleground for the clash of dictatorial and democratic 
educational ideas. However, in general the journal and its contributors maintained a 
philosophical and historical approach to education hinged on Persian language and 
literature with the effect that the conspicuous dearth of other literatures lingered on while 
the curriculum continued to ignore the cultural diversity of Iran.43 Language had become 
an indispensable component alongside historiography to reinforce a national image of 
                                                          
36 Amuzesh wa Parvaresh, Vol. 12, No. 8-11, Aban-Azar 1321 [Oct. 1942-Feb. 1943], p. b. 
37 Amuzesh wa Parvaresh, Vol. 27, No. 3, Mehr 1335 [Sep.-Oct. 1956]. 
38 See Amuzesh va Parvaresh, Vol. 29, No. 10, Tir 1337 [Jun. Jul. 1958], p. 27. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Amuzesh va Parvaresh, No. 9, Azar 1323 [Aug.-Dec. 1950], 469. 
41 Cf. Amuzesh va Parvaresh, ibid., No. 5, Mordad 1323 [Jul.-Aug. 1944], 271; ibid., No. 6, Shahrivar 1323 
[Aug.Sep. 1944], 324-29; No. 9, Azar 1323 [Nov.-Dec. 1944], 469. 
42 Cf. a translation of a work on education in rural areas which draws lessons from ‘new and democratic 
education in the U.S.A’. For this see Amuzesh va Parvaresh, Vol. 15, 1324 [1945-6]. 
43 Cf. Amuzesh wa Parvaresh, Vol. 12, No. 1 and 2, Farvardin-Ordibehesh 1321 [Apr.-Jun. 1942]. 
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Iran with the effect that the promotion of Persian was even more consciously pursued 
from the 1950s onwards. For example, in one of its issues towards the late 1950s, the 
journal lamented the deterioration of the quality of the ‘sweet’ Persian language and listed 
a number of requirements to tackle that overriding problem, one of which was ‘the 
prevention of teaching foreign languages (zabanhaye biganeh) [i.e. other Iranian 
languages spoken in Iran] in kindergartens and primary schools.44 A decade later, despite 
educational and critical articles, the journal continued to identify itself increasingly along 
national lines. A contributor to one of its 1965 issues stated that 
 
Another big goal of the educators [in teaching Persian] is a national goal. In this age especially 
when our country has entered a new historical epoch, this goal should be seen as an overriding 
goal in [teaching] Persian language. Because in the current age, the biggest wish of humanity 
is to achieve a high status […] [and] therefore from plurality to unity or from nationalism to 
the oneness of humanity and brotherhood of nations is [generally] considered the best logical 
and scientific way [to achieve that status].45 
 
Such intensified linguistic efforts and radicalised perceptions were clear manifestations 
of an intimate relation between an inexorable state-led modernisation and the process of 
nation-building. 
Moreover, by extolling the ancient, pre-Islamic Iran, the journal also became a 
platform to reinvent ancient traditions such as Mehregan, Nowruz, and Sadeh, a mythical 
ancient Iranian fire festival, to ‘safeguard qaumiyat and melliyat [Pe. ethnicity and 
                                                          
44 Amuzesh va Parvaresh, Vol. 30, No. 4, Bahman 1337 [Jan.-Feb. 1959], 61-63. 
45 Gonabadi Mohammad Parvin, "Amuzeshe Zabane Farsi Va Hadafe Tarbiyatie An," [Teaching Persian 
Language and Its Educational Aim], Amuzesh wa Parvaresh 35, No. 9 and 10 ( 1344 [1965]). 
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nationality]’ of Iran.46 The journal reflected the way modern education in Iran was 
expanding, however, by the middle of the 1970s, it was the development of the mass 
media, especially television and cinema, which elevated Persian to an unprecedented 
cultural status.  
In contrast to significant educational progress in urban centres, the advance of 
literacy in peripheral, and dominantly rural, regions like Kurdistan was curtailed by a 
weak infrastructure, the remoteness of the village, and also by educational decrees which 
stipulated the existence of ‘enough’ students to form primary and secondary schools.47 
Moreover, the absence of an adequate number of teacher training colleges in Kurdish 
cities except Sanandaj, let alone universities and other institutions of higher education, 
affected education in Kurdistan negatively. This remained the case towards the end of the 
1970s. 
  
                                                          
46 Amuzesh va Parvaresh, Vol. 30, No. 8, Khordad 1338 [May-June 1959]; and ibid., No. 9, Tir 1338 [Jun.-
Jul. 1959].  
47 Amuzesh wa Parvaresh, No. 11 and 12, Bahman and Esfand 1323 [Jan.-Feb. 1945]. 
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16. Education centres and the number of female teachers in the Kurdistan Province. 
 
 
17. Primary and secondary schools in some Kurdish cities (1955). 
 
 
 
18. Primary and Secondary schools in Iran (1955). 
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Education: 1963-1979 
 The 1960s and 1970s were distinguished from previous periods by the growing 
availability of more precise statistics which made possible a better view of educational 
conditions of Iran. According to later statistics, in 1966 from a school age (7+years) 
population of less than 19 million only 29.4 percent were literate.48 In urban areas, where 
more people lived, this number was almost 60 percent; and there were twice as much 
literate men than women.49 Therefore, in the early 1960s illiteracy still constituted a 
major issue for Iran. Under pressure to tackle this the state began to present new methods 
and invest more in education with the effect that educational conditions improved on a 
yearly basis. For example, in 1968 the rate of literacy rose to 33.4 percent among a 
school age population of almost 22 million, rising again in 1972 to 36.7 percent among 
a growing school age (6+years) population of more than 22 million in 1972.50 
The educational image of the Kurdish region changed radically in this period when 
the number of both primary and secondary schools increased and more people attended 
schools. Mixed secondary schools had been established in bigger Kurdish cities by the 
end of the 1930s, though in smaller towns schools either came late or were only available 
to boys. Except for establishing teacher or nurse training colleges in the provincial 
centres, founding universities were not on the agenda and school graduates had to travel 
to cities outside of their region, usually to Tehran or Tabriz to acquire higher education. 
Furthermore, parallel to both infrastructural improvements and new educational 
policies, more villages acquired teachers who in many cases began teaching in the 
absence of school facilities. New educational methods and investments were outcomes 
                                                          
48 Plan and Budget Organisation, Statistical Yearbook of Iran 1352 [March 1973 - March 1974], 62. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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of both the pressure from below and authority of the state which embraced a set of 
reforms incorporated into the White Revolution. Therefore, the interaction of many 
forces led to the intensification of educational reforms that took place in a changing 
socio-political context. 
One of the most significant educational developments in Iran was the introduction 
of the Literacy Corps in the end of 1962. Explaining the new Literacy Corps in a speech 
in 1963, the Minister of Education, Parviz Khanlari, informed his audience that despite 
educational achievements, from a population of ‘20 or 21 million only few were literate 
nineteen years after the passing of the Compulsory [and Free] Education Law’.51 The 
Shah too, agreeing with this bleak picture, claimed that 80 percent of the population was 
illiterate.52 ‘Even by the end of the [current] twenty-year plan’, Khanlari maintained, 
‘there will still be twelve million illiterates in Iran’.53 Therefore, he argued, it was for 
this reason that the Literacy Corps was presented as an effective alternative to such a 
plan. It had been formed in the previous autumn and like many other ideas it had been 
initiated before the announcement of the White Revolution by the Shah. However, it 
was hailed as the achievement of the monarch. While the ideas had been hatched in 
intellectual circles by likes of Khanlari for whom this was a new dawn in the battle 
against illiteracy, Amuzesh va Parvaresh embellished its first page by the message of 
the Shah who announced the start of a ‘sacred battle’ and a ‘national holy war’ to 
                                                          
51 Amuzesh va Parvaresh, Vol. 33, No. 1, Esfand 1341 [Feb.-Mar. 1963], 10. For this law see Amuzesh va 
Parvaresh, Vol. 12, No. 8-11, Aban-Bahman 1321 [Jan. 1943], Alef [A]. UNESCO estimated the number 
of illiterates in Iran to be more than 20 million or 75 percent of the population. 
52 See the Shah’s message in Amuzesh va Parvaresh, Vol. 33, No. 1, Esfand 1341 [Feb.-Mar. 1963]. 
53 Ibid.,12. This plan was divided into four parts the first of which had been included in the five-year 
economic plan. See Amuzesh va Parvaresh, Vol. 33, No. 1, 11. 
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eradicate illiteracy, thus expropriating the idea as his and labelling the action as his 
‘fatwa’ or decree.54 
The Literacy Corps consisted of new school graduates who were assigned to 
villages across Iran and their tasks also included giving advice on other issues such as 
health and infrastructure.55 According to contemporary observers, in the early 1960s the 
Literacy Corps consisted of mostly Persian speaking young graduates who were 
scattered across the Kurdish region.56 Their impact cannot be disputed, however, the 
quantity of villages, the poor quality of roads and lack of facilities restrained the impact 
of education on rural areas. Moreover, linguistic barriers and in most cases probably the 
lack of motivation among the corps hindered the expansion of modern education,57 
whereas undertaking other tasks, e.g. providing advice on social or health issues, 
depended on individuals’ political and social proclivities or dispositions and was not 
necessarily part of the job.58 According to oral history, the way individuals’ intellectual 
dispositions and practice were shaped was conditioned on their contact with the 
literature of the time which included examples of similar actions in other parts of the 
region, e.g. the writings of Nayef Hawatmeh, the Marxist Palestinian leader, and with 
ideas which encouraged closer contact with the masses.59  
In parallel to the Literacy Corps, there were native teachers who were allocated to 
villages to teach and gain experience before being employed in urban schools. Upon 
graduation from daneshsara (teacher training college), a graduate had to undertake a 
                                                          
54 Amuzesh va Parvaresh, Vol. 33, No. 1, Esfand 1341 [Feb.-Mar. 1963]. 
55 Amuzesh va Parvaresh, Vol. 33, No. 1, 60. 
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57 Ibid. 
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five-year teaching job in a village.60 Villages were not popular career destinations for 
teachers. However, inspired by progressive and philanthropic ideas of the time ‘teaching 
in a village became a vogue for the educated, urban generation’ in a changing political 
context. 61 For the growing popularity of such very ideas (see the next chapter) many 
chose teaching ‘as a way to promote social and political awareness of toodeha [the 
masses]’.62 Indeed, the increase in the number of social and political activists and the 
formation of what it assumed to be a network of such activists proved to be 
indispensable for the transformation of the educational image of Kurdish society. A 
successful doctor rising from a poor background in the city of Baneh recalls that 
 
My education could have been terminated after 6 years if it was not for a group of 
political and social activists in my home town. For example, Hashim Karimi, ‘Abdulla 
Eqdami and Muhammad Qaderyan were educated individuals who were influenced by 
Kurdish cultural products and movements, valued education and imparted social, 
ethnic and political ideas of the time. In the absence of state institutions in this regard, 
they encouraged me to continue studying and although I suffered from the lack of 
adequate income and had to work at the same time, I nonetheless continued my 
education and, after passing Konkur (Iranian university entrance exam), I was among 
the 220 students, which was the limit, admitted to Tehran University’s Medical Faculty 
in 1969.63 
  
This example attests to the significant impact of such activists’ social and educational 
work. Therefore, both the expansion of literacy and the increase in the number of people 
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62 Ibid. Biglari, Interview. 
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in higher education was owed to the intersection of many factors, namely the authority of 
the state to establish new schools and introduce new methods, and a new educated, urban 
generation, whose actions were shaped in changing social, political as well as ideological 
contexts–these contexts were domestic, regional as well as international. In many cases, 
the demand and financial contribution of landowners who were engaged in literacy 
activities or were culturally receptive to modern ideas induced the authorities to establish 
schools in their villages. The existence of an educated, urban generation, moulded by 
influential ideas and formed into various networks, exposed the limit of the state-led 
modernisation and the vitality of non-state agents of change as regards the expansion of 
modern education, a crucial point entirely ignored in modernisation theories (see 
diagrams in Chapter 2). Max Weber explains such actions on behalf of individuals as 
‘value-oriented’—a type of social action ‘determined by a conscious belief in the value 
for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior’.64 
However, in contrast to Weber’s observation that action of this kind occurred ‘for the 
most part only to a relatively slight extent’, across Iran in general and in the period under 
discussion, ‘value-oriented’ actions characterised an urban, educated generation that 
contributed immensely to social change.65 In a progressive perception of history, which 
guided activists during these decades, education was indeed an indispensable social value 
to fight for. It was through access to education that many were able to rise from poor 
socio-economic conditions.66 
Another aspect of modern education, which exposed the limits of the state action, 
was its unequal and prolonged nature. The following data elucidates this point: in April 
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1963 there were only 32 literacy corps in Kurdistan.67 Teacher training included women 
too, though their number was still low, and in 1963 from 14 applicants 9 were admitted.68 
According to Muhammad Sadeq Sheikhestani, the incumbent deputy director of the 
Statistical Centre of Iran, ‘in the academic year 1341-2 [1962-3] from 1,720,000 primary 
school students across Iran only 39 percent (apart from [those taught by] the Literacy 
Corps) [were] village students, while three-fourth of the population live[d] in rural 
areas’.69 In the same academic year, Amuzesh va Parvaresh informed its readers that the 
number of primary students across Iran was increasing with different paces in different 
regions, ‘leading to considerable disparity between provinces’. As an illustration of this, 
in 1964 from the above total number of primary school students, the Fars Province’s share 
was 14.5 percent while the Kurdistan Province’s share was 4 percent.70 Since the latter 
did not include all Kurdish cities, the share of the Kurdish region was probably slightly 
higher.71 Educational disparities surrounding gender were other aspects of education. In 
the same year, across Iran the share of girls was 30 percent,72 and, based on the difficulties 
of modern education to reach the peripheral regions in general and the countryside in 
particular, and also affected by cultural barriers, the number of girls in education 
especially in rural areas remained much lower than boys. 
According to statistics, the number of primary and secondary schools began to 
increase throughout the 1960s. In 1964 there were 420 primary schools against 18 
                                                          
67 Amuzesh va Parvaresh, No. 3 (Ordibehesht 1342 [Apr.-May 1963]), 60. 
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secondary schools in the Kurdistan Province.73 A yearly increase in the number of 
students was recorded in the next issues of Amuzesh va Parvaresh which continued its 
publication regularly, although the appearance of the images of the Shah, his patriarchal 
messages, as well as eulogising pieces on the monarch (on his new calendar and on 
performed reinvented traditions) increased to the detriment of intellectual and educational 
articles of the journal’s earlier periods. Diverse both in subject and in philosophical 
persuasion, one interesting aspect of the journal had been to recognise the individual 
efforts of men as well as women in the struggle against illiteracy. For example, ‘Aziz Al-
Muluk Ma‘refat (Mo‘temedi), was a Kurdish teacher from Sanandaj, whose teaching 
career and efforts to build schools for girls earned her, like many other pioneers across 
Iran, a deserved reputation among her contemporaries.74 She taught in Sanandaj and 
founded Namus [honour] School for Girls in Hamadan before accepting a headteacher 
role in Kermanshah’s Shahdokht Primary School for Girls. She then continued working 
in education after her retirement in 1963 and was assigned the role of bazras (Pe. 
inspector) in Tehran.75 The name Namus, which has protectionist connotations in relation 
to women, perfectly reflected the existing gender order of the society in which a brave 
individual like her not only had to fight illiteracy but also appease a hostile, patriarchal 
environment. Such individuals set the stage for a later, more educated urban generation, 
including women, that became a distinguished feature of the era of the White Revolution. 
According to official statistics, throughout the 1970s the number of primary and 
secondary schools in Kurdish urban areas continued to rise with the effect that between 
1966 and 1974 the number of elementary schools increased from 393 to 597 schools.  76 
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75 Ibid., 117. 
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Without specifying their urban or rural locations, available statistics claimed that these 
numbers for Literacy Corps elementary schools were 330 and 609 respectively;77 
enrolment in such schools increased from 8,000 to 15,000 pupils in this decade.78 This 
data, whether inflated or even complete, generally illustrates a picture that demonstrates 
both the impressive growth of modern schools and the rate of literacy. Official statistics 
claimed that while in March 1966 only 52 children attended kindergartens in the 
Kurdistan province, this number rose to 793 in March 1974.79 
Nevertheless, the expansion of modern education did not include universities, the 
absence of which outlasted the Pahlavi rule itself. This was caused not only by the 
shortage of staff and high rate of illiteracy but also by the state’s lack of will and plans. 
Therefore, in pursuit of higher education, school graduates continued to enrol in 
universities outside Kurdistan. As their number grew in the 1960s and 1970s, this resulted 
especially in the formation of more networks of Kurdish social and political activists (see 
the next chapter). 
Finally, at the end of 1965 the role of television in education was discussed in 
Amuzesh va Parvaresh in search of more effective, coordinated educational methods by 
rather ambiguously comparing ‘centralised methods’ used in France and Switzerland with 
‘decentralised methods’ used in England.80 This demonstrated the increasing significance 
of television in people’s lives in Iran. However, despite such intellectual and educational 
debates, television became an effective tool for the concentration of political power and 
the homogenisation of culture by the mid-1970s. 
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19. Aziz Muluk Ma'refat (Mo'tamedi). 
 
Source: Amuzesh wa Parvaresh, Vol. 37. Nos. 7 & 8 (1346 [1967]), 116. 
The text in the background reads 'Lady Ma‘refat in a Struggle Against Illiteracy Class in Tehran Laleh Primary 
School’. 
 
 
20. Institutions of Education in the Kurdistan Province 
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HEALTHCARE 
This section discusses a number of important themes as regards modern healthcare. They 
include the impact of modern healthcare on Kurdish society; the role of the state but also 
its limits and shortcomings; and the role of non-state agents of change. The expansion of 
healthcare institutions in Kurdish urban centres was another significant aspect of social 
change in the era of the White Revolution. By the end of the 1970s more people had 
access to medical treatments such as immunisation, medical information and advice. 
Parallel to this, the number of nurses and (foreign or native) doctors increased. As was 
the case with the expansion of literacy and schools, healthcare went through a prolonged 
and uneven process of change, but at a much faster pace and with considerable 
quantitative results. Healthcare was an urban phenomenon that needed time to become an 
ingrained institution in a society that was mainly rural and had continued to suffer from 
the absence of social services. Later, improved statistical data demonstrates the appalling 
medical conditions faced by earlier (mostly rural) populations and reveals a slow 
expansion of medical services. Therefore, with a growing awareness of medical issues, 
this process gradually engaged the educated urban generation. 
Modern healthcare advanced throughout the 1970s amid unhealthy environments 
and prevalent diseases especially in rural areas. Urban centres benefited more from 
sanitation, hygienisation and the expansion of health centres, though not all the 
neighbourhoods were affected equally. Most villages continued to live in an unhealthy 
environment. In the second half of the century health conditions in the Kurdish region 
were still appalling. This applied more acutely to peripheral regions and rural areas across 
Iran. In the 1950s or 1960s there were no health centres in rural areas in the Kurdish 
region while its towns and cities only had limited access to health and medical services. 
Death rates and infant mortality were high while ratios of physicians and hospital beds to 
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population demonstrated the scarcity of doctors and hospitals.81 As the next two figures 
demonstrate, by the mid-1970s these conditions improved considerably in comparison 
with earlier periods.82 The movement to ameliorate these conditions continued to face 
serious obstacles in a situation which ‘many villagers never benefit[ed] from medical 
science from cradle to grave’.83 According to oral history, across the rural areas in the 
Kurdish region ‘lice, swollen eyes, coughing, sloughy wounds, and leprosy in many 
villages, were prevalent’.84 People affected by leprosy faced extra challenges to make a 
living, and though they were not completely excluded from the community life and were 
helped by co-villagers, they nonetheless experienced social isolation. Moreover, the 
region was still characterised by the absence of hamam (bath house/room) and toilets. For 
example, ‘except in a landowner’s house, in 1352 [1973] there were no private or public 
toilet to be used by people in Jalalvand and Osmanvand regions in the vicinity of 
Kermanshah’ while people continued to rely on other unhygienic ways.   85 Common 
characteristics of Kurdish villages included the dearth of electricity, potable water, and 
sanitary sewers—there were usually no suitable toilets or baths—which kept the level of 
disease high. Moreover, animal manure was shaped into koshkalan (Ku. dried dungs 
heaped upon each other), located in front of the house to be used as fuel, becoming a 
haven for disease transmitting insects; domestic animals were kept in gawir (Ku. stable) 
which was a part of the inner space of the house. Immunisation was unknown and 
consequently measles and chickenpox were endemic and continued to kill or infect 
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individuals’ lungs and brains or affect eyesight; the death toll was tens or hundreds of 
people annually.86 Moreover, contact with animals and animal waste kept tetanus disease 
high while unhygienic washing materials, e.g. dimashora (solid white substance made of 
animal produce), spread microbes. Moreover, the lack of durables such as refrigerators 
and freezers left people with no way to store food.  
In urban centres, too, ‘low standards of sanitation and contact with hazards of waste 
contributed to the spread of cholera and typhoid, usually leading to an epidemy in 
summers’.87   A shocking aspect of life in urban areas in the 1960s was the absence of a 
sanitary sewer system. A small town like Baneh epitomised this: within the city ‘open 
channels carried sewage through the residential areas, ending up in nearby lands under 
cultivation’.88 Cholera was a lethal disease in such towns where, until the end of the 
1950s, people still died of rabies.89 Public awareness of health issues was at its lowest 
level while doctors and pharmacies with an adequate supply of medicine were rare, and 
advanced laboratories were unheard of. At the same time, people did not necessarily trust 
modern medical practices and therefore continued to use conventional methods.90 These 
conditions in more populous cities were only slightly better. People continued to use 
public baths, mostly khazineh (pool), washing in a shared pool, although in most cases 
new public baths with shower rooms replaced them by the end of the 1970s. Private baths 
in households were a new urban concept only used by the wealthy. However, visiting 
public baths in days of celebration also carried with it some cultural meanings. For 
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example, the act of visiting public baths as a family on New Year’s Eve or on religious 
days was a custom to welcome such important days. 
21. Iran’s Healthcare indicators for 1923 and 1976. 
 
Source: quoted in Mohammad Ali Faghih, “Behdārī”. 
 
22. Healthcare facilities in Iran (1978). 
  
Source: quoted in Mohammad Ali Faghih, “Behdārī”. 
 
Healthcare: its pace and scope of change 
The health conditions, discussed above, were radically transformed throughout the 1970s 
but more in Kurdish urban rather than rural areas. This was another factor which further 
consolidated the disparity between city and village. Despite the emergence of a more 
organised and effective healthcare system, including its various training organisations, it 
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was outstripped by health-related demands of a rising population. The states’ 
shortcomings in this regard emanated from a late emergence of effective methods to 
expand the healthcare system. The introduction of the concept of such a system was one 
of the basic objectives of Iran’s Fifth Development Plan (1973-), which was followed by 
a social security system (bime-ye ejtema‘i), introduced in 1975. Accordingly, in addition 
to a central apparatus, which included many directories, the Ministry of Health introduced 
various departments to improve healthcare at a peripheral level. For example, general 
departments of health (edara-ye koll-e behdasht), departments of health headed by county 
health commissioners, and district health centres headed by medical officers were 
assigned to function in Iran’s 23 provinces. This took place in the mid-1970s, however, 
merely increasing institutions did not necessary yield quick results. Health conditions in 
many Kurdish rural areas in the end of the 1970s were either as terrible as or minimally 
better than what they had been twenty years ago. The shortage of trained medical staff, 
slow infrastructural improvements and difficult access to villages were formidable 
hurdles for the expansion of modern healthcare. This is in addition to the religious and 
cultural resistance of people to modern healthcare, which resulted from lack of awareness 
and misperceptions of new scientific advances. Even in this front ‘the task fell on the 
shoulders of the recently school graduates who enthusiastically imparted medical 
knowledge to people’.91 Crucial, however, was the direction of centre- and urban-centred 
development plans, which generally lacked the will and initiatives for the peripheries and 
rural regions. This was partly, but significantly, compensated by a healthcare movement 
in Iran that promoted the idea and pushed for more reforms. 
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Indeed, the transformation of healthcare in Iran in the 1960s and 1970s originated 
from ‘a new and dynamic health movement’ which gained momentum in the early years 
of the second half of the century. The movement was characterised by an increasing 
number of individuals, who in the capacity of social activists contributed to the promotion 
of health awareness, and was embodied in public and private associations like Iranian 
Nurses Association (founded Khordad 1334/1955) and Persian journals such as Health 
for All and Health Today, published throughout the 1950s.92 This was extended to 
privately funded organisations to provide maternity care in rural areas.93 The movement 
was inspired and supported by an active generation of individuals, representing a new 
literary and social movement, epitomised by poet Shohrab Sephehri or children’s book 
writer and illustrator Muhammad Zaman Zamani.94 Usually overshadowed by elitist or 
political historiographies, this generation had its own history and continued to include 
many other literary figures, teachers and doctors, who, carrying a revolutionary zeal, were 
committed to social change to improve the life of Iranians.95 
 
Hospitals and medical services in Kurdistan 
According to statistics published in March 1974, there were 9 hospitals, including one 
run by ‘foreign mission’, with 359 beds in the Kurdistan Province.96 Along with most 
provinces orbiting the centre, there were no specialised hospitals or children hospitals.97 
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Plan and Budget Organisation’s 1974 Statistical Yearbook listed 66 unspecified clinics, 
10 ambulances and 26 pharmacies for the province where around 100 children were 
claimed to have received support from the Pahlavi charity.98 Mostly general practitioners 
and some general surgeons, the number of doctors did not reach one hundred. The 
considerable rise in the number of medical staff across Iran did not mean that they were 
distributed equally over provinces. The number of people employed in healthcare across 
Iran rose from 34,000 in 196699 to 79,710 in 1978.100 As the next figure shows, healthcare 
in Iran at the end of the 1970s could not be compared with earlier decades. According to 
contemporaries, a gradual change in health conditions in the Kurdish region became more 
tangible since the early 1960s. By 1970 there were more medical centres in urban areas, 
immunisation had become available, and sanitation improved with the effect that cities 
began to acquire covered carriage systems for transporting sewage; there were more 
toilets, cleaner public baths and piped potable water. However, hygienisation depended 
on planned urbanisation, the availability of services such as electricity, roads and 
transportation. These elements improved slowly and remained vulnerable in the face of 
harsh climates. For example, in winter and spring roads were blocked or flooded, 
interrupting transportation and the supply of fuel.101 As more roads were built more 
villages benefited from piped potable water, fertilisation and exterminators for the 
application of chemicals to eliminate vermin and insects. This demonstrates how tightly 
the elements of modernisation were interrelated. 
A new method pursued by the state as a principle of the White Revolution was the 
formation of the Health Corps. It consisted of young men and women, whose educational 
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level was high school diploma or above, and were trained for a few months before being 
dispatched to rural areas to work on rudimentary health and sanitation projects as part of 
their military service. There were also mobile units, including medical women, who 
supplied free contraceptives, an important medical development in rural areas since the 
end of the 1960s, and provided advice on menstruation and pregnancy.102 These units 
visited villages which had access to roads and transportation, but excluded a considerable 
number of inaccessible villages. Nevertheless, female nurses and teachers were crucial to 
the improvement of women’s living conditions. In the 1970s the risk of miscarriage or 
death during childbirth was still high. By the middle of 1970s, the number of infectious 
diseases had decreased and immunisation had increased. However, this was primarily an 
urban phenomenon, leaving the rural areas and the majority of the population struggling 
with poor standards of hygiene and without healthcare. 
Many reasons explained this gradual hygienisation and continuation of gruesome 
conditions in both Kurdish rural areas and poor city neighbourhoods. According to 
contemporary observers the state-led economic development was influenced by political 
considerations with the effect that, for example, the budgetary share of hygiene in 
comparison to the military was much lower. Although statistics refer to an institutional 
transformation of healthcare in Iran by the end of the 1970s, from a population of almost 
30 million, the number of students attending medical schools (daneshkade-ye Pezeshki) 
across Iran was only 500-600 per year, indicating the low number of trained medical 
staff.103 Moreover, the state concentrated on the centre and did not follow specific 
economic plans to boost peripheral regions’ economic potential, as for example was the 
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case not only in Kurdistan or Baluchistan but also in Khuzistan despite its oil and gas 
mines. As another study on the subject argues, 
  
Despite these advances, the development of health care in Iran was hampered by a lack of 
central planning and organization. Services provided by state and municipal organizations, on 
the one hand, and private groups, on the other, at times overlapped, causing wasteful 
duplication, while at the same time, because of maldistribution of services in terms of quantity 
and quality, segments of the population and some geographical areas could not be served 
properly.104 
 
There were also cultural barriers for the expansion of healthcare. Modern healthcare not 
only had to transform living conditions but also the perception of people who trusted 
conventional methods. Religious authorities like prominent sheikhs who had vested 
interest in maintaining conventional or religious methods continued to consolidate their 
authority on people’s mind by ridiculing and demonising new scientific knowledge. The 
absence of a tenacious effort on behalf of the state, except for its military presence, to 
expand knowledge and services meant that religious authorities continued to keep their 
hold on the society, especially in rural communities. This uneven modernisation of 
healthcare in Iran is best seen in the horrific health conditions which were still common 
in most rural areas in the Kurdish region in the late 1970s. The revolutionary upheavals 
at the end of the decade exposed the quality of life in villages when contacts increased 
and more educated individuals, including doctors and nurses, visited the countryside. 
Their testimonies demonstrate how villages (many only ten to twenty kilometres away 
from cities) were still deprived of electricity or potable water, or people used the same 
                                                          
104 Faghih, "Behdārī". 
 201 
 
hot water pool for washing;105 in other villages open sewers passed through houses and 
into the nearby river while, shockingly, people used the same river, that had absorbed 
sewage of upper villages on its way, for drinking and cooking.106 The presence of this 
new revolutionary generation in the rural areas was an unprecedented event which exerted 
a profound impact on the social awareness of the people. 
 
Utopias of social welfare 
As was the case with the concepts of behdasht (health), hygienisation and healthcare 
institutions, ‘social welfare’ was a latecomer too, prioritised in Iran’s Fourth 
Development Plan (1968-1973). Evaluating a request for social welfare expertise by 
Iran’s Plan and Budget Organisation, the Middle East Department of Britain’s Ministry 
of Overseas Development noted that this ambitious plan included ‘social insurance, 
family and child welfare, Youth Development, Community Development, Industrial 
Welfare, Rehabilitation of handicapped groups, Research and Training’.107 It was no 
secret that Iran was conspicuously devoid of expertise, trained personnel and relevant 
institutions and that this deficiency was in fact the reason behind the organisation’s 
request made in 1969 for social welfare experts.108 Although the request was initially 
regarded as both an indication of Iran’s seriousness ‘about its plans for the development 
of social welfare’ and an opportunity to invest in ‘a well-developed and progressive 
outfit’, the final reply states that ‘the Iran request in present circumstances is a dubious 
one and need not be followed up’.109 The main reason for this was the Department’s 
dissatisfaction with an old-fashioned, nineteenth-century perception of welfare as ‘soup 
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kitchen and crutches for cripples’.110 Therefore, as the ministry’s representative in Iran, 
J. H. O’Regan, stated later, it was better to ‘concentrate on those tasks which are either in 
our interests to pursue, or which are likely to make a reasonable impact on Iran’s 
development (in the wider sense of the term) or both’.111 Mrs Behaqi, who supervised the 
Organisation’s social welfare plan, desperately searched for expertise to teach new 
modules related to social welfare in Tehran and Shiraz universities.112 The Organisation 
found itself in such a desperate situation that it even welcomed experts with lower degrees 
to teach or work as development officers.113 Therefore, while the welfare system was at 
best unorganised and ineffective, both a faulty conception of welfare and desperate 
requests for experts revealed the grim state of ‘welfare’ in Iran in the end of the 1960s. 
The principles of the White Revolution included social policies as well. In the end 
of 1975 policies regarding education in the form of free education, including free meals 
‘for the needy’, ‘from kindergarten through the eighth grade’, and free secondary and 
university education in return for undertaking public services. In addition to the expansion 
of health centres and hospitals, the Lion and Sun Society (equivalent of the Red Cross) 
was assigned the task of providing healthcare to underprivileged while other state 
organisations affiliated with various ministries were supposed to cover people and regions 
not covered by the national health plan; more emphasis was put on medical units for the 
rural areas. However, as regards social welfare projects, dreadful social conditions 
continued. Social projects envisioned in the Fourth Plan became utopian projects which, 
with more promises made by the mid-1970s, continued to excite some economists who, 
                                                          
110 Ibid. 
111 ‘Request for social welfare experts’, (MID 242/86/02), dated 20 June 1969, TNA, OD 34/272. 
112 ‘Request for social welfare experts’, (MID 242/86/02), dated 27 September 1968, TNA, OD 34/272. 
113 ‘Request for social welfare experts’, (ES 332/213/03), dated 24 September 1968, TNA, OD 34/272. 
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based on Iran’s unprecedented economic growth during the early 1970s, believed ‘there 
were bright prospect for a resurgence of another Great Civilization’.114 
During the 1970s the Kurdish rural region remained outside any social welfare. 
There are no reliable statistics on or any indication of the existence of any such projects 
by contemporaries. Simultaneously, the impoverishing impact of the unplanned 
urbanisation and population growth revealed the dearth of social services in the urban 
centres. For example, modernisation exposed on a wider scale those with physical or 
learning difficulties as well as those in need of mental healthcare. Social problems 
emerged in many forms and the state at best responded to only some aspects of them. For 
example, in some cities, city councils set up parvareshgah (Pe. Orphanage) to protect 
orphaned children who were born out of marriage or abandoned by the side of a road. 
They came to be called parvareshgahi (Pe. raised in an orphanage) and the law for the 
protection of infants without guardians allowed adoption of these children by Iranians.115 
Being raised in such an institution had both cultural and social consequences. Children 
born outside marriage were perceived as na-shar‘i (Ku. illegitimate) and were called zoll 
(Ku. bastard); parvareshgahi was a new category which connoted a lower social status of 
those either born outside marriage or not living in a family. Moreover, the number of 
centres for the protection of people affected by lethal or life-changing diseases such as 
tuberculosis or leprosy were very limited. Leprosy patients were completely unprotected 
in the Kurdish rural areas and isolated in the cities. Infectious diseases were still lethal 
                                                          
114 Amuzegar, Iran: An Economic Profile, ix. Otherwise a very informative source with valuable data on 
the economic performance of Iran, its optimistic and uncritical approach to economic or social policies of 
the state is accompanied by avoiding any discussion of social consequences of modernisation. 
115 According to Yadola Biglari, a family judge, giving custody of a child to a person married to a citizen 
of a foreign country was not desirable; however, in one case he gave custody of a child to an Iranian man 
and his Swedish wife. See Biglari, Interview. 
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during the 1970s. For example, according to a medical college student, in the mid-1970s 
a high percentage of patients who admitted to his university hospital in Tehran died.116  
In fact, the notion of ‘people in need’ was itself dubious, confirmed by the extension 
of the categorisation of people to those who looked or acted ‘differently’. Many city 
neighbourhoods were characterised by individuals, many of whom adults, who suffered 
from down syndrome or speaking disabilities but, instead of their needs being recognised, 
they faced continuous violence in the forms of derogatory names, insults, intimidation 
and staring. There were no institutions available to take such individuals under their 
protection. Moreover, physical disabilities determined social status of individuals 
identified as ‘goj’ (Ku. ‘deformed’), maintaining a feeling of shame in them, social 
isolation and deprivation. It goes without saying that individuals affected by such 
conditions were deprived of education, while in most cases they also had to work in 
unfavourable circumstances. Categorisation and the continuation of ingrained cultural 
attitudes, the lack of education, health and social services were not peculiar to Iranian 
societies. They were universal issues. However, a decade after the introduction of the 
relevant projects in the development plans such individuals continued to rely on family 
and relatives rather than state institutions, which were either absent or inadequate. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter analyses the social consequences of land reform and modernisation which 
in the Kurdish region were followed by the migration of poor peasants to cities and by 
unbridled urbanisation. Insofar as the land reform is concerned, its uneven and 
inconsistent nature failed in ameliorating life in rural areas, still characterised by appalling 
                                                          
116 'Azizpur, Interview. 
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conditions in the end of the 1970s. Moreover, although it dealt the landowner class a 
mighty blow, this class remained wealthy and powerful, and for this reason a form of 
authority (sometimes military power) was consistently needed to ensure its acquiescence. 
That is why once the central authority was weakened amid the popular revolution in 1978-
9, in many regions the Kurdish agha class re-emerged to demand the restitution of their 
lost lands. However, both the regime of the Kurdish agha and tribalism were effectively 
weakened because of the combined effects of land reform and the socio-economic 
modernisation of Iran. 
Modernisation intensified in the era of the White Revolution towards an 
increasing urban-market based economy with significant consequences for the existing 
class structure and for the social composition of society. The expansion of the 
modernising institutions and state administration created a new urban, educated class, 
which, alongside the bazaar, construction and land investors, formed different layers of a 
new Kurdish middle class. At the same time, the modern Kurdish working class began to 
form amid an intensified modernisation and affected by its consequences. The 
unpreparedness of the development plans to face the consequences of modernisation and 
the dearth of social services created impoverished city neighbourhoods which was made 
up of the lower strata of the village population. Moreover, the expansion of Kurdish cities 
and the search for income by the new free-moving labour class increased the number of 
the urban wage labourers, who simultaneously faced both educational and healthcare 
deprivation and were exposed to social categorisation. 
The middle class was distinguished by higher income and employment in the 
public sector which bestowed on them a higher social status; they had more access to 
healthcare, new means of communication, i.e. radio and television, books and magazines 
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while their offspring could experience a relatively comfortable childhood. In short, these 
emerging classes were discernible by (1) level of income and (2) access to services, 
technologies and cultural capital. Moreover, in the making of a modern Kurdish working 
class the emergence of a new class of seasonal workers and family migration, which 
marked two significant consequences of land reform and modernisation, is significant. In 
all cases, individuals were exposed to exploitation in the absence of any labour laws, 
exacerbated by undesirable social and cultural environments; children and women were 
particularly vulnerable in this environment. Concurrently, village life remained devoid of 
social services still until the end of the 1970s, while the unequal expansion of modern 
education, behdasht and social services consolidated the existing gap between city and 
village.  
Meanwhile, the intensification of modernisation led to more radical approaches in 
economic planning. Finding its rationale in an uneven economic development or existing 
regional gaps, the aborted Sixth Plan (1978-83), which ‘modelled after France’s 
aménagement de territoire [spatial planning]’, meant to achieve ‘closer national 
integration—geographic, socio-economic and cultural’; and ‘aimed at a holistic 
development of various regions and ultimately the entire nation’ [emphasis added].117 
Moreover, economic development plans were affected by both political considerations 
and a nationalist vigour to ‘catch up with [Western] Europe’ economically as well as 
socially within 25 years, as the monarch claimed in 1975, lest the oil resources run out.118 
This holistic approach was pursued not merely in economic spheres but also in socio-
cultural realms. As noted above, based on a homogenised Persian culture, Iran’s modern 
education became increasingly an institution to foster a new, uncritical ‘Iranian’. 
                                                          
117 Amuzegar, Iran: An Economic Profile, 260. 
118 Quoted in ibid., 259. 
 207 
 
Finally, dictatorship alongside such methodological and ideological radicalisations 
widened the gap between the state and what is assumed to be Iran’s generations for 
change. Excluding others and ignoring advice in the last two decades of his reign, the 
Shah eventually became the embodiment of the state, whereas, as the product of both 
modern education and the ideas of the time, the generations of social activists and 
intellectuals acquired an increased role in social change, determined to move towards a 
socio-culturally progressive and democratic modernity. Even before the Shah was proven 
to be ‘not a man of crisis’, as the American ambassador noted during the political 
upheavals of 1978-9,119 one is tempted to say that he had already failed these generations 
by his authoritative role in the mismanagement of the modernisation process, providing 
indirectly the ‘objective conditions’ for the intellectual ascendency of an authenticity 
searching nativism instead. 
                                                          
119 William H. Sullivan, Mission to Iran (USA: W.W. Norton and Company, 1981), 57. 
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Chapter 5: The Political and Cultural Consequences of Modernisation 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The intensification of the dual process of socio-economic and political modernisation in 
the era of the White Revolution resulted in significant political and cultural changes which 
conditioned the Kurds’ resistance against homogenisation and marked the origins of 
modern trends in Kurdish politics. In the new age of visual means of communication, the 
era also transformed the existing social conditions and relations of power which reshaped 
cultural encounters in the multi-cultural nation-state of Iran. 
Politically, the dual process increased political centralisation and effectively 
obstructed political participation. The state was eventually mutated into an omnipotent 
and omnipresent force and prevented any form of dissent through a standing army and, 
in some cases, explicit militarisation. However, the state’s politics of cultural exclusion 
and homogenisation reinforced Kurdayeti in many forms. Consequently, ideologically 
embedded in an Iranian and worldwide context, networks of political and social urban 
activists emerged, leading to the formation of the nuclei of modern Kurdish political 
parties. The state justified suppression by reinforcing the assumption that armed struggle 
was an intrinsic characteristic of Kurdish opposition, undermining the existing non-
violent political, social, cultural, and literary movements. This said, the political history 
of the era is more complicated and is distinguished for the prevalence of non-violent 
forms of opposition and, interestingly, a critique of armed struggle, which new Iranian 
organisations such as Fedayyan and Mojahedeen perceived ‘as both strategy and tactic’.1 
                                                          
1 Mas'ud Ahmadzadeh, Mobareze Mosalahane: Ham Estrategy Va Ham Taktik [Armed Struggle as both 
Strategy and Tactic] (1349 [1970]), Available at http://www.iran-
archive.com/sites/default/files/sanad/cherikha_ta_1357-mobarezeh_masud.pdf, accessed 17/09/2017. For 
more on Fedayyan see Peyman Vahabzadeh, "A Generation Myth: Armed Struggle and the Creation of 
Social Epic in 1970s Iran," in H. E. Chehabi, et al. (eds), Iran in the Middle East: Transnational 
Encounters and Social History (London: I. B. Tauris, 2015). 
 209 
 
Insofar as cultural consequences of modernisation are concerned, this chapter 
focuses on ‘Westernisation’ and the establishment of the cultural hegemony of Persian 
language and culture. This is for two reasons: first, these two aspects provide specific 
perspectives to deal with cultural modernisation in multicultural Iran. ‘Westernisation’ 
here refers to new cultural products and ways of life originating from Western Europe 
and the United States which either were embraced or elicited resistance. Secondly, an 
analysis of these two aspects theoretically enables us to identify other mechanisms of 
cultural encounters in a historically multicultural entity. In contrast to the mechanisms of 
cultural encounters in a colonial context, this includes the centralisation of power and the 
cultural hegemony of the ‘superior’ culture. Of course, the postcolonial era witnessed the 
reproduction of the coloniser’s cultural superiority over the natives and the spread of 
economic corporations, which compensated for the coloniser’s physical absence or 
military and political rule. However, the distinctive elements of foreign/native always 
remained. In the case of the modern encounter of Persian and Kurdish cultures, the scale 
and the meaning of this distinction were different from a colonial encounter, which was 
deeply rooted in race and conquest. Within a multicultural nation-state, modern cultural 
encounters began to take place between cultures with intimate relations with each other, 
resulting in the hegemony of one over others. This is explained by analysing the process 
in which Persian cultural hegemony, defined and (re)introduced as Iranian, was realised 
and ensured its superiority over others in modern Iran. Moreover, in this process the new 
audio and visual means of communication were as essential as modern education. Also 
for this reason, the era of the White Revolution is distinguished, to borrow from John 
Thompson, for the mediasation of culture, that is, ‘the rapid proliferation of institutions 
of mass communication and the growth of networks of transmission through which 
commodified symbolic forms were made available to an ever-expanding domain of 
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recipients’.2 Therefore, as regards the cultural transformation of Iran, it is precisely for 
achieving Persian cultural hegemony that the era of the White Revolution sets itself apart 
from the preceding eras. 
 
MODERNISATION AND THE POLITICAL STITUATION IN KURDISTAN 
The modernisation of Iran continued to transform the political structure of Kurdistan. By 
the second half of the century, tribal local powers, mainly under duress, had submitted to 
the authority of the state. By the early 1970s nobody could cast doubt on the existence of 
an omnipotent state, recognised by its military prowess and intelligence agencies and 
characterised by an expanding bureaucratic administration. However, since the 
experience of Mahabad the oppressive machinery of the state had remained on standby 
for quelling any possible re-emergence of Kurdish opposition, which nevertheless re-
emerged, were quelled, and against all odds rose again to challenge political power. On 
the other hand, political centralisation effectively undermined political participation with 
the effect that the electoral process for the parliament became meaningless while the 
parliament itself became all but a rubber stamp. Therefore, these circumstances, affected 
by modern education, resulted in new networks of Kurdish political activists and, 
subsequently, the formation of the nuclei of modern Kurdish political parties. Iran 
continued to constitute the framework for political activism, while the organisational 
structure was not limited to the Kurdish region and ideological bearings reflected wider 
regional and international contexts. This situation was a direct result of the socio-
economic and political modernisation of Iran. Indeed, when new Kurdish political parties 
emerged amid the 1979 Revolution, it was no coincidence that their political programmes 
were explicitly articulated in the framework of modern Iran. To elaborate these claims, 
the following two sections present an overview of the political situation since the fall of 
                                                          
2 Thompson, Ideology, 11. 
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the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad until the end of the 1970s. This arbitrary periodisation 
is based on moments when changes are visible regarding the formation and political 
orientations of Kurdish opposition. 
 
1946-1968: the formative years of the Kurdish modern opposition  
This period begins with the suppression of the Kurdish Republic and ends with the 
quelling of what is known in Kurdish collective memory as the rebellion of 1968-9. In 
the post-Republic era, the political structure of Kurdistan continued to be shaped by 
political considerations of the state because of the threat of Kurdish opposition. Political 
suppression and incarceration of activists persisted, but, despite this, clandestine political 
activities also continued. Although the idea of armed struggle, with its universal appeal 
in the context of the concurrent Kurdish movement in Iraq, was going to become 
attractive, Kurdish political activism was recognised by clandestine, political and other 
non-violent methods, devoid of any specific plan for armed struggle. Even in the 1960s, 
when because of changing circumstances a group of activists based in Iraqi Kurdistan 
carried arms to protect themselves against capture and detention, the main concern 
remained the reorganisation of non-violent forms of dissent inside Iran. Nevertheless, 
1968 and 1969 are significant years in Kurdish collective memory in Iran. During these 
years Kurdish opposition met the aggressive reaction of SAVAK (Sazman-e Amniyat Va 
Etelaat-e Keshvar), Iran’s fearsome intelligence service, and the Iranian army. This 
culminated in a dangerous situation in 1968 when the army succeeded in quelling an 
important section of the opposition which moved as armed groups mainly in the northern 
part of the Kurdish region and made contact with the population and their sympathisers. 
As a result, the myth of shorreshi 46-47 (Ku. The rebellion of 1968-69) was born.  
Political activities in this period had their origins in the quasi-autonomous 
situation of the early 1940s which culminated in the Republic. Converged effectively in 
the following decades, political activities concentrated in the northern areas of the 
 212 
 
Kurdish region, whereas political and cultural activism in the southern parts, which 
remained under the state control during these years, continued to be reshaped as socio-
economic and political modernisations of Iran persisted. Dispersion and prolonged 
incarcerations followed the demise of the Republic, symbolised by forced exile and Ghani 
Bilouriyan’s and Aziz Yousefi’s prison years.3 However, the remnants of Kumita-i 
Lawan-i Dimukrat or the Republic’s Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan’s (DPIK) 
Youth Organisation matured to form the backbone of a new reinvigorated group, 
reinforced later by many others in the 1950s and 1960s, including university students. In 
these years, DPIK owed its nominal existence to a few individuals and was mostly 
regarded as a regional branch of the Tudeh (masses) Party of Iran until after the 1953 
coup against Muhammad Musaddeq. Although for many DPIK members the Tudeh Party 
maintained its ideological and organisational significance, the expansion from the early 
1960s to the 1970s was concurrent with DPIK’s growing organisational independence 
and the demise of the influence of the Tudeh Party.4  
The Iraqi Revolution of 1958 and the waves of arrests in Iranian Kurdistan in 1959 
and 1963, which forced many to flee to Iraqi Kurdistan, were two important developments 
in the revival of Kurdish opposition. 5 According to prominent members of DPIK, in 1959 
500 activists were either arrested or fled to Iraqi Kurdistan; this was repeated in 1963.6 
According to Sa‘id Kawa Kwestani, who became a central figure in the reorganisation of 
the party in the early 1960s, the Iraqi Revolution of 1958 reinvigorated Kurdish dissent 
after it had experienced serious setbacks during the 1953 coup which was followed by the 
quelling of the peasant uprising in Iranian Kurdistan.7 However, this revival led to new 
                                                          
3 Cf. Hazhar, Cheshti Mijawir. 
4 Cf. Karim Hesami, Khaterate Karim Hesami [Karim Hesami's Memoirs] (Sweden: Arzan, 2011), 102-31. 
5 Muhammad Khezri, Laparayek La Tekoshan W Julanaway Salakani 42-47 Hezbi Dimukrati Kurdistan 
[A Page from the Struggle and Movement of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (1963-68)] (Sweden: n.p., 
2003), 13. 
6 Ibid., 13 and 26. 
7 Sa'id Kawa Kwestani, Awerrek La Basarhati Khom [Looking Back on My Life] (1996), Available at 
http://said.kurdland.com in PDF format, Accessed on 23 May 2018, 54-55. 
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waves of arrests and imprisonments as a result of which a considerable number of political 
activists escaped to Iraqi Kurdistan.8 
The Iraqi Revolution had strengthened the Kurdish movement in Iraq under 
Mustafa Barzani, subsequently creating a space for a group of Kurdish-Iranian activists, 
among them Ahmad Eshaqi (known as Ahmad Tawfiq), to try to rebuild DPIK in the 
early 1960s.9 Attached closely to Barzani, the arbitrary measures of Tawfiq shrank the 
size of this group in Iraqi Kurdistan and disillusioned others. Finally, in the aftermath of 
the party’s rather impromptu Second Congress in 1963, Tawfiq became increasingly 
isolated and then disappeared ‘mysteriously’ in the areas under the Barzani’s control—
he had allegedly met Iraqi officials secretly in Baghdad and this ‘betrayal’ apparently 
sealed his unfortunate fate. Simultaneously, there were other members who followed a 
different, more democratic path in a new international context. One member later 
described his colleagues’ ideological and political outlooks:  
 
These individuals were left-wing runak-biran [Ku. enlightened; roshan-fekran in 
Persian]. In those days [the 1960s] it was the left-wing forces which led and pioneered 
anti-imperialist and emancipatory movements in East Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
We might not have equaled such groups in theoretical capacity, but we passionately 
felt attached to the path [they followed].10  
 
Attempts to rebuild the party and expand political activities continued in trying 
circumstances but with determination. Distancing themselves gradually form Tawfiq, the 
majority of this group, reinforced by a new wave of sympathisers, who had fled the 
political suppression of 1963, organised in the form of small, armed groups which led 
excursions to the Kurdish region in Iran in order to reorganise cells and inspire political 
                                                          
8 Ibid. 
9 Khezri, Laparayek, 13. 
10 Ibid., 129. 
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actions. This continued until 1968 and led to military clashes with the gendarmerie on 
many occasions. In a delicate situation, the Shah’s dictatorship installed brutal political 
repression in the aftermath of the political instability of the early 1960s as a response to 
the Kurdish movement in Iraq, which had given Kurdish activists in Iran motivation to 
expand their activities. Inevitably, the political activities of this group based in Iraqi 
Kurdistan and their attempts to maintain the organisational structure of the party in Iranian 
Kurdistan involved armed excursions. However, they lacked any plan for pursuing a 
guerrilla war. Instead, they argued that they had to be armed to protect themselves and 
avoid capture. In contrast to the prevalent popular and academic assumptions that this 
group’s primary objective was to organise armed struggle,11 oral accounts and published 
memoirs present a more complex picture. It is true that the concept of ‘armed struggle’ 
constituted this generation’s ideological bearings and this is vividly reflected in Esmail 
Sharifzada’s letter to Karim Hesami, written towards the end of the 1960s, in which he 
points out that ‘today a revolutionary storm has engulfed the country [Iran] and people 
have come to the conclusion that the only way to freedom is to take up arms’.12 However, 
this statement refers more to a new opportunity to expand and continue the struggle rather 
than a collective and planned action in that direction. Moreover, the letter did not 
necessarily represent the group, the main aim of which was to reorganise the party cells 
and maintain political opposition. As Muhammad Khezri recalls, when 
 
Suleiman Mu‘eini and other members undertook an excursion [inside Iranian 
Kurdistan] […] the purpose of their trip was not to instigate an [armed] rebellion […] 
because they had a good understanding of the situation which was unfavourable. 
                                                          
11 Cf. Farideh Koohi-Kamali, The Political Development of Kurds in Iran (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 
168-71. Otherwise a valuable book, this book remains uniformed in this respect despite the availability of 
many contemporary accounts written by such activists. 
12 Hesami, Khaterat, 121. 
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They had to move back to Iran to avoid detention and extradition to Iran [by the 
Barzanis]’.13 
 
The absence of both a collective plan and intention to embark on armed struggle is 
confirmed by Sa‘id Kawa Kwestani who was a central figure in the Committee for the 
Reorganisation of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan in the early 1960s. Based on 
Kwestani’s autobiography, one can infer that for many years the main aims of their group 
were to reorganise the party and its cells in Iranian Kurdistan and resume political 
activities. Therefore, armed struggle never appears to gain any pivotal role in the group’s 
activism or political programme; firearms were carried merely for protection and used in 
self-defence.14 
Furthermore, unlike Fedayyan, who, believing that the small engine of the 
revolutionaries could stimulate the big engine of the working class or the general public, 
and attacked a gendarmerie in Siyahkal in northern Iran in February 1971, this Kurdish 
group never intended to carry out any planned armed activity. Indeed, except for 
eulogising the clashes, Kurdish texts never refer to any premeditated actions. Of course, 
dictatorship and the militarisation of Kurdistan, in addition to the existence of other 
Kurdish movements in the neighbouring countries, strengthened inclination towards 
armed struggle as a form of resistance, as there has always been a correlation between 
militarisation and armed struggle in modern Kurdish histories. Therefore, ‘armed 
struggle’ as an idea existed but its practice was stipulated by circumstances; it was never 
planned as ‘strategy or tactic’. As another illustration of this, when armed groups 
appeared more frequently in Iranian Kurdistan, Esmail Sharifzada appealed in another 
letter to Kurdish activists studying in universities across Tehran to join them;15 they 
                                                          
13 Khezri, Laparayek, 155. 
14 See Kwestani, Awerrek, 72-115. 
15 Biglari, Interview. 
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rejected the appeal. The group and their associates inside Iran were aware of the obstacles 
to expanding their overt political activities or transforming it into an organised armed 
struggle. For example, the population remained merely sympathetic because the fear of 
arrest, torture and execution was widespread. Jeldiyan detention centre, or the ‘slaughter 
house of Jeldiyan’ as it was known in those years, became notorious for its brutal 
treatment of detained Kurdish political activists.16 Therefore, we can conclude that, on 
the one hand, rather than eluding to a plan, the evidence refers to the popularity of armed 
struggle especially in a new worldwide context, for example, in the wake of the Cuban 
Revolution and because of the Vietnam War. On the other hand, based on oral history, 
the complexity of this issue simultaneously defies the notion of Kurdish opposition’s 
intrinsic proclivity to guerrilla warfare and undermines the state’s pretext of armed 
rebellion to suppress Kurdish political and cultural resistance in any forms. The state was 
especially sensitive to this situation, as it had experienced a formidable Kurdish peasant 
uprising in 1952-3 and had to intervene on behalf of the threatened Kurdish agha class; 
as comrades in arms they brutally suppressed the uprising.17 
 Moreover, the political situation of the end of the 1960s increased pressure on the 
Kurdish activists who were based in free zones under Barzani in Iraqi Kurdistan. The 
amiable relationship between the Kurdish movement in Iraq and the Iranian government, 
which was engaged in hostility with part of the Arab world, exacerbated the situation, 
effectively restraining the group’s activity with the effect that the Barzani movement 
detained and extradited some members of the group to SAVAK. Suleiman Mu‘eini came 
to symbolise the Barzani movement’s acts of detention and extradition. He was allegedly 
assassinated by those associated with the movement in May 1968 and his body was 
surrendered to Iranian authorities and publicly displayed in cities of Piranshar and 
                                                          
16 Khezri, Laparayek, 83. 
17 On the uprising see Hassanpour, "The Peasant Uprising". 
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Mahabad.18 The expansion of this group and its political activities forced the Iranian 
government to militarise especially the northern areas of the Kurdish region and deploy 
more troops to guard the border with Iraqi Kurdistan. Astonishingly, this was followed 
by the Iranian army’s encroachment onto Iraqi Kurdistan to arrest the activists.19 The 
‘Rebellion of 1968-9’ took form in such circumstances rather spontaneously.20  
At the same time, the Union of Kurdish Students in Tehran crystallised the 
characteristics of the Kurdish political movement of the 1960s. In fact, it was both the 
other pole of the group described above and a centre for Kurdish opposition. The Union 
was historically significant for two reasons: first, it reflected the reorganisation of Kurdish 
political activities around an urbanised, educated generation; second, it embodied an 
intellectual transformation in a broader context of the popularity of anti-imperialist, left-
wing and revolutionary ideas, leading to an explicit critique of armed struggle in favour 
of social revolution in the 1970s. However, the members of the Union faced political 
repression amid political instability in June 1963 with the effect that many of its members 
were detained when security forces raided Tehran University in Amirabad, while some 
others fled to join the group already in Iraqi Kurdistan.21 This marked practically the end 
of the Union.22 However, upon their release from prison a year or so later, many of the 
members resumed their political activities. According to a contemporary observer, ‘this 
was the time when in the middle of the 1960s left-wing and socialist ideas attracted more 
students in Tehran and Tabriz universities’ as new centres of intellectual activities.23 For 
example, students’ social perception was effectively shaped by Dr Amirhosain 
                                                          
18 See Khezri, Laparayek, 186-7. According to contemporary and eye witness accounts, in another incident 
in Iraqi Kurdistan in spring 1968, five members were arrested in a house in Alane village in a common 
operation by forces of the Barzani movement and the Iranian gendarmerie. Four were taken to Jeldiyan 
military base where they were tortured and then executed there or in the Kurdish city of Piranshar’s military 
base; the body of the fifth person called Ebrahim Dalawaiy (sur), who had been wounded in this raid and 
died later, was displayed in public in Piranshar. For this see ibid., 164-5. 
19 Ibid., 162-66. 
20 Ibid., 156. 
21 Biglari, Interview. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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Aryanpur’s sociology class in Tehran University.24 Furthermore, the political 
developments, e.g. the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, shaped political outlooks. By then, 
Marxist and socialist ideas alongside Kurdayeti became guiding principles for a growing 
population of Kurdish university students, inspiring the remnants of the Union to 
contemplate organisational and political actions.25 This was especially the case in the 
wake of the quelling of the group, although, for example, Kurdish activists from Tehran 
had pondered to join them when DPIK members had begun to appear more frequently in 
northern regions of Iranian Kurdistan between 1968 and 1969. However, they were 
discouraged by internal disagreements and ultimately by the news of the rebels’ capture 
or death.26  
The deaths of Esmail Sharifzada, Mala Awara, Mina Sham and Mu‘eini brothers, 
Suleiman and Abdulla, terminated what came to be known as shorresh-i sallakan-i 46-47 
[the rebellion of the years 1968-69]. However, for the Kurds they became legends, 
connected past and present, and inspired future generations. The termination of the 
rebellion was meant to be the start of a new era for the Kurdish political activism in Iran. 
 
1968-1979: the expansion of the urban, educated generation and intellectual transformations 
The legacy of the political activism of the 1960s, symbolised by the rebellion, lived on 
but a new era had begun around a critique of armed struggle too. Political activism of the 
post-1968 era is distinguished by two groups of political activists. The first group, which 
was still influenced by left-wing ideas, included those who were committed to rebuilding 
and re-organising DPIK, and its prominent members lived in exile.27 Inspired by the 
movement and with their main bases in universities, the second group committed 
                                                          
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid.  
27 The Third Party Conference of DPIK in June 1971 ratified the party’s programme. For this see Hesami, 
Khaterat, 129. 
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themselves to Marxism and social revolution. In fact, with more ideological and cultural 
connections with the outside world, the modernisation of Iran had created new 
possibilities for political action, this time around quite different organisational and 
political ideas: Marxism and the need for a communist party to prepare subjective 
conditions for the overthrow of capitalism and building of socialism by a (social) 
revolution, objective conditions of which, they believed, had become ripe.28 Revolutions, 
anti-colonial struggles and progressive movements around the world enhanced the 
credibility of such ideas, whereas the structural transformation of Kurdish society from a 
landowner-peasant economy or ‘feudalism’ into a capitalist-worker economic system 
‘necessitated’ new theoretical and practical approaches. While the second group of 
activists shared Marxist and socialist ideas with other left-wing forces such as Fedayyan, 
they differed from them by their explicit refutation of Fedayyans’ mash-e cheriki or armed 
struggle. Lastly, although unlike the rest of Iran the growing modern Kurdish opposition 
was mainly dominated by leftist and secular ideas, Westernisation of Iran also had its 
political implications for religion in the Sunni dominated Kurdish region. This came to 
be embodied in the political life of Ahmad Muftizada (see below).  
 With regard to political participation, as modernisation and urbanisation 
accelerated, giving form to new political and cultural desires, no means of political 
participation in Kurdistan was promoted. In contrast, during the 1970s, the state became 
increasingly personified in the Shah who stopped listening to critiques or proposals while 
more capable individuals were sidelined in favour of uncritical acolytes, thus 
undermining collective efforts to modernise Iran in a more democratic way. For example, 
uncritical Amir Abbas Hovaida replaced Mansour, assassinated in 1965, as Prime 
                                                          
28 Biglari, Interview; Bahman Sa'idi, Penj Sal Lagal Abdulla Muhtadi [Five Years with Abdulla Mohtadi] 
(Sulaymaniya: n.p., 2010); Bahman Sa'idi, Khabat Baraw Sarkawtin: Didarek Lagal Ebrahim 'Alizada 
[Struggle Towards Victory: A Meeting with Ebrahim Alizadeh] (Kurdistan: Komala Central Committee 
Publication, 2012); Sho'eib Zakaryayi, Tharikhe Bazandeh: Naqdi Bar Husein Moradbegi's Tarikhe 
Bazandeh [The Lost History: A Critical Review of Hossain Moradbegi's 'Living History'] (Sulaymaniya: 
Rawand, 2010). 
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Minister, while Abdulla Entezam, the chairman of National Iranian Oil Company, ‘who 
appreciated different opinions [and] a wise administrator […] of which there were too 
few in Iran’, was dismissed in the aftermath of June 1963 religious uprising29—he had 
advised in the presence of the Shah that ‘the will of people ought to be respected’.30 
Ideologically, based on historical myths an exclusively radicalised national perception of 
‘Iran’ was being promoted by grand gestures such as the outrageously expensive 2,500 
Celebration of Iranian monarchy in 1971. This, in turn, encouraged further linguistic 
purification in favour of Persian, leading to the sudden change of calendar in the mid-
1970s to reflect a historical monarchy. Thus, the cult of personality was complete, and 
the Shah had become saye-ye Khoda or God’s shadow on earth.31 
 As a result, nascent political participation of the Constitutional years, noted in 
Chapter 2, continued to regress, shaping the Kurdish society of the 1970s in which people 
were, to benefit from Henry Tudor’s insight on another topic, ‘either excluded from 
politics altogether or who [found] their participation so regulated as to be ineffective’.32 
The election of ineffective Kurdish members of Majlis (Iran’s Parliament) exemplified 
precisely such a situation. This was accompanied by means of coercion via both constant 
surveillance and detentions by SAVAK and the presence of the army and gendarmerie 
bases in cities and the countryside, respectively.  
In brief, the Kurdish opposition until 1979 included various groups whose 
political orientations were influenced by past events and current social changes with 
intellectual implications. Parallel with attempts to reorganise DPIK, a new group, the core 
of which came from Tehran and Tabriz universities, formed a new circle in 1968-9 which 
became the nucleus of the later influential Revolutionary Organisation of the Toilers of 
Iranian Kurdistan, popularly known as Komala (Ku. organisation). This was followed 
                                                          
29 See Farmanfarmaian and Farmanfarmaian, Blood and Oil, 382 and p. 54. 
30 Ibid., 370. 
31 Ibid., 395-401. 
32 Henry Tudor, Political Myth (London: Pall Mall Press, 1972), 138. 
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throughout the 1970s by new networks of political and social activists who were 
influenced by past events and ongoing ideological transformations. Such networks were 
significant both politically and historically because, in the aftermath of the 1979 February 
uprising, both the new DPIK and Komala emerged as the most influential modern 
political parties in Iranian Kurdistan; structurally, they were the amalgamation of such 
networks. For this reason, they became rapidly popular within a short time span. This was 
especially the case with the latter. 
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23. The Iranian army displays Sulaiman Mu'eini's body, 1968. 
 
The text reads: ‘Sulaiman Mu‘eini this is the outcome of 
treason’. 
Source: Ruwange Website, at 
http://ruwange.blogspot.co.uk/2010/04/blog-post_22.html, accessed 10 
May 2018. 
 
 
 
Esmail Sharifzada (1942-1968) 
 
 
A well-known figure in Mahabad, Sulaiman 
Mu‘eini (1933-1968) studied in Mahabad, Tehran 
and Tabriz. 
 
24. Kurdish university students in the 1960s. 
 
By the 1960s, the intellectual centre of modern Kurdish opposition moved to new Iranian universities.  
Kurdish university students in the University of Tehran, March 1964. Esmail Sharifzada (back row, right); the poet Swara 
Ilkhanizada (forth from right); and (second from right), Amir Hassanpour (1943-2017), who became a renowned professor of 
Kurdish studies.  
Source: Kurdipedia, at http://www.kurdipedia.org/?q=2010110717142710600&lng=8, access 10 May 2018.  
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CULTURAL CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNISATION 
In addition to the enrichment of cultural resources, the dual process strengthened 
difference in favour of a homogenising Persian culture and language. The proliferation of 
the new audio-visual means of communication in the era of the White Revolution added 
a new dimension to cultural encounters in Iran. This is analysed in the next section, 
followed by other sections which discuss ‘modernisation and secularisation’, intellectual 
transformations and the forms of cultural resistance.  
 
The mediasation of culture and the theory of cultural encounters in a multicultural nation-state  
As Pierre Bourdieu argues, culture as a symbolic system or structure, i.e. instruments of 
knowledge and communication [which] can exercise a structuring or symbolic power 
needed to construct reality,33 relies on corresponding social conditions and relations of 
power to produce and perpetuate meanings which serve indirectly or directly the interest 
of the dominant groups or classes.34 From this perspective, the era of the White 
Revolution profoundly impacted the existing social conditions and relations of power, the 
result of which was, in Gramscian sense, the cultural hegemony of Persian language and 
culture over non-Persian speaking peoples in Iran. As such, to borrow from Bourdieu, the 
dominant culture contributed to 
 
the legitimation of the established order by establishing distinctions (hierarchies) and legitimating 
these distinctions. The dominant culture produces this ideological effect by concealing the function 
of division beneath the function of communication: the culture which unifies (the medium of 
communication) is also the culture which separates (the instrument of distinction) and which 
legitimates distinctions by forcing all other cultures (designated as sub-cultures) to define 
themselves by their distance from the dominant culture.35 
                                                          
33 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 166; see also David 
Swartz, Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1997), 
Ch. 1. 
34 Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, Ch. 7. 
35 Ibid., 167.  
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 At the same time, as the symbolic system presents itself as a classification system which 
generates meaning through binary oppositions,36 the enduring bipolarity of Persian as 
mainstream or official and other cultures within Iran as local distinguishes the era in 
question. However, culture as a source of domination also shapes cultural resistance of 
the unprivileged, as in our case wherein the Kurds sought to improve their position.  
The intensification of modernisation in this era marked new ways of cultural 
encounters for which the proliferation of new means of mass communication, especially 
television and cinema, was pivotal. In this respect John Thompson’s analysis of this 
communicative phenomenon, which characterises modern culture, provides great 
methodological insights. New means of communication serve to ‘reorganise and 
reconstitute social interaction’ and for Thompson this is precisely the significance of the 
deployment of technical media.37 Thompson explains mass communication as a site for 
the operation of ideology in modern societies and defines ‘ideological phenomena as 
meaningful symbolic forms in so far as they serve […] to establish and sustain relations 
of domination’.38 However, while this approach rightly invites extensive studies on the 
relation between ideology and mass communication in Kurdish-Iranian society, I focus 
on the way the framework for social interaction was transformed, for example, when radio 
and then especially television and cinema were institutionalised and spread in Iran in the 
second half of the twentieth century. Furthermore, Thompson formulates his thesis of ‘the 
mediasation of culture’ in contrast to the theses of secularisation and rationalisation of 
social life because, according to him, it is the mediasation of culture ‘which provides the 
principal frame of reference’ to analyse ideology in modern societies.39 The proliferation 
of new means of communication involves the transformation of individuals’ social 
                                                          
36 Swartz, Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, 84. 
37 Thompson, Ideology, 225. 
38 Ibid., 265. 
39 Ibid. 
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interaction, their perceptions of the world as well as the reorganisation of the relationship 
between the state and society. Benefiting from new means of communication, the era of 
the White Revolution transformed cultural encounters of Iranians with the outside world 
but just as crucially it transformed cultural encounters between various culturally distinct 
communities within Iran, resulting in the establishment of Persian cultural hegemony. 
The theory which is developed here considers the establishment of cultural hegemony of 
one community over many other communities that shared historical interactions and 
geographical proximity. For this peculiar situation, any cultural analysis methodology 
needs to take into account cultural encounters which are not colonial or imperial. Cultural 
critics of colonialism or Westernisation of culture, e.g. in Iran during the White 
Revolution, shed light on cultural encounters in direct or indirect colonial contexts where 
‘cultural/historical/racial difference’ is fixed by the discourse of colonialism,40 or where 
‘nativism’ is revoked in the wake of cultural onslaught of the alien. 41 Simultaneously, 
cultural critics have been concerned with the role of culture in the formation of modern 
nation.42 This said, the question of cultural encounters in the Middle East between related 
cultures has been largely overlooked by cultural and postcolonial studies which 
nevertheless provide a repository for a variety of critical practices which are 
methodologically significance for a study of cultural encounters in the nation-state of 
Iran. Studies on themes such as representation, power and knowledge, cultural 
production, resistance and diaspora provide theoretical foundations for cultural studies in 
Iran because there are similarities between colonial and non-colonial contexts, for 
example, in forms of control, legitimising ideologies or forms of resistance (see Figure 
26).43 
                                                          
40 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), 66. 
41 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage Books, 1994), 276. 
42 Cf. Bhabha, Nation and Narration. 
43 For more on these themes see Bill Ashcroft, Post-Colonial Transformation (New York: Routledge, 
2001); and on post-colonial studies see Bill Ashcroft et al. (eds), The Post-Colonial Studies Reader  (New 
York: Routledge, 1995). 
 226 
 
However, such a study requires to go beyond, for example, post-colonial studies 
and focus on a multi-cultural, non-colonial context in order to present more productive 
analyses of cultural encounters of interrelated cultures in the age of visual media and 
avoid clichés. A close analogy to Kurdish and Persian cultural encounter is perhaps that 
between Ireland and the British Empire. However, an assessment of this example 
highlights more differences than similarities with the nature of cultural encounters within 
Iran. Finally, in what follows, the argument regarding Persian and Kurdish cultural 
encounters in a non-colonial context is pursued alongside a brief account of the 
emergence of the new means of communication and their impacts on cultural interaction 
in Iran.  
Both in perception and in cultural and economic practices, the state’s nationalism 
throughout the era of the White Revolution radicalised towards creating its perceived 
monolithic Iranian civilisation. Technical modernisation exposed Iranians to a 
westernised way of life and worldview, which enjoyed a worldwide cultural superiority. 
However, while within Persian culture the state’s westernising modernisation evoked 
ideological reactions from an increasingly politicised Islam, which claimed to defend 
religion and cultural purity, and from socialist ideology, which criticised social inequality, 
electronic media simultaneously served to establish the hegemony of Persian culture in 
relation to other non-Persian communities; this is the flipside of cultural modernisation 
in those decades. Contemporary nativist and socialist critics were not concerned with 
cultural homogenisation even when their critiques of modernisation and capitalism 
expanded to include other ethnic communities. There are exceptions, but they are limited 
in scope. For example, in his Tarikh-e Mozakkar [Pe. Masculine History], written towards 
the end of the 1960s, the renowned cultural critic Reza Barahani drew attention to ‘the 
relationship between the Persian language and local languages’ because the latter, 
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according to him, also formed part of Iranian identity.44 Barahani claimed that ‘the official 
language of Iran is Persian, which is right and justified. If someone denies this, you can 
have him hanged. But you cannot deny the local languages of Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, 
Gilan and Mazandaran’.45 Barahani was mainly concerned with a relentless 
Westernisation of culture in general, which also tended to harm local music and 
languages. He made a mockery of the education system by saying that ‘from the very first 
moment the pupil wants to become an American’.46 Discussing non-Persian speaking 
students, he then reminds his readers that ‘this [Persian] language is not the pupil’s mother 
tongue language the learning of which compulsory, but an additional language, an official 
and state language, which must be learnt by the pupil’.47  Criticism of the inferior position 
of ‘local’ languages, i.e. mother tongues, surfaced in the works of other intellectuals and 
writers. For example, Jalal Ale Ahmad, a renowned Iranian writer who popularised the 
concept of ‘Westoxication’, was also concerned with the state’s homogenising language 
policies which, according to him, had no regard for local languages.48 
Regarding socialist literature, the output of Samad Behrangi (1939-1967), famous 
for his children’s literature, did not surpass the duality of official and local, and instead 
remained confined to the boundaries of class and class disparity.49 Language was not 
discussed in relation to the cultural transformation Iran was experiencing at the time; for 
Behrangi language only reflected reality: ‘language is connected to reality (Nezam-e 
hastiy [Pe. the order of existence]) through ideas’.50 Therefore, in the age of grand 
narratives, including the socialist outlook with the singularity of ‘class’ as the primary 
conceptual and organisational category, Behrangi was not attracted to nativism or the 
                                                          
44 Barahani, Tarikhe Mozakkar, 105-06. 
45 Ibid., 106. 
46 Ibid., 110. 
47 Ibid., 110. 
48 Ibid., 13. 
49 Cf. Asad Behrangi (ed.), Namehaye Samad Behrangi [Samad Behrangi's Letters] (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 
1357 [1979]); Samad Behrangi, Qessehaye Behrang [Behrang's Stories] (Tehran: Donya, 1359 [1980]). 
50 Asad Behrangi (ed.), Majmu'e Assare Samad Behrangi [Samad Behrangi's Collected Works] (Tabriz: 
Behrangi, 1382 [2005]), 67. 
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issue of cultural purity but was concerned with social injustice, which he criticised 
through his pedagogical literature. Furthermore, while, unlike the above-mentioned 
cultural critics, Behrangi was not concerned with cultural encounters or ‘Westernisation’, 
he nevertheless shared their avoidance of studies of the transformation of cultural 
relations between Iranian societies. 
These examples, therefore, crucially demonstrate how difference is differently 
institutionalised in colonial and multicultural, non-colonial nation-state contexts. In the 
former, difference tends to be based on racial ideologies, whereas in the latter and in an 
Iranian context, difference is developed based on the dichotomy of ‘mainstream’ and 
‘local’, which is then shaped and maintained mainly by various ideas of cultural 
superiority and inferiority rather than racial difference. The hegemonic quality that needs 
to be noted here is that the idea of ‘Persian as an official and state language’ had become 
common sense. In contrast to the earlier eras when Persian was praised and learned by, 
for example, Kurdish literates for its literary qualities, it had now acquired an official and 
state status, demonstrating a decisive cultural break with the past. 
The conspicuous absence of studies on cultural encounters within Iran was another 
aspect of the contemporary literary journals such as those published by various 
universities’ faculties of literature between 1960 and 1979. For example, a glance at the 
journal of Tehran’s Faculty of Literature, Nashriye-ye Daneshkade-ye Adabiyat-e 
Tehran, and those of Tabriz and Mashhad, reveals two prevalent trends of the time. First, 
Iranian (culture and language) and Persian are used interchangeably with the effect that 
the latter is consistently confirmed as Iran’s core linguistic and cultural element around 
which other Iranian cultures orbit. In a speech on the preservation of the Persian language 
in the summer of 1959, Sa‘id Nafisi (1985-1966), an internationally renowned literary 
figure for his immense contribution to Persian literature and a prolific writer, stressed 
how language [in this case Persian] was the most important tool for any modern nation, 
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urging everyone to regard its ‘preservation and expansion as their most important national 
duty’.51 The second trend bears on the absence of ‘Kurdish literature’ (and other non-
Persian literatures) as a field of study or as a literary subject, a trend vividly represented 
by contemporary literary journals. For instance, throughout the 1960s and 1970s Tehran 
University’s journal discussed the Kurdish language to a very limited extent, mostly in 
conjunction with ‘gouyesh-haye Irani’ (Pe. Iranian dialects).52 While researchers were 
willing to warn against the threat of the extinction of the dialects, they did not forget to 
emphasise, for example, that ‘among Iranian languages, the Persian language has a 
sublime status (maqam-e arjomand). This great language represents a brilliant civilisation 
and in its own right is unique in the world’.53  
However, culture as a source of domination also shapes the cultural resistance of 
the unprivileged, as in the current case wherein the Kurds sought to improve their 
position. The systematic promotion of Persian’s cultural supremacy was paralleled by the 
promotion of Kurdish literature by the notable contribution of several Kurdish students 
or scholars of Kurdish literature, for example, Qadir Fattahi Qazi, ‘Ubaidulla Ayyubiyan 
and ‘Abdulhamid Huseini. This group admirably continued to write interesting articles 
on Kurdish folklore, epics, poetry and culture for Tabriz University’s Faculty of 
Literature during the period. Ayyubiyan provided across many issues of the journal a 
translated version of Ahmad Khani’s Mam u Zin [Mam and Zin], classifying it as chiryka 
or, according to him, an epic story.54 This remained, however, an example of residual, 
tolerated culture, and not emergent culture, because the Mam u Zin of the mid-seventeenth 
century is written in Kurdish, and distinguishes the Kurds as a people with a distinct 
                                                          
51 Ziyaedin Sajjadi, "Sa'id Nafisi and Shenasandane Farhange Iran," [Sa'id Nafisi and Introducing the 
Culture of Iran], Nashriyeye Adabiyat wa Olume Ensanie Daneshkadeye Tehran 14, No. 3 (1967), 363. 
52 Cf. Dr Bahram Frewshi, "Zabanhaye Irani Dar Kharej Az Iran," [Iranian Languages Outside of Iran], 
Nashriye Adabiyate Daneshkade Tehran 12, No. 3-4 (1344 [1965]); Dr Mansur Ekhtiyar, "Shiweye 
Barresiye Guyeshha," [The way to Analyse Dielects], Nashriyeye Adabiyate Daneshkadeye Tehran 12, No. 
2 (1343 [1964]). 
53 Frewshi, "Zabanhaye Irani Dar Kharej Az Iran", 326. 
54 Cf. 'Ubeidulla Ayyubiyan, "Barresiye Tahqiqie Chiryka Mam U Zin," [An Analysis of Mam and Zin 
Epic Story], Nashriyeye Adabiyate Daneshkadeye Tabriz 13, No. 2 (1340 [1961]). 
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history and language. Other topics discussed articles by included a Kurdish calendar, 
which was presented in conjunction with, and not in contrast to, an Iranian calendar (see 
Figure 25).55 Along with the work of several other contributors, this group’s contribution 
to such literary journals continued throughout the 1970s. Yet however concerted their 
efforts were to draw literary attention to Kurdish literature and culture, their works 
remained limited in scope and reach, lacked institutional support and, thematically, did 
not transcend an aesthetic analysis of Kurdish literature; they were residual, and mostly 
introductions to the literature.56  
Other journals of the era of the White Revolution such as Sokhan (Pe. Speech), 
which claimed to be a literary, scientific and social monthly journal, and Rahnemay-e 
Ketab (Pe. Book Guide), which was a monthly journal of language and literature, research 
on Iranology and book review run by prominent literary figures such as Iraj Afshar. 
Developing a core cultural and linguistic position counter to other cultures in Iran, Persian 
literature was institutionally elevated. This was achieved not only through modern, 
including higher, education, but also with the support of the new means of 
communication. Prior to the foundation of radio broadcasting, Nafisi informed others in 
September 1939 that 
 
[I] had been assigned by the Commission of Radio to collect articles on the history and geography 
of Iran […] Because radio was one of the means to disseminate and propagate language and culture 
and an important factor in introducing Persian literature […] since its inception, I have regarded 
radio as a target of [my] scientific and cultural services.57   
 
                                                          
55 'Ubeidulla Ayyubiyan, "Taqwime Mahalliye Kurdi," [The Kurdish Local Calendar], Nashriyeye 
Adabiyate Daneshkadeye Tabriz 16, No. 2 (1343 [1964]). 
56 Qader Fattahi Qazi, "Chand Baite Kurdi," [Some Kurdish Couplets], Nashriyeye Adabiyate 
Daneshkadeye Tabriz [the Journal of the University of Tabriz Faculty of Literature ]  16, No. 3 (1343 
[1964]). 
57 Sajjadi, "Sa'id Nafisi", 361. 
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Moreover, in a couple of years Nafisi started his Az Yaddashtha-ye Yek Ostad (Pe. 
Notes from a Master) radio programme and then contributed to another programme 
called Marzha-ye Danesh (Pe. the Boundaries of Knowledge). 
Within Kurdish society, the modernisation had produced a new generation of 
Kurdish cultural and political activists who challenged cultural barriers and endeavoured 
to promote Kurdish literature, crucially by adopting new cultural ideas. Yet dictatorship 
would put effective restraints on this generation’s cultural productions. The 
intellectualism of the Persian, non-state literary journals, evolved around a literature 
which enjoyed a hegemonic status elevated systematically by the state through education 
and the manipulation of the new means of communication. This does not mean that those 
who run literary journals ignored other literatures’ capacities intentionally, or based their 
literary and intellectual presuppositions on acrimonious narratives. The reason for the 
marginalisation of other non-Persian literatures was that comparative or cross-cultural 
analysis they considered outside the purview of their programmes and publications.  
Furthermore, we need to bear in mind centuries of reciprocal relationships 
between Persian and Kurdish literatures and cultures in order to identify mutual benefits 
each took when one had begun to explore new literary grounds. Throughout the medieval 
period and the early modern times Persian language had been functioning as a lingua 
franca and formed the basis for religious schools’ curriculum, whereas multilingual 
Kurdish poetry, in contrast to modern, monolingual poetry, emerged throughout the 
Kurdish region under the suzerainties of the Ottoman and Iranian Empires. Persian 
literary credentials, combined with political marginalisation of pre-modern Kurdish 
societies in the Kurdish Emirates or Principalities, helped Persian to continue its higher 
literary status in the modern nation-state of Iran. It then received state’s political support 
and became hegemonic in the process of the homogenisation. For the nation-state, 
modernity resulted in nationalisation of history and culture based on distinctive history 
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and language as two ideological components of nationalism. In this context, an Iranian 
national narrative, which continued to use ‘Iranian’ and ‘Persian’ interchangeably, shaped 
the Persian literary giants’ literary works.58 Nevertheless, the works of likes of Nafisi 
inspired Kurdish scholars. 
                                                          
58 Sa‘id Nafisi’s literary works included (national) historiography. Cf. Sa'id Nafisi, Tarikhe Ejtema'i Wa 
Siyasiye Iran Dar Doreye Mo'aser [The Social and Political History of Modern Iran] (Tehran: Ahoura, 
1383 [2004]), first published in the summer of 1956; Sa'id Nafisi, Babak Khorramdin (Tehran: Asatir, 1384 
[2005]), first published in 1954. 
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25. ‘Ubeidulla Ayyubiyan’s Kurdish Calendar. 
 
In this calendar, Ayyubiyan presents the names of the months in ancient languages of Avesta, ancient 
Persian, Syriac, Arabic and modern Kurdish and Persian. Different Kurdish names of the months in 
this calendar are proposed by six Kurdish authors of whom E. Bizhan’s proposed names (the fourth 
column from right) have become established Kurdish (Sorani) names of month. Source: The Journal of 
Tabriz University’s Faculty of Literature (in Persian), No. 2, 1964. 
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An exclusive literature 
Thematically, as mentioned above, in the era of the White Revolution cultural critics 
across Iran were mainly distinguished by their treatments of two cultural and social 
aspects of their society: (1) what they assumed to be Westernisation of ‘Iranian culture’, 
reflected in nativist literature or in other literature which criticised rapid cultural changes, 
and (2) growing social and class disparities, reflected mainly in socialist literature. To 
this, one must add a state-sponsored or ‘royalist’ trend towards promoting the modern 
Iranian nation and state. This trend was represented, for example, by the monthly journal 
of Gowhar [Pe. Essence] dedicated to the literature, art, history, and culture of Iran, 
published by Bonyad-e Nikukariy [Pe. The Centre for Charity] since winter 1973; and 
Barresihay-e Tarikhi (Pe. Historical Analyses), published interestingly by the army’s 
higher command, Setad-e Bozorg Arteshdaran, from the summer of 1966.  
A common characteristic of these critiques and publications was their emphasis 
on the significance of the Persian language and ‘Iranian’ (Persian) culture in conspicuous 
exclusion of studies of other languages and cultures in modern Iran. Their literary 
attitudes were at best sympathetic but also culturally incorporative, i.e. Kurdish literature 
was allowed to be practiced to the extent that it did not challenge the status of Persian 
literature. There were no rigid literary or institutional instructions to prevent the practice 
of Kurdish literature but rather boundaries shaped and reshaped by hegemony. The 
literature in Persian continued to be more widespread and incorporative, producing 
knowledge to represent Persian’s national and official status, whereas Kurdish literature 
was devoid of such a strategy and platform. Subsequently what is Kurdish was 
represented by an exclusive literature, revealing that the scope of the practice of Kurdish 
literature remained within the boundaries of hegemonic culture, on the one hand, and was 
determined consensually rather than coercively, on the other, becasue Persian was 
increasingly perceived as superior, thereby reducing other literatures to the less literary 
statuses of mahalli or ‘local’ and of guyesh or ‘dialect’. Based on the contents of various 
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journals published by Iranian universities’ faculties of literature, Kurdish literature found 
itself effectively in the shadow of Persian literature, whereas sympathetic attitudes 
towards Kurdish literature were either promotive or conservative—‘Kurdish literature’ 
was a phrase used mainly by the Kurdish students of literature and not by, for example, 
those in charge of the influential literary journals or responsible for the educational 
curriculum. Therefore, the hegemony of Persian culture created a condition where, to 
borrow from Raymond Williams, ‘residual’ (Kurdish) cultural forms faced massive 
barriers to become ‘emergent’, i.e. to create new forms to challenge that which was 
accepted as the norm.59 ‘Massive barriers’ were invisible cultural perceptions, informed 
by the idea of the superiority of Persian culture, which as a hegemonic culture was not 
the culture of an outsider, the alien  other, as was the case with cultural encounters in a 
colonial context. It was a familiar/partner culture in relation to which, to borrow from 
Homi K. Bhabha, ‘in-between’ spaces had continued to produce hybridity and blur 
cultural boundaries for centuries.60  
The new means of communication significantly changed this situation because, in 
addition to the state’s political authority and modern education, they constituted the 
mechanisms needed to ensure Persian cultural hegemony. In an age of widespread 
illiteracy, the introduction of radio and, crucially, the visualisation of broadcasting added 
a different dimension to culture in general and to modern cultural encounters in particular. 
A significant effect of this process was the transformation of the framework for social 
interaction. Giving primacy to these modes of communication does not imply that the 
written modes such as the above-mentioned journals were insignificant. However, the 
written mode cannot be placed in a simplified cause and effect relationship with the 
establishment of the cultural hegemony of Persian because, first and foremost, they 
reflected a hegemonic process of which they were crucial parts. In contrast, audio and 
                                                          
59 Raymond Williams, Problems in Materialism and Culture (London: Verso, 1980), 40-41. 
60 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 1-18. 
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visual media, although, according to Williams, described misleadingly as ‘mass’ 
communication, enabled the ‘transmission [of cultural products] to individual homes’,61 
thus obviating the need for both the corporeal presence of the producer and the literacy 
skills of the receiver as a prerequisite. 
  
                                                          
61 Raymond Williams, Television (New York: Routledge, 1974), 17. Interestingly for this study focusing 
on the same period, in the early 1970s Williams conducted research in the United States ‘to describe the 
relationship between television as a technology and television as a cultural form’. Ibid., p. xiv. As a result, 
Television discussed how TV as a cultural product had become a vital part of American culture. 
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26. Cultural encounters in colonial and nation-state contexts: similarities and differences. 
Colonial Contexts     A Multicultural, Nation-State Context (Iran) 
 
Conquest 
Maintaining the coloniser’s presence 
Mechanisms of (modern) 
cultural encounters 
 
 
Modern education 
Written modes of communication 
Audio and visual means of 
communication 
Physical presence of the state 
 
Economic (natural resources, market, free 
labour) 
Maintaining the Empire’s international and 
regional positions 
Motivation  
Political: the integration of the state 
National: safeguarding the superiority of 
the core-ethnocultural group 
Territorial 
 
Domination over the natives through 
institutional and administrative control 
Exclusion 
Coercion 
Exploitation (Congo; the New World) 
Militarisation 
Forms of control  
Rule over the natives through institutional 
and administrative control 
Exclusion 
Coercion 
Militarisation 
Psychological pressure, e.g. by linking 
political demands to foreign desires 
 
The Civilising Mission 
Rejuvenation of stagnant cultures 
Neo-colonialism 
Legitimising ideologies   
Discourses of national unity and 
territorial integrity 
Safeguarding the monarchy/Islam 
Reading natives into the national 
Mainstream versus local (culture) 
 
Racial superiority 
Scientific superiority 
Intellectual/philosophical superiority 
Technological superiority 
Elements of cultural superiority  
Persian linguistic and literary superiority 
Monarchical and imperial pedigree 
Political centralisation 
Monopolisation of education and new 
means of communication 
Monopolisation of the idea of ‘nation’, 
e.g. the idea of ‘Iran’, to serve the core-
ethnocultural community 
Marginalisation of other cultures 
Restricting others’ access to cultural 
capital 
 
Resistance to imperialism as culturally and 
‘racially’ an alien force 
Nationalism 
Non-violent/non-cooperation resistance 
War of independence 
International alliance 
Literary resistance 
The practice of culture 
Forms of resistance  
Resistance to an exclusive state 
Nationalism 
Armed struggle 
Cross-ethnic revolutionary activism 
Literary resistance 
The practice and production of culture, 
e.g. music 
 
Industrialisation to maximise economic 
exploitation and facilitate effective colonial 
administration (e.g. rail way; factories) 
Destruction of the native economy (e.g. 
spinning and weaving in India) 
Consumerism 
 
 
 
Economic attitudes   
Economic deprivation to prevent 
economic empowerment (e.g. Iranian 
Kurdistan, 1921-present) 
Unequal modernisation and the absence 
of planned, regional development 
programmes 
Unequal distribution of cultural capital, 
hindering cultural production 
 
 
Post-colonial state 
Indirect colonisation (neo-colonialism) 
through economic, cultural and political 
means 
Maintaining scientific and technological 
superiorities 
Imposed colonial relationships transform into 
new conditions such as neo-coloniality or 
dependency 
Postcolonial 
conditions/globalisation-
localisation 
 
Increased demands for structural, 
educational and administrative reforms 
(e.g. today’s Iran) & for cultural rights 
The idea of local autonomy to empower the 
‘native’ to manage institutions 
Modernisation strengthens existing 
historical, socio-economic and cultural 
bonds between culturally distinct 
societies and creates new ones 
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The proliferation of the audio and visual means of communication 
The outbreak of the Second World War coincided with an increase in both radio sets and 
radio broadcasting in Iran. In addition to audio and written modes, visual modes of 
communication such as television and cinema, and the number of consumers, had 
considerably increased by the middle of the 1970s. In 1973 there were 424 cinemas in 
Iranian urban centres.62 According to Amanat , ‘filmfarsi competed with foreign imports, 
both Hollywood and Indian productions, in offering entertainment and moral messages 
customized for Iranian popular tastes’.63 In 1965 more than two million viewers saw 
Ganj-e Qarun (Qarun’s Treasure) movie.64  Prior to this, the most important development 
had been the addition of radio in 1935 to the existing oral and written modes of 
communication. As discussed in the previous chapters, linguistic homogenisation had 
effectively restrained publications in Kurdish. However, pervasive illiteracy across Iran 
meant that only a limited number of people could benefit from the written modes. 
Therefore, radio compensated not only for this deficiency, but also connected the 
individual to the outside world, and the radio set became a luxury in both urban and rural 
areas. However, the unequal modernisation of Iran also sustained the technological chasm 
between the two areas in the Kurdish region with the effect that most of the rural 
population remained effectively deprived of not only television, cinema and telephone 
but written modes of communication, too, even into the 1970s.  
In 1977, according to Jahangir Amuzegar, a contemporary economist, 
 
Radio Iran covers 85 per cent of the population [and] Recent technological breakthroughs in 
transistorizing communications devices have been directly instrumental in bringing radio to 
most remote towns and villages. There are now more than three million receivers in the 
country, serving an audience of about 29 million.65 
                                                          
62 Plan and Budget Organisation, Statistical Yearbook of Iran 1352 [March 1973 - March 1974], 143. 
63 Amanat, Iran: A Modern History, 684. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Amuzegar, Iran: An Economic Profile, 125. 
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Amuzegar highlights as a positive development the key cultural role of radio when its use 
achieved such an unprecedented scale: 
 
As a result of the widespread popularity of radio in Iran, it has come to be increasingly 
utilized for public education […] More important, it has played a key role in 
preserving and promoting traditional Iranian music and culture. In the meantime, by 
using Western programs, it has also been instrumental in funnelling Western 
knowhow and technology to Iranian society.66 
 
Indeed, the role of radio in public education was seminal. For example, according to 
contemporary observers, in the early 1960s ‘all available radio broadcasting, including 
[Kurdish] Radio Sanandaj, were instrumental in promoting public knowledge on matters 
concerning, for example, agriculture, animal husbandry and hygiene.67 Indeed, local radio 
stations which broadcast in Kurdish had been founded in the early 1960s culminating in 
‘the foundation of Radio Kermanshah which engaged with Kurdish poetry, music and 
theatre’.68 According to another account, with a critical view of Westernisation, ‘between 
1335 and 1350 [1956 and 1971], Radio Sanandaj functioned satisfactorily until the quality 
of its programmes began to decline because of widespread decadence across Iran’.69 
Although the latter account engages with ‘decadence’ to undermine the modernisation 
efforts, retrospectively it highlights the religious criticism of modernisation. 
                                                          
66 Ibid. 
67 Mustafasultani, Interview. 
68 Biglari, Interview. 
69 Ayazi, Sanandaj, 727. Radio Sanandaj was set up by army personnel and broadcast for one hour per 
week. Wireless was used to ‘broadcast army news and local music using loudspeakers. People gathered in 
front of the army base to listen. More advance broadcasting began a few years later, increasing the length 
of broadcasting from three to four hours per week to 24 hour a day when many individuals began to 
contribute to the programme. At least until the early 1970s, its most notable aspect was Kurdish music’. 
Ibid., 724-26.  
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Kurdish radio programmes were the outcomes of two concurrent processes: firstly, 
Kurdish cultural activists’ continuous endeavours to benefit from the new means of 
communication; secondly, as discussed below, the state’s policy to exploit such means to 
maintain its authority. Whatever the aim of the state, new means of communication, such 
as radio, satisfied cultural needs to some extent and encouraged poets and writers to 
benefit.70 As an illustration of this, the aim of Radio Kurdish Kermanshah, which had 
taken over Radio Tehran’s Kurdish programme, 
 
was [to promote the Kurdish movement in] Iraqi Kurdistan [in the 1960s] because of 
the ongoing conflict between Iran and Iraq. However, the literary individuals, who 
were employed [to run the programme], aimed at promoting Kurdish culture and 
language instead. The poet, Swara Ilkhanizada was an example. Teahouses in 
Kurdish cities were packed with people who had come to listen to radio.71 
 
The revolutionising effect of the emergence and the expansion of visual transmitting 
technology should not undermine the role radio played as an audio means of 
communication before and after the emergence of the visual means of communications 
for two reasons. First, when expanded, radio also revolutionised communication in a 
society which was characterised by widespread illiteracy and a predominantly rural 
population. Before the introduction of radio, itinerant literary figures like Qane‘, 
encountered in Part I, travelled and spread knowledge eliciting their recipients’ responses 
in many ways. For example, more interested in oral and written skills, people became 
more aware of the world, presumably affecting their social interaction.72 Secondly, the 
                                                          
70 Mustafasultani, Interview. 
71 Biglari, Interview. Radio Kurdish Tehran was founded as a result of efforts by prominent Kurdish 
individuals such as Shokrolla Baban and Mr Situdeh, a teacher of literature. Ibid. 
72 Such literary figures or social and political activists of later decades remained influential especially where 
written, audio and visual means of communication were not available. Another figure is undoubtedly Mala 
Awara (Mala Ahmad Shalmashi, 1934-68), mentioned above. 
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availability of Kurdish broadcasting in neighbouring Iraq naturally attracted attention 
from Iranian Kurds partly for their limited knowledge of Persian and partly as they looked 
elsewhere for cultural resources. This enhanced the Kurds’ interest in Kurdish culture and 
their desire for news about the Kurdish movement in that country too. The relatively free 
practice of the Kurdish language in modern Iraq, allowed for political reasons, discussed 
in Part I, and probably the desires of successive Iraqi governments to appeal to Iranian 
Kurds, made Radio Kurdish Baghdad very popular. According to several oral history 
accounts, Radio Baghdad broadcast the works of prominent poets such as Goran, and this 
had cultural impact on the listeners, who also reacted to broadcasts of political writings, 
news from Vietnam, China and Cuba, and even to obituaries. An example of this was 
[Radio Baghdad’s] commemoration of Che Guevara after he had been captured and then 
executed [in Bolivia] in 1967.73  
Moreover, using Kurdish as a political tool in the tension between Iran and the 
Arab world, Radio Cairo also broadcast in Kurdish memorably the song Azhdahak along 
with other Kurdish songs by the famous Kurdish singer, Salih Dilan.74 Written modes too 
fell victim to this tension. In retaliation, the Iranian government founded the Kurdistan 
newspaper in the 1960s, targeting Kurds in Iraq, which mirrored regional clashes of 
interest. However, Kurdish literary activists used the paper to promote Kurdish culture 
by publishing Kurdish poems and articles, in the same way that, for example, Amir 
Hassanpour, the future professor of Kurdish language and history, participated in Swara 
Ilkhanizada’s regular series Tapo w Boomalell (The Shadow and the Misty Land) on 
Tehran Kurdish Radio.75 Simultaneously, Radio Kurdish Kermanshah managed to elicit 
                                                          
73 Biglari, Interview; Amini, Interview, Kaiwan, Interview 
74 Biglari, Interview. 
75 Ibid. The editor of Kurdistan was Muhammad Sediq Muftizadeh and its owner was ‘Abdulhamid 
Ba‘idulzamani, a professor of Arabic. It is believed that Pezhman, a SAVAK employee in Tehran, was 
responsible for the Kurdish section of Radio Tehran. Ibid. Swara Ilkhanizada (1937-1976) was a gifted poet 
whose life was cut short in a tragic car accident. He graduated from Tehran University in 1968 with a degree 
in law and worked at the Kurdish service of Radio Tehran since 1968. 
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responses from different parts of the Kurdish region. Indeed, its Karwan-i She‘r w Musiqa 
(Ku. the Caravan of Poetry and Music), broadcast at the end of the 1960s, was so popular 
that, as a teacher recalls, ‘we [as listeners] participated by sending pieces of Kurdish 
poetry, and poets such as Fateh Muhammadi contributed by sending their poetry’.76  
 Therefore, although indirectly promoted by the state, radio broadcasting in 
Kurdish in Iran played a crucial role in advancing Kurdayeti. Individuals began to 
interact, albeit in a one-way communication, regardless of time and space. Although the 
implications of this new form of interaction were manifold, radio primarily transformed 
the recipients’ perceptions of the world. According to eyewitness accounts, returning 
seasonal workers brought radio sets back to their villages during the 1970s, in this way, 
connecting the village to the outside world by increasing the availability of technology.77 
Its first impact was the instigation of regular daily meetings of village inhabitants around 
the radio at specific times to listen to, for example, Radio BBC-Persian, Radio Tehran or 
Radio Baghdad. The state utilised radio to exert political influence and pursue its 
homogenising policies. However, this elicited cultural resistance to preserve Kurdish 
culture and language and thus radio promoted Kurdish identity, too. 
 
Television and Cinema 
Television stations were first established in Iran as private ventures. The Iranian 
government granted concessions to private companies which established the first 
television broadcasting systems in Tehran in 1958 and Abadan in 1960. State owned 
organisations followed suit, leading to the centralisation of television broadcasting by the 
early 1970s:78  
 
                                                          
76 Amini, Interview. 
77 Ibid. 
78 On this see Amuzegar, Iran: An Economic Profile, 125; Hamid Nafisi, "Cinema as a Political Instrument," 
in Ali M. Ansari (ed.), Politics of Modern Iran (New York: Routledge, 2011), 192. 
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In 1966 the state owned National Iranian TV was inaugurated. Later on, the government 
purchased the two private stations […] and established the Iran National Iranian Radio 
Organization, an independent agency to the government. In 1971 the two independent radio 
and television organizations were merged into one administrative unit called the National 
Iranian Radio Television Organisation (NIRT), to speed up and facilitate balanced expansion 
of the mass communications networks in the country.79 
 
The number of major television production and transmission centres increased to 15 by 
1976. Of these, two were stationed in Tehran and the rest were stationed in provincial 
centres or cities, including one in each of the predominantly or partly Kurdish cities of 
Sanandaj, Mahabad and Kermanshah.80 These three stations proved to be more imitative 
than original because they had limited hours and programmes in local languages and their 
programmes were no match for those which were broadcasted by the main stations in 
Tehran. According to one oral account, ‘in 1971 Sanandaj TV began its work by 
rebroadcasting Tehran TV’s programmes which, except for [the Iranian TV series] Talkh 
wa Shirin [Pe. Bitter and Sweet] and Morad Barqi, were westernised’.81 NIRT had 
impressive coverage for its three main programmes of Nationwide, Second Programme 
and International by 1976, as Amuzegar rightly predicted: 
 
At the end of 1976 the International Program broadcast eight hours per day. The Nationwide 
program covered 10 per cent [of the population]. Late in 1976, also, color television 
broadcast was introduced on regular channels. By the end of the Fifth Plan [in 1978], the 
Nationwide Program will cover 80 per cent of the population, and the Second Program will 
reach 50 per cent of the people.82 
 
                                                          
79 Amuzegar, Iran: An Economic Profile, 125-26. 
80 Ibid., 126. 
81 Ayazi, Sanandaj, 727. Talk wa Shirin was a popular, somewhat comic TV series which told the story of 
the middle class families in their struggle to come to terms to the ‘modern’ way of life. 
82 Amuzegar, Iran: An Economic Profile, 126. 
 244 
 
Television’s remarkable impact on the population could be seen in the way its 
programmes quickly became popular. The programmes mainly consisted of ‘Western 
classical music, biographies of important personalities and popular American and British 
series dubbed in Persian, as well as several indigenous series’.83 At the same time, a new 
industry evolved and expanded the market for television sets. ‘The estimated number of 
television receivers in March 1976 was over 1,000,000 of which half a million sets were 
in Tehran’.84 Television rapidly became popular, revolutionising social interactions in a 
different manner from radio. People who had gathered to listen to radio now gathered to 
watch and consume messages and their content visually and more profoundly. As scholars 
have noted, television replaced the traditional (Persian) naqqal or (Kurdish) bait-bezh 
(storyteller) of teahouses.85 In the Kurdish region radio had already replaced bait-bezh 
and, according to Amir Hassanpour, threatened Kurdish folklore more widely.86 
According to a survey conducted in 1974, the most popular programmes were either 
foreign series, or what some would call ‘Westernised’ local series.87 ‘Westernised’ was a 
vague term which was used to describe films and television series the content of which 
created tensions with religious or nativist views, but also engaged the population with 
new ideas. By 1979 more people acquired TV, and it became very influential in 
‘implementing the state’s cultural policy [of Westernisation]’.88 
 Despite the fact that it was the capital and other urban centres which primarily 
benefited from the availability of television, and regardless of their limited availability 
per household, television exerted great psychological effect on individuals’ minds. 
Unmatched by any other means of communication in terms of the speed and range of 
                                                          
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid., 127. 
85 Ibid., 126. 
86 Amir Hassanpour, "Farhangi Zaraki Le Khuli Teknolozhiy Zamanda," [Oral Culture in the Age of 
Technology],  http://en.calameo.com/read/0011170694fd3b13133a7, accessed 6 November 2017. 
87 Nafisi, "Cinema as a Political Instrument", 205 
88 Ibid. 
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impact, television re-oriented social focus and made people regulate their social lives 
around the new programmes or series. 
 Indeed, because of the novelty of television, its visual effectiveness and the state’s 
centralisation of radio and television broadcasting, powerful narratives shaped 
perceptions, determined cultural practices and blocked other narratives from forming and 
emerging. For example, while favourable images of the United States of America and its 
history were (re)produced in many ways, including through television series and movies, 
no critical knowledge of that country’s formation or the lives of its indigenous and black 
population were provided. Instead, sorkh-pust [Pe. red-skins], a new term to describe 
Native Americans, was juxtaposed with stereotypical cowboys—interestingly, no 
Kurdish term for sorkh-pust was coined. As a result, an inferior image of the former, 
against a progressive image of the latter, was institutionalised. As Barahani observed at 
the time, ‘America has managed to project such an [inferior] image of the natives that it 
encouraged the natives to support America and oppose themselves’.89 Similarly, movies 
telling the stories of Europe’s colonisation of Africa and India depicted the conquerors as 
the missionaries of civilisation in the ‘remote’ places of the world, where the natives 
presumably struggled to come to terms with the new age. Indeed, the greatest success of 
such movies took place in the colonised world or in rapidly westernising non-Western 
countries.90  
The crucial aspect of this production of knowledge was the link between culture 
and power, which produced narratives to maintain the cultural superiority of the powerful 
by confirming that superiority.91 Television had the primary role in the Westernisation of 
Iranian culture(s) neglecting any critical reading of ‘Western’ cultural products, on the 
                                                          
89 Barahani, Tarikhe Mozakkar, 88. 
90 Ibid.; Nafisi, "Cinema as a Political Instrument". 
91 Edward Said explains this link between culture and imperialism. See Said, Culture and Imperialism, xiii. 
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one hand, and paying no heed to worldwide intellectual debates pertaining to a critical 
understanding of the world, on the other hand.  
Meanwhile, Iran was rapidly acquiring greater intellectual and literary capacities 
in relevant spheres because of ongoing literary and intellectual transformations. In 
addition to journals, translation of foreign novels increased, as did the number of new 
male and female writers.92 This was matched by an increase in public interest in reading. 
A significant embodiment of this period was the formation of Kanun-e Nevisandegan-e 
Iran (Centre for Iranian Writers) in 1968, which was suppressed after only two years.93 
As Hassan ‘Abedini’s study of story-writing in Iran rightly observes, this literary 
transformation ‘was a result of social transformation, the emergence of intellectual groups 
amid the obstruction of political and social activities’;94 following a process since the 
Coup, Iran had eventually become an outright dictatorship by 1970.95 Nativism and 
Marxism stood out as two intellectual trends which, reflecting the socio-economic, 
political and cultural aspects of modernisation, assist us to delineate the context in which 
cultural encounters through new means of communication took place. Intense 
Westernisation surfaced a prominent, diverse intellectual trend in Iran, which advocated 
a return to ‘cultural purity’. Literary works, with different conclusions, and which 
remained either unpublished or suppressed by the state, reflected superbly this cultural 
encounter between the Western and Iranian (Persian) cultures. For instance, Barahani’s 
Tarikh-e Mozakkar to a great extent registered the intensity of Westernisation in urban 
centres, along with its effects on various layers of the population.96 Likewise, though 
coming to more radical conclusions, Jalal Ale Ahmad’s Gharbzadegi (Pe. Westoxication) 
could only be written in climate of intensive Westernisation that Iran had begun to 
                                                          
92 Hassan Mir 'Abedini, Sad Sal Dastan Newisi Dar Iran [One Hundred Year Story-Writing in Iran] 
(Tehran: Nashre Cheshme, 1377 [1998]), 408-09. 
93 Ibid., 418. 
94 Ibid., 408. 
95 For more on this period see ibid., 405-21. 
96 Cf. Barahani, Tarikhe Mozakkar, Ch. 10.  
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experience especially since 1960.  These works, especially the latter, had their origins in 
the works of some other intellectuals such as Fakhreddin Shademan (1907-1967) and 
Ahmad Fardid (1904-1994) who is believed to have invented the term gharbzadegi, and 
reflected a growing form of reactionary nativism to safeguard ‘cultural purity’. While 
Shademan and Fardid had formulated its historical and philosophical foundations, it was 
due to Ale Ahmad’s work, as Mehrzad Boroujerdi argues, that the concept became a 
discourse to oppose the West’s cultural onslaught.97 According to Dariush Ashuri, a well-
known literary critique, ‘we were preoccupied with this discourse [of Westernisation] 
[…] and obsessed with the search for the lost East’.98 Moreover, in the sphere of more 
explicit political opposition with a violent undertone, Ali Shari‘ati, an ideologue of the 
Islamic Revolution, symbolised the return to cultural roots through more explicit political 
opposition. Alternatively, a secular, Left-wing discourse had been forming by other 
literary groups, including those publishing literary journals and members of Centre for 
Iranian Writers who defied the Shah’s dictatorship and preserved a kind of Iranian 
‘Enlightenment thought’.99 To this we can add social and political activists who attempted 
to interpret social change, dictatorship and an advancing capitalist imperialism by social 
theories dominated by Marxism. Indeed, while counter-narratives’ access to new means 
of communication was regularly blocked, publishers circumvented censorship and, 
therefore, translated books or other modes of writing reached the curious individuals; 
another effective means of communication was the cassette. The 1979 Revolution was 
also characterized by an explosion of book publishing, and according to the same study, 
‘unprecedented in the history of Iran, around one hundred million books were published 
in 1979’.100  
                                                          
97 Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1996), 54-63. 
98 Dariush Ashuri, Ma Wa Moderniyat [We and Modernity] (Tehran: Tolou' Azadi, 1998), seven. 
99 See Mas‘oud Noqrekar, Bakhsi Az Tarikhe Jonbeshe Rowshanfekrie Iran [A Part of the Enlightenment 
History of Iran], Vol. 1 (Sweden: Baran, 1382 [2002-3]), 24. 
100 'Abedini, Sad Sal Dastan Newisi Dar Iran, 420. 
 248 
 
PERSIAN AND KURDISH CULTURAL ENCOUNTER   
Analysis of cultural encounters are abundant. These are, however, analyses of the 
encounters of a different nature, namely those that took place between fundamentally 
distinct cultures such as between Europeans and Native Americans or the British and 
Indians. A closer analogy to Persian and Kurdish cultural encounters is Ireland. Scholars 
of Irish historiography and cultural studies warn that a homogenising and monolithic 
approach to Irish [including Northern Ireland] history and culture is misleading, and they 
draw attention to the misconception that ‘Ireland’s position was or is exactly the same as 
that of all Britain’s African, Asian or Caribbean colonies’.101 Therefore, Ireland is not to 
be seen simply as a ‘colony’, indeed it seems there is an ongoing debate about to what 
degree the British Empire perceived ‘Irish questions as colonial’.102 Therefore, as Stephen 
Howe gives a detailed account of these debates, themes of Irishness versus Englishness, 
language, race, and culture continue to form historiographical and cultural debates.103 
However, there are many aspects of the cultural encounters between the British Empire 
and Ireland which distinguish this relationship from the one between Kurdish and Persian 
cultures. First and foremost, a colonial context formed British and Irish cultural 
encounters in a massive scale, followed by the issue of race, empire and nationalism, 
colonialist structure of imagery, followed by the fact, unlike the case of the Kurds, that 
Ireland became a state in a ‘postcolonial’ world, probably a former partner and/or victim 
of Empire but definitely a new partner of Europe. If the analogy is closer in terms of 
language, cultural nationalism and cultural hegemony, both a colonial or imperial context 
and the existence of an Irish state indicate more differences than similarities. Finally, the 
widespread application of postcolonial theories of Edward Said’s or Homi K. Bhabha’s 
to analyse Ireland history and culture does not merely stem from a methodological fault, 
                                                          
101 Stephen Howe, Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture (Oxfor: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 139. 
102 Ibid., 230. 
103 Cf. Ibid., Ch. 7; Stephen Howe, "Historiography," in Kevin Kenny (ed.), Ireland and the British Empire 
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which views Ireland as a ‘colony’.104 The point is, as Howe confirms in the case of 
Ireland, that postcolonial theories are necessary but inadequate because Ireland was not 
merely a colony.  
  Mechanisms of cultural encounters in colonial contexts are identified as conquests 
and direct colonisation.105 However, mechanisms of cultural encounters differ in non-
colonial, multicultural contexts in which one culture assumes cultural hegemony over 
others. The Persian and Kurdish cultures found themselves in a new historical context in 
modern Iran. They had historically lived in close geographical and cultural proximity 
prior to the formation of the modern Iranian nation-state which institutionally and 
politically endorsed the Persian culture and language. This was followed by the 
proliferation of new audio and visual means of communication in the second half of the 
twentieth century, which effectively transformed (pre-modern) political-cultural 
authority of Persian into a cultural hegemony in Gramscian sense. While they were 
linguistically familial and culturally resembled one another, these two peoples’ cultural 
practices in many ways were based on common historical and mythological origins. 
Therefore, this compels us to explain a situation in which a culture’s more distinctive 
characteristics (e.g. language, custom, and religion) assume superiority over its 
surrounding cultures with which it shares cultural resources. In our case, the Persian 
culture used its administrative experience and cultural prestige to assume cultural 
hegemony with the proliferation of both institutionalised and centralised means of 
communication. 
To elaborate on these claims, the following discussion benefits from Raymond 
William’s theory of communication as a means for cultural formation and production. 
First, his idea of ‘complexity of hegemony’ advances Gramscian perception of hegemony 
which ‘is not to be understood at the level of mere opinion or mere manipulation. It is a 
                                                          
104 For more on this see Howe, Ireland and Empire, Ch. 7. 
105 Cf. Peter Burke, History and Social Theory (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005), 162-65. 
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whole body of practices and expectations; our assignments of energy, our ordinary 
understanding of the nature of man and of his world. 106 Secondly, he highlights a ‘central 
system of practices, meaning and values, which we can properly call dominant and 
effective’.107 And crucial to our discussion of Kurdish and Persian modern cultural 
encounters is his notion of ‘residual’ culture, i.e. some cultural and social forms that 
continue to live in spite of the cultural hegemony of the other, and ‘emergent’ culture, i.e. 
the creation of new cultural meanings, values and practices which explicitly defies the 
hegemonic culture.108 This leads us to the notions of ‘residual-incorporated’ and ‘residual 
not incorporated’, and ‘emergent-incorporated’ and ‘emergent not incorporated’109 based 
on which we can understand why residual Kurdish cultural forms, e.g. music and clothing, 
are incorporated into the dominant culture but emergent cultural forms, e.g. in literature 
and education, are suppressed by it. For these reasons, Williams’ theory and explanation 
of culture is immensely useful to understand Kurdish and Persian cultural encounters. 
Postcolonial theories provide valuable cultural insights for evaluating cultural 
encounters in our case. Within these theories and studies, one can include subaltern 
studies. However, as argued throughout this chapter, Kurdish and Persian cultural 
encounters in modern times, in general, and in the age of visualisation of media, in 
particular, did not take place in a colonial context nor did these cultures perceive each 
other as alien. In addition to this, the Kurds have been partners in empire building, and 
later also in nation-building, though they did not reap the main benefit of such processes. 
Therefore, it is necessary to identify other mechanisms of establishing cultural hegemony 
beyond colonial conquest.  
 In the history of Iran, the main mechanism of cultural encounter was the exertion 
of political and military dominance of successive ruling dynasties of Iran on Kurdish 
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ruling families, Emirates or principalities, which also preserved distinct cultural 
characteristics of their Kurdish subjects. This situation changed during the middle of the 
nineteenth century when the process of the modernisation of state and society also meant 
the transformation of the Kurds into modern aqaliat-e qaumi (Pe. ethnic minority). Since 
the expansion of the Islamic civilisation in the seventh century, ruling families of Iran 
were comprised of dynasties with Arabic, Persian, and then Turkish origins until the 
modern Iranian nation-state made the Persian community the core ethno-cultural 
community of modern Iran. Historically, Persian had been a lingua franca and cultural 
practices overlapped without defining others as ‘ethnic minority’. There were forms of 
cultural domination of course, but the distinction between pre-modern and modern times 
could be seen in the use of Persian by the Ottoman ruling family or by ethnic Kurdish 
literary figures throughout the early modern times. 
 In contrast to the mechanism of conquest or the presence of the state in pre-
modern times, the mechanism of modern cultural encounters sustained relation of 
domination through cultural hegemony. Simply put, this refers to a situation in which the 
ruling culture is incarnated in unmanned technical means and, as set out by Foucault, this 
power becomes non-corporeal, i.e. it does not engage in physical confrontation. Although 
the modern Iranian nation-state had been promoting Persian language and culture since 
its formation, the political and military prowess of the state ensured that non-Persian 
cultural practices were curbed or incorporated into the ‘main’ culture. For example, as 
discussed in Part II, throughout the reign of Reza Shah, Kurdish language was banned 
and cultural practices were restricted through the coercive force of the gendarmerie. The 
heavy presence of the state was needed to implement the Pahlavi dress code and for the 
surveillance of individuals engaged in oppositional actions. The corporeal presence of the 
state diminished as its favoured cultural practices, e.g. the dress codes for teachers in 
schools and civil servants, became norms. In this regard, socio-economic transformation 
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of Iran was crucial. By the early 1940s, there was already an expanding educated urban 
generation, which had emerged as a result of modern education, urbanisation and the 
expansion of economy. However, the state still needed its heavy presence to provide 
political authority for the cultural practices it favoured. The state’s non-corporeal 
presence permeated widely as modern education expanded and publications reached more 
people. Moreover, in the second half of the century the state’s authority was substituted 
for the Kurdish agha or the landowner class. However, the pace and scope of these 
processes were slow and limited. For example, modern education was socially significant 
as a mode of cultural incorporation of others and its institutions, defined by Williams ‘as 
the main agencies of the transmission of an effective dominant culture’,110 were 
recognised as an effective and necessary way towards cultural homogenisation in Iran—
literacy was achieved through Persian. However, because of its novelty and uneven 
expansion, modern education could not have achieved a hegemonic scale with the same 
speed as the new visual means of communication would later obtain. As noted in the 
previous chapter, in the early 1960s, 70 to 80 percent of Iran’s 20 to 21 million population 
was still illiterate, a fact disadvantageous to Persian cultural hegemony—thus inspiring 
the idea of the Literacy Corps. Therefore, cultural hegemony stipulated the transition from 
corporeal to non-corporeal cultural power, which truly took off with the proliferation of 
the technical and visual means of communication in the 1960s and particularly in the 
1970s, creating conditions for Persian culture to achieve such an unprecedented 
hegemonic status. In Gramscian terms, hegemony refers to the maintenance of authority 
through consent or the acceptance of ‘the norm’ through consent rather than coercion. In 
this process, hegemonic ideas and practices, i.e. those supported and propagated by the 
ruling or superior culture, become common sense or norms, while other cultures were 
simultaneously condemned to the margin. Raymond Williams elaborates this Gramscian 
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perception of hegemony by applying ‘a central, effective and dominant system of 
meanings and values which are not merely abstract but which are organized and lived’.111 
He maintains,  
 
That is why hegemony is not to be understood at the level of mere opinion or mere manipulation. 
It is a whole body of practices and expectations; our assignments of energy, or ordinary 
understanding of the nature of man and of his world. [...] It thus constitutes a sense of reality for 
most people in the society. A sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is 
very difficult for most members of the society to move, in most areas of their lives.112  
 
Therefore, the era of the White Revolution becomes culturally significant for its 
mediasation of culture and creating the conditions to constitute ‘reality’. Crucially, this 
process simultaneously reproduces conditions for cultural resistance to defy the 
hegemonic culture. However, taking Williams into consideration, two points must be 
highlighted. First, the hegemonic culture develops capacities to tolerate and incorporate 
difference and opposition. Nevertheless, once cultural hegemony is established coercion 
does not disappear but remains to be applied when the dominant system is challenged by 
an alternative. Until then, one can defy dominant ideas but still be incorporated in the 
dominant system, which, as noted above, does not amount to mere ideas but to organised 
meanings and values. Moreover, some modes of opposition become incorporated so that 
‘whatever the degree of internal conflicts and internal variations, they do not go in 
practice beyond the central effective and dominant definitions’.113 This was the case with 
the Kurdish university students and academics in the 1960s and 1970s whose literary 
writings, valuable as they were, did not challenge the boundaries of the dominant culture. 
This was one reason why the hegemonic culture tolerated such practices. Secondly, 
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different views of the world may be expressed while a hegemonic perception, which is 
cultivated through modern education and ostensibly disseminates objective knowledge, 
continues to nurture those who have expressed doubt. This has a bearing on internal 
variations in reaction to events and their impact on one’s understanding of the world. For 
example, individuals may criticise the harsh conditions of colonisation but continue to 
hold a racial conception of the world, relying on a binary opposition of primitive versus 
developed to explain historical phenomena. Again, while an argument for the superiority 
of the Medes over the Achaemenes in ancient Iran is permitted, the representation of the 
Medes as the origin of a ‘Kurdish nation’ by Kurdish national historiography will evoke 
fierce reaction from the dominant culture. ‘Kurdistan Province’, though as an act of re-
division of the Kurdish region in the west of Iran, discussed in Part II, is formed and 
tolerated by the modern state as an act of sustaining the perception of the Kurds as an 
inextricable component of Iran and Iranian identity. However, the idea of ‘Kurdistan’ as 
an independent entity challenges the effective dominant system. This provokes coercion, 
explaining the continuous corporeal presence of the state. Kurdish cultural practices 
during the Pahlavi era were tolerated to the extent that they did not pose any threat to 
what was deemed the official, which safeguarded “national unity”. So long as these 
variations are incorporated, they pose no danger to the dominant system. Ultimately, ‘the 
dominant culture itself changes, not in central formation, but in many of its articulated 
features’.114 In fact, in modern society it always needs to change to remain dominant. This 
situation changes when different views began to defy the effective dominant culture and 
mutate into an alternative. In our case, Kurdayeti in modern Iran has continued as an 
alternative to the hegemonic culture.  
The above analysis explains why Persian cultural hegemony was effectively 
established in the era of the White Revolution as a result of the proliferation of the new 
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means of communication. It also sheds light on the dominant discourses, the centrality of 
which continues in spite of conscientious critiques directed against them. ‘Sorkh-pust’ 
alludes to the production of nomenclature in modern cultural encounters which 
popularises new terms in the dominant culture’s language. 
Finally, in the specific historical and social contexts of this era, especially 
throughout the 1970s, the institutionalisation and management of new means of 
communication, especially television, cinema and radio, took place in a two-pronged 
process. First, as discussed above, Iranian cultures became increasingly targets of 
‘Westernisation’ and new ideas, though there were different cultural reactions. For 
example, unlike the centre, Nativism as a movement for cultural purity and a reaction to 
Westernisation did not become very relevant to the Kurds for various religious, ethnic 
and political reasons. The second process pertains not only to the way that Westernisation 
was mediated by Persian cultural medium and hence restricted understanding because of 
linguistic barriers, but also to the way that new means of communication proved to be 
effective tools to serve homogenisation of culture based on Persian culture. This resulted 
simultaneously in the institutionalisation of the Persian language and culture as the norm, 
‘mainstream’ or ‘official’ (rasmi), and in the marginalisation of Kurdish culture, which 
was defined as mahalli (Pe. local). This mainstream-local binary concealed both the 
homogenising nature of this enterprise, and its marginalising effect on other cultures. As 
an illustration of this, the new monopolised means of communication realised cultural 
consent by making Persian the normal medium of communication, the normal educational 
means for social and economic success, and the normal way of achieving, in Bourdieu’s 
terms, various forms of cultural capital and intellectual prosperity for individuals.115 All 
this took place to the detriment of other cultures in Iran. 
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THE PAHLAVIS’ UNEQUAL CULTURAL MODERNISATION 
The cultural consequences of modernisation of Iran also included the enrichment of 
cultural resources to transform perceptions and promote cultural awareness. As argued 
above, the contribution of a new educated generation across Iran to this transformation, 
especially since the Second World War, was integral. This was reflected by a multi-
faceted culture of change represented by a wide range of journals and the cultural products 
of academics, writers and activists, some in ministerial posts. However, the state’s 
distribution of cultural resources remained unequal because the White Revolution’s 
unequal modernisation was not confined to socio-economic spheres. This seemed to 
benefit the preservation of the targeted non-Persian cultures, which had come into a new 
way of contact with a hegemonic culture. In reality, however, while the expansion of 
modern education in Kurdish rural areas was limited and written modes of 
communication faced the formidable barrier of widespread illiteracy, the enrichment of 
cultural resources in Iran could have benefited all Iranian cultures because it involved 
new ideas and literary forms which would defy conventional ways of life. The inferior 
social status of women was a case in point. This becomes more evident when one 
considers the state’s inability to deal with aspects of customs or traditions, which as 
cultural fetters continued to bind many layers of Kurdish society to undesirable ways of 
life. Therefore, a major shortcoming of the state-led modernisation was its failure to 
provide an equal distribution of new means of communication and establish cultural 
venues and centres such as theatre, library and other centres related to the promotion of 
Farhang wa Honar (Pe. Culture and Art). But individuals did not necessarily receive 
transmitted ‘message’ passively. Interaction with audio and visual means of 
communication as well as transmitted ideas, as argued in this chapter, transformed the 
framework of social interaction. Eventually, it was a specific culture and language that 
succeeded in monopolising cultural resources and means of communication with the 
institutionalised and political endorsement of the state.  
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Therefore, the state’s unequal distribution of cultural resources constituted other 
complementing aspects of cultural encounters. At the same time, the provision of Kurdish 
cultural resources was restrained with the effect that the level of the existing literary 
works or radio and television services in Kurdish were no match for those in Persian 
broadcasted on a massive scale.  
 
Custom and Traditions 
Cultural disparity between city and village. City-village disparity extended to cultural 
realms too. As discussed in the previous chapter, the village was by and large left out of 
technological modernisation. Although the state replaced the landowner class as the sole 
political authority, it did not become the provider of technological needs nor in this case, 
of cultural needs of the population in rural areas. Except for radio, which became 
gradually available in limited numbers, the Kurdish village was deprived of visual or 
written means of communication, let alone cinema, until the end of the 1970s. 
Concurrently, homogenising educational and media policies stipulated Persian linguistic 
skills for individuals to become educated, gain more economic prosperity and benefit 
from various cultural modes of communication and entertainment. Moreover, both 
widespread rural illiteracy and the ‘remoteness’ of the village, an image sustained by 
unavailability of transportation and roads for innumerable villages, aggravated the 
situation by restricting effective access to cultural resources. Although the content was 
not necessarily objective, as illustrated above, being deprived of new ways to engage with 
cultural activities and encountering a different language, debilitated individuals’ 
intellectual capacities. Nevertheless, the promotion of cultural awareness or initiating 
positive social change in rural areas was not the aim of the state. Except for its unsteady 
land reform and limited attempts to expand modern education and healthcare, throughout 
the 1970s there was no organised attempt by the state to promote cultural awareness in 
the rural areas. This was mainly because of the absence of provincial development 
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programmes in the state’s successive development plans, which were primarily urban-
oriented and aimed to project a progressive, ‘Western’ image of a new Iran. Indeed, the 
national image of Iran invited culturally homogenising policies enforced through 
education and, later more effectively, visual means of communication, which 
demonstrates the vitality of the new means of communication for the assertion of Persian 
cultural hegemony in modern, mediasised Iran. 
The village’s deprivation of new cultural means was mainly due to the state’s 
indifference to motivating cultural change and its obsession with security and superficial 
aspects of development and Persianisation, which had many consequences for rural 
communities. Most importantly, social customs and traditions, which were based on 
patriarchal or unequal class relations, continued unchallenged; such relations of power 
were reproduced at the expense of less-privileged groups within the village population, 
most notably among women and the lower strata. Moreover, with the intensification of 
modernisation between 1960 and 1979, people from rural communities, in general, found 
themselves caught up with modernisation’s unfavourable social and economic 
consequences which forced them to engage in migration, seasonal work and menial urban 
labour and urban poverty (see the previous chapters). With no technology in sight for 
rural women in particular, they continued to bear the burden of both domestic tasks and 
free labour while their access to social, educational and medical advice was barred by 
religious and traditional forces. The only effective link between the rural areas and the 
process of cultural change was established by urban social and political activists who, as 
teachers or medics, went the extra mile to engage more actively with the rural population, 
and passed to them the new ideas, which defied such relations of power. According to 
oral history, discussed in more detail in the previous chapters, although the state paved 
the way for modern education and healthcare to spread in rural areas, it was mostly 
teachers, adhering to the humanitarian ideas of the time that walked this extra mile. In 
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contrast, the state did not intend to impose extra humanitarian tasks on the Literacy Corps 
except for the urge to spread literacy. Indeed, the expansion of modern education and 
healthcare in Kurdish rural areas were limited. The effect of this was that, by the end of 
the 1970s, rural areas had not fundamentally changed in two decades. It is precisely in 
such circumstances that the role of non-state agents of change in the promotion of social 
and cultural awareness of people must be recognised. 
The growing cultural chasm between Kurdish urban and rural areas was evident, 
for example, in the institutions of marriage and family. In the end of the 1970s, the village 
society was still characterised by customs of zhin ba zhin (Ku. woman for woman) and 
‘engagement from birth’. In the former, two lovers’ a love-match engagement was only 
permitted if the man’s family was able to give a daughter in marriage to a man in the 
woman’s family. In this exchange, the other couple had to marry against their will. The 
latter custom allowed the engagement of girls and boys from birth. These customs 
corresponded either to the existing patriarchal system or served economic needs of a 
household. In contrast, throughout the 1970s Kurdish urban centres witnessed the 
emergence of a new generation of educated women who also entered employment on a 
wide scale (see Chapter 6).116 This was a result of a change in the perception of 
individuals, and the availability of cultural resources, something which conspicuously 
remained absent in Kurdish rural areas. Undoubtedly, the return of seasonal workers or 
students to the village brought back new ideas. However, the absence of the new means 
of communication, among many other things, restricted the scope and pace of cultural 
change in rural areas. In cultural terms, too, the White Revolution remained an urban 
phenomenon. 
 
Cultural Modernisation 
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Modernisation, the expansion of the economy and modern education intertwined with the 
proliferation of written, audio and visual means of communication (see Figure 27).  The 
concentration of the means of communication and cultural resources in the capital and its 
surrounding cities is juxtaposed with their limited availability in the peripheral province 
of Kurdistan to clarify the situation. The quantities for cinemas, theatres or libraries did 
not witness any significant change by the end of the 1970s. The first cinemas in Kurdish 
cities were technologically rudimentary. However, bigger cities distinguished themselves 
for their cinemas, which became more popular throughout the 1970s. This concentration 
applied to radio and television broadcasting, too, with the additional problem of the 
scarcity of programmes in Kurdish, which could not match Persian programmes in length 
or quality. One significant cultural effect of this was that Kurdish broadcasting was too 
paralysed to compete with a powerful, homogenising Persian. The table below 
demonstrates the near non-existence of publications in Kurdish in terms of written modes 
of communications such as newspapers and magazines. Moreover, the decrease in the 
publication of such modes across Iran corresponded to the ascendancy of dictatorship and 
the increase in censorship – in official statistics total numbers for 1964 and 1973 are 207 
and 195 respectively, indicating a downward trend in publication. In contrast to political 
upheavals during which a degree of freedom was allowed to Kurdish publications of many 
forms, the era of the White Revolution imposed a strict surveillance regime, while the 
state’s oppressive apparatus became more sensitive to Kurdish cultural activities. As a 
result, literary works, such as Hemin’s Tarik w Run, were published outside Iran and 
distributed clandestinely along with other Kurdish publications. This applied across Iran, 
where the number of books and interest in reading had increased, especially among 
university students,117 but censorship affected the publication and distribution of books 
that were labelled as subversive. In almost all cases the reason for the detention of Kurdish 
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individuals by SAVAK in the 1970s related to possessing Kurdish publications, some 
mere poetry, which were deemed revolutionary. 
During the era of the White Revolution ‘new’ theatres in bigger Kurdish cities 
emerged to some extent. It was relatively new and in spite of admirable individual 
endeavours, the lack of state support and the increasing dictatorship of the 1970s hindered 
its artistic advance. The history of modern theatrical activities went back to the early 
1940s.118 Historically, celebrations of important days such as Nowruz were accompanied 
by theatrical performances such as Miri Nowrozi (Ku. the Nowruz Prince) who 
symbolically ruled over a town or village and replaced their rulers during Nowruz.119 As 
Ayyubian noted in the early 1960s, 
 
Those National celebration (Jashnhay-e melli) in Kurdistan, and especially in Mahabad, are 
celebrated with utmost enthusiasm. The residents of Mahabad give national and local (mahalli) 
flavour to religious days and celebrate them more enthusiastically than other Muslims do. For 
example, [on such days] they visit each other and celebrate the day by special ceremonies […] 
There is no custom of marsi-ye khaniy (lamentation ceremony) in Mahabad’.120  
 
Such non-religious dramatic performances provided conditions for the advancement of 
artistic activities, especially the new theatre. However, political oppression remained a 
constant obstacle. For example, ‘by 1936, the celebration of Miri Nowrozi had declined 
until suddenly it was celebrated magnificently in 1945. In spite of powers hidden in 
ambush, Miri Nowrozi rule[d] Mahabad for fifteen days without causing any disorder 
whatsoever’.121 However, the decline of Miri Nowroz celebrations continued until it was 
eventually replaced by similar performances, which amounted to short, amusing plays, 
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while the threat of political reprisals and lack of state support remained constant 
obstacles. 
 Meanwhile, new theatrical performances increased with the expansion of modern 
education.122 According to oral accounts, Saqqez city epitomised the way theatrical 
production increased by secondary school students and other educational or military 
individuals. The latter for example, used opportunities such as the state’s celebration of 
28 Mordad (the coup against Musaddeq, 19 Aug. 1953), 21 Azar (the enthronement of 
Reza Shah on 12 Sep. 1925) or 6 Bahman (the referendum day for the White Revolution, 
26 Jan. 1963) to perform plays of different types.123 Introducing branches of Farhang wa 
Honar in 1971 to bigger cities, including Saqqez, in the Kurdistan Province boosted 
theatrical activities by organising music and theatre groups, while ‘some experts [in 
theatre] were dispatched by Iran’s Centre for Theatre to train young enthusiasts’.124 Plays 
such as Jan Nesar (Sacrificer) written by Bizhan Mufid was performed. A notable aspect 
of theatre in Kurdish cities was the emergence of young artists who pursued theatre as a 
distinct artistic field, composed plays and performed them with the least financial support 
and in poor facilities.125  
This trend reveals that modern theatre in Kurdistan developed spontaneously, 
without effective state support but because of individual endeavours by those who were 
determined to expand it. While Persian cultural hegemony and a more oppressive Pahlavi 
state of the 1970s hindered the Kurdish theatre, other individuals across Iran contributed 
to the growth of theatre in Kurdish cities. Taking into account the dearth of adequate 
research on Kurdish theatre, evidence and oral history allude more to the perception of 
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theatre as a kind of modern art, which indeed was a modern tool of expression, rather than 
a site of at least explicit cultural resistance. The plays limited their themes to include 
social issues and folklore while, as the advertisement in the following figure shows, this 
scarcity was compensated for by performing plays written by prominent Iranian 
playwrights—Theatre in Kurdistan became very politicised during the 1979 Revolution. 
 
Modernisation and Secularisation 
Interviews confirm a popular perception of the era of the White Revolution as a 
‘secularising’ age in which the religious way of life diminished and a new secular 
generation emerged. This new generation was increasingly characterised by possessing 
education and adhering to a ‘modern’, progressive worldview. This view of the era of the 
White Revolution is evidenced by many factors, for example, the emergence of educated 
women and their increasing presence in the public sphere, and by ongoing cultural 
transformations reflected by visual means of communication. Economic and political 
stability of the early 1970s seems to be another crucial factor that suggests the rise of 
secularity in the era in which a religious image of Iran was effectively being replaced by 
a ‘secular’ state. Indeed, the Pahlavi state was preoccupied with attempts to redefine 
Iran’s international place among ‘world civilisations’ through appealing to pre-Islamic 
Iran in expensive celebrations, e.g. the extravagant 2,500th Celebration of ‘Iranian 
Monarchy’ in 1971. At the same time, the cultural transformations strengthened that 
secular image, especially now that it was characterised by famous female singers.  
This view, however, results from a misconception of secularism not as the 
separation of state and religion or as the creation of a society which bestows on its 
members critical ability and deprive, for example, sanctified canons or institutions of any 
immunity to criticism. Moreover, there is a correlation between its perceived secularism 
and a decline in religious practices. According to Nikki Keddie, the modernisation thesis 
‘correlates modernization with secularization and generally measures secularization 
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primarily through declining church membership and declared religious beliefs’.126 She 
argues that the secularisation thesis ‘asserts that the social significance of religion 
diminishes in response to’ modernisation. This critical approach to ‘secularism’ enables 
us to view social and cultural transformation of both Iranian and Kurdish society neither 
as the secularisation of society nor as a natural consequence of ‘modernisation’. This idea 
of ‘becoming modern’ underlines a popular perception of ‘modern’ as advanced or 
civilised in contrast to ‘traditional’, i.e. backward. Therefore, the dichotomy of modern 
and traditional reproduces the popular misconception of ‘secularism’.  
Simultaneously, an inevitable comparison between Iran in the 1970s and earlier 
Iran (or what came to replace the Pahlavi state after 1979) strengthens the popular 
perception. However, this popular perception loses ground if one focuses on the Pahlavi 
state and its policies. When considering the Pahlavi state, it is clear that authoritarianism 
and Westernised modernisation sowed the seeds of, or at least contributed immensely to 
the rise of, political Islam, that is an Islamic movement which made as its goal the seizure 
of political power in Iran. The growth of political Islam was not an inevitable outcome of 
modernisation. Contingencies and external factors, undoubtedly, play their role in history; 
however, to understand the ascendancy of a social force over others, one should 
recognise, to borrow from Gramsci, ‘the preceding cultural period’,127    which, especially 
in this case, resulted in the cultural and political hegemony of the religious opposition.   
In fact, during the White Revolution the Islamic movement became increasingly 
revolutionary and politicised. This process had started since the early 1940s, as shown by 
the leadership of the militant activists, who deployed ‘clandestine political journalism and 
organisation while using religious sermons as a political platform…[and] the cooperation 
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between the militant clerics and petty bourgeois intellectuals’.128 Moreover, across Iran 
Islamic associations grew and the number of trained mujtahids, or interpreters of the 
shari‘a, increased, 129 adding to the already considerable number of religious 
functionaries, major and minor mosques, seminaries and religious schools, all of which 
were financially sanctioned by vaqfs (the offices of religious endowments), as well as 
religious taxes.130 Moreover, the dissemination of radical ideas took place through a 
network of mosques and religious associations, by which activists spread political tapes, 
including the speeches of Ayatulla Khumeini,131 who embodied this movement, and 
organised meetings in the Huseiniyas, congregation halls for Shi‘a commemoration 
ceremonies. 
This image of the growth of religious opposition does not fully apply to Kurdistan, 
which both adhered to a different branch of Islam and engaged in Kurdayeti’s cultural 
resistance against ethnic and cultural oppression. The dissimilarity results from the 
following religious and cultural reasons. The westernising modernisation of Iran was 
threatening the religious, hegemonising/hegemonic side of Persian culture, which was 
bound to a Shi‘a Islam represented by an authoritative, hierarchical religious 
establishment. At least an effective part of this establishment was politically inspired by 
the modernisation of Iran as a result of which it experienced a fundamental intellectual 
break with the past by committing itself to political action to seize power. At the same 
time, the scale of cultural transformation in central Iran and its major urban centres was 
more profound than elsewhere, for example, in the Kurdish region. Therefore, 
Kurdayeti’s major cultural and religious components functioned as effective barriers to 
the possible impact of the politicised religious movement in Iran. As noted above, the 
new educated generation in Kurdistan, which represented cultural, social and political 
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activities, inclined towards a socialist or progressive worldview which was preoccupied 
by social inequalities. In the political sphere, this worldview historically became the 
foundation on which organisational and practical cooperation between Kurdish activists 
and others in Iran took place. In contrast, organisational or practical unity based on 
religion has been almost non-existent in Kurdistan. 
 
However, the above assessment does not imply the complete absence of a religious 
movement in Kurdistan in the era of the White Revolution. Overlooked by studies of or 
memoirs on the period in question, modernisation stimulated a political and religious 
trend, which came to be embodied by Ahmad Muftizada (1933-1993) who eventually 
came to represent a religious Kurdayeti in 1979. He was born into a mufti family and the 
title is seemed to be designated by Naser Adin Shah, the Qajar ruler.132 The mufti’s role 
offered religious prestige to the mufti and his descendants in attracting the support of 
followers. Ahmad Muftizada’s grandfather and father resided in Sanandaj, presiding over 
the religious duties of the population. By the time he was born, the mufti role had to a 
great extent been institutionalised. In the early 1960s, Ahmad followed his father to 
Tehran University’s School of Theology where the latter taught and, when he fell ill, 
Ahmad began to teach. Among other Sunni teachers there was Hajj Abdul Rahman Agha 
Muhtadi, a former Minister of the Kurdistan Republic of 1946 and from a famous 
landowner family, who exerted a profound impact on the Kurdish identity of the current 
generation of Kurdish students.133 Ahmad Muftizada became a regular guest in Rahman 
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Muhtadi’s residence in Tehran were regular meetings on Kurdish culture and literature 
were held. He became the theology teacher’s son-in-law in the early 1970s after he 
became an activist for Kurdish political, cultural and religious rights.             
 Ahmad Muftizada’s political activities went back at least to the early 1960s when 
he was detained with other Kurdish activists for a short period. In these years he distanced 
himself from the mufti institution because it was ‘deriving its legitimacy from the 
King’.134 However, there seemed to be intellectual reasons too. He was influenced by 
Sayyed Qutb, the Egyptian political Islamist, and by the Muslim Brotherhood while he 
argued for ‘scientific’ aspects of the Qur’an, and emphasised Wahhabism in Sunnism.135 
For such reasons, ‘he ceased to be a Mulla, replaced his clerical dress for men’s suiting 
and retained a simple life’.136 By the middle of the 1970s, according to oral history, 
Muftizada had distanced himself from other Kurdish activists who inclined explicitly to 
the Left and became more outspoken against the Pahlavi regime. This is exemplified by 
his speech in Swara Ilkhanizada’s funeral in 1976, related through his wife’s family.137 
This is also illustrated in his contribution to public debates in which on one occasion he 
censured a prominent Baha’i in Iran—in the eyes of adherents of other religious schools 
in Iran, the Pahlavi regime favoured the Baha’is in detriment to others.138 His prison time 
in 1964 effectively changed Muftizada politically and the death of his beloved wife of 
heart failure in 1971 spiritually, making him a modest and scrupulous man. 
Furthermore, intellectually and practically, his social location was also important 
for him as a religious thinker. Sanandaj, the provincial centre, was a city which more than 
any other Kurdish city was affected by Westernisation through television and radio whose 
local programmes too, as noted above, gradually became more Westernised. Indeed, a 
                                                          
134 Ezzatyar, The Last Mufti of Iranian Kurdistan, 69. 
135 Biglari, Interview. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ezzatyar, The Last Mufti of Iranian Kurdistan, 108. 
138 Biglari, Interview. 
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crucial technological development, which made Muftizada a household name in 
Sanandaj, was the city’s part-time television channel in the Kurdish language. In the holy 
month of Ramadan in 1976 when a programme on religious matters was to be broadcasted 
in the evening, ‘there was no question about who would be the most appropriate 
individual to present on the show’ which continued for the entire month of Ramadan.139 
To support the argument regarding the impact of modernisation on religious thinking, 
however limited, but significant, we need to remember that Ayatulla Muhammad 
Mardukh was another, more prominent, religious authority who maintained the place of 
religion in public life in many ways, including his prolific writings. Also from Sanandaj, 
he contributed to religious debate by arguing against Shi‘a religious thought. For 
example, he wrote a pamphlet in the early 1960s in which he asserted that contrary to the 
belief of the Shi’a, Sayyeds (direct descendants of the prophet of Islam) did not exist.140 
Muftizada, Mardukh and the emergence of the idea of Maktab-i Qur’an (Ku. 
Qur’anic School), which materialised in 1979, highlights the existence of a religious 
movement, however weak, directly linked to the modernisation of Iran. In fact, as an idea, 
Maktab-i Qur’an was the result of Muftizada’s religious thinking which placed the holy 
book in the centre of the religious interpretation of social life. By the middle of the 1976 
he had become a critic of ‘the clergy’, of superficial ways of interpreting the Qur’an, the 
Prophet’s sayings, and a religion, which had become, in his view, ‘empty’ for people.141 
The Islamism of Ali Shari‘ati and the political and religious ideas of Mehdi Bazargan, a 
prominent liberal and religious figure, contained attractive elements for Muftizada.142 
                                                          
139 Ezzatyar, The Last Mufti of Iranian Kurdistan, 107. Ezzatyar’s main aim is to show that Ahmad 
Muftizada, who became a prominent religious figure in revolutionary Kurdistan in 1979, is a historical 
example to prove the Kurds’ aversion to both political Islam and religious extremism, making the Kurds 
ideal allies of the West. The book does not concern itself with the intellectual or cultural transformations 
of the era, in which the rise of Muftizada can be explained. 
140 Amini, Interview. 
141 Ezzatyar, The Last Mufti of Iranian Kurdistan, 101. 
142 Ibid., 101. 
 269 
 
While it is true that religious practices declined as a new educated, urban 
generation increasingly characterised Kurdish society, the Pahlavi’s ‘secularism’ did not 
satiate the spiritual needs of people, whose older generation continued to embrace 
religious practices. On a wider scale, the decrease in the number of religious schools and 
sects, and the gradual out-fashioning of various religious methods of healing, all went 
against the place of religion in society. In urban centres, where religious beliefs had 
shown signs of decline—this was seen in adopting new customs and ways of life—the 
population was gradually attracted to religious practices which included hajj pilgrimage 
and conducting rituals and ceremonies. This happened during the same period that 
technological novelties of television and cinema, and modern education were in full 
swing. 
The popular perception of the era of the White Revolution as secularising does 
not explain fully the cultural transformation of the era because it is based on a flawed 
understanding of secularism. The westernising modernisation of Iran also sowed the seed 
of modern religious Kurdayeti embodied by likes of Muftizada, whose political stance 
responded to ethnic and religious prejudices against the Kurds, while his religious 
thinking was a critique of, not only the institutional inferiority of the Sunni religion, but 
also a transforming society. 
 
CULTURAL RESISTANCE 
Modern Kurdayeti, as resistance to homogenisation, continued to rely on Kurdish cultural 
forms to preserve the main components of Kurdish identity. Modern Kurdish and Persian 
cultural encounters were based on a marginalised Kurdish identity and a homogenising 
Persian identity. As argued above, while the process of socio-economic modernisation of 
Iran succeeded in incorporating Kurdish society into modern Iran by strengthening 
existing bonds and creating new ties, political modernisation encountered ethnic 
resistance on behalf of the Kurds. The Kurdish language and other cultural aspects 
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preserved Kurdishness. Modern Kurdayeti is thus directly related to the political 
modernisation of Iran based on the centralisation of power and cultural homogenisation. 
Kurdish cultural and political activities were the results of the modernisation and were 
enforced and encouraged by ongoing ideological transformations. 
Cultural resistance here refers to both intentional or organisational and 
unintentional use of Kurdish in cultural activities, which defied Persian cultural 
hegemony. At an organisational level, cultural activities since the early 1960s were 
organised by Kurdish university students. The Union for Kurdish Students organised 
meetings, distributed published books, and celebrated specific days such as the formation 
of Kurdish Republic of 1946.   143 Linguistic simplification and purification which aimed 
to promote Kurdish words and compose Kurdish dictionaries was also important, while 
meetings were organised in Swara Ilkhanizada’s residence in Tehran to discuss Kurdish 
literature and other topics of the day.144 Such practices continued when the Union 
terminated in the middle of the decade and during this time more connections with Iranian 
left-wing activists were established. Subsequently Kurdish university students were 
influenced by socialist ideas.145 These organised cultural practices were inevitably linked 
to political activities.  
At a more popular level, teachers and other social and cultural activists played 
significant roles in the resistance. As members of a new educated, urban generation were 
affected by a culture of change across Iran, they disseminated Kurdish cultural forms too. 
They benefited hugely from Kurdish music and poetry, now transmitted by various radio 
stations.146 At the same time, an ongoing intellectual transformation closely corresponded 
to current socio-economic transformation which made new socialist ideas very attractive. 
                                                          
143 Biglari, Interview. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Amini, Interview; Biglari, Interview. 
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It was for this reason that, for example, Aryanpur’s sociology class was packed,147 and 
Kurdish teachers or cultural activists across the Kurdish region established libraries and 
bookshops.148 A significant impact of this process, the ability of people to read and write 
in Kurdish increased. This was especially the case with those engaged with Kurdish 
literature because political oppression effectively suppressed the wider population from 
gaining Kurdish literary skills. The popular awareness of Kurdish culture, literature or 
history was limited. Indeed, the combination of Pahlavi’s increasing dictatorship and 
Persian cultural hegemony significantly restricted access to knowledge. The process of 
Persian cultural hegemony crucially popularised the idea of ‘Persian culture as a more 
advanced culture’.149 Many trends illustrate this. For example, using conventional 
religious names for children declined while choosing Persian names increased 
considerably,150and growing cities such as Sanandaj, a provincial centre, became more 
‘Persianised’ in lifestyle and language. ‘Persianised’ also meant more ‘Westernised’ and 
it was no surprise that the cleric Ahmad Muftizada emerged to represent an Islamic 
Kurdayeti in Sanandaj in 1979. 
Like music, another crucial aspect of Kurdish culture, that had become more 
important than before, was the celebration of Nowruz as a Kurdish tradition. In the context 
of cultural resistance alongside other written and customary ways to promote Kurdish 
culture, cultural and political activists began to treat the celebration of Nowruz and Kawa, 
the blacksmith, as a Kurdish new year and a Kurdish champion, respectively; such a 
tradition was also politicised.151 The roles of individuals were crucial in expanding 
Kurdish customs and traditions which, when combined, indicated their paradoxical 
                                                          
147 Biglari, Biglari, Interview. 
148 Kaiwan, Interview; Amini, Interview. 
149 Amini, Interview. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Biglari, Interview. 
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growth as distinct cultural traits in relation to the increasing socio-economic integration 
of Kurdish society. 
Nevertheless, because the state was not hostile to the practice of Kurdish 
language, dress and ways of life in public and private spheres (except for the use of the 
‘official’ language and dress code in education and administration), Kurdish cultural 
forms continued to be represented by dress, Kurdish weddings and dance, and, crucially, 
music. The continuation of Kurdish cultural ways of life was possible because numerous 
individuals endeavoured to preserve them through poetry, literature, folklore, 
historiography and social and political actions. One artistic area, which represented 
Kurdish culture more freely, was undoubtedly music. ‘Local music’, as it was referred to 
in contrast to ‘Iranian music’, featured in radio programmes, opening a new arena for 
Kurdish artists, musicians and singers to mature and commit themselves to Kurdish 
cultural practices. Like many other cultural areas, the interrelation of Kurdish and Persian 
music and the state’s ‘secular’ attitude to music allowed Kurdish music to prosper. 
However, as oral history accounts confirm, the contribution of individuals were crucial 
to promoting Kurdish music. Radio and other technical means of communication made 
many signers household names within a short span of time. However, Kurdish music 
remained strictly ‘local’ because it never achieved the status of Persian music which had 
Iran’s television and radio stations at its disposal. The lack of state support and inadequate 
institutional resources hindered the artistic transformation of Kurdish music, while 
Persian music’s enjoyment of infinite resources and new technology contributed to 
Persian cultural hegemony. Nevertheless, Kurdish music remained a formidable site of 
cultural resistance.  
Kurdish cultural resistance characterised various aspects of modern cultural 
encounters. It was represented in various organisational and popular levels. Some aspects 
of Kurdish culture such as music, boosted by the introduction of radio, continued to be 
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practiced widely, while other forms of cultural resistance included the establishment of 
libraries and bookshops, the distribution of books, poetry and musical cassettes. This 
occurred despite the fact that Kurdish literature was heavily suppressed by the state’s 
oppressive apparatus, and the combination of linguistic policies and Persian linguistic 
hegemony prevented the popularisation of Kurdish literacy skills. Due to resistance and 
formidable distinctive elements of Kurdish identity, the modernisation failed in 
homogenisation of Iranian identities, i.e. identities living within Iran. On the contrary, the 
modernisation strengthened Kurdayeti which endeavoured to emerge in new political and 
cultural forms. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Politically, the era of the White Revolution eventually came to be characterised by the 
concentration of political power and the state’s oppressive measures against its 
opponents. As regards Kurdish opposition, it revived throughout the decades following 
the demise of the Kurdish Republic of 1946 while simultaneously encountering major 
intellectual transformations in the 1960s and 1970s, shaping new theories and political 
actions. Oral history, along with a closer analysis of the events, defies the myth of the 
Rebellion of 1968-9 as a period of armed struggle, instead presents it as a juncture when 
at least a decade-long activism was effectively suppressed by the Iranian army, partly in 
collaboration with the Barzani movement. The next decade marked the emergence of an 
educated generation of Kurdish political activists whose ideas and actions reflected a 
transforming age, subsequently forming the nuclei of modern political parties; a 
distinctive characteristic of this generation was its critique of guerrilla warfare. The 
reinvigoration of Kurdish opposition along with the emergence of new movements were 
directly linked to the socio-economic modernisation of an exclusive state, a process 
which, while accelerated the incorporation of the Kurds into modern Iran, encountered 
resistance against homogenisation.  
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The main cultural consequence of modernisation was the cultural hegemony of 
Persian. Until relatively recently, Iranian cultures had lived side by side and did not 
perceive each other as alien; they were communities with shared history and culture. Prior 
to modern cultural encounters, political and cultural domination by the ruling state was 
maintained mainly through coercive measures, while Persian culture and language relied 
on its literary prestige and administrative continuity and not on systematic 
marginalisation of others—Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh shaped the historical consciousness of 
the Kurds while Sufism relied on Persian for its literary form of poetry. Although political 
centralisation and institutional modernisation, most importantly modern education, 
inaugurated a systematic promotion of Persian culture and language into ‘mainstream’ or 
‘Iranian’ since the early decades of the twentieth century, Persian cultural hegemony was 
effectively achieved during the era of the White Revolution because it irretrievably 
transformed cultural dimensions through its proliferation of the audio and visual means 
of communication. Of course, by then literacy had also increased considerably, resulting 
in more effective impacts of written modes of communication in this respect. However, 
the audio-visual means of communication revolutionised the nature of cultural 
encounters. Until its emergence, based on a national understanding of the past, modern 
education had continued to cultivate the idea of the cultural superiority of the Persian 
language over other languages which were defined as its less significant branches. 
However, the new means of communication and their profound psychological impacts 
made Persian’s ‘normality’ and ‘superiority’ common sense, thus giving Persian culture 
a hegemonic status. Simultaneously, the White Revolution institutionalised the concept 
of other cultures and languages, including Kurdish, as ‘local’. This is best recognised in 
the state’s prioritisation of Persian as the official and state-preferred medium of 
communication regarding technological innovations, and exemplified by the literary 
advances in Persian literature, supported by institutionalised education and innumerable 
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publication houses. However, Kurdish cultural and literary resistance continued with the 
effect that the Kurdish society of the end of the 1970s was culturally a synthesis of the 
dialectics of cultural homogenisation and Kurdish cultural resistance.  
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 27. Radio broadcasting, Cinema, Theatre, Library, Newspapers and Magazines, 1972-73. 
Source: Plan and Budget Organisation, Statistical Yearbook of Iran 1352 [March 1973 - March 1974] (Iran: 
Statistical Centre of Iran, 1975), pp. 141-145. 
 
 
 
Programmes Broadcasted by Voice of Iran, 1972 (hours)
Location Total
Iranian
Music
Local 
Music
Foreign
Music
Literacy,
 Science
Religious
Programmes Plays Varieties News
Voice of Iran 8,760 2,916 234 1,395 699 286 286 1,150 1,796
Sanandaj 5,715 655 810 186 1,234 582 203 875 1,170
Kermanshah 7,116 690 386 267 3,437 562 357 650 767
Marivan 525 150 150 0 60 45 60 20 40
Mahabad 6,176 980 815 150 1,600 310 335 47 1,939
1972 1973
Total 418 424
Markazi
Tehran 121 122
Other Cities 18 17
Kurdistan Province 6 6
1972 1973
Theatres Seats Attendance Theatres Seats Attendance
City
Total 13 4,856 374,000 14 5,450 325,420
Tehran 7 2,435 29,000 8 3,030 31,420
Sanandaj 1 350 35,000 1 350 15,000
Libraries Books
Total 308 1,035,658
Tehran 13 171,000
Central Province
excl. Tehran 17 63,000
Kurdistan 8 22,262
Newspapers, Weekly and Monthly Magazines, 1973
Administrative 
Divisions Total
News-
paper
Weekly
Magazines
Montly
Magazines
195
(1964=207) 39 31 57
Central 134 26 29 55
Kurdistan
1
(1945=3) 0 0 0
Theatre and Attendance
Public Libraries
Cinema by Administrative Divisons
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28. Theatre in Kurdistan. 
 
From top: Miri Nowroz celebration in Mahabad, reported by a French newspaper in 1895. Source: ‘Ubaildulla Ayyubiyan, “Mire 
Nowruzi,” 105; theatre in Kurdistan in the middle of the 1970s. Scenes from Shahid-e Zende [The Living Martyr], 1977; and an 
advertisement dated Day 2536 [January 1977]. In the middle picture, from right, perform Amjad Alimuradi, Ja‘far Ja‘fardust and 
Ebrahim Weisiyan. The last two individuals were active in Mahabad and Sanandaj, respectively. Source: Faruqi, Saqqez, 166-169. 
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Chapter 6: The Modernisation of Gender Relations 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sets out to discuss the transformation of the social status of women in 
Kurdish society during the era of the White Revolution, which was characterised by 
important developments in both private and public spheres across Iran. For example, as 
the people’s awareness of hygiene began to increase and medical care became available, 
the burden of childbearing lessened, and later, with the decrease in the size of families, 
women’s presence in the public sphere increased, which, in turn, led to their growing 
independence. Legal, educational, medical and economic changes which affected the 
social status of women, were taking place in the background. In a process which 
combined such factors to transform the place of women, women’s agency was integral. 
Inextricably related to the process of social change across Iran, this transformation was 
no less significant in Kurdish society. The new image of women in Kurdish-Iranian 
society of the end of the 1970s was a product of the social change and transformation Iran 
had experienced especially in the decades following the Second World War. Although 
the gradual ‘emancipation’ and changes in the position of women in society has been a 
hallmark of modern Iran, more interpretations of this process and analyses of the concepts 
involved are required to explain various aspects of that process.  However, an attempt to 
review the literature on women in the modernising Kurdistan of the second half of the 
twentieth century quickly reveals the scarcity, almost the absence, of gender studies 
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approaches to the historical period. Some exceptions are found in the recent, though 
inadequate, inclusion of women in Kurdish historiography.  
This chapter starts with a brief discussion of the redefinition of the role of women 
by intellectuals, including the Kurdish literati, in Asian society, upon contact with modern 
ideas. The result was an intellectual foundation to deal with the question of woman in the 
process of modern nation-building. This is followed by an overview of the social and 
linguistic foundations of the gender order in order to cast light on social conditions and 
identify change. Next, this chapter underlines the scientific, educational, legal and 
economic changes of the era which transformed social status of women in Kurdish society 
as well as across Iran. The last sections of this chapter include assessments of the two 
important phenomena of collective agency and resistance, which impacted the course of 
social change. 
For source materials, this chapter relies on oral history, memoirs and official 
statistics. However valuable, these sources also expose the scarcity of the studies of social 
change and gender on the period; these studies have only begun to appear since the early 
2000s, authored by university students and scholars of Kurdish studies in Iran.1 To a great 
extent, however, this deficiency is compensated by the more established field of Iranian 
gender studies on the Pahlavi era, because the changes in Iran affected all women, 
regardless of cultural differences.2 This is a crucial point to bear in mind, because it is 
precisely for such a reason that any categorisation of women based on ethnicity will blur 
the study of the process of change and transformation insofar as gender is concerned.  Of 
                                                          
1 Cf. Rezayi et al., "Sonnat, Nosazi Wa Khanewade"; Mohammadpur and Iman, "Taqhirate Ejtemai Dar 
Sardasht". 
2 Cf. Guity Nashat (ed.), Women and Revolution in Iran  (Colorado: West View Press, 1983); Afkhami, 
Zanan, Dowlat Va Jame'e Dar Iran: 1941-1978; Women's Organization of Iran, Hoquqe Zan Dar Iran 
(1357-1346) [Women and Law in Iran (1967-1978)] (n. p.: Foundation for Iranian Studies, 1994). 
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course, in multi-ethnic Iran this does not obviate the need for consideration of distinct 
cultural or political behaviours, which should be explained by referring to contexts which 
highlight them.  
 
MODERNITY AND THE IDEAS OF THE ‘NEW WOMAN’ AND THE ‘NEW MAN’ 
This section briefly underlines the intellectual origins of modern ideas regarding women 
in modern nation-states, in order to help the understanding of discursive and social 
changes to the social status of women.  Based on the literature and intellectual movements 
of the turn of the twentieth century, the modern idea of ‘nation’, based on the new concept 
of vatan (motherland), was accompanied by the concepts of progress and modern 
education; the latter had come to be perceived, as Namek Kemal emphasised, as ‘true 
vehicle of progress’ and an essential ingredient behind any nation’s scientific and 
historical advance.3 Cultivating such ideas especially since the early twentieth century, 
intellectuals in Asian societies also began a radical redefinition of the social place and 
role of women in society. Previous social movements throughout the nineteenth century 
such as Babism and Bahaism in Iran had addressed the oppression of women, and 
encouraged their education; this was explicitly stated in the latter movement’s Book of 
Bayan. Based on the writings of the female historian and poet of the nineteenth century, 
Mastoura Ardalan (1804-1844), Kurdish poetry as the main literary form also included 
critiques of the social status of women. She expresses discontent with a situation in which 
‘a [woman’s] head, worthy of an officer’s, is veiled’.4 However, the new era of nations 
and nationalism demanded more radical changes in perceptions and practice. In addition 
                                                          
3 Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, 37. 
4 Quoted in Mastura Kurdistani, Tarikhe Ardalan [The History of the Ardalans] (Kermanshahan: 
Bahrami, 1946), ت [T]. 
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to the femininity given to vatan or patrie as Motherland, this was because the perceived 
progress of the ‘nation’ stipulated well-educated generations (of men). Therefore, ‘new 
woman’ was considered as both educated and the educator of the (masculine) nation; this 
notion began to be supported by both secular and religious nationalism, the latter 
represented by Islamic reformism.5 This concept of new women became evident in the 
Middle East as Qasim Amin, an Egyptian lawyer, entitled his 1899 book The Liberation 
of Women. 
These ideas were embraced by Kurdish intellectuals with the effect that the traces 
of modernity, which entailed a modern view of women, can be detected since the early 
twentieth century in Kurdish literature, mainly represented by poetry. For example, after 
returning from Istanbul to Ottoman Kurdistan in the early twentieth century to convey the 
message of modernity, Piramerd (1867-1950) was one of the early advocates of the idea 
of the new woman among Kurdish modernists, linking taraqi vatan (the progress of the 
Motherland) along with awladi chak (good generation) to educated women.6 He insisted 
 
Only the educated girls 
Make the nation succeed 
Raise [the kind of] children [needed] 
For the nation to proceed.7 
 
Therefore, the need to educate women was justified by emphasising their roles as 
educated mothers in the progress of the new nation because, as Piramerd argued, progress 
                                                          
5 Cf. Qasim Amin, The Liberation of Women [and] the New Woman (Cairo: American University in 
Cairo Press, 2000). 
6 Omed Ashna (ed.), Piramerd, Vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Hawler: Aras, 2009), 27. 
7 Piramerd, Diwani Piramerdi Namir [the Eternal Piramerd's Collection of poetry], ed. Mohammad Rasul 
Hawar (Hawler: Shivan, 2007), 30-31. 
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stipulated a ‘good [i.e. well-educated and holding modern ideas] generation’. Later 
literary figures such as Fayaq Bekas (1905-1948), Qane‘, Goran (1904-1962) and Hemin 
continued the promulgation of ‘new woman’ throughout the twentieth century amid social 
and political transformations,8 though there were others such as Aladdin Sajjadi (1907-
1984), whose national refashioning of the Kurds and their history rejected ‘new woman’ 
because, according to him, women remained men’s intellectual inferiors despite 
education.9 
Kurdish Poetry also revealed the influence of other radical ideas. For example, 
seemingly influenced by the Iraqi poet Jamil Sidqqi al-Zahawi (1863-1936), Fayaq 
Bekas’s poems explicitly demanded unveiling as an essential step towards the 
emancipation of women; this aspect later influenced Hemin’s poetry too. Such ideas were 
received and popularised in intimate connection with the modernisation of ‘the nation’ in 
general, and the institution of education in particular. Observing women’s social 
inferiority, the idea of the new woman inspired educated and powerful women who 
exerted a profound impact on social change. Meanwhile, this modern redefinition of 
woman intimately involved a redefinition of men, aspiring to become a ‘modern man’ 
who had to play an active role in the making of the new woman; this indicated the 
modernisation of both femininity and masculinity, new ways by which gender roles were 
socially and culturally reconstructed in a changing world, in connection with each other. 
The abovementioned literary figures were mostly men, committed to that very goal. 
Alongside nation-building, the twentieth century can also be considered a century of 
making new women, while modernisation transformed the social organisation of sexual 
                                                          
8 See Qane‘s and Goran’s diwans or collections of poetry. 
9 Aladdin Sajjadi, Mezhui Adabi Kurdi [The Hisoty of Kurdish Literature] (Kurdish) (Sanandaj: 
Kurdistan, 1391 [2012-13]), 139. 
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difference.From this perspective, we can observe that modern Iran had produced a 
modern image of women by the end of the 1970s fundamentally different from the earlier 
generations. This process involved challenging enormous social and discursive obstacles 
that worked to maintain the social inferiority of women. Nevertheless, any comparative 
study of the early decades with later decades of the twentieth century will quickly reveals 
the remarkable scope of change.  
Women of various communities had always played active roles throughout history 
in the family and the workplace. These two spheres of life became more distinct with the 
expansion of a capitalist economy. Women in Kurdish communities of village, towns, 
and tribes contributed to economic production, and maintained the family, by undertaking 
more tasks and bearing more responsibilities than men. Prior to significant changes in the 
role of women in the family, women were mostly prepared for marriage; married women 
had to devote most of their time to childbearing or caring for children, with the effect that 
before they reached thirty-five many had already given birth to a high number of children. 
As a result, their chances of a better life were restricted. A number of interrelated factors 
(as discussed below) transformed the place of women in society in general, although for 
many, especially those in rural areas or the urban poor, conditions had not profoundly 
changed even by the end of the 1970s. 
Despite the contribution of intellectuals in Iran, Kurdistan and the region, in mid-
twentieth century Iran to be a woman still meant to be an asset in man’s possession,10 
with limited access to social resources. The hegemony of man and the subordination of 
woman were (re)produced by a constitutive discourse which banked on cultural symbols 
and social norms and was supported by the existing institutions such as religion. The 
                                                          
10 Qubadi, Interview. 
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interaction of these elements contributed to the definition of the woman who was 
represented by man, who ‘sets the standards of propriety for women’s behaviour, their 
role in society, and the kind of punishment meted out to women who did not abide by the 
social norms set for them’.11 The woman’s life, behaviour and dress code were shaped 
under both the visible and the invisible gazes of the patriarchal man. The continuation of 
the authority of the man through such norms and codes maintained a patriarchal system 
which was reinforced by a patriarchal language, biased religious practices and the politics 
of the ruling classes.12 A good Kurdish woman was idealised as pak (Ku. pure) or ma‘sum 
(Ku. pitiful and innocent), while one seen as immoral was addressed as behaya or 
besharm (shameless) to suggest that she lacked modesty and honour respectively. In this 
definition, the woman was but a sex object, a childbearing person and a housekeeper. In 
a mostly rural society, the culture of the Kurdish agha (landowner) shaped important 
aspects of the existing gender relations. It was these relations which began to transform 
with the expansion of a capitalist market economy, urbanisation, and modern education. 
However, the conditions of the past, i.e. religious norms, customs and cultural symbols, 
were also fundamental ingredients for (re)shaping gender relations. The transformation 
of the mode of production did not automatically transform social or cultural norms: as 
discussed further below, agency was crucial for social change. 
The linguistic reproduction of powerful masculinity and subordinated femininity 
was another crucial aspect of gender relations in Kurdish societies. As Amir Hassanpour 
has shown, deviance from mainstream social norms was associated with negative, but 
firmly institutionalised, traits such as hiz (literally, always ready for sexual intercourse) 
                                                          
11 Nashat, Women and Revolution in Iran, 5. 
12 For the role of Kurdish language see Amir Hassanpour, "The (Re)Production of Patriarchy in the 
Kurdish Language," in Shahrzad Mojab (ed.), Women of Non-State Nation: The Kurds (Costa Mesa: 
Mazda Publishers, 2001). 
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and makkar (cunning), which were framed as feminine qualities. On the other hand 
bravery, stamina and wisdom were qualities associated with men, who were naturally 
capable of ruling, judging and leading. Women of different social classes might have been 
distinguished materially or to some extent culturally, based on their degree of access to 
cultural capital. However, the definition of woman as the property of man, based on the 
norms of masculinity and femininity, applied more or less to any woman. 
According to Hassanpour, who has conducted extensive and excellent research on 
the subject, ‘the unequal distribution of gender power is clearly recorded in the Kurdish 
language, which is one of the ignored yet powerful sites in the exercise of patriarchal rule’ 
in Kurdish society.13 For example, zhin (Ku. woman) and piyaw (Ku. man) represent 
diametrically opposed qualities. Man connotes ‘human being’, while piyaw kushtin or 
piyaw khirap are used to refer to ‘to kill [a man]’ and ‘[becoming] a bad man’, 
respectively. Words for positive qualities are formed with a masculine suffix, for example 
(manliness, manhood), aza-yi (bravery) and netirs-i (fearlessness). By contrast, the words 
most associated with woman are traditionally feminine qualities such as namus (honour), 
abrru (honour), sharaf (honour), sharm (shame, shyness) and haya (modesty, sense of 
shame). Piyaw-ati, manliness, is a positive virtue, while wek-jin or zhinana, derived from 
the word for woman, connote being a coward and cowardly acts respectively. 
Moreover, language is not merely employed to maintain gender inequality and 
reinforce prejudice against women. At times, similar clichés are used to refer to women 
and minorities as a means of degradation. For instance, in Kurdish oral culture ‘women 
and the Jews share the stereotype as timid [while] men signify bravery’.14 To add to 
Hassanpour’s study, such designations are closely linked to social practices and to 
                                                          
13 Ibid., 227. 
14 Hassanpour, "Farhangi Zaraki Le Khuli Teknolozhiy Zamanda". 
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femininity, with the effect that the practices of marriage and divorce, genital mutilation 
and social exclusions, what are held to be ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’, etc., are shaped 
and supported by such discursive designations. Moreover, lexical, semantic and 
ideological constructions of patriarchy, extend into every layer of Kurdish oral and 
written culture. This is clearly seen in the many Kurdish dictionaries which later emerged. 
For example, Hazhar’s Hambana Borina reflects misogyny and functions to reproduce 
the existing power relations in Kurdistan.15 Nevertheless, resistance to the linguistic 
foundations of gender order in Kurdish societies constituted a crucial aspect of life, 
recorded in Kurdish language; examples of folklore and song which promoted the place 
of woman, also reflected linguistic resistance. 
 Societal change and resistance to patriarchy, and obstacles to them, formed other 
aspects of women’s lives. Into the 1970s, women still remained deprived of medical 
assistance and knowledge which were also scarcely available for the wider urban and 
rural populations. Pregnancy marked the most difficult time in women’s lives, with 
childbirth proving the major challenge. As a teacher recalls, 
 
Farasat, a woman from Digin village, continued to work on the carpet-weaving machine in 
spite of being pregnant. She spent long hours behind the machine while seated, which 
threatened her health seriously. I warned her about the consequences, but she wanted to finish 
the carpet as quickly as possible because she would not be able to work for a while after giving 
birth to her child. I could not do more [because there were no medical centre or doctors 
                                                          
15 Hazhar’s misogynist stance towards women can be seen in his celebrated book, Cheshti Mijawir. The 
fact that he was a prominent poet with an interesting, somewhat nebulous, background, gave him a 
linguistic authority, hence his dictionary instantly became very popular.  
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nearby]. The night she gave birth to her child, there was only the midwife with her unhygienic 
equipment.16   
 
Women in Iranian societies constantly encountered cultural and religious barriers set by 
the patriarchal system, determining what was ‘allowed’ or ‘disallowed’ for them. Women 
in conservative households were not supposed to share their problems with doctors, and 
were frequently reminded of the unsuitability of women’s education. Moreover, they 
were made to believe that ‘women’s diseases’ were a natural part of life, which either 
went away or stayed, depending on the will of the Supreme Being.17 Violence against 
women was widespread, and it was considered the duty of the man to ensure ‘his’ 
woman’s subordination. Women exercised no rights in marriage’ and had to succumb to 
norms and customs such as zhin ba zhin (exchange marriage) and early marriage 
engagement, even from birth. Writing about his childhood, the translator Muhammad 
Qazi (1913-1998) recalls how violence extended to the disruption of the life of women 
who, becoming widows following the death of their husbands, had to succumb to 
decisions made by others in order to survive; in many cases they were also separated from 
their children.18 Woman’s subordinated status was protected by the absence of rights to 
divorce husbands and choose partners. 
These all took place in a culture in which masculine norms shaped a ‘common 
sense’ which ruled social and cultural behaviours. Underneath were hidden forms of 
violence. One area was female genital mutilation (FGM), carried out in extremely 
unhygienic circumstances, inflicting enduring physical and psychological damage to 
                                                          
16 Gulrukh Qubadi, Shaqayeqha Bar Sanglakh: Zendegi Wa Zamaneye Yek Zane Kord Az Kordestane 
Iran [Poppies on Rocks: The Life and Time of a Kurdish Woman from Iran] (2015), 84. 
17 Mustafasultani, Interview. 
18 Muhammad Qazi, Khaterate Yek Motarjem [A Translator's Memoir] (Tehran: Zenderud, 1992), 19. 
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young girls, some still in infancy. Another ugly side to this practice was its secrecy. The 
same teacher quoted above remembers that, in spite of her close contact with the women 
of the village where she was teaching, she only found out about the practice of FGM by 
accident because women were forbidden to talk about their experiences in public.19 It is 
impossible to provide precise data, but based on various reports, one can reasonably 
speculate that the practice was carried out as a social norm in some areas or 
communities.20 In this way, control over both the woman’s body and her sexuality was 
ensured, while the imposed silence confirmed the normality of the practice. 
As noted in the previous chapters, in addition to household tasks and helping 
husbands or fathers on the land, women were exploited in carpet workshops across the 
Kurdish region. This economic role was not concealed. However, woman’s productive 
role on the land and in the family was not acknowledged as such, while working as skilled 
or semi-skilled labourers was linked to the economic needs of the family. As 
modernisation intensified, women began to achieve a better social status in many respects 
in the urban centres, while the growing demand for carpets increased the exploitation of 
women in such workshops mostly in the rural areas. Moreover, low wages and long hours 
characterised the working conditions in the workshops. For example, in Sanandaj and its 
vicinity, carpet workshops were set up for low-income or migrant women, while 
machines were installed inside family houses to exploit women and benefit from their 
work.21 According to Gulrukh Qubadi, a teacher and women’s activist in the 1970s,  
                                                          
19 Qubadi, Shaqayeqha. 
20 For a recent published work on the subject, cf. Fatema Karimi, Tragediye Tan: Khosunat 'Aleyhe Zanan 
[The Tragedy of the Body: Violence Against Women] (Tehran: Roushangaran, 1389 [2010]). The author 
explains in a video clip that she found out through her research, conducted in the 2000s in the Pava 
region, how FGM was considered by affected women as both normal and a religious duty, while the idea 
involved widespread stress and fear endured by girls who expected the same fate. See 
https://vimeo.com/51060946, accessed 13 December 2017. 
21 Qubadi, Interview. 
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Farah [Pahlavi] Agribusiness (sherkat-e sahami-zara‘i-e Farah) for the cultivation of 
opium and poppy seeds (Kheshkhash) also set up a carpet workshop in the Marenj Muzhezh 
region around Sanandaj. It only employed young girls to work under male or female 
managers who were trained in the art of carpet-weaving. They had long working hours, 
which lasted from 6 am to 6 pm. Breaks were every four or five hours during which the girls 
were taken out to do body exercise. Wages were paid to the girls’ fathers. When these young 
girls grew up, they continued to work as ‘self-employed’ on a machine purchased by their 
parents. Families benefited from their children who were either working in carpet-weaving 
workshops or on a machine set up in the household, whereas young girls endured hardship 
and received their wages in a dress or custom jewellery only once a year. There were other 
carpet workshops in other cities such as Kermanshah, Mariwan, Saqqez, Bukan and 
Minanduab [indicating the growth of the carpet industry]. Physical or other kinds of 
punishment undoubtedly existed, however we do not know if there was sexual harassment.22 
 
Migration and the expansion of the economy, as discussed in the previous chapters, 
increased women’s share in the workforce. More Kurdish women became brick-oven 
factory workers, cleaners, housekeepers and vendors. All these jobs involved harsh 
conditions. Female vendors included elderly women who had to sell their products, 
usually hot food, sometimes in extreme climates in open spaces of city bazaars. The need 
for more income was a decisive factor for the increase in the number of working women 
in urban centres, while considerably more rural women brought their products to sell in 
city markets. The women of the migrated families became residents of impoverished 
districts in the cities, and began to work as cleaners or baby-sitters to increase family 
income. This change had of course cultural implications for these women, who began to 
                                                          
22 Ibid. 
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become accustomed to an urban way of life. Moreover, seasonal workers who were 
exclusively male, left behind wives and children in uncertain circumstances and relying 
for protection on others.  
At the same time, modernisation was characterised by the growing employment 
opportunities for women who graduated from schools. Since the early 1960s the number 
of women in teaching and nursing increased because of the spread of modern education. 
In a change from the early decades of the century, these women no longer exclusively 
came from aristocratic families, because more primary and secondary schools for girls, 
as well as teaching and nursing training colleges, had popularised literacy and created 
employment opportunities for women in certain jobs (see Figure 17). A crucial aspect of 
this process was the increase in gender awareness of society, reflected in a generation of 
men in urban centres who were more open to the new ideas which aimed to enhance the 
social status of women. Furthermore, there were social customs and ways of life which 
prevented the seclusion of women and provided more space for their interaction with men, 
particularly in Kurdish communities. This was exemplified by the peculiarity of Kurdish 
wedding with mixed group dances and women’s intermingling with men, and the absence 
of strict religious ceremonies which characterised the Shi‘a religion (e.g. the 
commemoration of Imam Hussein in Muharram), which effectively decreased the 
segregation of men and women. Indeed, among the Kurds the celebration of the end of 
Ramadan or Feast of the Sacrifice, when religious duties were carried out, amounted to a 
public holiday. 
Woman’s subservience to man continued to be ensured and reinforced by religion 
in myriad ways. ‘Appropriate’ behaviour and dress code were required when a woman 
encountered religious authorities or entered sacred places. A woman’s access to powerful 
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positions was effectively restricted by assigning her to seemingly sacred roles whose 
fulfilments ensured her purity and God’s satisfaction. The mosque too remained a 
masculine space; however, there were other spaces such as Takya, where they could 
perform religious ceremonies. Although such religious institutions for women increased 
in urban centres in the 1960s and 1970s, participation mainly came from an older 
generation of women, in search of spiritual help.  
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THE IMPACT OF THE WHITE REVOLUTION ON THE PLACE OF WOMEN IN SOCIETY 
The era of the White Revolution was characterised by important interrelated factors which 
profoundly affected the social status of women in Kurdish society. The following section 
concentrates on the scientific, educational, legal, and economic changes, as well as 
women’s collective agency. The approach in identifying and explaining these factors is 
informed by a non-developmental view and the perception of the White Revolution as 
primarily a phenomenon that modernised the existing gender relations.  
 
The new science and modern education 
The topic of new science was discussed in relation to the expansion of modern healthcare 
in Chapter 4. However, a brief discussion of the topic is also required here. The 
introduction of women to new medical science in Kurdistan entailed their gradual 
emancipation from the previous conditions of childbirth and lack of hygiene, thus creating 
more opportunities in life. According to oral accounts, the introduction of contraceptives 
and their free distributions especially since the 1960s was the significant step in that 
direction.23 This was not an isolated incident, but was accompanied by the expansion of 
medical means and knowledge, hygienisation and the increase in the number of women 
working as medical staff, who ‘enthusiastically worked to ameliorate the existing 
conditions’.24 
However, the urban and rural centres’ share in the new scientific technologies and 
medicine was not equal. While cities continued to benefit from new healthcare, rural areas 
developed at a slow pace in that direction because of poor infrastructural and geographical 
conditions, as well as the absence of the state, as discussed in previous chapters. This 
                                                          
23 'Azizpur, Interview. 
24 Ibid. 
 293 
 
asymmetrical relationship with technology had enduring effects and outlasted the era of 
the White Revolution. For example, a doctor recalled how he carried out an operation in 
Sardashat in 1979 to extract a stillborn child that had remained in the mother’s abdomen 
for three days. This had caused the mother unbearable pains, without having access to 
any medical advice to identify what caused the pain.25 Despite improvements in social or 
medical conditions, the urban-rural disparity remained a formidable obstacle to the 
improvement of conditions for many women.  
Modern education in Iran was undoubtedly another significant institution the 
impact of which on women and society cannot be overestimated. The idea of modern 
education for girls in Iran had become more acceptable by 1918, when the first public 
school for girls was opened following a limited number of private or missionary schools, 
which had started operating since 1907. The first such schools in Sanandaj in Iranian 
Kurdistan were opened in the early years of the 1920s. Although more primary and 
secondary schools for girls were established in the bigger cities of Kurdistan by the end 
of the 1930s, schools for girls only proliferated in the second half of the century (see 
Chapter 4). Until there were more female teacher training institutions, the shortage of 
teachers was a significant factor which, combined with other educational deficiencies, 
hindered women’s education.26 
For women, modern education continued to distinguish the present from the past. 
Among the upper classes, as noted above, literacy and greater social and political roles 
for women were not alien concepts. Modern education, too, became more accessible to 
the women of the better-off families first. For example, in Sanandaj during the early 
decades of the modern state women from aristocratic families, such as Mo‘tamed Vaziri, 
                                                          
25 Ibid. 
26 Qubadi, Shaqayeqha. 
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went to primary schools for girls between seven and twelve years’ old. Based on the old 
six-class system, and due to the lack of secondary school, students could become teachers 
after accomplishing the six-year education. Some women founded other schools for girls 
in Sanandaj upon their graduation elsewhere and their return to the city.27 By the end of 
the 1930s, across Kurdish cities the number of girls and young women from prominent 
families in education increased, as did the number of schools. This process gradually 
impacted social attitudes to women in education, and with the impact of political events, 
more women from the wider population were encouraged to seek education. For example, 
a women’s society, Yakiati Afratani Kurdistan (Kurdistan’s Women Union), was founded 
in Mahabad under the Kurdish Republic in 1946, possible because of a new intellectual 
atmosphere in the region since the early 1940s in which the Organisation of Kurdish 
Revival stood out for its progressive publications and activities. The society’s aim was to 
educate women, while a modern image of woman was even advocated by prominent 
Kurdish men such as Qazi Muhammad, the head of the Republic.28 Nevertheless, 
dominant patriarchal views continued to exclude women, including the members of the 
society, from political participation in the Republic. For example, as Mina Qazi, Qazi 
Muhammad’s wife and a founder of the society recalled later, ‘when the Republic was 
announced in [Mahabad’s] city square, we watched from afar in our home’.29 No specific 
role was assigned to women in the Republic, other than a limited friendly attitude towards 
literacy for women. Nevertheless, the new idea of women’s emancipation was 
incorporated in the political and social agendas of Kurdish activists, and the interruption 
of the experience of Mahabad, a phenomenon of the early 1940s, was a serious setback 
                                                          
27 Qubadi, Interview. A teacher in the 1970s, Qubadi can recollect stories told by her mother about 
women education in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
28 Oremar, Interview with Mina Qazi, 16-18. 
29 Ibid. 
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for attempts to enhance the social status of women in society. The political situation of 
the early 1940s in general and the Republic in particular facilitated intellectual 
transformations, exemplified by Nishtiman, and enabled the formation of such societies. 
According to Mina Qazi, the society aimed to eradicate illiteracy and create opportunities 
for Kurdish women to prosper and ‘serve their society’.30 
The efforts of women of urban upper classes became the guidelines for modern 
education, encouraging the establishment of more schools for girls in Kurdish urban 
centres. Modern education for girls developed greatly, until it achieved the emergence of 
a generation of educated women who, as the result of the expansion of primary and 
secondary schools for women in Kurdistan, became representative of the women of the 
1970s. Although the expansion of schools on this scale was only possible because of the 
intensified modernisation, this does not undermine the tireless determination of the 
previous generation of women who helped popularise modern education for women. The 
introduction of the Literacy Corps in rural areas, according to a teacher from the time, 
was a turning point which presented women with an opportunity to teach. Simultaneously 
some men, influenced by the intellectual transformation of the time, became more aware 
of gender issues.31 The intellectual atmosphere of the 1960s and 1970s was crucial in 
encouraging political and cultural activists to advocate teaching in the most deprived 
regions. In these circumstances, and encouraged by other activists, more educated 
Kurdish women chose teaching to expand literacy, which involved engaging with women 
in need.32 The Literacy Corps was a crucial means to that end.33 Although the presence 
of any member of the Literacy and Medical Corps in deprived regions was a new 
                                                          
30 Ibid., 17-18. 
31 Kaiwan, Interview. 
32 Qubadi, Interview. 
33 Ibid. 
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development per se, for those who had incorporated the era’s ideological transformations 
and were receptive to progressive and left-wing ideas, this meant more active involvement 
in social change. For example, as Qubadi recalls, 
 
We [teachers] worked longer hours in the village school, organised after-school clubs, 
eschewed corporal punishment, and paid attention to the pupils’ family circumstances. We 
were friendly, mixed with women and their families, and listened to their problems. Teachers 
taught large classes. For example, when I was a teacher in Zarrin Chia village around 
Kermanshah [in the middle of the 1970s], I had 30 to 40 (Year 1 to Year 5) pupils. All stayed 
in the same class. Ten were girls. People began to send their girls to school more than before. 
We established strong relationships with people to be able to convey progressive and 
emancipatory ideas [to them]. We organised meetings with women to discuss domestic 
violence, which was common, and find solutions when they sought advice on marriage and 
family problems. Despite unfavourable conditions, teaching was a thrilling experience which 
hugely impacted on a community’s life.34 
  
The availability of female teachers also created a help point for women to seek advice, in 
most cases for the first time, on social or cultural issues. In the absence of relevant state 
institutions in the rural areas, the presence of female teachers and their community work 
had become very significant. Whilst they had the authority of the state behind them, their 
constructive approach to work stemmed from their intellectual dispositions, and their 
willingness to go to rural areas in need and spontaneously engage in extra social work 
merits recognition. 
  
                                                          
34 Ibid. 
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Legal and economic changes 
The modern state was in favour of a new image for women, allowing legal changes in 
favour of women. In addition to new civil laws, the most significant event was the forced 
unveiling of 1936, which intended to ‘emancipate’ women but had the impact on shutting 
women back in the sphere of home Although young school girls had started to go to 
school in school uniforms even before this law, once the law passed their mothers in many 
cases preferred to stay home for fear of forced unveiling and abuse from the police.35 The 
banning of the veil entailed (passive) resistance from women by staying home. 
Nevertheless, it gradually institutionalised a new women’s dress code in schools and a 
less veiled type of dress in public. Its later implication was that legal and state support for 
women could be effective, eventually institutionalising a new dress code for women.36 
Kurdish women, specifically those living in the village, were not accustomed to strict 
veiling. However, they had been veiled enough according to Islamic dress code. The 
chashew/chador (Ku./Pe. open cloak) was customary, as was other forms of headgear for 
women. Initially, the proposed dress code (1936) seemed too foreign to the culture, and 
impractical (see Figure 33), to be implemented by force. 
The new family laws were other crucial actions for which the pressure of women 
had been indispensable. However, without the power of the state, such laws could not 
have been materialised. Combined with other educational or medical developments, these 
laws increased the age of marriage for both sexes and bestowed upon women more rights 
in marriage, family and child custody.37 Because of religious opposition and the Shah’s 
                                                          
35 Qubadi, Shaqayeqha, 21-22. 
36 Camron Michael Amin, The Making of the Modern Iranian Women (Gainesville: California University 
Press, 2002).  
37 See these laws in Hoquqe Zan Dar Iran (1357-1346), 351-62. 
 298 
 
conservatism, these laws had their own limits. Nevertheless, they represented major 
advances in the legal status of women. 
While the increase in the number of women in new jobs also owed itself to the 
expansion of modern education, employment provided economic independence and 
empowered women in both the home and in public. The socio-economic transformation 
created or increased new opportunities in teaching, nursing and the private sector. The 
Kurdish society of the 1960s had significantly become accustomed to women working as 
teachers, secretaries or nurses, and to their growing independent presence in public. 
Women had also been a part of production, as noted before, and the expansion of the 
economy also expanded their economic involvement. However, the achieved degree of 
independence in new jobs, which required prior education, created a new dimension in 
the existing gender relations in favour of women. Indeed, this accentuated the resistance 
of men to women’s empowerment, even in middle class families.38 
The share of women in this empowerment was not of course equal. Another 
important factor which restricted the positive impacts of legal and economic changes on 
the place of women, remained the gap in incomes and the economic well-being of families 
across different classes and regions. Economically, the majority of women joined the 
new, growing Kurdish working class. Babysitters, cleaners, market vendors and 
housekeepers increased many-fold. The internal migrant women resided in the new poor 
city districts on the outskirts of the cities. Most of them had lost their previous productive 
role in agricultural production without being provided with better economic 
opportunities. As noted in the previous chapters, many women ended up in brick-oven 
                                                          
38 Qubadi, Interview. 
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factories, enduring harsh living and working conditions. There were no protective labour 
laws for anyone. 
Therefore, the relationship between the economy and gender followed an 
undulating pattern, while economic well-being and educational background affected the 
degree of economic empowerment of women. Nevertheless, socio-economic changes 
introduced women to new possibilities in life which could not have been imagined a few 
decades earlier. For example, despite the hardship involved, working outside the home or 
residing in cities entangled women with others who endeavoured to enhance women’s 
social status.39 Actively pursued by Iranian women’s organisations, new laws to improve 
working conditions for women followed the expansion of women workforce.40 This 
involved a discursive battle on behalf of the Woman’s Organisation to create a fertile 
ground for the public supporting laws protecting women workers. The Organisation 
proclaimed that ‘Today, working is an honour for woman’,41 and advised women that 
‘Evening times are the time for doing household tasks and helping the children with their 
homework’.42 Nevertheless, this conservatism was compensated by an ardent cultivation 
of the notion of ‘the equality between men and women’, and providing previously non-
existent advice for working women and mothers.43 These created the ground for a possible 
labour law, which promised the support of the state. The following message of the 
Organisation reflected the realities of the time, including cultural resistance to improving 
the place of women, the ambivalent position of the White Revolution – i.e. both its 
modernising impact and its conservatism – and the significance of women’s agency: 
                                                          
39 Ibid. 
40 Hoquqe Zan Dar Iran (1357-1346), 362-74. 
41 Cf. Ibid., 314. 
42 Cf. Ibid., 322. 
43 Cf. Ibid., 312, 15, 19 and 23-48. 
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The White Revolution placed our country at the crossroads of progress and development. The 
share of women [in the Revolution], especially that of working women, has been more than 
others. [This is] because, on the one hand, their right to vote was recognised and, on the other, 
in the same way as their brothers, they became shareholders in factories […] [unlike before] 
the wages for men and women are equal […] working is an honour for woman and a woman 
is worth more if she can work, because her wages will enhance the economic well-being of 
the family and bring prosperity.44 
 
Finally, the appearance of women in the domains of sports and the arts, as further 
significant aspects of socio-economic and cultural modernisations, should alert us to other 
significant, thus far neglected, aspects of modernisation. Physical education constituted 
an aspect of modern education in Iran, and grew with the latter’s expansion. Like modern 
education, it gained a special place in the modern, nationalising state; however, new 
sports required pioneers who, influenced by progressive and national ideas of the time, 
actively advocated a healthy education at least since the 1930s.45 Although by the mid-
1970s the expansion of sports had considerably included school girls and created a firm 
foundation for women in sport, descriptive histories of men in sport in Kurdistan have 
totally ignored women.46 According to official statistics, quantitatively, in 1973-74 in 
table tennis, basketball, fencing, volleyball and handball, there were respectively 474, 
248, 57, 366 and 76 female participants in Kurdistan Province, compared to 1124, 336, 
84, 1123 and 82 male participants.47 Combined with oral accounts and photographic 
                                                          
44 Ibid., 310-11. 
45 Cf. Amuzesh wa Parvaresh, Vol. 9, No.5 (Mordad 1318 [1939], 7. 
46 Cf. Bahram Mehrpaima, Pishineye Warzesh Dar Saqqez-Kordestan [The Genesis of Sport in Saqqez-
Kurdistan] (Tehran: Tavakoli, 1390 [2011]). 
47 Plan and Budgent Organisation, Daftarcheye Amare Iran [Statistical Notebook of Iran] (Iran: Statistics 
Centre, 1976), 133-36. 
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evidence, a rising proportion of women in sport can be seen, which signalled the profound 
transformation of conventional sports which had been dominated by men. The growing 
presence of women in sport could not have been possible without the firm foundation 
which was laid during the modernisation of education. 
Music and cinema became other spheres in which the traditional conception of 
women was challenged, with the creation of new roles for women and the modernisation 
of the existing perceptions. The cinematic arts perpetuated the image of women, now 
literate and working, as sexual beings facing the constant threat of offensive attitudes, or 
as sexually vulnerable to prostitution because of poverty; for these reasons, the protection 
of men as their saviours was constantly required. At the same time, the increasing number 
of women in educational and healthcare jobs, or as singers, writers and poets with literary 
and artistic influence, helped create and transform the perceptions of the new generation 
of educated, urban men. The growing presence of women in such fields coincided with 
the proliferation of the audio and, especially, visual means of communication such as 
radio and television, which maximised their impact on society, forcing the 
reconfiguration of the boundaries of masculinity and femininity. Qualitatively, the 
women of the early twentieth century and women of the 1970s could not be compared in 
their social position and attitudes, which also applied to men. 
In 1978, 
 
The women’s share in Iran’s work force was approximately two million, including 190,000 
with university education and expert training. 144,000 women worked as civil servants, 
including 1,666 women with various managerial posts. The number of [female] university 
lecturers exceeded 1,800 [while] there were women working in the army and police force 
or as lawyers, judges and engineers. The theology faculties [in the universities] were the 
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only institutions which did not have any place for women. In 1978, as a result of the 
endeavours of organised women’s groups for encouraging the political and electoral 
participation of women, 333 women were elected the members of local councils. In the same 
year, there were 22 [female] members of the Majlis [Parliament] and another two members 
of the Senate.48 
 
Collective agency 
Interrelated with other the factors discussed above, women’s agency was an indispensable 
factor in the transformation of the place of women in Iran in general. To include this 
factor in an analysis of the cultural transformation of the period, is to emphasise the 
actions undertaken by a generation of educated women, who were intellectually shaped 
by progressive ideas of the time. These actions included the establishment of schools, 
women’s organisations, help points, social work in difficult conditions in villages or 
among the poor, and political agitation towards forcing new elections and the legislation 
of family laws. These actions were not meagre. It was women’s collective agency that 
primarily explains the distinction between Iran, which experienced a notable 
transformation of gender relations, with some other neighbouring countries, which went 
through much more limited, institutional changes. In Iran, because of the profound 
institutional changes a higher status of women was preserved although a woman-friendly 
state was replaced by an ideologically strict and misogynist one. Furthermore, incessant 
intellectual transformations in Iran since the Constitutional Revolution, and later the 
emergence of political parties in the 1940s (the Tuda) and 1960s, e.g. Fedayyan, which 
became a platform for women’s activism, cannot be overemphasised. 
                                                          
48 Hoquqe Zan Dar Iran (1357-1346), 18-19. 
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The connection with the outside world, the expansion of the new means of 
communication, and revolutions and movements, including the advance of feminism, 
were all reflected in a generation of Iranians’ writers, poets, and social and cultural critics 
among which women stood out and provided role models. Confirmed by the oral accounts 
of women workers, teachers and local activists, this occurred in a situation of extreme 
hardship, within a hostile culture and under a politically oppressive state during the era 
of the White Revolution. The historical lesson derived from this is that collective agency 
is a crucial factor for bringing about the institutional transformations regarding women in 
Iran. Presenting a challenge to visible and invisible practices involving women, directly 
or indirectly, was possible because of ‘new women’, whose emergence owed itself to 
many interrelated factors, discussed above. New lifestyles made social norms or practices 
unfavourable to women look outdated and encouraged action; the existence of a 
generation of women, whose emancipation had begun and who were fighting for their 
further emancipation, was to radically transform the existing gender relations or social 
norms in Iran in the period in question. Indeed, as one can infer from recent reports of 
international organisations, governments legal actions are not effective without the 
existence of a social force, i.e. socially and politically active women, to transform social 
norms.49   
This said, while recognising women’s activism in Kurdistan in the era of the White 
Revolution, one cannot imagine the elevated place of women in Kurdish-Iranian society 
outside the history of Iran in the twentieth century. As the society’s socio-economic 
integration into modern Iran continued, the place of women became increasingly linked 
                                                          
49 Cf. United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), Femal Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical 
Overview (New York: 2013),available at: http://data.unicef.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/FGMC_Lo_res_Final_26.pdf. 
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with the way gender relations in Iran were being transformed. By the 1940s, feminism in 
Iran had entered public discourse as a consequence of Iranian women’s activism, reforms 
and new laws in the preceding years.50 Two world wars, which brought women of many 
countries into factories in a massive scale, the Russian Revolution, and other social 
movements, were as crucial in spreading the ideas of women’s emancipation and gender 
equality. As a result, by the 1960s a widespread nehzat-e zanan or women’s movement 
in Iran had gradually taken form, represented by various women’s organisations.51 
Without the pressure from this movement, the right of women to vote would not have 
materialised in 1963. Indeed, family laws, ratified by the Parliament in the following 
years, which radically altered the gender relations in Iran, were owed to the actions of the 
women’s organisations. However, the movement still needed to become more powerful 
and self-aware if women were to achieve more rights and enhancement of their social 
status.52 This led to more liaisons with the state, the support of which the movement hoped 
to attract by appealing to Princess Ashraf, the reigning Shah’s twin sister. As the result of 
several months of research by a group of women’s leaders, the Women Organisation was 
formed with the Princess as its honorary president. The Organisation’s first congress in 
1966 consisted of 5,000 members who had come from different parts of Iran to ratify the 
Organisation’s Constitution.53 
The Women Organisation was an amalgamation of many smaller organisations 
which had been launched by women’s activists, and had been proliferating across Iran. 
As a result of its liaison with the state and, positively, with male ministers in power, the 
Organisation became more powerful. Its efforts affected, for example, school textbooks, 
                                                          
50 Amin, The Making of the Modern Iranian Women, 7-8. 
51 Afkhami, Zanan, Dowlat Va Jame'e Dar Iran: 1941-1978, 39. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 39-40. 
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a more favourable labour law for working women, family law and penal codes.54 Its 
branches spread across Iran—there were 10 branches in the Kurdistan Province—
encouraging women’s more active participation in society.55 According to the director of 
the Organisation, Mahnaz Afkhami, the Shah was supportive but remained conservative 
for fear of the reaction of the religious hierarchy.56 The biggest hurdle was an ingrained 
patriarchal ideology, supported by culturally deep-rooted religious institutions. The 
Shah’s support emanated from his character, but more importantly from the need for a 
new place of women in the modernising Iran too, while his conservatism reflected the 
contemporary social and cultural struggles. 
Although the women’s societies continued their existence independently, Iran’s 
Women Organisation gradually became more centralised as the result of its liaison with 
the state. Seeking to accumulate political influence through powerful individuals and 
ministers initially yielded the desired results. However, in the long run, according to 
Mahnaz Afkhami, the Organisation became too aligned with the state, especially when 
making a mistake of supporting the new one-party system which only recognised the 
Rastakhiz Party:57 ‘This made many dissidents of the [Shah’s] regime suspicious of the 
Organisation’.58 Nevertheless, the women’s movement and the Organisation left an 
indelible mark on Iran with their major contributions to the enhancement of the social 
status of women in Iran. With distinct cultural characteristics, imagining the new women 
in Iran without the women’s movement is impossible. 
 
                                                          
54 In textbooks working women were represented as better mothers in order to appease the patriarchal 
system. They did also advocate 8-hour work days and the establishment of nurseries within factories. 
Hoquqe Zan Dar Iran (1357-1346), 316.  
55 Ibid., 387. 
56 Afkhami, Zanan, Dowlat Va Jame'e Dar Iran: 1941-1978, 101. 
57 Ibid., 217. 
58 Ibid. 
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Resistance 
A significant aspect of the existing gender relations was undoubtedly women’s resistance 
to different forms of male dominance, manifest in the various ways in which they 
interacted with their environment. Examining the conditions of women from this 
perspective allows for a change of perception from women as a category in development 
theories or an en mass force, to women as human beings with names and faces. In this 
regard, it is very productive to use Ilan Pappe’s notion of ‘autonomous space’ which 
women created to cope with a male-dominated society or to organise and manage their 
lives.59 While Pappe concisely stresses the importance of legal and social ‘reforms from 
above […] initiated by the state, and by the well publicized feminism of “women 
worthies”’,60 the roles of educated women and organised feminism in Iran which made 
‘reform from above’ and changes in the legal system possible, need to be underlined. 
Therefore (Pappe seems to miss this point) it was not simply the ‘secularisation of the 
legal system’ by the state, but pressure from below along with the ongoing tension 
between (organised) women, the state and the religious establishments, on the one hand, 
and between the state and the religious institutions, on the other, which determined the 
scope of change of the social status of women. According to Pappe, the secularisation of 
the Middle Eastern states after World War I created ‘better opportunities for effecting a 
significant transformation in the position of women through legal reforms’. However, he 
maintains, ‘it was left to state officials in high positions to formulate and execute new 
policies in women’s favour if they were inclined to do so’ (emphasis added).61 
                                                          
59 Pappe, Modern Middle East, 224. 
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In the case of Iran, women’s activism, exemplified by publications and 
organisations, had preceded the modern state of Iran;62 ‘same-tireless dedication was 
responsible for bringing about the passage of Family Protection Law in 1967 and its 
amendment in 1973’.63 State officials’ dispositions were decisively affected by the 
existence of such a pressure and, insofar as the state was concerned, it relied on political 
acts to have impact on women’s social or legal status. The infamous kashf-e hejab, or 
unveiling, was a case in point. It aimed to create a superficial modern image of Iranian 
women while women organisations such as Women’s League were being eliminated and 
disbanded.64 As another illustration of this, the right of women to vote in Iran, which was 
incorporated into the principles of the White Revolution, only came after the symbolic 
participation of women in the previous election, which forced the state to change the 
election laws in favour of women in 1963. As Pappe rightly argues, the state’s reforms 
related to women resulted from economic or political considerations.65 Although the 
support of state, especially in the face of the mounting opposition of religious forces, was 
crucial, a study of women’s activism since the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 shows 
that ‘above all, it was the tireless effort of hundreds of committed women for more than 
fifty years that finally brought about the passage of this [election] law’.66 This point is 
further illuminated by comparative studies of the status of women in Iran and other 
                                                          
62 For example, as Nashat shows, early publications included Shukufeh (Blossom), Zaban-e Zanan (The 
Women’s Voice) and ‘Alam-e Naswan (The World of Women), ‘undertaken by the women activists to 
enlighten women’. Two early societies formed in the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 
were Anjoman-e Azadi-ye Zanan (the Women’s Freedom Movement) and Anjoman-e Mukhadarat-e 
Vatan (National Ladies’ Society). For this see Guity Nashat, "Women in Pre-Revolutionary Iran: A 
Historical Overview," in Guity Nashat (ed.), Women and Revolution in Iran (Colorado: West View Press, 
1983), 22 and 24. 
63 Ibid., 30. 
64 Ibid., 28. 
65 This chapter’s observations on Pappe’s argument, which is in favour of writing women histories with a 
new methodology, complements his valuable study and his deconstructive approach to concepts 
popularised by modernisation and development theories. 
66 Nashat, "Women in Pre-Revolutionary Iran", 30. 
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regional countries. As a case in point, as Pappe noted, Jordan failed to keep pace with 
others in introducing reforms related to the status of women.67 There may be many 
reasons for the different chronologies and paces of change related to women; however, 
the tradition of organised feminism and the impact of pressure from below are significant 
factors which explain the differences of processes related to women in different countries, 
from Tunisia to Iran to Afghanistan.68 The histories of women are intertwined with 
women’s efforts to reform their societies’ gender order. 
As their incorporation into modern Iran continued to accelerate, Kurdish-speaking 
women in Iran were increasingly affected by the gradual modernisation of gender 
relations. In different ways, changing historical and social contexts presented new 
opportunities for them to challenge social norms. In Kurdish society, microhistories can 
be uncovered through the seemingly trivial stories of excluded women, or of major 
histories relating to the educated, urban generation which redefined women’s role in both 
private and public spheres. These stories include cases in which women, encountering a 
female teacher for the first time in the 1970s, express opinions on customs such as forced 
marriage and female genital mutilation and against domestic violence, and interesting 
tales of, for example, the cooperation of the wives of the same landowner to maintain a 
role in the management of the community, despite the fact that polygamous marriage 
created unfavourable conditions for the women involved. Represented by prominent 
women, women’s societies, and educated and working women, the microhistories record 
social and political activism throughout the twentieth century.  
                                                          
67 Pappe, Modern Middle East, 235. 
68 The absence of this factor becomes more conspicuous when Pappe seems to attribute the process of 
change mainly to the state changes related to the status of women in Iran under the Pahlavis, without 
making the pressure from below central to these changes. This leads to an incorrect conclusion about 
women not defending the Pahlavi state during the 1979 Revolution. For this ibid., 237-38. 
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The presence of prominent women throughout Kurdish history undoubtedly exerted 
a great impact on their communities’ perceptions of gender. The existence of such 
‘women worthies’ was not, however, exclusive to the Kurds, and more importantly the 
acceptance of their powerful role, according to studies on women in the early modern 
times, probably stemmed from the fact that the hierarchies of social class or genealogy 
outweighed gender as a determinant of social role.69 The upper class in pre-modern 
Kurdish principalities, e.g. Soran, Ardalan and Baban, contained ‘women worthies’ 
throughout successive centuries. They emerged as poets (Mastura Ardalan), or as activists 
(Habsa Khan Naqib, 1891-1953), who is believed to have founded the first women’s 
society in 1930 in Sulaimaniya in modern Iraq, or as community leaders (the provincial 
governor of Halabja, ‘Adila Khanim, 1848-1924). Many such individuals functioned as 
points of support for women of the lower strata too. The women of the landowner’s 
household did not always belong to the upper class. According to published memoirs, in 
the first decade of the twentieth century, the three wives of the agha of Delawan village 
worked as a team, under the supervision of the older wife, to manage the myriad tasks of 
the landowner’s household and also the community around it.70 In this way, they created 
their own autonomous space, including a help point for other women to rely on.  
In some Kurdish regions, radu khistin (Ku. elopement) challenged forced marriage 
in favour of mutual love. In a region like that of Sardasht in west of Iranian Kurdistan, a 
woman could succeed in choosing her partner for life by conducting marriage through 
elopement. The eloped couple took refuge in a powerful household, usually that of a 
landowner or a tribal chief, after which attempts were made to achieve the consent of the 
                                                          
69 Wiesner-Hanks, "Gender", 107. 
70 Hesami, Le Bireweriekanim, 22. The author (1926-2001) was a Kurdish political activist and a teacher. 
His memoirs contain valuable observation on such women’s life, however, without providing any 
analysis.  
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woman’s family to the marriage. As an insult, a woman could be mocked by other women 
‘for not being fit for elopement’. However, not all cases of elopements ended peacefully. 
In some regions such as Mangorayeti, located between Sardasht and Mahabad, elopement 
continued to be practiced until the 1980s. 
As noted in Part I, women formed the most vulnerable section of society throughout 
the vicissitudes of the twentieth century. Rafiq Helmi reported how women, who had to 
leave their homes in Iranian Kurdistan during World War One and enter Ottoman 
Kurdistan, were forced to engage in prostitution to survive, while Hemin recalled the 
trading of young girls for a sack of flour during the next war. Consistently missed by 
national historiography, Kurdish movements relied heavily on women; whilst the men 
were fighting, women endured hunger and the consequences of forced banishment. They 
were always the first to suffer from the governments’ brutal oppressive machine. A 
typical example was Azad’s, a Kurdish boy living under the Ba‘th regime, mother, who 
followed her husband who was a Peshmarga of Mulla Mustafa Barzani during the 1960s 
and 1970s. Throughout those years, she had to take care of many children, giving her 
consent to her husband’s ideas and orders ‘by only saying OK’.71 
Political movements, often rather indirectly, engaged women in politics. Later 
political upheavals and uprisings during or in the post-World War Two era, such as the 
Kurdish Republic, the crisis of the nationalisation of oil in Iran, and the peasant uprisings 
across Bukan region in Iranian Kurdistan, increased women’s direct participations in 
politics. Village councils included female representatives in many cases.72 Patriarchal 
gender relations ensured women’s participations were within the boundaries of the 
existing patriarchal system. However, inevitably the historical events affected social, 
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political and gender awareness of all. An illustration of this is the story of Mina from 
Qoital village around Sardasht, whom a teacher met in the end of the 1970s. Among the 
local people, Mina was known for being brave and free-minded. Her husband, Husein, 
had regularly defied the landowners, and later began to help the group around Sharifzada 
and Mu‘eini (see the previous chapter) during the 1960s. After marrying Husein, Mina 
became engaged in political activities. She would hide and escort other activists to pass 
checkpoints safely, deliver correspondence and undertake logistic tasks. At the end of the 
1970s, ‘Mina had three children whose characters resembled hers in many ways’.73 
Finally, the new educated, urban generation could count on an unwavering support from 
their mothers, who encouraged their daughters to change the way women lived. 
 
CONCLUSION  
‘Modernity’ in Iran, including Iranian Kurdistan, entailed new institutions of education 
and civil and political bodies (women’s societies, political parties, and the ‘secular’ state) 
which challenged the traditionally inferior social status of women in both family and 
public. For statesmen and intellectuals alike, transforming Iran into a modern nation 
postulated the ‘new woman’, vital for a progressive image. Consequently, the state-led 
modernisation restructured the existing gender relations, which came to be characterised 
by the growing presence of women in various social, cultural and economic fields. This 
process involved significant scientific, educational, social and legal achievements for 
women, for which, taking into account the pressure which women put on the state, 
women’s activism was indispensable. The histories of women in Iran in general, and in 
Kurdistan in particular, demonstrate this activism which defied the existing gender order. 
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Although the development discourse, which guided the Pahlavi state’s modernisation, 
discovered women as a category, reformism in Iran had preceded the new discourse by 
many decades. Later efforts both from above and from below to improve the place of 
women in society were a synthesis of that reformism and development discourse. The 
Pahlavis’ constructive approach to the question of women was crucial for realising the 
above achievements. It comes as no surprise that the women of Iran of the 1970s, 
particularly urban women, generally considered themselves better-off in comparison with 
the women of the past. Furthermore, the new image of woman continued stubbornly to 
distinguish Iran in the region, despite the change in the nature of that state at the end of 
the 1970s, indicating women’s agency as a significant factor to obtain such achievements. 
Statistics show the inclusion of many women in ministerial and governmental post 
or with responsibilities in executive and judicial power centres.74 In Kurdistan this was 
reflected in a higher number of educated women who became teachers, nurses, lawyers, 
secretaries, doctors, etc., accompanied by a new perspective on the role of women in 
society, effectively formed during the second half of the twentieth century. As argued in 
this chapter, this needs to be linked to social change across Iran as another significant 
aspect of the socio-economic incorporation of Kurdish society into modern Iran. 
The 1979 Revolution, which was heavily filmed and shown on television, 
presented women as a social force and revealed an institutionalised women’s activism. 
This activism continued to characterise Kurdistan in the following years, despite the 
disappearance of the women-friendly Pahlavi state and its replacement with a state 
committed to sex segregation. A case in point presents itself in the fact that the White 
Revolution socially changed and modernised the place of women in Kurdish society, yet 
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the disparity between the urban and rural areas regarding the place of women stubbornly 
remained and continued to characterise the Kurdish region still in the 1980s. Women’s 
activism continued to promote the expectations of rural women who waited to take their 
chances when the state-led modernisation finally and more properly reached them in the 
next two decades following the 1979 Revolution, of course prioritising its own needs like 
the Pahlavi state had done before.   
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29. The women of landowner households around Saqqez, Qajar Kurdistan, 1910. 
 
Source: courtesy of Kurdistan Photolibrary of Hossein Yazdanpana. 
 
 
30. Nahid Primary School pupils in school uniform, Saqqez, 1973. 
 
Source: courtesy of Shahnaz Shahlaiy. 
 
 
31. Students in Kurdish dress, Parvaresh Secondary School for girls, Saqqez, 1979. 
 
Source: courtesy of Shahnaz Shahlaiy. 
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32. Hapsa Khan Naqib among new Kurdish-speaking women, modern Iraq, circa 1950s. 
 
Source: http://www.khaktv.net/all-detail.aspx?jimare=2438&type=farhang. 
 
 
 
33. Kashf-e hejab (forced unveiling). 
 
The elites with their wives and daughters in a school in Saqqez, Kurdistan, the end of 
the 1930s. This photograph shows attempts to demonstrate an artificial image of 
women. The new dress code seems too foreign and is not fully observed by the women. 
Source:  Faruqi, Saqqez, 225-6. 
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CONCLUSION:  Kurdish Society a Synthesis of the Dual Process of 
Modernisation 
 
The central idea of this study posits that the modernisation of Iran and the formation of 
Iran’s modern nation-state involved a dual process of socio-economic transformation and 
homogenisation of identity and culture based on Persian as the perceived nation’s core 
ethnocultural community. This process, by the end of the 1970s, had resulted in profound 
social, economic, political and cultural transformations of Kurdish society in Iran. It also 
created new conditions for resistance to homogenisation and struggle for political and 
cultural rights of the Kurds to continue, according to various historical contexts. 
Each chapter in this study sets out to demonstrate in different, but interwoven, ways 
how this dual process takes place, and what impact it has on the formation of modern 
Iranian Kurdish society. They shed light on two crucial aspects of that process. First, 
socio-economic modernisation results in the (unequal) integration of Kurdish society in 
modern Iran. For example, urbanisation, the expansion of economy, the successive 
centralising, urban-oriented development programmes, the new modernising institutions 
of education and healthcare, and cultural modernisation, all strengthened or created new 
bonds between Kurdish society and other societies in modern Iran in a single political and 
economic entity. Therefore, while it endeavoured to promote its political and social 
positions in the new nation-state and preserve its commonality with other Kurdish 
societies located in adjacent nation-states, Iranian Kurdish society followed the 
integrating tendency of social change and modernisation. The concept of Kurdish-Iranian 
corresponds to this reality, which is the result of almost a century-old transformation and 
modernisation of Iran; it is no coincidence that political and cultural demands of the Kurds 
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in different historical conjunctures, including the Kurdish ‘Republic’, have been defined 
within the framework of Iran. 
Secondly, the dual process involves the Kurds’ resistance to a homogenising 
modernisation while their struggle for cultural and political rights continues. This reflects 
a Kurdish society the political and cultural structures of which were (re)shaped according 
to the policies of the state in the context of modern cultural encounters. The concept of 
Kurdayeti is believed to represent, more than a vague ‘Kurdish nationalism’, this aspect 
of the dual process; it continued to be reconfigured according to historical contexts, for 
example the quasi-autonomous period of the early 1940s and the revolutionary activities 
of the 1960s and the 1970s, and to be affected by intellectual transformations, a case in 
point being the inspirational Thirdworldist ideologies of the 1960s. Meanwhile, 
discourses of power, based on the concept of the Kurds as aqaliate qaumi along with 
misrepresentation, justified the Kurds’ marginalised position in the modern nation-state 
of Iran, political suppression and militarisation; however, this was unceasingly defied by 
political, social, and cultural activisms of a new, urban, educated generation of men and 
women throughout the twentieth century. From this perspective, this study concludes that 
to understand the consequences of modernity and modernisation for the Kurds in Iran, we 
need to look at the dialectics of the dual process, because Kurdish society of the second 
half of the century is effectively a synthesis of that multifaceted process. 
As discussed in Chapter 3 and in the other chapters that follow, during this process 
the era of the White Revolution distinguishes itself for the intensification of 
modernisation and unprecedented social transformations it entailed. It is important to 
avoid mythologising or trivialising the era, and acknowledge its significance for 
twentieth-century Iran, by a critical reading of the state-led modernisation in that period. 
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In fact, rather than being an invention of the ruling Shah, the White Revolution, as a 
reform programme in a specific historical context, was a synthesis of the existing ideas 
to reform Iran, and the development discourses or theories which emerged in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. This becomes more evident if we underline two 
facts. First, explained by political scientists, the aim of the modernising programmes of 
post-World War Two era, including the White Revolution, was to thwart revolution by 
neutralising the threat posed by discontented social classes or groups. As the historians 
of Iran have also noted, the inception of the White Revolution to implement the existing 
reformist ideas of the time in Iran, was an attempt to preserve the monarchy during a 
tumultuous period of regional revolutions and coups. The second fact pertains to the 
emergence of what it holds to be generations for change, who, ultimately failed by a 
personified dictatorship, left an enduring legacy through, for example, social, cultural and 
literary activism. Simultaneously, as discussed in Chapter 5, the proliferation of the audio 
and visual means of communication, made the era a unique and challenging episode in 
the formation of modern Iran. 
The consequences of the state-led modernisation during the White Revolution for 
Iranian Kurdish society were significant; however, they simultaneously revealed the 
project’s centralising orientation. Analysed in Chapters 3 and 4, since the mid-twentieth 
century, development programmes became increasingly centralised and continued to be 
characterised by the absence of any provincial (or more precisely regional) planning. 
Until then, the lack of revenue was one of the main problems which had paralysed the 
effective execution of economic plans in Iran. As a mainly rural and agricultural society, 
the Kurdish region under Reza Shah, but also in later periods, suffered from both the 
orientation and deficiencies of the economic policies. In this respect, the Plan 
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Organisation of the 1950s under Ebtehaj symbolised centralisation and set a precedent 
for the economic plans that followed during the White Revolution. Indeed, the Second 
Development Plan (1956-1962) effectively marked the triumph of centralisation in its 
tension with decentralisation, or more regional-oriented, plans. 
This remained the case even when more comprehensive and sophisticated plans 
emerged, owing to the spiralling oil revenues of the early 1970s. Consequently, the 
development plans retained their focus on the expansion of modernisation from the centre, 
with the effect that their emphasis on industrialisation or privatisation excluded regions 
which lacked capital and the potential of which was ignored. The notion of ‘provincial 
development’ died with the White Revolution. Moreover, insofar as the Kurdish region 
was concerned, political considerations also affected the state’s economic policies, while 
economic changes reflected the economic expansion of the state, symbolised, for 
example, not by ‘industrialisation’, but by a thriving, labour incentive, construction 
industry. Therefore, the general improvement of socio-economic conditions in Kurdistan 
depended on the effectiveness of the development plans to address, for instance, 
infrastructure, urbanisation, transportations, communications, healthcare and education. 
Nevertheless, and in this respect, the urban-oriented development plans of the 1960s and 
1970s were socio-economically more effective than their predecessors. 
Furthermore, the scope of change was significantly extended during the era of the 
White Revolution to include, for example, modern education and healthcare (with major 
results), while land reform as its centrepiece effectively replaced the political and social 
authority of the Kurdish landowner class with that of the state. Although debilitated, the 
Kurdish agha class did not disappear but maintained their economic and social power in 
different ways, or remained dormant to re-emerge opportunistically to claim the 
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restitution of their lost lands; a unique opportunity presented itself when the central power 
lost its coercive forces and subsequently its grip on society in 1979. Moreover, the land 
reform led to unprecedented migration and social movements of Kurdish peasantry, with 
their own social consequences. For example, as a unit of the workforce, migrating peasant 
families endured harsh working conditions in brick-oven factories, while an army of 
seasonal workers was also created. This attests to the shortcomings of the reform as an 
uneven and prolonged process with serious social consequences. However, as confirmed 
by contemporaries, the reform inaugurated massive social movements also with further 
dynamic ramifications: it linked the village to constantly changing economic and social 
spheres, and marked the effective start of the end of its social isolation. As noted, this had 
not yet been realised by the end of the 1970s, though significant changes in many respects 
could be detected. Finally, the long-term demise of both the foundations of tribalism, and 
the social and political cohesiveness of the Kurdish agha class, a reality of twenty-first 
century Iranian Kurdistan, could not have happened without the White Revolution’s land 
reform; this is a distinguishing characteristic of Iranian Kurdish society compared with 
other Kurdish societies of the region. 
 Moreover, modernisation entailed a profound transformation of social formations. 
Most notably, the expansion of a market economy, along with a conventional mercantile 
economy, modern education and healthcare, and civil administration, yielded a Kurdish 
middle class, whereas the land reform, unplanned urbanisation which produced 
impoverished city neighbourhoods, and the growth of the economy, contributed 
immensely to the formation of modern Kurdish working class, a significant proportion of 
which, in addition to farm workers, consisted of modern seasonal workers and unskilled 
urban labourers. 
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Regionally, insofar as the disparity between urban and rural areas in Kurdistan was 
concerned, it was sustained, and in many cases the gap even widened, during the era of 
the White Revolution; no economic plan concerned with urbanisation, industrialisation, 
modern healthcare and education addressed that issue effectively. Culturally, this 
disparity applies to the unequal distribution of cultural capital too. While the urban centres 
continued to benefit from cultural innovations in an increasingly mediasised society, a 
significant part of the rural areas remained isolated from a rapidly changing world. 
Furthermore, two other major areas of change pertained to political and cultural 
spheres. Above all, the (re)formation of both political and cultural structures of Kurdish 
society corresponded to the process of homogenisation. A crucial element in this respect 
was political and cultural resistance to the homogenising policies of an authoritarian 
modern state, which continued to be a prominent characteristic of Iranian Kurdistan. 
Between 1946 and 1979, except for short intervals, dictatorship and militarisation 
characterised the political situation of Kurdistan, and continued to undermine civil and 
democratic means of political participation. By the 1970s, the absolute power of the 
monarch had been established. These factors kept the idea of armed struggle both relevant 
and attractive, especially in an era during which the Thirdworldist ideologies became 
inescapably influential. Insofar as Iranian Kurdish political activists were concerned, this 
was specifically the case with the movement of the 1960s, the end of which marked a 
critique of guerrilla warfare in favour of social revolution theories. Moreover, 
administratively, in the same period the motives behind modern administrative divisions 
differed from pre-modern, largely geographical and administrative considerations, and 
began to serve a national, homogenising modern state. This resulted in further redivisions 
of the region and led to the marginalisation of communities such as the Failis in the south, 
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and less privileged cities and regions in the northwest of Iran’s Kurdish region, such as 
Somabradost. Finally, modern education, social change, urbanisation as well as the 
intellectual transformations of post-World War Two era yielded modern Kurdish political 
parties, which, in the long run, proceeded to completely replace tribal politics in Iranian 
Kurdistan. 
As explicated in Chapter 5, insofar as culture as a symbolic system is concerned, 
this study illuminates the most significant aspect of the era’s cultural transformation, that 
is, modern cultural encounters within a multicultural nation-state, in contrast to a colonial 
or imperial context, which resulted in the establishment of Persian cultural hegemony. 
The state and its modern education had effectively paved the way in that direction; 
however, the proliferation of audio, but crucially also visual means of communication 
such as television and cinema, were crucial to this end. 
Although resistance to a hegemonic culture persisted, the cultural structure of 
Kurdish society continued to (re)form according to the way cultural encounters between 
intimate, and not alien, cultures were taking place. It was in this context that the 
hegemonic notion of ‘mainstream’ or ‘official’, and ‘local’, to describe Persian language 
and culture and that of other non-Persian speaking peoples in Iran respectively, became 
deeply ingrained in society in the era of the White Revolution. Admittedly, since the early 
years of the formation of the modern Iranian state, the literary prestige of Persian had 
begun to enjoy a state-sponsored political authority. However, the cultural superiority of 
Persian became hegemonic when the cultural inferiority of others was further 
institutionalised as a consequence of the visualisation of the means of communication, 
which proliferated alongside the expansion of modern education in Iran, transcending any 
literacy skills required for using the written modes of communication. Finally, the 
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modernisation’s unequal distribution of cultural capital hindered the cultural potential of 
Kurdish society, especially in its rural regions. Therefore, championed by cultural and 
political activism, Kurdish society came to be characterised by Kurdish cultural resistance 
to the advance of a hegemonic culture. Such a tension between a homogenising culture 
and a resisting culture, meant that Kurdish cultural production continued to be either 
hindered or promoted according to variable social conditions. 
In order to present this original and critical reading of the dual process, this study 
relies on a methodological and theoretical framework which makes a firm connection 
between nation-building and modernisation theories. Insofar as the concepts of ‘Kurd’ 
and ‘Kurdistan’ are concerned, this study’s heterogenous approach renders insufficient a 
well-established homogenous approach, which has been historically advocated by an 
intellectual tradition since the end of the nineteenth century, and sustained vigorously 
throughout the next century. This framework benefits also from the advance of social 
change studies, and critiques of modernisation and development theories, and is informed 
by cultural and gender studies which have been discussed throughout this study. 
Combined, they form a conceptual framework to assess themes related to Kurdish society 
in Iran. In this respect, a unique contribution of this study is a methodological break with 
the intellectual tradition in order to be able to approach the Kurds not as a monolithic 
entity, but as members of various Kurdish societies, each affected by almost a century-
old social change and transformation in various nation-states. This approach does not 
undermine the Kurds’ cultural commonalities, which exist regardless of their geographic 
locations, nor attempts to erode their distinct histories. It simply asks for their assessments 
in their own terms, based on both their own and common histories with others around 
them. It is only this heterogenous, theoretically informed approach which can help the 
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scholarship to leap forward in its analysing the social and historical formations of modern 
Kurdish societies. 
Furthermore, a study of the formation of modern Kurdish society needs to underline 
the role of non-state agents of change and their interaction with the state as the central 
player. This study’s examination of the expansion of modern education and healthcare 
reveals the significance of including non-state agents of change. Although urban oriented, 
these institutions were two leading areas of change in Kurdistan, also because their 
expansions involved the endeavours of non-state agents of change, who made the 
promotion of the social and cultural awareness of people a major part of their mission; 
the role of non-state agents of change is often overlooked by theories of modernisation. 
The interaction of the state and non-state agents of change is also revealed in the process 
involving the modernisation of gender relations. Women’s agency was crucial in the 
emergence of both an urban, educated generation of women by the end of the 1970s, and 
for the institutionalisation of a promoted social status of women in Iranian societies. 
Lastly, this study’s unique contribution to both Kurdish and Iranian studies is 
complemented by its academically productive nature. Its investigation of the dual process 
reveals the need for further examinations of various themes. For example, it identifies a 
paradox based on Kurdish society’s simultaneous social integration and cultural 
resistance. On the one hand, this refers to the strong connections between Iranian societies 
and, on the other hand, underlines the Kurds’ ongoing struggle to improve their cultural 
and political positions within modern Iran. However, this raises two new sets of questions 
around (1) Kurdish identity, and (2) social change studies, which propose new avenues 
of research. As regards the former, how do the dialectics of this process continue to 
(re)shape Iranian Kurdish society in the periods that follow the era of the White 
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Revolution? How do cultural encounters manifest themselves? To identify any advances 
of Kurdish cultural practices in Iran, what course, to borrow from Williams, has the 
tension between emergent and hegemonic cultures taken since the 1970s? How prominent 
has Kurdish culture and literature become in recent decades? These and many more 
questions reveal that the dual process incorporates infinite sources which affect the 
formations of Kurdish identity and modern Kurdish society. This is a dynamic process 
which must be acknowledged. 
The other set of questions bears on a decisive turn to social change studies, whose 
themes need to be examined in the light of constant methodological and theoretical 
endeavours in relevant fields. This means engaging, among scholarly fields, with studies 
of economy and society; gender order and reproduction of masculinity and femininity; 
the class structure; education and healthcare; the disparity between city and village; and 
historiography, political science, literature, and cultural studies. This is also necessary in 
order to defy national narratives which continue to claim these fields in detriment to social 
history and to social change studies. 
The result of the expansion of the scholarship will be demarginalisation of Iranian 
Kurdish studies in the face of homogenous, national narratives, on the one hand, and 
making such studies central to Iranian studies, on the other. The achievement of this is 
presupposed by an approach which, founded on common social, economic, cultural, 
political and historical concerns between Kurdish society and other societies in Iran, 
regards Kurdish and Iranian studies as complementary. Such concerns are as significant 
as any society’s peculiarity in all those aspects, because they reflect a common process 
of change and transformation in the last century. To promote that attitude in academia is 
a major task, but worth fighting for; and based on the common enterprises of the past, one 
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can (always) be, to borrow from Gramsci, optimistic in will (while pessimistic in 
intellect). However, this optimism does not make the fulfilment of the task less urgent. 
The author of this study passionately believes it makes a difference in that direction. 
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